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Fall 2023 marked the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative, first announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013. The BRI consists of a series of infrastructure projects, including ports, power plants, and rails, that support maritime and overland routes across Eurasia. It serves as an extension of Xi’s “China dream” and seeks to connect the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the world, from the markets of South Asia to Europe. Not lacking in ambition or scale, Xi’s initiative has faced several obstacles over the years – funding issues, security concerns, and doubt from countries that initially signed onto BRI but ultimately withdrew their agreements. Nevertheless, October’s Belt and Road Forum demonstrated continued interest in BRI among the over 130 states in attendance. The Forum’s official website touts the conference as an international meeting of the minds, arguing that “the BRI has rejuvenated the Silk Road spirit of peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit.”
Despite the PRC’s triumphant rhetoric, the number of world leaders to attend the BRI Forum seems to have dropped since 2019, falling from 36 to 20. Several notable member states that participated in 2019, such as Spain, Greece, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, did not attend BRI this year, seemingly pulling back from BRI. Interestingly, Sri Lanka’s leader Ranil Wickremesinghe – whose country’s Hambantota Port is frequently cited as an example of debt-trap diplomacy – attended the BRI Forum. As Europe shies away from the BRI, the PRC turns its attention to other regions as alternatives– most notably South Asia.
BRI in AfPak: Continuity and Change
As a region closely tied to the PRC in terms of security and trade, South Asia represents a critical node of BRI. Pakistan, which boasts the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), plays a crucial role in BRI. The PRC and Pakistan have maintained a decades-long partnership encompassing all aspects of statecraft, from nuclear development to historic trade ties. However, security concerns in Pakistan pose an ongoing risk to Chinese investment in that country. Last November, insurgents killed 14 government troops in Gwadar, Balochistan – the site of an ongoing insurgency that has previously targeted Chinese investments. Gwadar is the site of the crown jewel of CPEC – Gwadar Port, touted as the “next Dubai,” despite major lags in funding and ongoing instability throughout Balochistan.
Meanwhile, two suicide attacks on mosques in southwest Pakistan in late September killed over 50. While these attacks did not directly target Chinese interests in the country, they signify a rise in instability that could spell trouble for CPEC, as some past suicide attacks have implicated Chinese investments (such as the 2022 bombing of a Karachi Confucius Institute). Annual trends reflect a similar increase in instability: South Asia Terrorism Portal reports 1,202 terrorism-related deaths in 2023, compared with 971 in 2022 and 664 in 2021. The total number of suicide attacks has risen as well, from 13 in 2022 to 29 this year. Meanwhile, the total number of terrorism-related incidents has been on a steady rise since 2019, increasing from 284 in 2019 to 747 this year.
Though the PRC remains intent on maintaining its BRI investments, it has called for increased security guarantees in Pakistan due to the ongoing regional security risks. Meanwhile, the PRC and Pakistan continue to hold brainstorming meetings, progress review meetings, and joint patrols to solve these issues. These events signal a joint commitment to maintaining the PRC-Pakistan relationship, a so-called “all-weather friendship” encompassing diplomatic, economic, and security ties.
Meanwhile, Chinese interest in Afghanistan continues to expand. As the Taliban struggles to develop Afghanistan’s economy and provide basic services, it has relied on the support of powerful actors and investors willing to overlook its pariah-state status. Notably, the PRC – which requires the Taliban’s assurance that it will not serve as a base for terrorism – has taken an interest in Afghanistan’s mineral deposits. This presents an opportunity for the Taliban, which allegedly plans to send a technical team to the PRC to discuss potential investments.
Despite the PRC’s ambitious rhetoric, BRI has faced several logistical and financial obstacles over the past decade. The seeming expansion of the CPEC and investments in Afghanistan should not necessarily alarm Western analysts. Despite Afghanistan’s rich reserves of lithium and copper and geographical proximity, Bejing remains hesitant to make substantial investments in Afghanistan due to security risks. If last year’s attack on Kabul’s Chinese hotel is any indicator of the safety of the PRC’s future investments in Afghanistan, the PRC may take years to make significant investment inroads there. Moreover, Afghanistan’s numerous logistical challenges, including a paucity of secure roads, pose a challenge to any countries looking to invest there, even states directly on the border. Although the Taliban “will continue discussions in Beijing on plans to build a road through the Wakhan corridor, a thin, mountainous strip in northern Afghanistan, to provide direct access to China,” this initiative could cost a great deal and take years to materialize.
The Future of BRI
Insights into the future of BRI lies in the Belt and Road Forum’s (BRF) official website, which describes the new forms that BRI will take – those of trade, commerce, and digital development as opposed to physical infrastructure. BRF points out that BRI’s new turn aims to “deepen reform in areas including state-owned enterprises, digital economy, intellectual property, and government procurement,” in addition to proposed infrastructure projects. While infrastructure projects are impressive and give the PRC physical access to its partner countries – in the form of ports and railroads – they also take much time to develop and remain vulnerable to attacks and the vicissitudes of geography. The PRC’s continued involvement in Pakistan indicates that infrastructure projects will not be abandoned entirely but may take a backseat to nonphysical investments in South Asia. As the PRC shifts its attention to new geographical targets, analysts must devote equal attention to the aspects of BRI that transcend geographical boundaries.