Instability in Gaza: Assessing Hamas’s Grip on Power

A Hamas election rally. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

In late August, the Gaza Strip was rocked by a pair of suicide bombings that killed three police officers and injured multiple civilians.[i] Overt challenges to Hamas’s supremacy are rare, but they are not without precedent. Hamas was the victim of targeted explosions in 2015 and 2017, though neither was as effective as the recent bombing.[ii] Hamas responded by declaring a state of emergency; a senior official swore to “hold those responsible to account.”[iii] The group made good on its promise, carrying out a widespread crackdown that exposed the culprits to be rival-militants aligned with the Islamic State (IS).[iv] In the wake of these developments, some worry that Hamas may be losing control of the embattled enclave, especially as popular discontent spreads and the humanitarian crisis worsens.[v]

Hamas has ruled the Gaza Strip since violently ousting the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2007.[vi] While indisputably the largest of the Gaza-based militants, Hamas is far from the only group active. Others include Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Harakat al-Sabireen, both of which practice Shiite jihadism and enjoy patronage from Iran.[vii] The Mujahideen Shura Council (MCS) and the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigades are Salafi; the latter is an extension of the Islamic State (IS) and likely perpetrated the recent suicide bombings.[viii] The Popular Resistance Committee is secular, as is the Fatah-offshoot Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.[ix] Toward Hamas, each fluctuates between collaboration and competition; all resist Israel and reject perceived Zionist aggression. 

Over the past two months, Hamas has worked to ferret out IS sympathizers, engaging in what one outlet called a “secret war” against the group.[x] Animosity between the militants is well-known, especially since IS publicly declared war on Hamas in a gruesome execution video last year.[xi] IS may be an outlier in its bellicosity, but other groups have engaged in additional forms of dissent. PIJ has challenged Hamas by carrying out border incursions and launching rockets without permission.[xii] This may occur at the behest of Iran or to sabotage a cease-fire with Israel. In response, Hamas typically alerts Israel if it is not responsible for an attack.[xiii] After a recent unsanctioned incursion, Hamas took the extraordinary step of issuing a “Fatwa” (religious ruling) to expressly prohibit “individual jihad operations.”[xiv] Resisting Zionist aggression is lauded, provided it occurs on Hamas’s schedule and with Hamas approval.

Despite signs of instability in Gaza, Hamas won’t be overtaken by another armed group anytime soon. This causes mixed feelings in Israel. In spite of their commitment to mutual destruction, Hamas and Israel often have convergent interests.[xv] Israeli policy over the past several years has been to quietly reward periods of calm by easing the blockade (i.e., fuel, electricity) and allowing transfers of Qatari money.[xvi] This is appreciated by cash-strapped Hamas, but doesn’t sit well with other Gaza-based militants.[xvii] By cracking down on dissent, Hamas is able to consolidate power and enjoy financial relief. Israel prefers Hamas’s governance – however brutal – to the alternatives. [xviii] The circumstances attest to an uneasy alignment of preferences, though neither group will openly admit it.

Nor will Hamas be overthrown by popular revolt. The group is immensely popular in the West Bank; a 2018 poll found that Hamas’s political chief Ismail Haniyeh would handily defeat PA President Mahmoud Abbas in an election.[xix] West Bank Palestinians may view Hamas as a refreshing alternative to the PA, which is often referred to as the “dog of the occupation.”[xx] The picture is decidedly less rosy among Gazans, who endure the brunt of Israeli strikes, power outages, and blockades on a daily basis. In March, protests erupted in response to deteriorating living conditions and pervasive unemployment.[xxi] Many have grumbled that the March of Return demonstrations have yielded no results.[xxii] General discontent is unlikely to become an Arab-spring style uprising, however. Hamas’s efforts to stifle protests – by clubbing and jailing participants – remain effective.[xxiii]

Nevertheless, the situation is far from sustainable. Reports indicate that the Gaza Strip could be uninhabitable by next year.[xxiv] Israel and Hamas may work together, but periodic rocket barrages will still occur. Hamas must maintain the perception that it is leading the struggle against Zionism in order to quiet dissent from other militants. The Israelis, for their part, will continue incentivizing Hamas to crackdown on all forms of opposition. Israel has been clear that some form of government – even one as brutal as Hamas – is much preferred to anarchy. Unless a massive realignment of preferences occurs, ordinary Gazans will continue to suffer the effects of this arrangement. In Gaza, Israel and Hamas both have a vested interest in preserving the status quo at the expense of the Palestinian people.