Image Source: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats
The use of information as a tool to influence foreign audiences is a tale as old as time. The creation and spread of technology may have amplified the process, but the purpose of disseminating information remains the same – shape public opinion, sow discord, undermine trust, and erode democracy. While international communities cooperate to stop this threat, malicious actors remain adaptive. This article explores the case study of how Russian influence operations persisted despite Lithuanian countermeasures to curb their activities. In particular, the analysis focuses on Facebook as a “getaway” platform, where pro-Kremlin actors deploy digital networks and bots to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and how existing measures are not sufficient to halt the adaptive nature of Russian propaganda.
Russia is no stranger to the deployment of propaganda to achieve its geopolitical and strategic goals – and Lithuania is at the forefront of that information war. As part of its so-called “Near Abroad,” Moscow seeks to assert its influence in Lithuania by spreading pro-Russian and anti-Western disinformation. After Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Lithuania amplified state measures to curb Russian propaganda in the country. The Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania (LRTK) suspended 32 Gazprom Media-controlled television programs and six state-controlled broadcasting channels. Most recently, in September 2023, LRTK decided to block 53 IP addresses that enabled the online distribution of Russian propaganda television programs. Alongside the government, Lithuanian NGOs, civil society, and media are engaged and conduct proper due diligence in the fight against Russian influence operations. Disinformation analysis center Debunk.org, Delfi’s Lie Detector, and “Lithuanian Elves” are the most prominent platforms when it comes to fighting Russian influence.
In an interview with BBC, Russian propagandist and ideologist of the Russian world, Aleksandr Dugin said “truth is a matter of belief… total fact is the fact society believes in.” Dugin’s sentiment summarizes what Russian or pro-Russian channels aim to do – the dissemination of “Russian truth.” Yet, what happens when primary platforms get suspended? The propaganda machine adapts and redirects resources to social media, where it continues to build the Russian version of reality.
Pro-Russian network on Facebook
As a method of persistence, pro-Kremlin actors use a network of Facebook pages and groups to supersede suspended Russian channels. The LRT Investigation Team and DebunkEU.org conducted a joint investigation on pro-Russian activities on Facebook and identified over 100 Facebook pages and groups administered by a handful of individuals. The report attributes the disinformation network to pro-Russian groups in Lithuania and groups them into four blocks: 1) 41 Facebook pages and groups linked to pro-Russian administrators and authors; 2) 28 Facebook groups and pages run by fictitious accounts and profiles under the control of Rimantas Janavičius – an unknown figure spreading disinformation; 3) Activities linked to the Family Movement opposing pro-LGBTQ+ legislation and pandemic restrictions in Lithuania; and 4) 11 Facebook groups linked to the Lithuanian People’s Party – a political party advocating for a departure from the EU. The common thread in this network is the dissemination of ‘’Russian truth,’’ remarking on the Russian justification for the invasion of Ukraine and attempts to divert attention away from civilian casualties in Ukrainian cities.
A separate investigation published in February 2023 revealed pro-Russian activities on the Facebook page ‘Russkaya Litva’ (Russian Lithuania) and associated interconnected accounts. At its peak, Russian Lithuania had 100 thousand subscriptions and generated almost 2 million reactions on social media. The report analyzed subscribers of the ‘’Russian Lithuania’’ group, revealing that the authenticity of these Facebook accounts can be called into question. The majority involved shared several characteristics – they recently joined social media, had a similar location, had an absence of information on their profile, and liked pages of fake profiles pretending to be Ukrainian women.
Bots to the Rescue
In addition to digital networks, pro-Kremlin groups also deploy bots or “rented by deception” accounts to amplify the messaging or harass specific organizations. Lithuanian National Radio and Television English Facebook page “LRT English” became the target of coordinated bot attacks in 2022. Between June 1 and August 31, the Facebook page received 111 times more reactions than the average post, with the most significant increases occurring on Russian-related posts. The content of the bots contained hate speech and disinformation. The investigation revealed that more than half of the 847 accounts had a high probability of being fake accounts generated from African and Asian countries. The Russian propaganda machine frequently uses bot farms to either spread or amplify disinformation, hence coordinated attacks against LRT follow under their usual modus operandi. However, the investigation revealed an important development in how pro-Russian groups cultivate accounts on social media. While investigating LRT attacks, DebunkEU identified the “account renting strategy” of the campaign. Two users, one identified as Russian, collected accounts by running ads and offering money for renting social media accounts. Even though the investigation did not reveal the state actor’s involvement, the campaign coincided with Russian interests and goals of pro-Kremlin propaganda.
Persistence of propaganda on Facebook
Russian propaganda has a persistent nature, which cannot be eradicated by existing countermeasures. While private and government entities have projects fighting foreign influence, unfortunately, as the Lithuanian example shows, they cannot halt “quick to adapt” malign actors. Facebook conducts its due diligence through a third-party fact-checking program. Within this framework, Meta partnered with local organizations worldwide to identify false or misleading information, which upon detection are subjected to a reduction of content distribution. According to Meta policies, it also bans “repeated offenders” and deletes unauthentic accounts.
Indeed, such measures slow down the process of campaigns but as practice shows, pro-Russian accounts tend to bounce back from the restrictions by opening new accounts. Russian Lithuania, for example, renamed its secondary ‘’Lithuania.ru’’ page to ‘’Russkaya Litva’’ to continue its daily flood of pro-Russian content. The same tendency can be observed in other countries and their respective pro-Russian actors. Even though Facebook banned major Georgian pro-Russian group Alt-info in 2021, their new Facebook is still active on the platform.
As observed, combating disinformation on Facebook is challenging. The bans, restrictions of accounts, and reduction of content make propaganda harder for pro-Russian groups since it takes time and resources to create new accounts and reach the level of following/subscriptions they had before the restrictions. Nevertheless, it only serves as a temporary solution that can be easily reversed if given enough resources. The more pro-Russian groups develop, the more challenging they become as demonstrated by the “account-renting” methodology.
After Lithuania introduced the suspension of Russian or pro-Russian broadcasting channels, Moscow diverted even more of its resources to influence operations on social media. The unauthentic network of bots and generally coordinated pro-Russian campaigns on Facebook demonstrate Moscow’s ability to adapt to the changes in the information environment. The suspension did not pull “Russian truth” off the table for Moscow, it simply changed the platform where it would act.
Public Opinion in Lithuania
Measuring the impact of propaganda is a difficult task given that various unrelated factors can influence one’s perception of certain events. However, public surveys serve as a good indicator for assessing the potential success of it. In Lithuania’s case, Baltijos Tyrimai published a public survey in January 2023. 90% of the Lithuanians have an unfavorable opinion of Russia, which does not come across as a surprise given that Lithuania sees Russia as an aggressor invading Ukraine. Taking data into consideration, one can assess that Russian propaganda in Lithuania isn’t successful. However, Moscow keeps exploiting pro-Russian individuals to have a level of foothold inside the country.
The response of Russian networks to Lithuanian measures exemplifies how adaptive Russian propaganda can be. After the suspension of Russian channels, pro-Kremlin actors redirected their time and resources to Facebook and continued to disseminate and amplify “Russian truth” via a network of Facebook pages, groups, and bots. Through persistence, malicious actors even evolved their methods of cultivating profiles on Facebook by relying on “account renting”. Lithuania has deployed commendable efforts to fight pro-Russian information but as the recent development shows, much more needs to be done in all sectors to halt it. Persistent pro-Russian actor footholds in the country remain a threat to Lithuania.