



Georgetown Security Studies Review

Volume 2, Number 2
June 2014

A publication of the Center for Security Studies at
Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

<http://gssr.georgetown.edu>

Georgetown Security Studies Review

Published by the Center for Security Studies
at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

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Military Disengagement from Politics: The Case of Pakistan's Revolving Barracks Door

ANTHONY BELL

This paper examines the underlying causes that have led the Pakistani military to abdicate from direct rule and argues withdrawals are best explained by a divergence of interests between the military regime, which becomes absorbed by preserving its political power and legitimacy, and the military, which is focused on maintaining its institutional interests. It sheds new light on critical political dynamics within Pakistan and highlights theoretical implications for civil-military relations theory.

It is not surprising that the recent spate of political clashes between the Pakistani civilian government and the military has generated widespread speculation among policymakers that a military coup could transpire in Islamabad. Pakistan has experienced four military coups and thirty years of military rule since the nation achieved independence in 1947. The Pakistani military is indisputably the most powerful political actor in one of the world's most dangerous countries due to the nation's political instability, violent internal strife, and its enduring rivalry with a more powerful India. In the civil-military literature on Pakistan, there are an abundance of explanations for the military's political hegemony, the causes of military takeovers, and the consequences of its dysfunctional civil-military relations for democracy. Rather than examining why and how the military intervenes in politics, this paper will look at the other side of the coin: why and how the military chooses to disengage from politics.

Given the scholarly focus on military interventions in Pakistan, there has been little rigorous inquiry into why and how its four military regimes have ended, and even less investigation into the pivotal role the military has served in facilitating each transition and the implications this has for the wider body of civil-military relations theory. The central research question of this paper is: Why does the Pakistani military return to the barracks? It will explore the underlying causes that have led the military to abdicate from direct rule, arguing that withdrawals are best explained by the divergence of interests between the leaders of the military regime, who seek to preserve their grip on political power, and the active leaders of the armed forces, who seek to protect and advance the corporate interests of the military. This breach is the key motivation for the military to return to the barracks. The opportunity for withdrawal is triggered when the regime encounters political difficulties consolidating its authority, which often backfires by rejuvenating civilian opposition and requires the regime to turn to the military to enforce its will. So long

as the domestic opposition to the regime does not pose a direct threat to the military's core interests and there are viable civilian alternatives available, the military will seek to return to the barracks rather than incur the costs of repression.

This paper begins with an overview of Pakistan as a case study and a review of the civil-military relations literature related to military interventions and military withdrawals. It will then outline the civil-military scholarship related to Pakistan and provide an overview of its civil-military relations. This is followed by a short background outlining Pakistan's political history after independence. Next, it presents a detailed examination of the conditions that have led to the end of Pakistan's four military regimes in 1968, 1971, 1988, and 2008 and illustrates how the divergence of interests between the active leaders of the armed forces and the leaders of the military regime eventually caused the former to prefer a return to the barracks. The paper then analyzes the commonalities and patterns of behavior in these cases to explain how and why this divergence of interests takes place and concludes by reviewing the causes of military withdrawal in Pakistan, providing theoretical implications, and offering paths for further research.

The Case of Pakistan's Praetorian Military

Pakistan is an exceptionally rich case study for civil-military relations for several reasons. First, Pakistan has proven resilient in the face of the waves of democratization over the past few decades that contributed to widespread changes in civil-military relations in previously coup-prone corners of the world.¹ Indeed, the basic question of civilian control in Pakistan remains a highly contentious political issue today. Second, Pakistan's political system is characterized by its strong praetorian military, which has repeatedly overthrown weak civilian governments.² The country has experienced four military regimes that have ruled the country for over thirty years under Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Yahya Khan (1969-1971), Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) (See Annex 1). Third, Pakistan is a critically important state for U.S. policymakers. Pakistan is a strategic mid-tier regional power that possesses nuclear weapons. It has served as a frontline state during the Cold War and reemerged as such in the War on Terror as a hotbed of Islamist extremist groups including al-Qaeda. Lastly, Pakistan's turbulent relationship with its powerful nuclear-armed neighbor India has produced several major wars, countless skirmishes, and enough saber-rattling to foster a near-perpetual crisis atmosphere in the subcontinent.

¹ See Larry J. Diamond, "Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?" *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (July 2000).

² The Army is the foremost branch within the armed forces, a primacy which in part stems from the continental nature of Pakistan's security threats that requires a sizable ground force and reflects its role as the vessel for seizing political power. While the military services are relatively autonomous from one another, the Navy and the Air Force have always been treated as junior partners in the Army's conduct of political and military affairs and thus junta-style governments have not been seen in Pakistan. Ayesha Siddiq-Agha, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 60-61.

While the Pakistani military is extremely politicized, it has remained a highly professional organization with a significant degree of internal discipline and cohesion. The most powerful political and military position in Pakistan belongs to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), which is currently filled by General Raheel Sharif. The COAS heads the Army Combatant General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi and represents the Army in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), a body charged with inter-service coordination.³ At the very top of the Army's hierarchy, the COAS has a broad portfolio of military and non-military duties, the latter including managing the Army's relations with the civilians, brokering deals amongst the political parties, and supervising the military's policy fiefdom (especially in foreign affairs).⁴ The COAS always led Pakistan's military takeovers and subsequently served as the head of state or returned the military to the barracks (See Annex 2). Besides coups, the military's principal method for interfering in the civilian political process is through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. The ISI exists outside of the formal military command structure but informally serves under the COAS.⁵ The ISI has a domestic political-wing that monitors and intervenes in domestic politics on the military's behalf.⁶

Evolution of the Theoretical Approaches: Military Interventions to Military Withdrawals

Military intervention in politics and military disengagement from politics are two sides of the same theoretical problem. These dependent variables are similarly rooted in the basic civil-military problématique: societies create militaries for protection but in doing so endow their militaries with the power to threaten their societies.⁷ The crux of the issue revolves around how civilian governments can

³ The military's three service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense (who is almost always a three-star Army officer) are members of the JCSC, a body charged with inter-service coordination and providing military expertise to civilian leaders. The council is headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), who also serves as the Supreme Commander of the Pakistani Defense Forces and the senior military adviser to the civilian government. While the CJCSC is technically the nation's highest-ranking military officer, he has no command authority, and in practice is regarded as ceremonial figure and subordinate to the service chiefs. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 20-25.

⁴ C. Christine Fair, "Why the Pakistan Army Is Here to Stay," *International Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2011): 583.

⁵ Schofield and Zekulin, "Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in Post-OBL Pakistan," *Defense & Security Analysis*, 320.

⁶ For instance, the ISI has financed small religious and conservative political parties ahead of elections to draw votes away from the major parties. The ISI has also been accused of paying bribes to politicians, buying votes, and other nefarious political activities. Mark J. Roberts, "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?" *Joint Force Quarterly*, 48, no. 1 (1st Quarter 2008).

⁷ As S.E. Finer notes, "Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise." S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 5. Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-

exercise control over militaries that have the strength to usurp their authority, or conversely, how civilians can regain control after being kicked to the curb by their militaries. The majority of civil-military scholarship has focused on developing and refining one side of this problem: the causes of military intervention. The effort to locate the source of military interventions has produced a large and contentious literature which first emerged from the debate over the relationship between military professionalism and civilian control.⁸

The *coup d'état* is the apex of military intervention and therefore its study became an early central tenet in civil-military relations theory.⁹ Many scholars including Huntington (1957, 1968), Finer (1962), Nordlinger (1977), Thompson (1975), Welch (1976), and Luttwak (1979)—to name only a few—have addressed the causes, typologies, and frequency of military coups. They have identified numerous and complex webs of casual factors behind military coups, which are commonly separated into opportunities and motives.¹⁰ Coup opportunities arise from a weakening of the civilian regime, whether it has lost legitimacy through acts of corruption, electoral fraud, or other forms of political mischiefs, or perhaps a general ineptitude at governing. Opportunities can also be fashioned from broader conditions in the country such as a floundering political process, internal unrest, external security threats, or economic crises. In terms of motivations, coups are nearly always justified by their perpetrators to have been committed on behalf of the national interest.¹¹ Such claims, however, are commonly dismissed as camouflage to hide the military's pursuit of narrower sets of interests. Some scholars contend that the military may be motivated to stage a coup to defend or advance a particular socioeconomic class or sectional group in society.¹² Another possible motivation is the personal interests of the military leadership who seek greater political power, glory, or riches for themselves after seizing power. Many authors have recognized one of the strongest motivations for coups is to preserve the military's corporate self-interest, which includes the preservation of the military's autonomy, hierarchical discipline, internal

Military Relations Problématique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996).

⁸ Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999). See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 84. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 194-195.

⁹ Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," 218.

¹⁰ See Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1983).

¹¹ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 35.

¹² See Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; José Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup Revisited," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and Samuel Finch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986).

unity, organizational prestige, access to resources, privileges, and other aspects.¹³ Despite the abundance of coup studies, deciphering the precise causes behind a coup is extremely difficult. Apart from the sheer array of possible causal factors, none of these explanations are mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the traditional theoretical focus on coups has fallen by the wayside in contemporary civil-military relations due to the decline of coups in many parts of the world after the 1980s as many countries stabilized along either democratic-paths, as did much of Latin America, or along military-authoritarian paths, as did much of the Middle East.¹⁴

Compared to the abundant attention theorists have given to studying interventions, the other side of the coin dealing with military withdrawals is astonishingly underdeveloped. As David Pion-Berlin observes, “Although for almost every military intervention one can find a military withdrawal, the former has been the subject of literally hundreds of major studies while the latter has not.”¹⁵ Rather than looking at what causes a military to rush from the barracks and storm the palace, this perspective is concerned with what causes a ruling military to hand the palace back to the civilians and return to the barracks. Withdrawals, unlike coups, almost never transpire by sheer force of arms. Militaries have the ability to intervene in politics and seize power because they possess a monopoly on force in their society. Civilians do not have reciprocity to forcibly remove the military from power. In this regard, their relationship is decisively one-sided. Despite the military’s ability to seize and hold onto power, scholars have noted that military regimes are unusually short-lived forms of authoritarian government. Ruling militaries nearly always withdraw and do so with a degree of acquiescence—but usually not with much enthusiasm. Lastly, it is important to draw a distinction between what is meant in this paper by military withdrawal, disengagement, and “returns to the barracks.” These terms relate to the military’s abdication from *overt* rule—the self-dismantlement of the military regime—it does not necessitate the military’s full retreat from politics nor an acceptance of civilian supremacy.

There are few studies directly concerned with military withdrawal. Most of the literature has developed as secondary findings within the traditional focus on interventions and remains scattered and under-theorized. Perhaps the earliest and most important work to touch on military disengagement is S.E. Finer’s *The Man on Horseback*. In the course of his inquiry, Finer observed that militaries sometimes terminate their rule, restore civilians to power, and subsequently “return to the barracks.” According to

¹³ Bruce W. Farcau, *The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 26. See also: William R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-makers* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973); Martin C. Needler, “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power,” *Latin American Research Review* 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1975).

¹⁴ Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 218.

¹⁵ David Pion-Berlin, “Retreat to the Barracks: Recent Studies on Military Withdrawal from Power,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 32, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 137.

Finer, a return to barracks occurs due to the combination of three conditions: “The disintegration of the original conspiratorial group, the growing divergence of interests between the junta of rulers and those military who remain as active heads of the fighting services, and the political difficulties of the regime.”¹⁶

Alfred Stepan offers a useful framework for understanding the complex division of responsibilities and interests that arise in military regimes.¹⁷ He unpacks “military regimes” into several parts. The first component is the military-as-government, which refers to the top military leaders who directly wield the political power of the state which typically comprises the ruling general or junta and a small clique of key officers and civilians. The second component is the military-as-institution, which denotes the majority of the officer corps who for the most part remain responsible for “normal” military duties.¹⁸ Stepan contends that if the military-as-government precipitates a crisis or otherwise endangers the corporate interests of the military-as-institution; the latter might be willing to overthrow the former to redress the problem. Even then, the military must feel it is in its best interest to transition power to civilians rather than just reconstitute another military-as-government.¹⁹

Eric Nordlinger’s study on praetorianism focuses on interventions and the political sociology of the officer corps.²⁰ He briefly touches on the motivations behind disengagement, suggesting that sometimes militaries prefer the “relative political purity” of the barracks to the unpleasant governing process.²¹ Noting the military regimes are characteristically short-lived, he identifies three paths by which military regimes are supplanted by civilian governments: civilian pressure which forces the military from power (extremely rare), military countercoups which return power back to civilians (somewhat rare), and voluntary disengagements (the most common). Nordlinger identifies the military’s corporate interests as among the most important reasons behind a voluntary withdrawal.²²

¹⁶ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 191.

¹⁷ Alfred C. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). Stepan’s dichotomy between the military-as-government and military-as-institution is essentially a refinement of the distinction Finer drew when he differentiated between the “junta of rulers” and the “active heads of the fighting services.”

¹⁸ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 30-33; 71. Although sometimes termed the “fighters,” this category can also include the military bureaucracy and the general staff. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 215.

¹⁹ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 76. Reinterpreting Stepan’s concepts into agency theory, it is possible to comprehend the military-as-government as the principal and the military-as-institution as the agent. Many authors erroneously conflate the military to be a perfect agent for the military regime.

²⁰ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 4.

²¹ Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 60.

²² Alongside a lack of desire to remain in power, the difficulties of governing, restoring the military’s reputation, achievement of the intervention’s objectives, and confidence that successor governments will not violate the military’s interests. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 145-147.

In terms of literature primarily concerned with military withdrawals, Christopher Clapham and George Philip diagnose factionalism as a major problem for military regimes. In the long-term, political intervention is corrosive to military unity. They posit that all military regimes face a common political problem in preserving their ruling interests with their limited capacity for political organization and management.²³ Claude Welch, exploring the conditions for successful “long-term” military disengagement from politics, contends that withdrawals are based on the military’s corporate interests and broader dynamics such as domestic conflict and the economy.²⁴ Many of the works on military withdrawal dovetail nicely with the comparative politics literature on transitions from authoritarianism.²⁵ Most of these approach the matter of military withdrawal from the normative standpoint of how civilians can best muzzle a politicized military and return it to the barracks. Yet as Welch points out, “No single, coherent school of thought exists regarding the causes and consequences of returns to the barracks and the pathways of liberalization and democratization.”²⁶ Some scholars have poked and prodded at the issue of diverging interests in military regimes within the context of disengagement but there have been few direct inquiries and even fewer substantive case studies into its potential theoretical applications for civil-military relations.

