Photo of Kigali Memorial Centre in Rwanda (taken by Fanny Schertzer, Wikimedia Commons)
By Jacob Goldstein, Columnist
In the eyes of most people around the globe, the Rwandan genocide ended in 1994. Yet, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighbors, the tensions underlying the Rwandan genocide are still present and once again threatening to erupt.
A major Hutu rebel group in the DRC, the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), recently ignored the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s January 2 disarmament deadline.[i] [ii] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the FDLR in 2013 for fomenting violence, sexual brutality, and recruiting and targeting children in the DRC.[iii] The group’s leader, Sylvestre Mudacumura, is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes.[iv] The U.N. peacekeeping force in the DRC (MONUSCO), the Congolese government, and the United States all supported the SADC’s ultimatum.[v]
As of the January 2 deadline, only 300 of the estimated 1,500 FDLR fighters gave up their weapons.[vi] In response to this lack of disarmament, the DRC’s central government in Kinshasa issued a statement stating, “The option of disarming (the rebels) by force is now inevitable and all the preparations to do so have been made.”[vii] Additionally, Russ Feingold, former US Senator and current Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, told reporters, “military action must be undertaken to pressure the FDLR to lay down its arms.”[viii] These statements, coupled with the cancellation of a regional summit to discuss the FDLR, appear to signal that military action against the group is inevitable.[ix]
The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), an international force of 3,000 peacekeepers that is part of MONUSCO, and possibly the Congolese army, will likely be responsible for any operation against the rebels.[x] The FIB is more skilled and experienced than many of the peacekeeping forces deployed by the U.N. in Africa. An example of FIB’s effectiveness was its 2013 successful assistance to the Congolese army to defeat M23 rebels in North Kivu.[xi]
The importance of the ongoing situation with the FDLR goes beyond the existence of yet another rebel group in central Africa. Indeed, many militias essentially have a free hand in parts of the DRC. The FDLR is not simply the DRC’s problem. According to a new U.N. report, the group’s leaders may have operated from within Tanzania.[xii] The wife of the FDLR’s leading commander in South Kivu, Hamada Habimana, is alleged to have transferred money for the group from inside of Uganda.[xiii] Most importantly, Rwanda uses the existence of the FDLR as a justification for intervention in the DRC.[xiv] Justified or not, these grievances harken back to the early 2000s when East African states waged proxy wars inside of the DRC. The Second Congo War killed more than 5 million Congolese and was the deadliest conflict since World War II.[xv]
If the FDLR is to be defeated, the solution must contain both military and diplomatic components. On the military side, the FIB should look to the successes achieved by US and Ugandan forces against the Lord’s Resistance Army. While American resources were important, tracking down Kony’s group was best left to the Ugandans themselves.[xvi] Foreign soldiers in Africa have a tough time tracking and surviving in the bush. Accordingly, foreign troops cannot hope to match the FDLR on its home turf. Additionally, psychological warfare was extremely effective in inducing defections from the LRA. Many of the soldiers in these militias were coerced into joining as child soldiers. This makes the militias vulnerable to certain disarmament campaigns. For example, a song by a Ugandan pop star called “Come Home” was used against LRA fighters to convince them to lay down their arms.[xvii]
On the diplomatic side, the United States and U.N. need to deal with Rwandan President Kagame’s unsavory governance tactics. Kagame’s success in building up Rwanda after the genocide has bought him a sizeable amount of political capital with Western governments. Kagame abuses this political capital. According to a report by the Enough Project, “the FDLR is gathering political momentum by having created new alliances with four Rwandan political parties that are frustrated with the increasing lack of political space in Rwanda,” partly due to political repression by the Kagame regime.[xviii] Some African countries are extremely unhappy with alleged assassinations of dissenters by the Rwandan government, most notably the suspicious death of a former Rwandan intelligence chief who was advising South Africa and Tanzania in Johannesburg in 2014.[xix] [xx] As a result, these states exhibit hesitance to support Rwanda against the FDLR. The United States and U.N. should pressure Kagame to liberalize and allow greater political opposition in order to reduce domestic support for organizations like the FDLR in the Congo.
