Image Source: United Nations
In late December 2023, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA, finalized its withdrawal from the country after over a decade on the ground. Its exodus came after Mali’s transitional military government withdrew its consent for the UN peacekeeping mission, citing the UN’s inability to curb the violence they had been brought in to manage.
The withdrawal of MINUSMA has paved the way for Russia to assert dominance in the region through Wagner Group, a Kremlin-affiliated private military company (PMC). Wagner forces were invited into Mali to serve as “military trainers” in 2021 by the transitional military authority which seized power on the night of May 24, 2021, led by then-Vice President and current interim President Colonel Assimi Goita. Since the Wagner Group began operations in Mali, civilian casualties have surged by 278 percent. A cold war for influence between Russia and Western-allied multilateral organizations is currently unfolding, with conflict-ridden nations in Africa as the battlefield.
MINUSMA’s reputation was precarious even before the drawdown. During its tenure in Mali, MINUSMA faced violent protests demanding its withdrawal from the country. A wave of protests in 2022 led by pro-Junta and anti-western group Yerewolo Debout sur les Remparts (Yerewolo Standing on the Ramparts) demanded that the peacekeeping mission leave Mali. These protests framed MINUSMA as a vestige of French colonial occupation, proffering Russia and the Wagner Group as viable alternatives to Western influence. Tensions were further inflamed by Wagner mercenaries, who falsely accused French forces of killing civilians and building mass graves in April 2022. The French army countered with drone footage of Wagner-affiliated forces staging the scenes.
This scenario underscores a worrying trend: the outsourcing of conflict management from sovereign states and established multilateral institutes to opaque, for-profit entities. This transition not only bolsters Russia’s influence in Mali but also signifies a broader erosion of Western sway in the region. Wagner’s presence in Mali reflects Russia’s success in positioning itself as a viable alternative to traditional multilateral institutions, sidestepping the UN or a regional organization such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which enforce oversight and global humanitarian standards, in favor of profit-driven organizations. Further, Russia has elevated PMCs as a tool to expand the Kremlin’s international influence and gain footholds in resource-rich, conflict-ridden regions.
Notably, the US Department of State reported in 2021 that the Malian transitional government is paying Wagner $10 million per month, highlighting the lengths Mali is willing to go to avoid Western involvement and its accompanying conditions
The Malian government, too, has a dismal human rights record, exacerbated by its efforts to dodge international scrutiny. Early in 2024, Mali pulled out of ECOWAS eliminating the possibility for victims of human rights abuses to bring cases before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. Moreover, the Malian government has sought support from Russia to veto UN resolutions aimed at holding those responsible for human rights abuses accountable. For example, in August 2023, Russia blocked a resolution to continue investigations into human rights abuses by armed factions, Malian security forces, and Wagner operatives.
While the UN and governments engaged in peacekeeping were not without their own biases and interests, international oversight of the peacekeeping operation shared both burden and responsibility. The evolution from state-led to mercenary-managed conflict resolution raises profound concerns. The growing reliance on PMCs devoid of accountability or oversight is a troubling development in global conflict management, reflecting a shift away from established norms of international engagement and humanitarian principles. This shift not only complicates efforts to ensure human rights and civilian safety but also risks entrenching conflicts further by prioritizing profit over peace.
The Descent into Turmoil: A Decade of Conflict and Intervention in Mali
In 2013, the Malian government, besieged by an escalating Islamic insurgency including a rebellion by Mali’s Tuareg ethnic minority and violence linked to Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, extended an invitation to UN peacekeeping forces. In July 2013, a contingent of 12,600 UN troops, succeeding a collaborative operation by ECOWAS and France, received an initial warm welcome. However, the mission, MINUSMA, quickly became one of the deadliest in UN history, failing to prevent Al Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated terrorist attacks and losing over 300 peacekeepers in the process.
The relationship between MINUSMA and Mali’s pro-Russian junta deteriorated rapidly, especially as the UN began vocalizing concerns regarding the government’s human rights violations and its engagement with the Wagner Group. This escalating tension led Mali to revoke its consent for the peacekeeping operation. The UN acceded and in a unanimous vote in June 2023 agreed to end MINUSMA’s operations.