What Causes the Pakistani Military to Return to the Barracks?

In the civil-military literature on Pakistan, there are ample explanations for the military’s political interventions and the causes and consequences of the country’s frequent interventions.²⁷ Many of the independent variables scholars have offered to explain military interventions in Pakistan fail to account for military withdrawals (and why repeated interventions transpire). The first and most prominent explanation offered is the weakness of the country’s civilian political parties and democratic institutions

²³ Christopher Clapham and George Philip, eds., *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes* (Worcester: Billing & Sons, 1985), 5. Maniruzzaman examined a large number of cases of military disengagement looking at the different withdrawal process and their impact on the duration of the civilian governments. Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987).

²⁴ Claude E. Welch, *No Farewell to Arms: Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). Pion-Berlin, “Retreat to the Barracks,” 141.

²⁵ See O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*: (1986); Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999).

²⁶ Claude E. Welch, “Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events,” *Armed Forces & Society* 18, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 324.

²⁷ See Veena Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India* (New Delhi: Sage, 1991). Saeed Shafiqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Boulder: Westview, 1997). Ayesha Siddiqi-Agha, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy* (London: Pluto, 2007).

compared to the physical and political strengths of the military.²⁸ Second is that the military receives the lion's share of the national budget in addition to the enormous business empire it has amassed.²⁹ The third argument focuses on the external security environment, primarily Pakistan's fierce rivalry with India and the existential threat Islamabad feels from its more powerful neighbor. Unfortunately, these arguments predict stability for military rule in Pakistan.³⁰ They cannot explain the variation in military rule over time and why the military returned to the barracks in 1971, 1988 and 2008 or its bungled efforts to hand power to the civilians after staging a counter coup in 1969. Surveying the explanations for the instability in Pakistan's regimes, Paul Staniland concludes, "The unanswered puzzle is why Pakistan has not become a military ruled bureaucratic-authoritarian state despite three sustained attempts to build precisely such a regime...Scholars assume that the army simply could not maintain its rule, but comparisons make it clear that military-backed authoritarianism can be enduring."³¹

The literature covering military withdrawal in Pakistan is quite small, paralleling the small segment the study of "returns to the barracks" occupies in the field as a whole. Mazhar Aziz uses path dependence and a historical institutionalism framework to explain how early political arrangements and military interventions compounded to shape civil-military outcomes, diagnosing that the corporate interests of the military are key.³² Hassan Askari Rizvi offers a comprehensive investigation into the military's role in politics, coups, and the character and policies of the military regimes.³³ Rizvi does discuss the causes of military withdrawals in Pakistan, but unfortunately his basic framing of the phenomena is somewhat inelegant.³⁴ Moreover, a host of independent variables used to explain military withdrawals in

²⁸ Paul Staniland, "The Poisoned Chalice: Military Culture, Contentious Politics, and Cycles of Regime Change in Pakistan." MIT Working Paper, 2009, 5-8.

²⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Ayesha Siddiqi-Agha, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

³⁰ Staniland, "The Poisoned Chalice," 5-8.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

³² Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State* (London: Routledge, 2008).

³³ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 28-33.

³⁴ Rizvi considers instances when the ruling general legally ends martial law and attempts to legitimize the military regime by taking off their uniform as genuine withdrawals rather than treating these efforts as smokescreens like most scholarly work on civil-military relations and authoritarianism. This essentially blurs the distinction on the regime type and the occurrence of military withdrawals. Indeed, the regime periods in question (Ayub 1962-1968; Zia 1985-1988) would meet Geddes' basic definition of a military regime, which is "governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointment." See Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 73.

other countries do not fit Pakistan's often peculiar circumstances.³⁵ For instance, a common cause of withdrawals is rampant factionalism within the military. Yet every coup and withdrawal in Pakistan has been led by the active head of the Army, supported by the top brass, and received cooperation down the command structure. As Staniland notes, "...the army enters into and withdraws from politics cohesively."³⁶ There has never been a serious coup attempt in Pakistan emanating from junior officers, spontaneous unit uprisings, or a non-military party.³⁷ Although the military is extremely politicized, it has remained a highly professional organization with a significant degree of internal discipline and cohesion.

Accordingly, this paper utilizes the works of Finer and Stepan to disaggregate a military regime into two echelons: the regime or military-as-government led by the political heads of the Army and the military or military-as-institution led by the active leaders of the armed forces. This paper argues that withdrawals in Pakistan are best explained by the divergence of interests between the leaders of the military regime, who seek to preserve their grip on political power, and the active leaders of the armed forces, who seek to protect and advance the corporate interests of the military. The breach between the two echelons is the key motivation for the military to stage a return to the barracks. The opportunity to withdraw is triggered when the regime encounters political difficulties consolidating its authority and faces off against a revitalized civilian opposition which requires the regime to wield to the military as an instrument of repression. So long as the domestic opposition to the regime does not pose a direct threat to the military's core interests and there are viable civilian alternatives available, the military will seek to return to the barracks rather than incur the costs of repression.

Pakistan's Historical Context

Pakistan's armed forces are a legacy from the British Indian Army that was inherited upon the nation's independence in 1947. At that time, the military was instilled with a tradition of civilian supremacy from the colonial administration.³⁸ Pakistan's violent separation with India and the dispute over the Kashmir

³⁵ See Staniland, "The Poisoned Chalice" 4-9.

³⁶ Ibid., 5.

³⁷ This consistency has been accomplished by an extralegal decision-making council comprised of the COAS, the GHQ staff, and the corps commanders, totaling about thirty of the most senior Army generals. These meetings, which have become institutionalized over the years, are a key mechanism for achieving a consensus within the senior officer corps on the direction of the military's political activities, including whether or not to overthrow the civilian regime. This process is significantly more formalized and tiered than the standard model for military coups in other countries where ad hoc coalition-building process occurs among like-minded officers. Schofield and Zekulin, "Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in Post-OBL Pakistan," *Defense & Security Analysis*, 315. Bruce W. Farcau, *The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 5.

³⁸ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 22.

region, which led to the indecisive Indo-Pakistan War of 1947-48, served as the first test for the Pakistani Army.³⁹ The early period of post-independence politics in Pakistan were dominated by the Muslim League led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, who respectively served as Governor General and Prime Minister. The League had been a potent force within the political environment of British India because it had served as a mass platform for the Muslim minority. While committed to democracy, the League's leaders believed they were entitled to govern the country they had forged but discovered religion was no longer a salient rallying point once the nation had separated from India. Pakistan was a fragmented nation with intense political cleavages along provincial, ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and socioeconomic lines.⁴⁰ Furthermore, West Pakistan and East Pakistan were separated by a thousand miles of hostile Indian-territory. The country was dominated principally by Muhajirs and Punjabis of West Pakistan who filled the upper-echelons of the League, the other political parties, the civilian bureaucracy, and the officer corps.⁴¹ A major dilemma emerged in the late 1940s which would become the central political problem in Pakistan for several decades: the Muhajir and Punjabi politicians became reluctant to initiate democratic processes because it would guarantee an enormous permanent shift in national political power to the numerically superior Bengalis of East Pakistan. With West Pakistan certain to lose out to East Pakistan in any fair electoral contest, the country's political development stalled.⁴² For over a decade after independence, the politicians could not reach a final agreement on a constitution and other electoral arrangements. The League fragmented into opposing factions. Instability amongst the political parties led to a rapid turnover in leadership, with seven prime ministers rising and falling between 1951 and 1957 before the first military coup occurred in 1958.⁴³

The Ayub Khan Regime: The Countercoup

After seizing power in 1958, COAS General Ayub Khan promoted himself to Field Marshal and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.⁴⁴ General Muhammad Musa replaced Ayub as the COAS and was widely seen as a compliant apolitical officer. More than subsequent military rulers, Ayub kept the

³⁹ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 47-48.

⁴⁰ Stephen P. Cohen, "Pakistan: Army, Society, and Security," *Asian Affairs* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1983): 3-4.

⁴¹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst, 2009), 162.

⁴² Akbar Zaidi, "State, Military and Social Transition: Improbable Future of Democracy in Pakistan," *Economic and Political Weekly* 40, no. 49 (December 2005): 5173.

⁴³ Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 26.

⁴⁴ In Huntington's chapter on praetorianism and political decay, he heaps praise on Ayub Khan: "More than any other political leader in a modernizing country after World War II, Ayub Khan came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or "Great Legislator" on the Platonic or Rousseauian model." Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 251. Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 35.

military at arm's length in the day-to-day running of the country, largely relying on the bureaucracy to administrate.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, a number of senior officers did join Ayub in the military regime, becoming ministers, governors, and wearing other political hats. Replacing the parliamentary government, Ayub introduced "Basic Democracy" and the 1962 Constitution. Basic Democracies were local apolitical party-less councils meant to bestow legitimacy on Ayub's rule by electing him president in 1960 and 1965.⁴⁶ Over time, he relied less and less on his staff and corps commanders for policy advice and more on civilians, like his foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who became one of Ayub's closest confidants.⁴⁷ In addition to providing the military a relatively high degree of autonomy from the military-as-government, Ayub provided the armed forces with large increases in defense expenditures and secured enormous U.S. military aid packages for modernization.⁴⁸

The first visible splits between Ayub and the military took shape in 1964-65. Ayub, Bhutto, and others in the military-as-government saw the window of opportunity for a favorable resolution of the Kashmir dispute was closing and began plotting a military solution, over the objections of the military-as-institution. Ayub delegated the planning for the operation to a joint civilian-military cell, which was dominated by Bhutto's men from the Foreign Office and some intelligence officers. The influence of Bhutto and the Foreign Office on military planning undercut the military's chain of command and threatened its autonomy and unity.⁴⁹ The regime's final plan was a half-baked scheme that would unfold in two phases. The first phase called for as many as 30,000 "guerrillas" to infiltrate across the Line of Control (LOC) into Indian-controlled Kashmir and instigate an uprising. In the second phase, an Army division would swiftly cross the LOC and seize strategic areas before the Indians could react.⁵⁰ COAS Musa Khan and other senior Army officers raised objections with Ayub over the plausibility of the plan's success and the risk high of escalation, which Ayub dismissed.⁵¹ The Army was confident that if India felt it was losing the fight in the Vale of Kashmir, it would launch a massive counterattack across the international border in the Punjab, a fight the Army knew it was unlikely to win. The COAS and the GHQ, as one general later wrote, viewed the entire ordeal as "...a bastard child, born of the liaison between the Foreign Minister [Bhutto] and General Malik [Division Commander in Pakistani

⁴⁵ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 127. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 174-175. Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia*, 78-79.

⁴⁶ Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia*, 90-96.

⁴⁷ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 195.

⁴⁸ Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 104-105. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 200.

⁴⁹ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 230.

⁵⁰ Talbot, *Pakistan*, 177.

⁵¹ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 206.

Kashmir].”⁵² Accordingly, the military high command shirked in supporting planning for the war. The GHQ delegated responsibility for the Kashmir operation’s planning and execution solely to Malik’s divisional headquarters and made no effort to notify its combat commanders or otherwise prepare the Army and the other services for war.⁵³

The Second Kashmir War in 1965 ended with Pakistan’s acrimonious defeat. After Pakistan achieved some success in Kashmir, India launched an armored counterattack into the Punjab and caught Islamabad’s forces there entirely unprepared. The military-as-institution became disenchanted with Ayub and Bhutto’s mishandling of the war and the ceasefire agreement that resulted in no change of territory. Senior combat commanders and mid-level officers were extremely dissatisfied with the poor generalship displayed by the GHQ. Musa Khan was replaced as COAS by General Yahya Khan, one of Ayub’s protégées.⁵⁴ The breach between Ayub’s regime and the military rapidly diverged after the war and was soon exacerbated by the regime’s declining political support and the rise of popular political parties. After the war, Bhutto split with Ayub and departed from the regime. He formed the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) in 1967 on a populist, socialist, and anti-Ayub platform which gained a large following among the Punjabi majority in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the Awami League (AL), a Bengali nationalist mass political party with a separatist agenda, was also on the rise and further threatened the military regime’s legitimacy.⁵⁵

The shell game of Ayub’s Basic Democracy soon collapsed upon the emergence of popular opposition parties demanding a return to parliamentary democracy.⁵⁶ The heightened agitation by civilians, however, was not the decisive blow to the Ayub regime. As Stepan points out, “the loss of civilian support must somehow be transformed into a tangible cost or a direct threat to the military-as-institution.”⁵⁷ The political opposition increasingly fanned civil unrest, which led Ayub to seek to ratchet up repression by imposing martial law and calling out the Army in early 1969. For the military, violent suppression of the mass protests, especially in the Punjab where it recruited the majority of its officers and enlisted personnel, came at a high risk to its corporate interests by threatening its unity and prestige.⁵⁸ Given the massive breach between interests of the military and those of the regime, the military no longer

⁵² General Gul Hassan quoted in Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 207.

⁵³ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 207-240

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁵⁵ Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 58-66.

⁵⁶ Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 113-120.

⁵⁷ Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, vol. 3 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 77.