The FDLR is a violent and destabilizing militia that African countries, the United States, and the U.N. are right to combat with force. However, they must incorporate the lessons learned from the fight against the LRA, as well as consider Rwanda’s role in creating conditions in which rebel groups can thrive, if these efforts are to be successful.
[i] Gabe Joselow, “DRC Rebels Face Deadline to Disarm,” Voice of America News, January 1, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/drc-rebel-group-faces-deadline-to-disarm/2581865.html.
[ii] AllAfrica, “Statement by President Zuma on the Situation Related to the Voluntary Daisarmament of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in the DRC,” January 3, 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201501030203.html.
[iii] U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Department Designates Militant Groups in the DRC,” January 3, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1815.aspx.
[iv] International Criminal Court, “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura,” July 3, 2014, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/MudacumuraEng.pdf.
[v] Gabe Joselow, “DRC Rebels Face Deadline to Disarm,” Voice of America News, January 1, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/drc-rebel-group-faces-deadline-to-disarm/2581865.html.
[vi] Reuters, “Congo threatens to attack Rwandan Hutu rebels as ultimatum expires,” January 3, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/congo-threatens-attack-rwandan-hutu-rebels-ultimatum-expires-071605087.html.
[vii] Reuters, “Congo threatens to attack Rwandan Hutu rebels as ultimatum expires,” January 3, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/congo-threatens-attack-rwandan-hutu-rebels-ultimatum-expires-071605087.html.
[viii] Gabe Joselow, “DRC Rebels Face Deadline to Disarm,” Voice of America News, January 1, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/drc-rebel-group-faces-deadline-to-disarm/2581865.html.
[ix] Stephanie Wolters, “Extending the FDLR disarmament deadline will only prolong the agony,” Institute for Security Studies, January 12, 2015, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/extending-the-fdlr-disarmament-deadline-will-only-prolong-the-agony?utm_source=January+13+2015+EN&utm_campaign=1%2F13%2F2015&utm_medium=email.
[x] James Karuhanga, “Rwanda: Pressure Mounts on DRC, MONUSCO Over FDLR,” AllAfrica, January 4, 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201501040151.html.
[xi] Reuters, “Congo threatens to attack Rwandan Hutu rebels as ultimatum expires,” January 3, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/congo-threatens-attack-rwandan-hutu-rebels-ultimatum-expires-071605087.html.
[xii] James Karuhanga, “Rwanda: New UN Report Pins Tanzania on FDLR Militia,” AllAfrica, January 20, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201501200268.html.
[xiii] James Karuhanga, “Rwanda: New UN Report Pins Tanzania on FDLR Militia,” AllAfrica, January 20, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201501200268.html.
[xiv] Enough Team, “How to Dismantle a Deadly Militia: Seven Non-Military Tactics to Help End the FDLR Threat in Congo,” Enough Project, November 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/files/FDLRReport-HowToDismantleADeadlyMilitia-EnoughProject-Nov2014.pdf, pg. 1.
[xv] Joe Bavier, “Congo war-driven crisis kills 45,000 a month: study,” January 22, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/22/us-congo-democratic-death-idUSL2280201220080122.
[xvi] Eliza Griswold, “Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?” New York Times, June 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?_r=0.
[xvii] Eliza Griswold, “Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?” New York Times, June 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?_r=0.
[xviii] Enough Team, “How to Dismantle a Deadly Militia: Seven Non-Military Tactics to Help End the FDLR Threat in Congo,” Enough Project, November 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/files/FDLRReport-HowToDismantleADeadlyMilitia-EnoughProject-Nov2014.pdf, pg. 2.
[xix] Enough Team, “How to Dismantle a Deadly Militia: Seven Non-Military Tactics to Help End the FDLR Threat in Congo,” Enough Project, November 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/files/FDLRReport-HowToDismantleADeadlyMilitia-EnoughProject-Nov2014.pdf, pg. 4.
[xx] Gabriel Gatehouse, “Patrick Karegeya: Mysterious death of a Rwandan exile,” BBC News, March 26, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26752838.