Countering al-Shabaab’s Virtual Western Recruitment

By Jamie Geller |

Seeking to geographically expand its jihad, al-Qaeda-core established relations with Somali Islamic militants in the mid-1990s. Those same militants later comprised the al-Qaeda Somali affiliate, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen, or al-Shabaab.[1] Over the years, the group has become better organized and more sophisticated.

Al-Shabaab’s September 21, 2013 attack at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya showed its understanding of the media’s power in recruitment. During the attack, the group used its Twitter platform – @HSMPress – to broadcast its version of events and emphasize the role of American foreign fighters in the operation.[2] Following the physical attack, al-Shabaab disseminated a 58-minute video, “Woolwich Attack: It’s an Eye for an Eye,” that explicitly called for Western Muslims to conduct lone wolf attacks to support global jihad.[3] The sophistication of both the Westgate attacks and the accompanying virtual recruitment campaign demonstrate al-Shabaab’s mounting capacity. To effectively respond, the U.S. government needs an effective counter-messaging strategy.

Using both video and more instantaneous platforms like Twitter, al-Shabaab’s formal media wing, Al Kataib Foundation for Media Productions, uses three packaging techniques to increase the resonance of its messages. First, it communicates diagnostic messages that identify ills that many Western Muslims perceive, particularly those involving identity and foreign policy-based grievances.[4] Second, it conveys prognostic messages that offer solutions to the diagnosed ills; most often violent jihad to defend Islam. Third, it uses motivational messages that reference a holistic Muslim ummah and the need to restore Islam’s historic greatness.

Employing social persuasion tactics, al-Shabaab tends to publicize Western operatives in media communications. Before he defected in March 2012, al-Shabaab strategically used Alabama-born, English speaking operative Omar Hammami as its Western face.[5] After he defected, Hammami was replaced by another American operative, Abu Ahmad al-Amriki. Though scholars debate the exact role Hammami, and later al-Amriki, played in the terrorist organization, it is clear that al-Shabaab used them both to make it easier for a particular category of recruits to identify with the group.

The post-Westgate recruitment video demonstrates al-Shabaab’s sophisticated use of its official platform and persuasion tactics. Diagnostically, the video blames Western governments for Muslim identity grievances, citing the “widening gulf between Muslims in the West and Kaffir neighbors” and blaming Western foreign policy for contemporary Muslim conflicts.[6] Motivationally, the video stresses the global jihad, encouraging viewers to join the holistic Muslim ummah and help restore Islam’s greatness.[7] Furthermore, it tells individuals to select Quranic passages that speak to them directly.[8] Finally, the video emphasizes “movement-entrepreneur-led activism” in which individuals undertake lone wolf actions in support of a common agenda.[9] The video discusses both unsuccessful and successful attacks, underscoring how these operations can be tactically feasible and strategically valuable.[10]

The video’s target audience is cognitively radical U.K. Muslims; people who are radical in ideology, but not yet carrying out attacks.[11] Subtle hints throughout the video point to this conclusion. Most noticeably, al-Shabaab chose an English-speaking narrator with a British accent.[12] Moreover, the video uses English subtitles with Arabic clips, particularly for key al-Qaeda speeches, but does not use Arabic subtitles during the English content.[13] The video also focuses on the 2013 Woolwich attack in London that was carried out by al-Muhajiroun, an Islamist terrorist organization based in Britain. Finally, the video is almost an hour long, which makes it clear that it was only intended for cognitive extremists. Individuals with only cursory knowledge of jihadist ideology would be unlikely to watch the entire film.[14]

To counter al-Shabaab’s improving physical capacity and virtual media outreach efforts, the U.S. government must undermine al-Shabaab’s credibility, rather than the tactics it espouses. In particular, the United States should challenge the narrative that al-Shabaab attempts to sell on Twitter by highlighting the group’s poor treatment of foreign fighters. When Hammami defected, he cited poor treatment. Al-Shabaab reacted by issuing official statements minimizing Hammami’s strategic contributions and publically accusing him of spreading “societal discord (fitna).”[15] The group’s quick, loud response highlights both its reliance on foreign recruitment and its vulnerability to narratives about the mistreatment of Western fighters.

The U.S. government included counter-messaging in official counterterrorism policy when it created the Department of State’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.[16] And indeed, this group has already implemented some measures to counter al-Shabaab’s virtual narrative.[17] However, current programs are too closely associated with the government. Often, messages display the Department of State logo, which immediately undermines their credibility. Going forward, messages should either be anonymous or come from moderate Muslims “who have greater credibility with the most relevant target audiences.”[18] Any connection to the U.S. government will instantly undermine the argument in the eyes of radical Muslims.

American citizens are protected by a complex patchwork of active and passive defenses against terrorism. While no single measure ends the threat, together the web is difficult to penetrate. Introducing an effective counter-messaging strategy would add another layer to the web of protection and make a successful terrorist attack by al-Shabaab even less likely.

Jamie Geller is an MA candidate in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and the GSSR Associate Editor for the Middle East.