⁵⁸ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 242-245.

saw its best interests vested in the perpetuation of the Ayub regime and became willing to sacrifice the military-as-government to quell the unrest.⁵⁹ Army Chief Yahya Khan, with the consensus of the Army brass, refused to enforce martial law on behalf of Ayub and in effect staged a bloodless counter-coup. Having lost the support of the active leaders of the Army, Ayub subsequently resigned his office and handed power to Yahya.⁶⁰

The Yahya Khan Regime: The Generals' Revolt

General Yahya Khan assumed the presidency from Ayub in March 1969. He formed an entirely new military-as-government that included far more dual-hatted officers than under Ayub. Yahya promoted his close associate General Abdul Hamid Khan as COAS. Yahya moved quickly to address many of the underlying political issues that had plagued Pakistan's domestic political order since independence in order to extricate the military from direct power. He abrogated Ayub's 1962 Constitution and announced free elections would be held in late 1970 for a National Assembly, which would draft a new constitution and guarantee East Pakistan proportional representation with West Pakistan for the first time.⁶¹ The regime and the military felt there was some risk to the military's long-term corporate interests by returning the civilians to political power, and especially enfranchising the Bengalis.⁶² Yet these fears were placated by intelligence reports throughout the campaign that showed a roughly even split among the various opposition parties in each wing of country. The regime believed it could act as an arbiter among the divided parties in a deadlocked legislature to protect the military's long-term interests.⁶³

The military regime's plan to withdraw was entirely derailed by the election results. The Awami League attained an outright majority in the legislature, sweeping all but two of the seats in East Pakistan. Bhutto's PPP won roughly two-thirds of the seats in West Pakistan. After the elections, the AL issued six hardline demands on regional autonomy including East Pakistan's right to form its own military. Bhutto refused to form a government with the AL. In March 1971, after negotiations between the parties and the regime failed, Yahya declared the National Assembly would be indefinitely delayed. East Pakistan descended into open revolt and the AL soon declared the region's independence as Bangladesh. Yahya,

⁵⁹ Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization," 76-77.

⁶⁰ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 243. Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 119-120.

⁶¹ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 251-254 and 258.

⁶² Apart from paring down defense spending, there was unease that a national government dominated by Bengali politicians would want the West Pakistan-oriented military to provide more than a token constabulary force in East Pakistan, which had been left almost completely undefended in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, and would add Bengalis to the officer corps, which comprised about 55 percent of the population but only five percent of the officers. For ethnic divisions in the Army, see Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 32-54.

⁶³ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 258-260.

supported by the Army (minus the few Bengali regiments which mutinied), unleashed a brutal military crackdown in the East. The situation devolved into a full-scale civil war in which hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed by the military over the course of nine months.⁶⁴ India invaded East Pakistan in November 1971 to support the Bangladeshi rebels in response to the massive flow of Bengali refugees into India triggered by the fighting. Pakistan retaliated by launching an invasion from West Pakistan into India in early December. Within several weeks, India successfully routed the Pakistanis along the two fronts, captured a third of the Pakistani Army that was trapped in the East, and forced Yahya to capitulate.⁶⁵

Days after the dismemberment of Pakistan and the catastrophic military defeat to India, Yahya and his cadre indicated that the regime would remain in power. At that point, many of the Army formation commanders and senior headquarters officers stepped in. The Yahya regime had been a complete disaster not only for the country, but for the military as well, as morale and prestige hit rock-bottom and unity frayed. Acting on the demands of many lower commanders, Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan, who occupied the tier directly under the COAS, sent an explicit threat to the regime: unless Yahya and the military-as-government resigned *en masse* the next day, tanks would roll into the capital and unseat them. COAS Gen. Hamid Khan, who was seen by his subordinates as a Yahya lackey, assembled the senior officer corps to see if he would be an acceptable replacement—an idea floated by several in the regime—but he was rejected.⁶⁶ Yahya, the military-as-government, and Gen. Hamid were forced to resign in late December. Once the top echelon of the regime was removed, Gen. Hassan was appointed acting COAS and the Army quickly arranged for Bhutto and the PPP to assume the reins of power and returned the military to the barracks.⁶⁷

The Zia Regime: The Fortuitous Plane Crash

General Zia-ul-Haq and the Army seized power in 1977 after Bhutto rigged parliamentary elections and attempted to have the military impose martial law to quash opposition protests. Early in his regime, Zia made considerable efforts to make the military-as-institution a stakeholder in his regime. Zia had not truly established himself as the head of the Army before the coup, and in the first few years of his rule was respectful of the senior officer corps and solicited their policy views. As Rizvi claims, “The key to the invulnerability of Zia-ul-Haq was the support he enjoyed from the senior Army commanders.”⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 57-61.

⁶⁵ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 61.

⁶⁶ Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 142.

⁶⁷ Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 73. Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 79.

⁶⁸ Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 181.

Furthermore, plenty of incentives were given to the military in terms of increased defense expenditures and personnel pay, as well as huge tracts of agricultural land, residences, bank loans, and other side perks.

The military favored free elections and a return to democracy in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, it was content to go along with Zia's efforts to legitimize his government so long as it did not threaten the military's self-interests.⁶⁹ A referendum was held in 1984 that gave Zia a five-year term as president. Like Ayub, Zia oversaw general elections for a sham non-party legislature the following year and handpicked a civilian politician, Muhammad Khan Junejo, as his Prime Minister, after which martial law was finally lifted.⁷⁰ Zia had miscalculated Junejo and the legislature, which proved to be more dynamic than anticipated and unwilling to act as the rubber stamp Zia wished. The relationship between Zia and Junejo caused rising political divisions within the military-as-government while revived opposition parties such as the PPP began clamoring for the end of military rule and a return to parliamentary democracy. The military's corporate interests became tangled in the Zia-Junejo feuding, as they quarreled over cabinet appointments, military spending and perks, promotions for the top-brass, and Zia's dual-hatted role as he clung to the ceremonial title of Chief of Army Staff (whose actual responsibilities rested with the VCOAS).⁷¹

The military not only resented Junejo's forays into its autonomy, but also Zia's meddling in its internal affairs and his inability to protect the military's corporate interests from his own faux civilian government. The period of collaboration between the military-as-government and the military-as-institution was at an end.⁷² As Zia civilianized his rule, he distanced himself from the military-as-institution. Where once Zia had shrewdly dabbled in the promotions and assignments of the top brass, by the late 1980s his interference in the Army's hierarchy had evolved into blatant nepotism, a disregard for the rigid promotion system, and an undermining of the chain-of-command. Zia surrounded himself with civilians and loyal officers. He even wed his children with some of those senior officers to build kinship alliances.⁷³ The officers that Zia did not trust were denied promotions to key postings or subsumed into the ever expanding number of active and retired officers running the civilian bureaucracies where they could amass fortunes for themselves but held no command. Zia rotated three VCOAS during his tenure, ending with Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, who was appointed in 1987. The turnover of personnel at the top and the passage of time required Zia to promote relatively junior officers to senior posts. He also stopped seeking political input from senior officers. Zia's meetings with the corps commanders and top-brass

⁶⁹ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 366; 379.

⁷⁰ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 380-382.

⁷¹ Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 200.

⁷² Brian Cloughley, *War, Coups, and Terror: Pakistan's Army in Years of Turmoil* (New York: Skyhorse, 2008), 48.

⁷³ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 386.

became more and more infrequent and devoid of discussion and debate. Zia undercut Beg and GHQ's command, preferring to meet with the younger corps commanders and even lower officers in private where he would dole out patronage.⁷⁴

The political tensions within Zia's regime, and between the regime and the military, came to a head in the summer of 1988. In April, an ISI munitions dump used to arm the Afghan mujahedeen exploded in the heavily populated military capital of Rawalpindi, killing hundreds of civilians. To stem public outrage, Junejo demanded the resignation of the head of the ISI and the directorate's former head then serving as CJCS, perhaps the two generals with whom Zia was the closest. In May, Zia responded by dismissing Junejo and dissolving the legislature. He did so without consulting with the VCOAS or corps commanders, and then ordered the weary Army to seize key buildings and arrest the civilian leaders of Zia's own government.⁷⁵ Despite the political setbacks and rising unrest, Zia began making plans to reconstitute his government with new elections and stay in power. In August 1988, Zia, along with most of his closest military aides and the U.S. Ambassador to Islamabad, were killed when their C-130 crashed shortly after departing from a tank demonstration where much of the Army high command was in attendance.⁷⁶ Upon Zia's death, the leadership of the country passed to VCOAS General Beg.⁷⁷ Within hours of Zia's death, Beg, the corps commanders, and the GHQ staff reached a unanimous decision to return to the barracks.⁷⁸ A civilian caretaker government was appointed to oversee free elections held in November 1988 in which the PPP under Benazir Bhutto, ZA Bhutto's daughter, regained power.⁷⁹

The Musharraf Regime: Pulling the Plug

Pakistan's fourth military regime occurred under COAS General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in October 1999 after the civilian government under Nawaz Sharif attempted to fire Musharraf amid rising civil-military tension over Sharif's peace overtures to India and the military's subsequent provocation and defeat in the Kargil War.⁸⁰ In its formative years, the Musharraf regime's relationship with the military

⁷⁴ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 386-387.

⁷⁵ Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 202.

⁷⁶ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 42. Nawaz lays out the mysterious circumstances surrounding the plane crash and the subsequent post-crash investigations. It is widely thought that Zia's death was an assassination. See Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 393-405.

⁷⁷ General Beg had "coincidentally" that day turned down two offers from Zia to join him abroad his aircraft after the tank trials, as did a number of corps commanders, who all subsequently headed to the GHQ. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 394.

⁷⁸ For further history, see Babar Sattar, "Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism," in *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 399-401.

⁷⁹ Cloughley, *War, Coups, and Terror*, 48-52.

⁸⁰ Ayesha Siddiqi-Agha, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 99

preceded much like the early years of the Zia regime. Defense spending increased, as did side benefits for the officer corps. Musharraf was deferential to his corps commanders and mindful to safeguard the military's corporate interests from his political endeavors. Musharraf anointed himself president and held faux elections for parliament with his own political party, the PML-Q, while he crushed the PPP and the offshoot of the Pakistani Muslim League loyal to Nawaz (PML-N).⁸¹

By late 2006, however, Pakistan was besieged by surging militant violence pouring out of the Afghan border area where the Army was waging a war against rural tribes aligned with al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. Amid the backdrop of the escalating extremist violence, the regime began to unravel in 2007 in the run up to Musharraf's presidential reelection and parliamentary elections as the military withdrew its support for the government. The judges Musharraf handpicked for the Supreme Court started to challenge the legality of the military regime, mainly his unconstitutional dual-hatted role as President and COAS. In response, Musharraf suspended the highly-respected Supreme Court in March, igniting riots across the country that lasted until his successful reelection in October. As protests demanding a return to democracy gripped the major cities, Musharraf acquiesced to the domestic and U.S. pressure to allow the PPP and PML-N to contest the next parliamentary elections in early 2008.⁸²

After the Supreme Court threatened to invalidate his reelection due to his position as COAS, Musharraf declared a national emergency, abrogated the constitution, suspended the court again, and ordered the Army into the streets to quell the unrest. Divisions between Musharraf and the military rapidly grew during the two-month emergency and the subsequent run-up to the parliamentary elections. The senior officers were likely extraordinarily unhappy with Musharraf's decision to have the Army forcibly step in to protect his political fortunes. Several weeks into the emergency, Musharraf stepped down as COAS and retired from the Army—the first of Pakistan's military rulers to relinquish the title and leave the military while in office—and was succeeded by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. In concurrence with the corps commanders, Kayani sought to refurbish the military's unity and prestige, and he signaled that the Army would no longer jeopardize its corporate interests for Musharraf, who would have to survive politically on his own laurels. Kayani ordered the hundreds of active duty officers assigned to civilian positions back into military service. To prevent Musharraf from politicking to his commanders, Kayani placed a ban on officers taking meetings with Musharraf or partaking in any political activity.⁸³ The next month, hundreds of retired senior Army officers demanded Musharraf's resignation—a clear

⁸¹ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 127-129.

⁸² The United States threatened to cut off the billions of dollars in operating funds and equipment it was providing the military. Laura King, "Quitting army a risky proposition for Musharraf," *Los Angeles Times*, November 15, 2007.

⁸³ Tim Johnson, "Pakistan military retreats from Musharraf's influence," *McClatchy*, January 18, 2008.

signal he had lost the support of the military.⁸⁴ Days before the February 2008 parliamentary elections between Musharraf's PML-Q party and the opposition parties, Kayani ordered the Army and intelligence agencies not to interfere with or otherwise rig the polls.⁸⁵ While Musharraf was still chief executive, his regime was on political life support and the Army was pulling the plug on the besieged military-as-government and returning itself to the barracks.

Without the military's backing, Musharraf's party was trounced at the ballot box by the PPP and PML-N. Suddenly, Musharraf faced near-certain impeachment from the new hostile parliament and likely criminal charges from the Supreme Court. Musharraf considered removing Kayani and dissolving the legislature, but he lacked supporters within the Army after Kayani had the handful of commanders still believed loyal to the beleaguered president reassigned. In August, Kayani reportedly informed Musharraf it was time for him to resign rather than fight the impeachment charges. In exchange the Army would secure him immunity from prosecution.⁸⁶ With no leg to stand on, Musharraf resigned from the presidency and was replaced by President Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto's widower and the leader of the PPP.⁸⁷ In this instance, the military returned itself to the barracks and was content to sit idly by and watch Musharraf's regime crumble, confident its corporate interests were best served—at least for now—under a civilian government.

Inferences: What Causes Pakistan's Returns to the Barracks?

The Pakistani military has played a crucial role in ending the nation's four military regimes, and facilitating a return to the barracks and the transition to civilian government. Many scholars, however, have accepted returns to the barracks in Pakistan as an inevitability given the immediate circumstances surrounding them: a disastrous defeat on the battlefield (1971), the sudden death of the ruling general (1988), and widespread civil discontent (1969, 2008).⁸⁸ Although these were certainly proximate causes, none of them alone were ultimately sufficient to force the military to withdraw.⁸⁹ Rather, these factors presented the Army with opportunities to return to the barracks, and they mattered to the extent that

⁸⁴ Carlotta Gall, "Military Retirees Demand Musharraf's Resignation," *The New York Times*, February 8, 2008.

⁸⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008), 390.

⁸⁶ "Pakistan army to ask Pervez Musharraf to resign," *Daily Telegraph*, August 8, 2008.

⁸⁷ Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 394.

⁸⁸ For example, Shafiqat writes, "The Pakistani experience revealed that the military withdrew from politics, not voluntarily, but under conditions of extreme distress or defeat." Shafiqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 167.

