Colombian police officers stand in front of people lining up to try to cross into Colombia from Venezuela through Simon Bolivar International Bridge in Cucuta, Colombia, on January 24, 2018. Photo Credit: Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters
By: Ben Carsman, Columnist
Over the past four years, Venezuela has been plunged into a severe political and economic crisis. While initially sparked by the 2014 decline in global oil price, the primary drivers of this disaster have been long-standing systemic corruption and economic mismanagement on the part of the Venezuelan government.[i] This ineptitude and venality have provoked a humanitarian crisis, making Venezuela nearly equivalent to a war zone in terms of citizen security and access to basic services. Furthermore, this catastrophe is no longer confined to the Venezuelan state. The massive flow of refugees and migrants fleeing this crisis—estimated at over three million since 2015—is now beginning to dramatically affect other countries in Latin America, threatening to destabilize the region.[ii] Given the threat such instability poses to US national interests, the U.S. must immediately devote greater focus and resources to this issue.
Since 2014, Venezuela has regressed into an authoritarian state devoid of economic opportunity or basic goods and services that now teeters on the precipice of total economic collapse. Once the wealthiest country in Latin America,[iii] Venezuela’s GDP (PPP) has dropped over 40% since 2015[iv] and is forecast to contract by double digits again in 2019.[v] Inflation over 12 months reached nearly 500,000% in September 2018,[vi] and given the continuous decline in Venezuelan oil production[vii]—accounting for well over 90% of export sales and as much as 50% of GDP[viii]—this economic freefall will almost certainly continue for the foreseeable future.
As a result, the humanitarian crisis ravaging the Venezuelan people has reached incomprehensible proportions. Roughly nine in ten Venezuelans live in poverty[ix] and have difficulty purchasing food,[x] which led to Venezuelans losing an average of 24 pounds in 2017 alone.[xi] Three out of four hospitals in the country lack basic medical supplies, and treatable and communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, diphtheria, and malaria are spreading as a result.[xii] Moreover, homicide rates in Caracas are now estimated to be as high as 140 per 100,000 residents, making it more violent, by some measures, than Kabul or Baghdad.[xiii]
In order to escape this hellish combination of authoritarianism, violence, famine, and disease, millions of Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015.[xiv] Over 15,000 refugees and migrants leave the country each day, and other countries in the region are swiftly becoming overwhelmed.[xv] Colombia has already taken in roughly one million Venezuelans over the past few years,[xvi] Peru has seen more than 500,000 arrive since the beginning of the crisis,[xvii] and Chile, Brazil, and Argentina have taken in a combined 250,000.[xviii]
As the Colombian Ambassador to the United States, Francisco Santos, admitted to the Washington Post in September, this massive flow of refugees and migrants is more than governments in the region can effectively manage without US assistance.[xix] Providing food, shelter, and basic services to millions of refugees is a particularly onerous burden for countries like Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil, that have long struggled with good governance,[xx] insurgencies,[xxi] and poor economic performance.[xxii] A violent backlash against these migrants has already occurred in some communities along the Venezuelan border, and this reaction could spread and intensify should the flow of migrants continue or increase.[xxiii]
While it may be tempting for some American policymakers to seek to avoid greater involvement in this crisis due to other pressing national security priorities, its potential impact on American interests in the region must be considered. Plan Colombia has seen the U.S. invest over $10 billion in its Andean partner since 2000 in an effort to improve security and governance to contain the chaos, corruption, and violence that cocaine cartels and leftist guerrillas have inflicted upon the country for decades.[xxiv] Venezuela has long been considered a safe haven for drug traffickers, guerrillas, and narco-terrorists, and increasing instability has allowed these groups to further utilize Venezuelan territory as a base of operations.[xxv] The uncontrolled movement of millions of people across Venezuela’s borders threatens to exacerbate the security challenges posed by these sub-state actors, who have already begun victimizing the migrant population and taking advantage of the chaos to spread their influence and facilitate trafficking.[xxvi]
The U.S. also has strategic interests at stake due to its centuries-old view of Latin America as its geopolitical flank.[xxvii] Though some policymakers have disavowed this sentiment in recent years,[xxviii] the return of great power competition;[xxix] Russia and China’s multi-billion dollar investments in the Maduro regime;[xxx] and Venezuela’s possession of the largest proven oil reserves in the world[xxxi] compel the U.S. to recognize the strategic stakes involved in today’s crisis and take a leading role in the international community’s response.