While human rights abuses occurred during MINUSMA’s tenure, its phase-out was marked by a spike in violence against civilians and the remaining peacekeepers. The mounting conflict between Tuareg rebels and the Malian army mounted, seeing assaults against UN bases and rebel groups commandeering UN equipment amid Mali’s export restrictions. Pictures posted on social media showed rebels posing with captured gear. Terrorism has surged, with attacks more than doubling since the start of the drawdown in August 2023.
Human Rights Concerns
In a sobering report from March 2024, Human Rights Watch shed light on grave human rights violations in Mali, documenting extrajudicial killings perpetrated by Malian armed forces alongside Wagner mercenaries. The incidents recounted are not isolated tragedies but part of a pattern of brutality within ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns, often indiscriminate in their violence which ranges from kidnappings and executions to drone strikes.
In February 2024 drone strikes at a wedding killed at least five men and two boys. The next day, as the community attempted to bury the victims, a second drone strike was conducted, killing another five men and two boys. Early this year, Malian soldiers accompanied by Wagner fighters arrested 25 people including four boys in the town of Ouro Fero. That same day, local villagers recovered the burned and bound bodies about four kilometers away.
The egregious human rights violations by the Wagner Group are symptomatic of the operational framework embraced by Mali’s government and the dangers posed by the elevation of PMCs. For the military regime in Mali, Wagner represents a strategic ally. This partnership has enabled the government to avoid the scrutinous gaze of the UN, which has been critical of Mali’s human rights track record and the conduct of its counterinsurgency measures.
In stark contrast, Wagner offers no such reproach. As a silent, transactional accomplice, Wagner bolsters the Malian authorities in their suppression efforts, both fueling and actively engaging in the merciless violence inflicted upon civilians. The chilling pattern of human rights abuses by Wagner is emblematic of the problematic shift from regulated peacekeeping to an unaccountable, private force. This shift illuminates a broader, unsettling trend where states opt for allies that enable rather than challenge their methods, raising profound concerns about the future of international peacekeeping and the safeguarding of human rights in conflict zones.
Geopolitical Competition
The Junta’s demand for the UN to withdraw was not the first sign of discontent with the UN’s mission. The ruling Junta’s leader, Colonel Assimi Goita, has openly courted Russian support since the coup in 2021. In the days after Colonel Assimi Goita declared himself president, pro-army supporters marched in Bamako waving Russian flags.
This was a strategic move by Goita, who sought to exploit geopolitical rivalry to consolidate his position. Russia has worked to cement itself as an alternative to UN and other Western forces in Africa, with Wagner operations spanning Sudan, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Libya, and Mozambique, despite its permanent role on the UN Security Council. France’s enduring involvement in West Africa and its role in major multilateral institutions has married anti-French, anti-UN, and anti-Western sentiments.
Russia has capitalized on its international otherization since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Despite Russia’s clear imperialist ambitions, Russia has painted itself as a victim of exclusion by the same international system that facilitated the colonialism and imperialism that brutalized and exploited West Africa. Through PMCs and information campaigns, Russia weaves a narrative that it can be a decisive security partner without any of the baggage of Western-led institutions.
The war for influence in West and Central Africa waged by France and other Western powers against Russia, and vice versa, is abundantly clear. In December 2020, Facebook announced that it removed over 100 Facebook and Instagram accounts and pages that had originated from France targeting Mali and other countries including Central African Republic, and to a lesser extent Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Chad. Facebook stated that these accounts violated its guidelines against “coordinated inauthentic behavior” and focused on elevating criticisms of Russia’s involvement in Africa while elevating the French military.
On the other hand, Facebook removed about 400 accounts linked to Russia that targeted various countries in Africa. The accounts elevated critiques of French foreign policy and voiced pro-Russian opinions. The two countries have operated influence campaigns in hopes of promoting themselves as the partner of choice. Riding a wave of anti-French, anti-UN, and anti-Western sentiment, Russia has emerged as a clear winner.
As coups have spread across sub-Saharan Africa, including those in Gabon, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso, one of the most popular protest accessories has become a Russian flag. Russia’s strategic intervention through the Wagner Group is emblematic of a broader maneuver to extend its geopolitical influence at a time when regional turbulence provides fertile ground for such expansion.
The ascent of Russian PMCs not only exacerbates human rights violations and entrenches conflict but also signals a diminishing sphere of influence for traditional multilateral institutions and the liberal world order. It signifies a troubling departure from the norms and expectations of international conflict resolution and governance, fundamentally reshaping the landscape of global power dynamics and intervention.