⁸⁹ Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, vol. 3 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 76-77.

each pushed apart or pulled together the interests of the active leaders of the armed forces and the leaders of the military regime. These events and their political contexts altered the military's underlying preference for how best to safeguard its corporate interests from reinforcing the status quo regime to selecting an alternative regime and staging a return to the barracks. Assessing Finer's three conditions for military withdrawals, the disintegration of the original conspirator group and the political difficulties of the regime can be seen as sub-variables of the divergence of interests between the military-as-government and the military-as-institution. Furthermore, there are several commonalities and patterns in these cases to explain how and why the divergence of interests occurs.

The Vice of Origin Problem: In the aftermath of a coup, the military regime's authority to govern is *pro tempore*. There is a fusion among the military and the newly-formed regime with shared interests and common goals, which allow the two to operate in relative harmony compared to the ousted civilian government.⁹⁰ The threat to the military's corporate interests which triggered the coup is righted by the establishment of the military regime. In due time, the military rulers recognize they cannot rely on the military as a blunt instrument to provide legitimacy by force and expect it to repress domestic opposition in the long-term. The regime begins down a rocky path to legitimize itself through sham liberalization efforts. So long as the military's corporate interests are secured, it lends support to the regime's effort to legitimize itself. The rifts between the military and the regime are still young and shallow, but the regime's political difficulties at achieving legitimacy begin to drive a wedge between the two.

Rewards and Punishment: Pakistan's military regimes, like their civilian counterparts, have all suffered from severe control problems. Military and civilian leaders' efforts to control the military have generally been all carrot and no stick.⁹¹ The regimes are quick to provide economic incentives to the military by increasing defense spending, securing foreign arms suppliers, increasing pay, and providing side benefits. Neither military nor civilian leaders have engaged in elaborate coup-proofing measures, doubtlessly because such efforts would draw the ire of the military which would face a threat to its unity and monopoly on force.⁹² While both military and civilian leaders have frequently tinkered with the promotion system and top-brass assignments to install loyalists, these efforts prove inadequate.⁹³ Moreover, wholesale liquidations or mass purges of the officer corps, a common feature of military

⁹⁰ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 31.

⁹¹ Sattar, "Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism," 397-399.

⁹² See James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Autumn 1999).

⁹³ For instance, Prime Minister ZA Bhutto promoted Zia ul-Haq to COAS in 1976 over more senior officers because he was perceived to be more politically pliable to Bhutto's civilian government. Zia later led the coup against Bhutto and engineered his execution. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promoted Pervez Musharraf to COAS in 1998 for similar reasons, only to be overthrown and exiled by Musharraf the next year. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 337-338, 500-501.

regimes elsewhere, have not occurred in Pakistan.⁹⁴ Without many sticks, there is clearly a stark limit to how far the regime can motivate the military to do its bidding through building informal personalistic-alliances and providing economic incentives when the military is faced with a high cost to its corporate interests.⁹⁵

Regime Maintenance: An authoritarian military regime only seizes and remains in power by the use or threat of violence. Once its military becomes unwilling to repress on the new regime's behalf or takes other actions towards achieving a return to the barracks, it is committing an act of shirking essentially equal to the original coup. Furthermore, by illegally seizing power when the military's corporate interests were threatened, the regime itself has set a strong precedent for the military to do so again under such conditions.⁹⁶ While all of Pakistan's coups have been relatively bloodless, there is often a brief period afterward when the military is willing to crackdown for the new military regime in order to reestablish calm. Over time, however, the military becomes gradually wearier of performing widespread regime maintenance at the expense of its corporate interests.⁹⁷ At the same time, the regime's efforts to achieve legitimacy often begin to backfire as political opposition revives and greater repression is required. The military begins to shirk in protecting the regime from domestic political crises and officers form a preference to return to the barracks.

Conclusion and Implications

The Pakistani military is motivated to return to the barracks for the same reason it leaves the barracks: to protect its corporate interests. Theorists have generally assumed that the basic civil-military problématique ends after a coup. The military then rules as a unified actor or the military acts as a perfect agent of the military regime. Yet this is clearly not the case in Pakistan. To draw on agency theory, the military-as-government becomes the substitute principal for the civilian authorities while the military-as-institution remains the agent. Obviously, the distinction is blurry because both principal and agent are wearing uniforms and often appear to act in concert. Yet, beneath the surface, their interests are on different paths as the active leaders of the armed forces seek to protect the military's corporate interests while the leaders of the military regime seek to protect its grasp on political power. In the long run, these

⁹⁴ See Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 192-193.

⁹⁵ For further discussion and case study, see Terence Lee, "Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 1 (October 2005).

⁹⁶ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 193.

⁹⁷ One major exception to this was the military's ruthless crackdown in East Pakistan in 1971. Yet from the perspective that the possible breakup of Pakistan was a major threat to the military's corporate interests—defending the state's territorial integrity being its primary mission—can at least partly explain its willingness to engage in outright butchery on behalf of the Yahya regime. Shafiqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 61.

preferences prove divergent. Further research is needed on military withdrawals from politics, which remains considerably underdeveloped and has fallen to the back of the research agenda in recent years. Theorists should recognize that politics and agency problems in civil-military relations pervade even under military regimes when the “civilian” principal is actually the military-as-government.⁹⁸ Although comparative politics has recognized that schisms among the military elite as the leading cause of death for military regimes, they have not fully drawn out the civil-military dimensions.⁹⁹ For policymakers, an enhanced understanding of Pakistan’s dysfunctional and complex civil-military relations will help craft better policy towards U.S. military aid and balancing the dealings with the current civilian government and the military.

Anthony Bell is a recent graduate of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He is currently an Instructional Assistant at the George Washington University and an intern in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), Office of African Affairs.

⁹⁸ Feaver makes such a case, but does not link it to returns to the barracks, see Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 292-293.

⁹⁹ See Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999).

Anatomy of a Winning Insurgency: Learning From Hizballah's Victory Over Israel in the 1982-2000 South Lebanon Conflict

JEFF BURDETTE

In developing a counter-terrorism strategy, the United States should seek to learn from the elements that have been successful for past insurgents. This paper looks at Hizballah's 2000 victory over the Israel Defense Forces and analyzes why the insurgency was successful and what U.S. policymakers can learn from Hizballah's success.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States was pitted against a resilient and adroit insurgency. And each time, the United States struggled to respond effectively. Given the growing presence of al-Qaeda linked or inspired insurgents in numerous countries throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, the United States is likely to be drawn into more of these conflicts in the near future. To respond effectively, the United States must develop a counterterrorism strategy that understands and react to the success of past insurgencies.

In few conflicts can more of these lessons be found than Hizballah's 2000 victory over the Israel defense Forces (IDF). In 1982, Hizballah launched an insurgency that would culminate two decades later in Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. When the fighting escalated in 2000, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered Lebanon with an impressive history of success, including lopsided victories over its Arab neighbors in 1948 and 1967, but returned without achieving its objectives.

How did Hizballah, a force comprised of no more than a few thousand fighters, drive the IDF from Lebanon? This paper answers this question in five parts. The first section traces Hizballah's emergence in southern Lebanon in the early 1980s. The next three sections explain why Hizballah's impressive success is best understood as the culmination of a sophisticated and highly effective politico-military strategy founded on a strong and loyal political following, a vast social welfare program, and military success. In the fifth and final section, the paper shows how the lessons from Hizballah's success are relevant to U.S. counterinsurgency practitioners today.

Southern Lebanon in 1982 and Hizballah's Emergence

On June 6, 1982, the IDF crossed into Lebanon as part of Operation Peace for Galilee, an attempt to bring security to northern Israel by expelling Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces based in southern Lebanon. Their endgame was the establishment of a friendly Christian government in Beirut,

led by Maronite militia commander Bachir Gemayel. But, Israel had not given serious thought to how they would administer the power vacuum left in the south by the destruction of the PLO's mini-state.¹ As the PLO collapsed and this vacuum emerged, the Shia, a majority of the population in southern Lebanon, rushed to fill it.

By 1982, the Shia in Lebanon had endured a long history of suffering; one observer described them as “a politically, socially, and economically marginalized minority- the ‘wretched of the earth.’”² Moreover, their location in southern Lebanon placed them at the center of the PLO-IDF fighting and they suffered disproportionately in the IDF incursions in both 1978 and 1982.³ In light of their history of political oppression and socioeconomic deprivation, it's unsurprising that the Shias celebrated the expulsion of the PLO. However, this was not support for Israel's presence in Lebanon.

Shia resistance to the IDF began almost immediately. Hizballah was not the first group to rise to defend the Shias or contest Israel's presence in Lebanon. Initially, the Shia militia Amal was dominant. However, Amal was beset by several important weaknesses that would be skillfully exploited by an ascendant Hizballah. First, Amal was largely secular and could expect only tenuous and begrudging support from religious conservatives.⁴ Second, they exposed themselves to charges of being collaborationist. When Amal leader Nabih Berri agreed to join a ‘national salvation’ committee that also included Gemayel, outraged Shias condemned him as a collaborator with the Israeli occupiers and even his own deputy angrily denounced him.⁵ Third, and perhaps most importantly, Amal was viewed as soft and ineffectual because of their reluctance to engage in violence against the IDF. In the early days of the conflict, the Higher Shiite Council, led by senior Amal member Shams al-Din, urged the Shia of Lebanon to reject the occupation and refuse to cooperate with Israel.⁶ But he was describing a campaign of civil disobedience, not one of violence. For some, this was not enough.

Tempers reached their breaking point on October 16, 1983, when an IDF convoy traveling through the town of Nabatiya interrupted villagers celebrating the sacred Shia holiday of Ashura. Outraged, the worshipers rioted in protest. When they attacked the IDF vehicles, soldiers opened fire,

¹ Daniel Isaac Helmer. “Flip Side of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000.” *The Long War Series*, 47. Available at: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/helmer.pdf>.

² Graham E. Fuller. “The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance.” *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2006-2007), 142. Available at: http://catalogo.casid.difesa.it/GEIDFile/07winter_fuller.PDF?Archive=191308091958&File=07winter_fuller_PDF.

³ Florence Gaub. “The Role of Hezbollah in Post-Conflict Lebanon.” *European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies* (July 16, 2013), 7.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Nicholas Blanford. *Warriors of God* (New York: Random House, 2011), 46.

⁶ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 47.

killing and wounding several worshipers.⁷ Al-Din again called for civil disobedience but conceded that “we might need years before we achieve our final objective.”⁸ To the furious Shia, this call for patience rang hollow.

Amal’s apparent impotence in the face of this latest indignity divided its membership and exposed Amal to radicals prepared to outflank them with promises of immediate, violent action. This opportunity would prove fortuitous for the group that would come to be known as Hizballah.⁹ In stark contrast to Al-Din’s meek call for non-violent resistance, Hizballah-linked cleric Hussein Fadlallah pledged ferociously “if it is legitimate to defend self and land and destiny, then all means of self-defense are legitimate.”¹⁰ These were not empty words. Exactly one week later, Hizballah launched a pair of massive coordinated suicide bombings against French and American barracks in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French soldiers.

Political Strategy

Hizballah amassed strong support through a sophisticated and effective political strategy resting on two pillars: a broadly resonant narrative emphasizing nationalist resistance to Israeli occupiers and a massive social welfare program that consolidated public support.

Hizballah’s Narrative

Beginning with Mao Zedong, insurgents have emphasized the centrality of broad-based political support to military success. Accordingly, Hizballah’s most important challenge was to build a narrative capable of not only energizing their narrow political base of conservative religious Shias, but also transcending it to reach Lebanon’s cosmopolitan and religiously diverse population. In the context of Amal’s competition for leadership of the Shias and the brutal inter-confessional civil war raging throughout Lebanon, this meant being able to reach beyond Shia religious ideology without disavowing it.

At first, Hizballah was largely unsuccessful in its attempts to strike the ideological balance between being adequately conservative for their base and sufficiently secular for the rest of Lebanon. In February 1985, when they released a manifesto formally announcing their formation, efforts to reach beyond the Shia community were of secondary importance to consolidating the support of their base. Journalist Nicholas Blanford characterizes the document as reflecting an “arrogance of conviction”; it was

⁷ Ibid., 48.

⁸ Ibid., 49.

⁹ Though the roots of Hizballah can be traced to 1982, they did not formally announce their existence until February 16, 1985. Before that, they existed as a largely clandestine, loosely organized network, operating under different names, including Islamic Jihad.

¹⁰ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 49.

written to energize existing supporters, not woo new ones.¹¹ Moreover, though the first goal listed in the manifesto—the expulsion of western powers from Lebanon—was premised upon popular nationalist sentiment, the remaining two were of much narrower appeal. The second goal called for the defense of Muslims and Christians, but singled out the predominantly Christian Phalange as their oppressor.¹² The third goal was even more explicitly exclusionary, calling for the establishment of an Islamic government as the only means of protecting the sovereignty of Lebanon from the predations of external powers.¹³

Scholar Christopher Whitting points out that this emphasis on religion meant Hizballah “had nothing to offer the non-Shiite two thirds of Lebanon’s population.” Even its support within the Shia community had as much to do with Hizballah’s commitment to redressing their historical deprivations and indignities as it did with ideological affinity.¹⁴ Early attempts by Hizballah to impose an austere form of sharia law upon southern Lebanon were met with an intense backlash. One observer describes this period:

“Islamic laws backfired to such a degree that they alienated the local population, with the closure of coffee shops being deemed especially harsh. The Islamic laws ruined the local tourist economy, with empty beaches and restaurants. [Hizballah] had disregarded the importance the local population attributed to individuality and were losing their support in the process.”¹⁵

As Whitting explains, this soon changed; “by the 1990s, Hizballah was forced to the conclusion that it could not continue to defy Lebanon’s cosmopolitan reality...Party leaders came to deny any ambition to impose an Iranian-style Islamic state.”¹⁶ Instead, they cloaked themselves in nationalism, relentlessly portraying themselves as the only capable defenders of southern Lebanon. By 1989, senior party official and future Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was reassuring the Lebanese that “we do not seek power and do not wish to compete with anyone over state positions; our political

¹¹ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 72.