US policy must pressure the Maduro regime to restore democracy and provide basic goods and services to the Venezuelan people while also ensuring that American action does not exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. It must prioritize the alleviation of pressure on neighboring states through dramatically increased funding for the UNHCR and bilateral capacity building initiatives to improve these nations’ resilience. To enhance legitimacy, US policy should also be conducted primarily through multilateral institutions like the Organization of American States or coalitions of the willing to more effectively isolate the Maduro regime diplomatically, address the refugee crisis, and prepare contingency plans for a range of scenarios, including internal collapse and external intervention by other regional states.[xxxii] The U.S. must also be cognizant of Russian and Chinese activities in the region to ensure that neither country leverages instability to gain further influence in the region.[xxxiii]
Though the future of Venezuela is highly uncertain, what is not is the need for the U.S. to take a more substantial role in leading the international response to what has become a true regional emergency. Accordingly, the U.S. must immediately devote greater focus and resources to addressing this crisis, lest more severe disruptions further destabilize the region and directly threaten US national security.
[i] “How Venezuela’s Crisis Developed and Drove out Millions of People,” BBC News, August 22, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877.
[ii] Stephanie Nebehay, “U.N. Seeks $738 Million to Help Venezuela’s Neighbors Handle Migrant Flood,” Reuters, December 04, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-un/un-seeks-738-million-to-help-venezuelas-neighbors-handle-migrant-flood-idUSKBN1O30XU.
[iii] “Crisis Response: Tracking Venezuela’s Unprecedented Migrant and Refugee Flows,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 13, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.csis.org/events/crisis-response-tracking-venezuelas-unprecedented-migrant-and-refugee-flows.
[iv] “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” International Monetary Fund, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=19&pr.y=20&sy=2010&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=299&s=NGDP_R,NGDP_RPCH,NGDP,NGDPD,PPPGDP,NGDP_D,NGDPRPC,NGDPRPPPPC,NGDPPC,NGDPDPC,PPPPC,PPPSH,PPPEX,NID_NGDP,NGSD_NGDP,PCPI,PCPIPCH,PCPIE,PCPIEPCH,TM_RPCH,TMG_RPCH,TX_RPCH,TXG_RPCH,LUR,LP,GGR,GGR_NGDP,GGX,GGX_NGDP,GGXCNL,GGXCNL_NGDP.
[v] Kenneth Rapoza, “Odds Of Venezuela Getting Its Act Together In 2019 Are Zero,” Forbes, November 26, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/11/26/odds-of-venezuela-getting-its-act-together-in-2019-are-zero/#827684233ab5.
[vi] “Venezuela’s Annual Inflation Hits 488,865 Percent in September: congress,” Reuters, October 08, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy/venezuelas-annual-inflation-hits-488865-percent-in-september-congress-idUSKCN1MI1Y6.
[vii] Alexandra Ulmer, “Exclusive: Rosneft’s Sechin Flies to Venezuela, Rebukes Maduro over Oil Shipments,” Reuters, November 24, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-venezuela-exclusive/exclusive-rosnefts-sechin-flies-to-venezuela-rebukes-maduro-over-oil-shipments-idUSKCN1NT0TJ.
[viii] “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/article/venezuela-rise-and-fall-petrostate.
[ix] Ibid
[x] “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
[xi] Vivian Sequera, “Venezuelans Report Big Weight Losses in 2017 as Hunger Hits,” Reuters, February 21, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-food/venezuelans-report-big-weight-losses-in-2017-as-hunger-hits-idUSKCN1G52HA.
