President Joseph R. Biden prepares to deliver remarks on U.S. foreign policy at City University of New York in July 2019. Photo Credit: Adam Schultz/Biden for President
This piece was originally run in “The Diplomatic Pouch” (https://medium.com/the-diplomatic-pouch/analysis-restoring-americas-position-as-team-captain-f48affeb47a6)
Since the end of World War II, and until “America First,” U.S. foreign policy championed a system of alliances, international institutions, and multilateral diplomacy. This strategy served two ends. First, it solidified American leadership of the world order it created, and second, it allowed America to best confront its greatest threats to national security. While the Biden-Harris administration has committed to renewing America’s position of global leadership, we must ensure that Trump-era policies of abandonment and retrenchment are anomalies, regardless of the party in power.
What really made America great – Liberal institutionalism, partnerships, and alliances
The Trump administration touted two mottos that were naturally in tension: “Make America Great Again” and “America First.” From a foreign policy perspective, these two agendas were largely incompatible: it was, in fact, America’s championing of cooperation and liberal institutionalism that first propelled the nation to its position of greatness in 1945. As victors in the Second World War, American policymakers had the opportunity to fashion a new world order, prioritizing principles they believed best served the nation and world. The result was a global system of institutions, partnerships, and alliances that amplified America’s democratic principles abroad and solidified its position of global authority. At the center of the order, U.S.-led institutions locked states into agreements in exchange for membership: dues included tacit support of western, liberal ideals and acquiescence to US leadership, direction, and at times, hypocrisy. The United States prioritized compromise, cooperation, and open markets, reassuring allies who joined the system that America would not seek to control them but would also not desert them.
Alongside institution building, policymakers forged alliances and partnerships that multiplied America’s global reach. Bilateral relationships enabled vast overseas expansion of U.S. bases, and material and political support to allies with shared priorities further entrenched American influence. In military conflicts since Korea, America has benefited from the international legitimacy that multinational military operations confer. Coalitions like NATO, a subject of much scrutiny and criticism under Donald Trump, continue to provide America with a security network of like-minded nations.
More recently, the United States, leading a global coalition of over 80 members, partnered with Iraqi and Kurdish-led Syrian forces in their fight against ISIS; these partners bore the brunt of the conflict, making our commitment to them that much more significant. I experienced this reality firsthand in 2018, while visiting northern Syria as a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. At a market, a young Kurdish man with whom I’d been speaking looked at me and asked, “Is America going to leave us?” quietly telling me that if the answer is yes, “we will lose everything.” From a human perspective, we know this story’s sad ending. From a policy perspective, this abandonment was a tragic misstep and signal to our coalition of partners, and the world, that America is not always a reliable, or charitable, partner.
Prior to the last administration’s pivot to isolationism, America’s relationship with the liberal world order was largely symbiotic: Western ideals and democratic principles spread while America’s global reach and leadership grew. This is not to say the system was without faults – this reality will never change. Yet every four years, a U.S. administration has a choice: withdraw and rail against an imperfect system, or fight to restore and reshape it from within. If history has taught us anything, it is that the latter is in both the nation’s, and the world’s, best interest.
Teamwork makes the dreamwork – Confronting a transnational security agenda
The second element demanding a return to its position of global leadership and cooperation is the transnational nature of today’s security threats. A range of issues at the top of the list – terrorism, migration crises on multiple continents, a global pandemic, climate change – demonstrate that our greatest security threats do not recognize state boundaries. Twenty years into this century, globalization is not something we can simply “opt out of,” as the COVID-19 pandemic has so intensely demonstrated. There is no “America First” policy or level of isolationism that could keep this novel virus from sweeping our nation. Washington did emerge in the crisis as a global leader, but this time only in COVID case counts. Unable to control the pandemic at home, the Trump administration failed to help allies and friends and watched as Beijing moved swiftly to fill this void.Imprudently, Washington announced its intent to withdraw from the World Health Organization, at a time when the loss of life and tragedy demanded both symbolic and real international cooperation. Although painful to learn, the clear lesson of 2020 is that putting “America First” is a strategy fated to fail; we need partners and mended fences, not walls, to confront our most pressing security challenges.
The system is flawed, but change occurs from within
The Trump administration used “free riding” allies, uneven burden sharing, and the domestic fervor for “America First” to justify its condemnation of international cooperation. While there is a degree of legitimacy to these grievances, America cannot simply pack up and go home, even if we wanted to do so. We need not remain hidebound to the precise parameters of the post-World War II world order; modern circumstances indeed necessitate change. Yet the basic principles of global cooperation and institutionalism must endure. Our nation’s modern greatness was born on these principles. The transnational nature of today’s security threats demands we work side-by-side with partners and find new ways to negotiate with adversaries. As policymakers in the mid-20th century astutely realized, the United States cannot fundamentally change the system from the outside, and leadership of it drives America’s global power. Teamwork can be painful, but for the United States, it is the nation’s best hope to confront a litany of global security challenges, and to do so from its prized position at the helm.
 G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter, 1998-1999): 45-46; Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, “How the Vietnam War Broke the American Presidency,” The Atlantic (October 2017): https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/how-americans-lost-faith-in-the-presidency/537897/.
 Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order, 45, 63.
 Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Saving America’s Alliances,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2020): 127-128.
 Nora Bensahel, “International Alliances and Military Effectiveness: Fighting Alongside Partners and Allies,” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Elizabeth Stanley and Risa Brooks (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 202.
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 Report to Congressional Committees, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as Identified by Federal Agencies, prepared by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Washington, DC, December 2018).
 “The United States leads in coronavirus cases, but not pandemic response,” Science, April 1, 2020, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/united-states-leads-coronavirus-cases-not-pandemic-response.
 “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard,” World Health Organization (World Health Organization), accessed April 8, 2021, https://covid19.who.int/?gclid=Cj0KCQiAgomBBhDXARIsAFNyUqONM5vtdmhTXHH3E2Pfx86YvjqyqQ_T2o15kPl2qt_7JvLW6ZuolLEaAhwuEALw_wcB.
 Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs (March 18, 2020): https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order.
 Katie Rogers and Apoorva Mandavilli, “Trump Administration Signals Formal Withdrawal from W.H.O.” The New York Times, July 7, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-who.html.
 Rapp-Hooper, Saving America’s Alliances, 127.
 Susan B. Glasser, “How Trump Made War on Angela Merkel and Europe,” The New Yorker, December 17, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/how-trump-made-war-on-angela-merkel-and-europe.
 Rosie Gray, “Trump Declines to Affirm NATIO’s Article 5,” The Atlantic, May 25, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-declines-to-affirm-natos-article-5/528129/.