¹² The Phalange is a Lebanese political party primarily supported by Maronite Christians. During the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war, the armed wing of the Phalange represented Lebanon’s most formidable Christian militia. For further background, see “Phalange Party” in Thomas Collelo, ed. *Lebanon: A Country Study* (Washington: General Printing Office, 1987). Available at: <http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/85.htm>.

¹³ “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program.” Accessed July 25, 2013. Available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20060821215729/http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm.

¹⁴ Christopher E. Whitting. “When David Became Goliath.” *Masters Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College* (June 1, 2001), 65. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA397303>.

¹⁵ Iver Gabrielsen. “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.” *Small Wars Journal* (July 11, 2013). Available at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hezbollahs-strategy-and-tactics-in-the-security-zone-from-1985-to-2000>.

¹⁶ Whitting, “When David Became Goliath,” 65.

movement is based on the premise of fighting Israel.”¹⁷ This new narrative resonated. By 1992 Hizballah was widely considered unmatched in its single-minded drive to expel Israel from Lebanon.¹⁸

They sought to consolidate their new nationalist bona fides by taking steps to allay fears that they hoped to establish an exclusionary theocratic state. First, they actively sought to integrate themselves into a political system they previously rejected as corrupt and apostate. In 1992, several Hizballah candidates ran for Parliament and the group won eight seats.¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, their platform focused almost exclusively on resistance, rather than religion or the imposition of sharia. A popular campaign slogan noted that “they resist with their blood, resist with your vote.”²⁰ Significantly, Hizballah’s candidates were mostly civilians rather than clergy members, and even included members of other religions.²¹

Second, they aggressively reached out to non-Shia communities, particularly Maronites. This effort included the abandonment of an initial goal to abolish Lebanon’s sectarian political quota system.²² Hizballah also took conscious steps to moderate its rhetoric towards Christians. Leaders stopped dismissing them as unwelcome intruders unworthy of full rights and began welcoming them as *muwataneen* (fellow citizens).²³ They even sought to portray themselves as not only accepting of other sects, but actively inclusive of them, establishing special intra-confessional military units known as “Lebanese Resistance Brigades.”²⁴

As Hizballah embraced nationalism and the resistance narrative, their public standing improved dramatically. After Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, a devastating Israeli air campaign provoked by Hizballah rocket fire, they were so strongly supported in Lebanon that no politician from any sect dared criticize their insurgency, and the government was ready to defend Hizballah before the United Nations.²⁵ A villager interviewed in 1993 in the wake of an Israeli air operation spoke for much of the country when he said Hizballah is “only fighting for their country...they just want to get Israel out of here.”²⁶

But even while Hizballah was integrating itself politically and extending an olive branch to Lebanon’s other religious communities, they were able to satisfy their conservative Shia base. Iver

¹⁷ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 91.

¹⁸ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 54.

¹⁹ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Gaub, “The Role of Hezbollah in Post-Conflict Lebanon,” 7.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Whitting, “When David Became Goliath,” 66.

²⁵ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

²⁶ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 56.

Gabrielsen notes that, remarkably, “the Party of God said enough to energize its Islamic members, but also toned down their rhetoric sufficiently to appease their non-Islamic neighbours.”²⁷ That they were able to strike this difficult balance is testament to their political agility and skill.

Social Welfare

The nationalist narrative was only one pillar of Hizballah’s campaign to win the support of the public. In parallel with the developing narrative, they erected a vast social welfare program. Numerous scholars have argued that Hizballah’s focus on providing basic services to the long-deprived people of south Lebanon gave them a degree of public support the IDF could never hope to match. Indeed, the scale of Hizballah’s program was breathtaking running the gamut from food, clothing, and monthly stipends to the construction of hospitals and schools.²⁸ In their southern Beirut stronghold, they purchased trucks and employed volunteers to clear the mountains of garbage clogging the streets.²⁹ They improved the sewage system and provided agricultural assistance to farmers. By 2000, roughly 400,000 people were receiving healthcare from Hizballah.³⁰

As Blanford notes, Hizballah viewed these programs as an important strategic tool in their insurgency against Israel.³¹ The assistance helped create a state of dependency that fused the population inseparably to Hizballah. Hizballah deputy leader Naim Qassem explains that this was seen as an important part of their ambition to build a “society of resistance” whereby the insurgency would belong not just to formal members of Hizballah, but would become an inextricable part of the entire community. In his words, the resistance would become “an integration of the people, whereby everyone gives.”³²

Hizballah’s aid program also allowed them to exploit the collateral damage incurred during IDF operations. They have claimed that, between 1991 and 2000, they repaired every single home damaged in an Israeli raid or attack, a total of 17,212.³³ Daniel Helmer recounts a typical episode: “as soon as Israel stopped shelling, [Hizballah] returned into the areas and began rebuilding the homes that Israel had destroyed.”³⁴ The assistance programs, therefore, placed the IDF in a difficult bind where almost any offensive operation could be twisted into a political coup by Hizballah.

²⁷ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 82.

³² Ibid.

³³ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

³⁴ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 56.

Military Strategy

It is often said that, in insurgencies, people back winners. Unsurprisingly then, in addition to a strong narrative and their vast public welfare program, Hizballah's military success was instrumental in fueling its public support. This success can be attributed to their understanding of the relationship between military and political strategy, their tactical flexibility, their persistence in identifying and focusing on Israeli public support as the center of gravity, and their significant external support from Iran and Syria.

The Relationship between Military and Political Strategy

Summing up the relationship between politics and military strategy nearly 200 years ago, Carl von Clausewitz wrote "the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it."³⁵ Importantly, Hizballah recognized that military strategy is important only within the context of a viable, coherent political strategy; or, more bluntly, the political goal drives military strategy, rather than the inverse. Consequently, Hizballah military operations were always designed with the specific intent of cultivating popular support and they adopted and fiercely adhered to a new admonition, "the population is a treasure—always nurture it."³⁶

Hizballah went out of its way to meet this standard, adopting onerous precautions to ensure its attacks did not lead to unnecessary civilian casualties. This even extended to taking promising military options off the table if they were deemed likely to harm the Lebanese population. For example, few weapons had as significant a strategic impact as Hizballah's stocks of Katyusha rockets. Despite their limited tactical value, each rocket fired across the border by Hizballah terrified the population of northern Israel and highlighted the IDF's continued inability to eliminate this threat. Yet, each rocket fired was also invariably met with ferocious Israeli retaliation, such that even some supporters of Hizballah became apprehensive about their use.³⁷ As a result, Hizballah largely abandoned offensive use of the rockets. According to Nasrallah, their value was as a deterrent: "If you attack us, we will use our Katyushas; if you do not attack us, we will not use our Katyushas."³⁸ Hizballah, in other words, correctly assessed that a less restrained use of the missiles could lead to military gains, but they would be outweighed the resulting loss of popular support and damage to Hizballah's narrative.

Flexibility

The second pillar of Hizballah's military success was their notable strategic and tactical flexibility and willingness to study and learn from the IDF. An early account of Hizballah's tactics from a UN observer

³⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz. *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

³⁶ Helmer. "Flip Side of the COIN," 54.

³⁷ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 99.

³⁸ Ibid.

in Lebanon dismisses them as “amateur and foolhardy, though very brave.”³⁹ Their early success in employing terrorism to impressive effect has been well documented, but their tactics on the battlefield were still fairly rudimentary at the beginning of the insurgency. They focused principally on large-scale raids against IDF and Southern Lebanon Army (SLA) outposts. These ambitious attacks usually resulted in very heavy casualties and limited success. The UN observer describes a typical early raid: “They simply walked into the line of fire only to be cut down immediately...A single attack against Israeli troops in mid-1986 resulted in twenty-four [Hizballah] fatalities.”⁴⁰ These tactics were, of course, unsustainable. First, Hizballah could not afford the casualties. Though Hizballah boasted a large number of supporters, and often drew on them to bolster operations, the number of full-time fighters was quite small. Estimates for the number of Hizballah fighters range from several thousand on the high end to as low as 500 full-time fighters on the low end.⁴¹ Second, the ineffectiveness of their tactics undermined their public support because people are unlikely to accept the risks of supporting an insurgency unless they expect it to win.⁴² Hizballah would have been particularly sensitive to this concern given their emphasis on maintaining strong public support. Clearly, their tactics needed to change.

In fact, Hizballah proved exceptionally adaptive. Helmer recounts that “suicide assaults on IDF positions gave way to sophisticated, coordinated, and timed attacks as [Hizballah] became more and more effective.”⁴³ Small, quick ambushes became a common, and devastatingly effective, tactic. Hizballah drafted and disseminated a list of thirteen principles of warfare encapsulating many of the tactics made famous by Mao and other classic guerillas. One principle cautions fighters to “avoid the strong and attack the weak,” while others emphasize that “surprise is essential to success” and urge fighters to hit hard and then “slip away like smoke before the enemy can drive home his advantage.”⁴⁴ These principles served as their new tactical model.

As Hizballah adapted, they were at once everywhere and nowhere on the battlefield. In 1990, the IDF officially credited Hizballah with 25 attacks; by 1998, they were averaging almost four per *day*, an increase of over 5000% annually.⁴⁵ IDF and SLA soldiers “grew to dread moving out of their base camps

³⁹ Whitting, “When David Became Goliath,” 66.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ See Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000”; Kellie S. Rourke. “U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Is it adequate to defeat Hezbollah as a threat model of future insurgencies?” *Masters Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College* (June 12, 2009), 5. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502050>.

⁴² Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

⁴³ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 51.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 53.

⁴⁵ Whitting, “When David Became Goliath,” 46.

for fear that any object, rock, bush, or tree might explode next to them.”⁴⁶ But even as the tempo of attacks spiked, the IDF was frustrated by their inability to find and strike Hizballah insurgents. Whitting explains that “the perpetual problem facing the IDF is that Hizballah targets cannot be found. They were looking for guerilla targets. They found none to hit and there was nothing they could do.”⁴⁷ Too often, the frustrated IDF responded with mass, non-targeted sweeps that resulted in the arrest of innocents or retaliatory shelling or air strikes that invariably harmed civilians.⁴⁸ Predictably, this only reinforced Hizballah’s support.

Presaging the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hizballah’s most feared weapon was the roadside bomb; it was perhaps here that they best demonstrated their impressive flexibility. Iver Gabrielsen describes the cat-and-mouse contest for supremacy that developed between Hizballah bomb-makers and the IDF:

*When the IDF employed sniffer dogs to discover wire-triggered bombs, [Hizballah] answered by hiding IEDs inside fiberglass rocks and used radio control to set off the bombs. The IDF responded by sweeping radio frequencies from listening posts at Mount Hermon. [Hizballah] then switched to using cell phone receivers to trigger the IEDs. The IDF answered by jamming cell phone signals, while [Hizballah] responded by using infra-red beams to set off the IEDs.*⁴⁹

Despite persistent IDF attempts to eliminate the roadside bomb threat, Hizballah always remained one step ahead. In February 1999, near the end of the war, Hizballah’s IED campaign enjoyed its greatest success when a roadside bomb killed Brigadier General Erez Gerstein, one of the most senior IDF commanders in Lebanon.⁵⁰ By the end of the conflict, Hizballah’s roadside bombs had become so sophisticated and so well hidden that IDF mine clearing operations entailed patrols walking along roads and literally counting rocks.⁵¹

By the Israeli pullout in 2000, some IDF officers admitted that Hizballah had been more flexible and adaptable than its adversary. According to General Moshe Kaplinsky, commander of the Golani Brigade, Hizballah is a “learning organization” that studies Israel’s evolving tactics.⁵²

Israeli Political Will as the Center of Gravity

⁴⁶ Ibid, 73.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 86.

⁴⁸ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 53.

⁴⁹ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Whitting, “When David Became Goliath,” 84.

⁵² Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 148.

The third component of Hizballah's military success was their unwavering fixation on Israeli political will as the war's center of gravity. Because insurgents, almost by definition, are militarily inferior their goal is typically not military victory, but to prolong the conflict until their adversaries are willing to concede or negotiate a settlement favorable to the insurgents. Similarly, according to Gordon, Hizballah had no illusions about their inability to directly confront the IDF militarily and never sought to.⁵³ Unlike Mao, who envisioned a phased insurgency culminating in a conventional victory, Hizballah never attempted to build a conventional force. From the very beginning they recognized that the war would turn on public perception, so they focused their efforts on attriting Israeli political will by isolating Israel from its allies, building a sophisticated media apparatus, and directly threatening the Israeli public.

One of Hizballah's first goals was to demoralize Israel by driving its allies from the battlefield. The United States, for its support of Israel, and France, for its support of Maronite Christians, were identified as critical targets, and Hizballah went aggressively after both.⁵⁴ In fact, Hizballah first became broadly visible to the world with a spate of terrorist attacks against the United States and France in 1983. On April 18, a suicide bomber detonated a truck bomb outside of the U.S. embassy, killing 17 Americans. Then, on October 23, truck bombs were detonated minutes apart at separate barracks housing American and French soldiers, killing 241 Americans and 58 Frenchmen.⁵⁵ The message was clear; as long as the United States and France remained in Lebanon, their forces would be targeted. Soon thereafter, the Multinational Force in Lebanon withdrew.⁵⁶

Hizballah also took aim at Israel's Lebanese allies. The Southern Lebanese Army, a largely Christian militia established by the IDF, became a favorite target and Hizballah sought the defection of SLA fighters through both coercion and incentives. Hizballah terrorized the SLA, cultivating and encouraging the perception that no fighters were safe. An assassination program killed SLA leaders at all levels, culminating most prominently in the death of deputy leader Aql Hashim.⁵⁷ Yet this stick proceeded with a parallel system of incentives; amnesty was offered to any SLA fighters willing to defect or become spies.⁵⁸ By 1999 this combined assassination-amnesty campaign had created "a deficit of trust"

⁵³ Shmuel L. Gordon. "The Vulture and the Snake: Counter-Guerilla Air Warfare: The War in Southern Lebanon." *Mideast Security and Policy Studies*, No. 39 (July 1998). Available at: <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/39pub.html>.