[xii] “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
[xiii] Ibid
[xiv] “Crisis Response: Tracking Venezuela’s Unprecedented Migrant and Refugee Flows,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 13, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.csis.org/events/crisis-response-tracking-venezuelas-unprecedented-migrant-and-refugee-flows.
[xv] Jackson Diehl, “Can Latin America Handle Venezuela’s Collapse without the U.S.?” The Washington Post, September 30, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/can-latin-america-handle-venezuelas-collapse-without-the-us/2018/09/30/58302bb4-c25e-11e8-a1f0-a4051b6ad114_story.html?utm_term=.977da23d710b.
[xvi] Stephanie Nebehay, “U.N. Seeks $738 Million to Help Venezuela’s Neighbors Handle Migrant Flood,” Reuters, December 04, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-un/un-seeks-738-million-to-help-venezuelas-neighbors-handle-migrant-flood-idUSKBN1O30XU.
[xvii] Jim Wyss, “Colombia Denies It’s Plotting with Brazil’s New President to Invade Venezuela,” Miami Herald, October 30, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article220841375.html.
[xviii] “Crisis Response: Tracking Venezuela’s Unprecedented Migrant and Refugee Flows,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 13, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.csis.org/events/crisis-response-tracking-venezuelas-unprecedented-migrant-and-refugee-flows.
[xix] Jackson Diehl, “Can Latin America Handle Venezuela’s Collapse without the U.S.?” The Washington Post, September 30, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/can-latin-america-handle-venezuelas-collapse-without-the-us/2018/09/30/58302bb4-c25e-11e8-a1f0-a4051b6ad114_story.html?utm_term=.977da23d710b.
[xx] “Brazil’s Corruption Fallout,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-corruption-fallout.
[xxi] “Colombia’s New President Calls off Talks with a Leftist Insurgent Group,” The Economist, September 13, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/09/13/colombias-new-president-calls-off-talks-with-a-leftist-insurgent-group.
[xxii] Andrew Walker & Daniele Palumbo, “Argentina – the Crisis in Six Charts,” BBC News, September 09, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45451208.
[xxiii] Dom Phillips, “Brazil Calls in Army after Mob Attacks on Venezuelan Migrants,” The Guardian, September 02, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/02/brazil-army-venezuela-border-migrant-crisis-attacks.
[xxiv] Megan Alpert, “15 Years and $10 Billion Later, U.S. Efforts to Curb Colombia’s Cocaine Trade Have Failed,” Foreign Policy, February 08, 2016, accessed December 11, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/08/15-years-and-10-billion-later-u-s-efforts-to-curb-colombias-cocaine-trade-have-failed/.
[xxv] “Crisis Response: Tracking Venezuela’s Unprecedented Migrant and Refugee Flows,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 13, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.csis.org/events/crisis-response-tracking-venezuelas-unprecedented-migrant-and-refugee-flows.
[xxvi] Ibid
[xxvii] “Monroe Doctrine, 1823,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 11, 2018, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe.
[xxviii] Zachary Keck, “The US Renounces the Monroe Doctrine?” The Diplomat, November 21, 2013, accessed December 11, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-us-renounces-the-monroe-doctrine/.
[xxix]United States, Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, 1, January 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
[xxx] Alexandra Ulmer, “Exclusive: Rosneft’s Sechin Flies to Venezuela, Rebukes Maduro over Oil Shipments,” Reuters, November 24, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-venezuela-exclusive/exclusive-rosnefts-sechin-flies-to-venezuela-rebukes-maduro-over-oil-shipments-idUSKCN1NT0TJ.
[xxxi] United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook – Country Comparison: Crude Oil – Proved Reserves, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2244rank.html.
[xxxii] Jim Wyss, “Colombia Denies It’s Plotting with Brazil’s New President to Invade Venezuela,” Miami Herald, October 30, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article220841375.html.
[xxxiii] Lara Seligman, “U.S. Military Targets Growing Russian and Chinese Influence in Latin America,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/19/us-military-targets-growing-russian-and-chinese-influence-in-latin-america/.