⁵⁴ Augustus Richard Norton. *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 37.

⁵⁵ Kellie S. Rourke. "U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Is it adequate to defeat Hezbollah as a threat model of future insurgencies?" *Masters Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College* (June 12, 2009), 5. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502050>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Gabrielsen, "Hezbollah's Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000," 4.

⁵⁸ Helmer, "Flip Side of the COIN," 58.

between Israel and the SLA, with each questioning the other's commitment.⁵⁹ In one particularly devastating episode, Hizballah kidnapped SLA security chief Ahmed al-Hallaq and immediately compromised the entire IDF intelligence structure in Lebanon.⁶⁰ In effect, Hizballah's ability to knock out Israel's allies left the IDF alone on the battlefield, and the effect on Israeli morale was deeply damaging.

While seeking to isolate Israel, Hizballah also launched a sustained and multifaceted campaign to shape Israeli domestic opinion. The famous Clausewitzian concept of the trinity of war observes that the continued prosecution of a war requires the alignment of a state's political leadership, military, and population.⁶¹ In effect, this represents a key vulnerability to modern liberal democracies because militarily inferior insurgents can challenge their adversary's ability to sustain combat if they are able to adequately influence its population. Hizballah recognized this vulnerability and built its military strategy around it. According to Israeli analyst Schmuël Gordon, Hizballah intended "to aim at what Israeli society is most sensitive to- the loss of human life."⁶² Hizballah has explicitly discussed their awareness of Israeli casualty sensitivity and its potential as a lever for undermining support for the war. Hizballah official Nabil Qawk observed "the more Israelis we kill, the more disputes we'll be sowing among them."⁶³

One of Hizballah's 13 principles of war notes that "the media has innumerable guns, whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle."⁶⁴ Indeed, Hizballah stands out among most insurgents in the sophistication and aggressiveness of their media operations. In 1991, it founded its own television station, al-Manar ("the beacon"), and radio station, al-Nour ("the light").⁶⁵ For the remaining decade of the insurgency, this media arm would become one of Hizballah's most important weapons. Media and propaganda were integrated directly into Hizballah military planning and operations; attacks were videotaped and quickly disseminated through al-Manar.⁶⁶ The ability to document their attacks and broadcast them directly to the Israeli public served to demonstrate Hizballah's effectiveness and substantiate their successes while exerting an emotional impact that press releases or written stories never could have. By 1996, Hizballah had sought to capitalize on this success by broadcasting some al-Manar and al-Nour programming in Hebrew, directly addressing IDF soldiers and civilians and relentlessly hammering home the message that the IDF would be subject to attacks for as long as it remained in

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Whitting, "When David Became Goliath," 75.

⁶¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

⁶² Gordon, "The Vulture and the Snake."

⁶³ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 200.

⁶⁴ Helmer, "Flip Side of the COIN," 54.

⁶⁵ Whitting, "When David Became Goliath," 94-95.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 94.

Lebanon.⁶⁷ One IDF officer bemoaned the effectiveness of this strategy, assessing that “frequently, TV reports on a guerilla operation have more effect than the operation itself.”⁶⁸ Or, as Nayaf Krayyem, chairman of al-Manar explained in a 2001 interview, “it’s a political weapon, social weapon, and cultural weapon.”⁶⁹

Hizballah even designed some offensive operations specifically with propaganda in mind.⁷⁰ It was tireless in its pursuit of opportunities to reinforce their message that Israeli counterinsurgency would be both futile and bloody. On January 19, 2000, IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz held a press conference announcing that 1999 had seen just 13 IDF fatalities. Hizballah immediately escalated its offensive operations, soon averaging 15 attacks per day. Within three weeks of the press conference, Hizballah had killed 7 IDF soldiers and humiliated Mofaz. Polls in Israel showed a dramatic decline in public support for the war.⁷¹

Hizballah’s media operations have been linked to the growing morale problems that plagued the IDF as the conflict progressed. In 1995, a paratrooper unit was disbanded after its soldiers learned they were being deployed to Lebanon and demanded that their commander give them a different mission.⁷² By the end of the war 200 IDF soldiers had been imprisoned for outright refusing to serve in Lebanon.⁷³ In Israel, peace movements such as the Four Mothers group emerged and vocally advocated immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.⁷⁴ The IDF’s targeting of Hizballah’s TV and radio facilities suggests that it shared Hizballah’s views on the importance of its media operations.⁷⁵ Nasrallah himself has claimed that victory would not have been possible without al-Manar.⁷⁶

Hizballah’s pressure on Israeli domestic opinion went beyond effective use of the media. It also pursued attacks demonstrating their ability to bring insecurity directly to Israeli civilians. The message was that not only would the IDF continue to face heavy casualties until it agreed to withdraw, but even civilians within the borders of Israel were not safe.

First, a series of terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated Hizballah’s ability to reach Israeli targets anywhere in the world. Most famously, it has been blamed for a pair of major attacks in

⁶⁷ Ibid., 136.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 96.

⁶⁹ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 135.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

⁷² Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 149.

⁷³ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

⁷⁴ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 200.

⁷⁵ Gabrielsen, “Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000.”

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Buenos Aires: the 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing and a 1994 bombing at a Jewish community center. Blanford has argued that these attacks were intended to convey a clear message to Israel that Hizballah “had the means and will to retaliate on a global basis.”

Second, Hizballah used Katyusha and other short and medium-range rockets to tremendous effect. As noted, Hizballah was hesitant to actually fire rockets into Israel, fearing that harsh retaliation would degrade their support. Nevertheless, it was still able to effectively use the rockets to shape Israeli public opinion. Their presence alone served as an implicit threat and Hizballah’s deployment of the rockets, even if infrequent, clearly demonstrated to Israeli citizens the IDF’s inability to keep them safe. Helmer reports that “by 1988, Israelis in Galilee were beginning to doubt that they would ever have permanent security in their homes from Katyusha rockets,” rendering ironic the name Peace for Galilee given to Israel’s original 1982 incursion into Lebanon.⁷⁷ By the 1990s, Israel was forced to provide significant financial incentives to prevent residents from fleeing.⁷⁸

Hizballah’s ability to directly target the Israeli public is a fairly unique for an insurgency facing an external counterinsurgent. In very few expeditionary counterinsurgencies, as opposed to their domestic counterparts, does the insurgent have the capacity to target as much of the counterinsurgent’s populace as frequently and easily as Hizballah. While other insurgents can attempt to use terrorist attacks to create a similar effect, they cannot hope to do so in the quantity or with the tempo with which Hizballah can launch rockets. And while strong states will generally have robust counterterrorism capacities, there was little Israel could do to stop Hizballah’s rockets throughout the South Lebanon Conflict. Hizballah’s proximity to Israel, therefore, gave them a unique capacity to undertake such operations directly against the Israeli population, both abroad, and within Israel itself. The emergence of this new trend, in tandem with their effective media operations, made Hizballah’s capacity to shape Israeli domestic opinion all the more acute.

External Support

The final element of Hizballah’s military success is its strong external support from Iran and Syria. Numerous scholars of insurgency discuss the importance of external support, with some going so far as to describe it as nearly a prerequisite of success. For instance, Bard O’Neill argues that “unless governments are utterly incompetent, devoid of political will, and lacking in resources, insurgent organizations must normally obtain outside assistance if they are to succeed.”⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Helmer, “Flip Side of the COIN,” 55.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 139. See also Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movement* (Washington

From the very beginning, Hizballah had enormous external support. Indeed, despite its deeply Lebanese character, Hizballah's very roots are entangled with foreign powers. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with the support of Syria, took an active role in encouraging Hizballah's formation. Hizballah reciprocated by hewing closely to the *wilayat al-faqih*, the revolutionary Shia Islamist conception of governance advanced by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. A February 1985 open letter formally announcing the group's formation opens by proclaiming "we obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and jurist...Ruhollah Musawi Kohmeini."⁸⁰ In 1995, the two were bound even closer together when Iran formally designated Nasrallah Supreme Leader Khomeini's deputy in Lebanon.⁸¹

In return for Hizballah's ideological fealty, Iran provided substantial support in the form of training, weapons, and funding. Helmer has argued that support from Iran and Syria was "vital" to Hizballah's emergence.⁸² In 1982 as Hizballah was beginning to coalesce, the IRGC sent 1,500 soldiers to Lebanon to train and support the movement.⁸³ The training assistance was supplemented by large-scale shipments of weapons.⁸⁴ For its part, Syria offered Hizballah logistical support and helped secure the supply line through which Iranian weapons and trainers flowed.⁸⁵ This support went beyond purely military assistance. The vast social welfare programs so essential to Hizballah's public support were largely underwritten by Iranian funding.⁸⁶

Hizballah made no effort to hide the extensive material and political support it received. Former Hizballah Secretary General Subhi al-Tufayli conceded that denying Iran aided his organization was like "denying that the sun gives light to the Earth."⁸⁷ Despite the close ideological, financial, and military links between the two, it would be a mistake to view Hizballah as purely an Iranian proxy. It would have

D.C.; RAND, 2001); Jeffrey Record, "External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success" *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVI (Autumn 2006).

⁸⁰ "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program." Accessed July 25, 2013. Available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20060821215729/http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm.

⁸¹ Helmer, "Flip Side of the COIN," 51.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Whitting, "When David Became Goliath," 46.

⁸⁴ Fuller, "The Hizballah-Iran Connection," 142. Note: "Effective" is of course a relative term. As noted, Hizballah's early operations were tactically primitive compared to their later operations. However, they were able to conduct several sophisticated and effective terrorist attacks as early as 1983, and this likely would have been impossible without Iranian training and material support.

⁸⁵ Natasha Lander. "Hezbollah: Organizational Analysis of an Insurgency." *The Michigan Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol. 7 (Spring 2010), 2. Available at: <http://www.mjpa.umich.edu/uploads/2/9/3/2/2932559/6-lander-hezbollah.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Gabrielsen, "Hezbollah's Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985-2000."

⁸⁷ Ibid.

been impossible for Hizballah to maintain its strong popular support if it were seen as an Iranian pawn. Terrorism expert Graham Fuller argues that Hizballah retained significant autonomy and broadcast this independence to their Lebanese base. According to Fuller, “all Lebanese are deeply aware of the group’s deeply Lebanese character” and viewed Hizballah’s close relationship with Iran as a forgivable example of pragmatism in a nation with a long and pervasive history of foreign meddling in domestic politics.⁸⁸

Lessons from the South Lebanon Conflict

For the foreseeable future, insurgencies are likely to continue to dominate the landscape of conflicts confronting the United States and its allies. Recent years have seen al-Qaeda linked, inspired, or sympathetic insurgents active to varying degrees in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and a litany of other countries throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Given overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority and the vulnerabilities to insurgency demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, these adversaries will continue to seek to confront the United States and its partners with irregular or asymmetric tactics and strategy.

The United States would do well to study Hizballah’s success against Israel. Particular attention should be paid to Hizballah’s ability to shape an attractive and resonant nationalist narrative and its use of social services to win the support of the population. The United States has recognized the effect of Hizballah’s social services model, and sought to deny insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan similar opportunities by integrating the provision of services into its counterinsurgency doctrine.⁸⁹ This strategy has often proven difficult, with frequent reports of waste and corruption.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, even in the face of difficulties, this effort should not be conceded; one of the key lessons of Hizballah’s victory is that providing services where the government is unable or unwilling to do so is one of the insurgents’ most effective means of winning support.

It will be more difficult for the United States to craft a resonant narrative, but where authentic counter-narratives form organically, the United States should recognize an opportunity to support them. For instance, in Iraq, there were several waves of popular resentment and anger against al-Qaeda insurgents, but each ended in failure until late 2006 when the United States actively encouraged and supported what would come to be known as the Anbar Awakening.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Fuller, “The Hizballah-Iran Connection,” 143.

⁸⁹ For example, see *Army Field Manual 3-24: Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C.; Department of the Army, 2009), 7-20.

⁹⁰ Jordan Carney, “Waste and Fraud in Afghanistan: A Greatest Hits Collection,” *National Journal*, February 11, 2014. Available at: <http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/waste-and-fraud-in-afghanistan-a-greatest-hits-collection-20140211>.

⁹¹ Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), 18-23.

Attention should also focus on drawing lessons from the important components of Hizballah's military success, many of which have seen echoes in the strategies of other recent insurgencies. For instance, two key elements in Hizballah's strategy will remain major concerns for the United States. The first is Hizballah's ability to directly target the Israeli population. While the United States is unlikely to ever face an insurgent capable of threatening its population to the degree Hizballah did Israel's, al-Qaeda has proven both innovative and persistent. Before September 11, 2001, it would have been impossible to imagine an insurgent conducting such a lethal attack in its enemy's homeland. Moreover, just as Hizballah relied more on the threat of rockets than their actual use, al-Qaeda does not necessarily have to conduct a steady stream of attacks to have the desired effect on public opinion. Second, internet and social media platforms like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook have made it even easier for insurgents to manipulate public opinion in its enemy's homeland. *Inspire*, the English-language magazine produced by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has received widespread media attention in the United States, and is likely one of the major reasons AQAP is generally regarded as the most dangerous al-Qaeda franchise.⁹²

Little can be done about the advances in technology that have made it progressively easier for future insurgents to reach the American public and the threat from terrorists capable of striking the United States will remain, but the United States may be able to blunt the effects of both propaganda and future attacks by building greater psychological resiliency in its population. Experts have pointed out that, far from strengthening resiliency, an emphasis on the dangers of terrorism have more often increased fear.⁹³ By building resilience in its population, the United States has the potential to blunt this problem by reducing the ability of future insurgents to use propaganda and the threat of attacks to manipulate public opinion. And, of course, the United States has been bedeviled by varying levels of material and political support provided by states to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Pakistan's unwillingness or inability to deny safe haven to the Taliban has threatened the success of American counterinsurgency efforts, while Iran was often accused of supporting insurgents in Iraq.⁹⁴ Because there

⁹² For examples of AQAP being deemed the most dangerous franchise, see Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Peter R. Neumann, "Al Qaeda's Most Dangerous Franchise," *Wall Street Journal*, May 20, 2012. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304203604577395611014467928>; Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, "Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)," *Council on Foreign Relations*, August 22, 2013. Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369>.

⁹³ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, *Bin Laden's Legacy: Why We're Still Losing the War on Terror*, (Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011, 217-220.

⁹⁴ For information on the Taliban safe haven in Pakistan, see Lisa Curtis, "Denying Terrorists Safe Haven in Pakistan," *Heritage Foundation*, Backgrounder No. 1981 (October 2006). Available at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/10/denying-terrorists-safe-haven-in-pakistan>. For background on Iran's support of Iraqi insurgents, see Lionel Beehner and Greg Bruno,

are often greater geopolitical interests at play that prevent more concerted action against the state providing support, there may be little the United States can do to alter the cost-benefit analysis of states that choose to sponsor anti-U.S. insurgents, just as there was little Israel could do to deter Iran from supporting Hizballah. Nevertheless, because external support can be such an important factor, U.S. war planning should give careful thought to whether and to what degree the insurgency is likely to receive external support and weigh its decision about whether or not to engage in a given counterinsurgency campaign accordingly.

The above points provide a snapshot of how Hizballah's victory yesterday should help inform U.S. counterinsurgency efforts tomorrow. By cataloging and exploring Hizballah's victory against Israel, this paper illuminates how insurgents have won in the past, and how they can win again in the future. The United States ignores the seeds of Hizballah's success at its own peril.

Jeff Burdette is an MA candidate in Georgetown's Security Studies Program; his research interests include jihadist terrorism and Middle East and North African security issues.

The Moral Foundations of Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

MIKE BURNHAM AND SHANNON PETERSON

This paper examines what motivates individual actors to participate in nationalist movements and ethnic conflict. Drawing from recent research in psychology, it shows how individuals construct ideological paradigms, and how this impacts their decision making process. Finally, it utilizes Jonathan Haidt's moral foundations framework to quantitatively compare nationalist ideologies in mainstream political ideologies in the United States.

How do individuals morally justify participation in ethnic violence? This paper presents original research that attempts to answer this question. Using text analysis software and Jonathan Haidt's moral matrix, a total of 225 text samples from three different ideological groups—Liberals, Conservatives, and White Nationalists within the United States—were analyzed. The samples were then tested using multiple linear regression to determine if there are ideological differences between the mainstream ideological groups (liberals and conservatives) and the white nationalists.

The first half of this paper introduces the question and how it contributes to the literature. The question is rooted in the ongoing debate on the rationality or irrationality of individual actors in ethnic conflict, terms that have largely become synonymous with material self-interest and nationalism. First, the paper argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained without accounting for nationalism as a motivating factor. Next, it shows that the dichotomy between rational and irrational is fundamentally flawed and that nationalism, therefore, cannot be characterized as irrational.

The second half of the paper uses psychological literature from Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Haidt to propose a more accurate model of human cognition, one in which the motivation of nationalism can be more completely understood through the framework of ideology. It shows how individuals construct ideological paradigms, and how it impacts their decision-making. By understanding this, ideological actors are more predictable and can be fit within the framework constructed by Haidt to codify ideologies. The paper then applies this framework to the moral foundations of nationalist movements and ethnic violence and finds that ethnic partisans primarily rely on moral justifications associated with ethnic identity and purity. Finally, it closes with a brief discussion on policy implications and avenues for future research.

Rationality vs. Irrationality

The dichotomy between rationality and irrationality has permeated the literature on ethnic conflict. John Mueller's essay pits self-interested actors against nationalists driven to "murderous enmity."¹ Likewise, Stuart Kaufman, in a 2006 essay titled "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice?," offers a "head-to-head test of rationalist and symbolist theories of ethnic war."²

Rational choice theories largely define ethnonationalists as self-interested actors motivated primarily by material interests. Common motivations include control over territory or natural resources, material security, and power. Generally, under such explanations, ethnicity plays a secondary or passive role as a justification or convenient excuse for conflict.³ Thus, rational choice theorists are often anti-nationalist or reductionist in nature; ethnic conflict is merely a doppelgänger for more conventional warfare.⁴

Outside the rational self-interest camp is an extensive body of literature that describes individual participation in ethnic conflict as 'irrational' in nature. Irrationality is typically defined as behavior motivated and or driven by emotions, passions, and identity. Unlike rational self-interest, irrationality does not exist as a theoretical concept. Rather, it exists as rationality's antithesis, utilized by authors primarily when rejecting materialist explanations of ethnic conflict. Social construction or primordialism typically provides the theoretical foundation. The notion that conflict is irrational is introduced when it can be shown that behavior does not follow traditionally defined rational self-interest. The examples are many:

- "The dyed in the wool nationalist is a romantic, not a rationalist... He thinks in terms of the spirit and culture of his people, not in terms of bargains and calculations," states Anthony Birch.⁵
- In an essay titled "Beyond Reason" Walker Connor expresses the sentiment by quoting Chateaubriand, "Men don't allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions." Connor concludes that "people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational."⁶
- Historian of oriental studies Bernard Lewis describes the clash of civilizations as "perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our

¹ John Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War," *International Security*, 25 (2000), 62.

² Stuart Kaufman, "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice?: Testing Theories of Extreme Violence," *International Security*, 30 (2006), 47.

³ Athena S. Leoussi, editor, *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 148-151.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Michael Hechter, "Nationalism and Rationality" *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 35 (2000), 4.

⁶ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 206.

secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”⁷

- “There remain irrational elements of explosive power and tenacity in the structure of nations and the outlook and myth of nationalism... many of these conflicts, and perhaps the most bitter and protracted, stem from just these underlying non-rational elements” argues Graham Smith.⁸

As Ashutosh Varshney stated, the alternatives to rational self-interest have simply been regarded as emotional or otherwise “irrationally” motivated behavior.⁹

There are two issues with this dichotomy. First, because the notions of rationality and irrationality have been so closely tied with the motivations of material self-interest and nationalism respectively, the literature has also developed a dichotomy between these motivations. Second, the notion that actors fall neatly into a single category of either calculating or emotional does not agree with psychology. In order to understand why the moral motivations of ethnic conflict are significant, it is important to briefly address these two issues.

Materialism vs. Nationalism

One of the implications of dichotomizing actors as, in the words of Walker Connor, either rational (defined in terms of material self-interest) or national animals is that some authors portray actors that think exclusively “in terms of the spirit and culture of [their] people.”¹⁰ Conversely, other authors have stretched the notion of material self-interest to portray it as the singular cause of ethnic conflict, shunning nationalist or culturally driven motivations. This second category of theorists question the utility of codifying the nationalist and cultural motivations of ethnic conflict.

While materialist motivations such as security and personal gain can be an essential element in catalyzing ethnic conflict, it has yet to be shown theoretically or empirically that material self-interest can provide a comprehensive explanation for ethnic conflict. Nationalism is a significant motivating factor in ethnic conflict, and is therefore necessary to understand in order to explain ethnic conflict. This paper borrows Walker Connor’s definition of nationalism: a nation “connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related,” and “nationalism connotes identification with and loyalty to one’s nation.”¹¹

Realism provides one of the simplest explanations of ethnic conflict rooted in material self-interest. While other theories define self-interest in terms of economics, realism approaches it from the angle of security. Barry Posen (1993), for example, argues that ethnic groups seek survival above all else

⁷ Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” *The Atlantic*, September 1, 1990, accessed May 12, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/?single_page=true

⁸ Hechter, “Nationalism and Rationality,” 4.

⁹ Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” *American Political Science Association*, 1 (2003), 2.

¹⁰ Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 195 and Hechter, “Nationalism and Rationality,” 4.

¹¹ Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, xi.

and guarantee security by pursuing relative power.¹²

But the same criticisms that realism faces as a theory of international politics apply to it as an explanation for the motivation for ethnic conflict. While some behavior can be accurately characterized as driven by security or power consolidation, much of it cannot. Two of the distinguishing features of ethnic conflict are the propensity toward violence beyond any objective gains in security or power, and engaging in behavior that defies individual self-interest. It is difficult to argue, for example, that the Holocaust had anything to do with power or security. Nor can realism explain “the countless fanatical sacrifices which have been made” in the name of nationalism, such as suicide bombings carried out by secular, nationalist groups like the Tamil Tigers.¹³

In “The Banality of Ethnic War,” John Mueller characterizes ethnic conflict as an event largely perpetrated by materially self-interested individuals and elites. He argues that ethnic conflict occurs “not because people generally gave into murderous enmity but because they came under the arbitrary control of armed thugs” who were responding to material incentives provided by political elites.¹⁴ The role of nationalism, according to Mueller, is nothing more than an “ordering device” for individuals to pursue more self-interested goals. He goes so far as to say that any social indicator, such as right-handedness or loyalty to a soccer team, would provide an adequate substitute for ethnicity.¹⁵

To support his claim, Mueller draws examples from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the former Yugoslavia, the fact that Slobodan Milosevic bussed protestors to nationalist rallies, promising them food and liquor as compensation, calls into question the fervor of nationalist forces. Likewise, Mueller argues that violence in Rwanda was not characterized by neighbors falling upon neighbors, but by bands of thugs who were compensated for participating in the slaughter with daily beer and meal and the prospect of looting.¹⁶ In both cases, Mueller shows that many were coerced into participating in killings.¹⁷

While Mueller makes a compelling case for the role of materialism, there is reason to doubt that ethnic conflict can be explained solely by this motivation. For one, the claim that nationalism functions only as an ordering device is unsubstantiated. The premise rests on the false dilemma in which actors are entirely motivated by either nationalism, or material self-interest. The fact that many perpetrators of ethnic violence were materially compensated does not mean materialism was their sole motivation. Food and beer may be sufficient incentive to mobilize individuals against an ethnic group, but not necessarily

¹² Posen, “Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” 28.

¹³ Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 206 and Hechter, “Nationalism and Rationality,” 3-4.

¹⁴ Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War,” 62.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 53 and 60.

against left-handed people. The prominent role that nationalism played in Marxist-Leninist revolutions supports this assertion. Despite the fact that Lenin described appeals to nationalism as a “despicable betrayal of socialism,” he also labeled it “one of the most important constituents in the policy of winning the masses and preparing a victorious revolution.”¹⁸ Regimes in China, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia also depended on it to assume power. As Walker Connor points out, “it is indeed a powerful testament to the primacy of ethnonational over economic motivation, that a school predicated upon economic determinism should turn to ethnonationalism to propel them into power.”¹⁹

If this is true, the emphasis on material incentives may be confusing causation. Daniel Goldhagen (2009) states it succinctly in *Worse Than War*: “People who hate other people and see them as a mortal danger are often happy to improve their material or professional lives when their self conceived enemies are eliminated. Yet, there is little evidence that personal benefit has been a widespread or determinative motive.”²⁰ Is mass genocide caused by, as Mueller suggests, purely economic incentives? Or, as Goldhagen argues, were there nationalist hatreds already present that political entrepreneurs could capitalize on with materialism?

Goldhagen also presents evidence that challenges Mueller’s assertion that ethnic violence in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia was largely coerced. While some coercion did take place, the killing atmosphere in Rwanda, for example, was described as “lax, with all kinds of opportunities for Hutu to adjust how, and when, and whether they slaughtered their Tutsi neighbors.”²¹ In fact, Goldhagen argues that, in general, a lack of coercion was the rule, rather than the exception, to genocidal assaults. Citing genocides perpetrated by the Nazis, Turks, British in Kenya, Belgian in Congo, and others, in addition to those by the Hutu and Serbs, Goldhagen argues, “leaders have easily found people wanting to kill the targeted victims. Coercion has been unnecessary.”²²

Mueller’s emphasis on economic self-interest provides valuable insights. Material incentives are often present and can impact the decision making of both elites and individuals during ethnonationalist conflicts. However, material incentives are insufficient motivating forces for the violence and destruction that accompanies most ethnic conflict. Other forces, such as nationalist sentiment, must also be present.

Much like Mueller, Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2008) argue that ethnic conflict is rooted in economic interests. Specifically, they cite disputes over natural resources and the ability to capitalize on

¹⁸ Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 157-158.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 158.

²⁰ Daniel Goldhagen, *Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity* (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 224.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 151.

²² *Ibid.*

opportune social conditions as the primary causes.²³ Similarly, in a 2003 piece written for *Foreign Policy*, Collier decries nationalist explanations of conflict and claims economics and self-interest, not ethnic tensions, are behind the political violence.²⁴

To support their argument, Collier and Hoeffler utilize large data sets and employ binomial logit regressions to identify the most significant causes of civil wars. They find that economic and opportunistic variables, such as the presence of valuable resources or the number of potential soldiers, are the most significant in determining whether or not a country erupts into violence. In contrast, social factors, such as ethnic and religious fractionalization, are considered far less significant. The authors conclude by stating that violence is most consistent with greed motivations, and that “the grievances that motivate rebels may be substantially disconnected from the large social concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious identity.”²⁵

Yet, the fundamental error in the greed and grievance papers is found in their generalized categorization of conflict. Both authors, and the Correlates of War datasets they used, treat civil war as an aggregate category.²⁶ Neither considers the idea that identity wars, such as ethnic conflict, have fundamentally different causes than non-identity based conflicts.²⁷ By not differentiating amongst conflicts, Collier and Hoeffler miss an important distinction. Generalizing their findings to ethnic conflicts is thus misleading. In order to understand the causes or motives of ethnic conflicts, one must examine a dataset of ethnic conflicts.

In *The Geography of Ethnic Violence*, Monica Duffy Toft used the more appropriate Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR), the largest dataset on issues concerning ethnicity and conflict. MAR also includes cases in which no war results.²⁸ The dataset used by Collier, by contrast, excludes instances with fewer than 1,000 battle deaths and instances of one-sided violence—the latter is a hallmark of ethnic conflict.²⁹

While the primary focus of Toft’s work is measuring the effect of geographic, rather than economic, variables on ethnic conflict, some of her findings directly contradict those of Collier and

²³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, Oxford University Press, 56:4 (2004), 587-589.

²⁴ Paul Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” *Foreign Policy* (2003), 40.

²⁵ Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” 589.

²⁶ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61 (2009), 5-6.

²⁷ Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Non-ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45.3 (2001), 259-282.

²⁸ Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 34-35.

²⁹ The Correlates of War codebooks can be accessed via: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>. All data sets require a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths.

Hoeffler. Social fractionalization, measured by ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, is largely insignificant in Collier and Hoeffler's work. Toff's, however, suggests it is significant.³⁰ More telling is that the correlation of conflict with resource rich territory is negative. Whether or not territory is perceived to be a homeland is both significant and positively correlated.³¹

All of this questions the robustness of Collier's advice to ignore explanations based on ethnic roots and look toward economic explanations instead.³² Explaining ethnic conflict exclusively in terms of material self-interest appears overly simplistic. Material incentives matter, but it has not been shown theoretically or empirically that they can provide a comprehensive explanation. A more complete and accurate explanation of the phenomenon requires reference to nationalist forces.

The Rational/Irrational Dichotomy and Psychology

In addition to the tension between material and nationalist interests, subjecting humans and their behavior to the rational/irrational dichotomy is fundamentally inaccurate and problematic. In much of the literature in social science, rational decision making is described as is goal-oriented, linear, consistent, and coherent. This portrayal of individual decision-making is the subject of considerable criticism, particularly from psychologists. For instance, Nobel Prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman states that "the definition of rationality as coherence is impossibly restrictive; it demands adherence to rules of logic that a finite mind is not able to implement. Reasonable people cannot be rational by that definition."³³

However, Kahneman warns, this does not mean that people should be branded as "irrational."³⁴ Whether or not the authors intended them, describing ethnic conflict as irrational carries a separate host of implications. To say that actors behave irrationally implies they do not obey any rules of logic, are inconsistent in choice, or do not perform cost-benefit analyses. If described in this way, actors in ethnic conflict are thought of as mindless zealots rather than calculating, reasoned individuals making conscious, deliberate decisions. This belief imposes a limit on one's understanding of ethnic conflict. Irrational behavior does not follow a pattern and therefore cannot be wholly understood or predicted.

System I and System II

Rather than categorizing it into a dichotomy of rational or irrational action and goals, ethnic conflict

³⁰ Toff, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence*, 43.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Collier, "The Market for Civil War," 40.

³³ Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking: Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 411.

³⁴ Ibid.

should be understood as a process of both intuition and rationality.³⁵ Keith Stanovich and Richard West, and later Daniel Kahneman, developed useful labels for the distinction: System I and System II. System I refers to intuition; it “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.” Rational thought is slow and deliberate; this is called System II.³⁶ System II “allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it” and is capable of reasoning.³⁷

Focusing on intuition largely eliminates the notion of irrationality. While System I thinking may be influenced by emotions or ‘passions,’ which are often associated with irrational and unpredictable behavior, it is also often predictable and can even be cost minimizing. Intuition is a product of both biology and social construction, and it helps explain the reasoning and motivations of actors.

Kahneman’s definition also defines rationality by its process rather than its goals. Reasoning actors will pursue whichever course they believe will maximize their utility, but the objects and actions that provide utility may vary greatly between actors. This definition moves beyond the simplistic understanding that pursuing self-interested goals is rational, and other goals are irrational.

System I: Ideological Judgments

The pursuit of any goal is rational because it provides utility to the actor. This is as true of ethnic conflict as it is profit maximization. But why do members of one ethnic group determine that killing the members of another would provide them the greatest utility? This paper argues that the preferences that lead to ethnic conflict are ideological, moral, and intuitive.

Before continuing it is important to provide a few more working definitions. According to Kathleen Bawn, ideologies are “enduring systems of beliefs, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political circumstances.”³⁸ Furthermore, they are “based on something other than direct self-interest” and encompass concepts of identity, values, and morals.³⁹ Ideology is essentially a manifestation of certain preferences. Second, this paper treats morals and values as synonymous. While the two are different, their proximity and the lack of a widely accepted definition make it difficult to establish the idiosyncrasies of each.

³⁵ It is important to note that the cognitive and social models presented here are simplified versions of reality. Nationalism and ethnic conflict are complex phenomenon that stem from many different motivations and variables. While the models presented here are enlightening, they are not exhaustive.

³⁶ Kahneman, *Thinking: Fast and Slow*, 20-21

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 20-21, 48.

³⁸ Kathleen Bawn, “Constructing Us: Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False Consciousness,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 43 (1999), 305.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 305-306.

Ideology is Intuitive

The moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt attempted to answer the question of whether or not ideology is a function of System I or System II cognition. In the context of ethnic conflict, do ethnic partisans, espouse the ideologies that lead them to violence because they logically deduced them to be correct, or is the result of an intuitive judgment? Haidt argues that psychology has found notions of values and morality to be intuitive, rather than rational in nature. They appear “suddenly and effortlessly in consciousness, without any awareness of the mental processes that led to the outcome.”⁴⁰ Moral and ideological judgments are thus associated with System I.

To test this theory, Haidt and his colleagues devised several experiments in which they presented subjects with moral dilemmas and gauged their responses. Experiments included telling stories in which a character violated a harmless taboo, asking the test subject if the action was right or wrong, and asking atheists to sign a contract to sell their soul.⁴¹ In the experiments they found the vast majority of subjects were able to pass instant judgment on the innate correctness of the action (System I), but struggled to find reasons why (System II). Additionally, test subjects proved largely unwilling to change their mind when the experimenters stripped away arguments for their decision. Haidt summed up his findings as follows:

“Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second... Conscious reasoning functions like a press secretary who automatically justifies any position taken by the President... Reasoning can take us to almost any conclusion we want to reach because we ask ‘Can I believe it?’ when we want to believe something, but ‘Must I believe it’ when we don’t want to believe.”⁴²

In the context of ethnic conflict, System I seems to determine where one lies on the spectrum of ethnic partisanship. Whether or not one values ethnic solidarity and self-determination and whether or not ethnic violence is an appropriate method of reaching that goal appear to be an intuitive judgments. Once those judgments are passed, System II can justify almost any action. As a result, it appears that humans engage in ethnic violence not because they are driven mad by enmity but because intuition tells them it is morally just.

The Biological and Social Construction of Ideology

Naturally, the next question that must be answered is what informs System I thinking. Haidt provides two explanations: genetics and social construction. While the degree to which genetics impacts behavioral traits is debateable, the fact that it matters has been borne out by much research. Studies on identical

⁴⁰ Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” *Psychological Review*, 108 (2001), 6.

⁴¹ Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind* (New York: Random House, 2012), 36-40.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 91.

twins reared in separate households due to adoption show that twins are more likely to share political ideologies than two other randomly selected people.⁴³ One study claims that genetics explain roughly one-third to one-half of the variability of political attitudes among people.⁴⁴ The remaining one-half to two-thirds are determined after birth.

Genetic and environmental factors do not work in isolation of each other. While individuals may be born with a certain proclivity to a political ideology, this disposition is not hardwired. Haidt proposes a developmental perspective consisting of three steps to understand how the two interact.⁴⁵

First, genes construct brains.⁴⁶ In 2011, scientists isolated several genes that varied between political ideologies. Genes collectively give people brains that create responses that can shape their political dispositions. Examples include how reactive one is to threats, and one's reaction when he or she is exposed to novelty and change.⁴⁷

Having a genetic proclivity towards an ideology does not mean that certain people are predestined to engage in ethnic violence. In the second step, genes interact with their environment. Personalities and beliefs develop "in response to the specific environments and challenges that they happen to face."⁴⁸ Genetics provides a first draft, and social environment alters that draft throughout a person's life.

Finally, individuals construct narratives of their lives. These narratives "provide a bridge between a developing adolescent self and an adult political identity." People interpret the events in their lives and assign meaning to them to create an identity about who they are and what political ideologies they espouse.

This process is largely a psychologist's spin on what constructivists already know. Interests are defined by identities, and identities are endogenous to the system in which they reside. The point, however, is that political judgments are largely determined prior to the moment in which a person faces a dilemma. When someone is faced with a political or moral decision, he or she will generally not stop and reason through it with System II thinking. Biological and social factors combine to define how one's System I interprets morality and how his or her brain provides an intuitive answer that System II justifies post-hoc as the press secretary for System I.

This process is perhaps best illustrated by a hypothetical example of a young Hutu male in Rwanda. From birth, his genetic proclivities are reinforced by a broader, socially-constructed narrative

⁴³ Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 278.

⁴⁴ John Alford, Carolyn Funk, and John R. Hibbing, "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" *American Political Science Association*, (2005).

⁴⁵ Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 278-282.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 278.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 279.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 280.

that presents Tutsis as different, unworthy of equal treatment as human beings, and potentially a threat to his prosperity and existence. These combined factors of social conditions and genetics encourage him to construct a political narrative centered on his ethnic identity as a Hutu, and the role of Tutsis as a threatening other. When the opportunity to participate in violence against Tutsis is placed before him, his System I responds with the set of values created by his genetics and social environment and he feels that participating is the right thing to do. His System II cognition then works to justify this intuition. He may provide a rationalization that he is defending his ethnic group, that he is extracting justice for past wrongs, or that Tutsis are not really people. He then makes a conscious decision to participate in the violence.

System II: Value Rationality

Ideological judgments are a function of System I. However, it would be inaccurate to characterize actors in ethnic conflict solely by their intuitive judgments. System II serves two primary functions with relation to ideological judgments. First, it provides post-hoc justification for intuition. Second, it performs reasoned, cost-benefit analyses to determine how and actor will mobilize on behalf of an ideology.

This second function is not particularly novel. Again, it is a psychologist's spin on a constructivist argument. Alexander Wendt (1992) makes it clear that even though the interests of an actor are endogenous to the system in which they reside, they are still subject to cost-benefit analyses. People act toward objects "on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them."⁴⁹ All goal-oriented behavior is subject to cost benefit analysis, but the goals are variable for each actor, ranging from material interests, nationalism, or any number of possibilities.

In *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality*, Ashutosh Varshney introduces the Weberian definitions of value and instrumental rationality and points out that rational behavior has traditionally been viewed exclusively in terms of rational self-interest. This type of rationality is instrumental rationality⁵⁰ Value rationality, however:

"...is produced by a conscious 'ethical, aesthetic, religious or other' belief, 'independently of its prospects of success.' Behavior, when driven by such values, can consciously embrace great personal sacrifices. Some spheres or goals of life are considered so valuable that they would not normally be up for sale or compromise, however costly the pursuit of their realization might be."⁵¹

There are a couple of important concepts here. Most important, both instrumental and value rational behavior are associated with System II. If a society or individual values ethnic purity, its pursuit is just as

⁴⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization*, 46 (1992), 396-397.

⁵⁰ Varshney, "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality," 2.

⁵¹ Ibid.

valuable and rational as the pursuit of economic gains in that it brings utility to the pursuant. Actors will plan and make conscious decisions to pursue that value.

Secondly, value rationality can be pursued independently of its prospects for success. Defending and upholding values is an end in and of itself. The mere act of representing the desired value provides utility to the actor even if it is a foregone conclusion that the end result is failure, or if the act provides little to no material benefits. More specifically, Varshney argues that utility gained from upholding these values is connected to cultural or individual perceptions of dignity and self-respect.⁵²

This provides a powerful explanation as to why ethnonationalists may choose self-destructive behavior, such as suicide bombings, or plan to execute violence beyond what is politically advantageous, such as genocide. When deciding how and why a person will uphold or fulfill the moral judgments made by System I, System II relies on value rationality, which is highly insensitive to costs.⁵³

Additionally, the concept of value rationality helps explain how both socially constructed and materially self-interested goals can play a significant role in mobilizing actors to violence. As Varshney further elucidates:

“Most of the time and in most places, ethnic or national mobilization cannot begin without value-rational microfoundations. For it to be instrumentally used by leaders, ethnicity must exist as a valued good for some. However, ethnic mobilization cannot proceed on value-rational grounds alone. Strategies are necessary; coalitions must be formed; the response of the adversary—the state, the opposed ethnic group, the in-group dissenters—must be anticipated. And many would join such mobilization, when it has acquired some momentum and chance of success, for entirely selfish reasons.”⁵⁴

To draw from a previously used example, Mueller was wrong to isolate materialism as the primary motivating force for soldiers in the Rwandan genocide. As was pointed out by Goldhagen, ethnonationalist microfoundations already existed and instrumentalist incentives helped mobilize those foundations.

Measuring Morality

The above section explains the cognitive processes at work in ethnic conflict. But is it possible to determine if an actor or group is prone to System I judgments that will lead to violence? Doing so requires a method for observing ideologies and moral paradigms.

Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph devised a moral matrix that consists of five different “moral foundations.” Each foundation is presented as a dichotomy, such as care/harm and sanctity/degradation.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 2.

Each dichotomy was identified by linking adaptive challenges frequently cited by evolutionary psychologists and connecting those with virtues commonly found, in some form, across cultures.⁵⁵ The moral foundations are “adaptations to long standing threats and opportunities in social life.”⁵⁶ The five dichotomies and descriptive information are presented in Table 1 below. Because these foundations are rooted in evolution, they are assumed to be universal. The interpretation of each foundation and the relative importance placed on it, however, is not universal. The foundations are analogous to moral taste buds.⁵⁷ Liberals and Conservatives broadly, for example, have separate notions of what defines the sanctity/degradation dichotomy. While Conservatives generally refer to notions of chastity and religious purity, Liberals often associate it with nutrition or nature.⁵⁸

Table 1: Moral Foundations

	Care/harm	Fairness/ cheating	Ingroup/ outgroup	Authority/ subversion	Sanctity/ degradation
Evolutionary challenge	Protect and care for children	Reap benefits of two-way partnership	Form cohesive coalitions	Forge beneficial relationships within hierarchies	Avoid contaminants
Original triggers	Suffering, distress, or neediness expressed by one’s child	Cheating, cooperation, deception	Threat or challenge to group	Signs of dominance and submission	Waste products, diseased people
Current triggers	Baby seals, cute cartoon characters	Marital fidelity, broken vending machines	Sports teams, nations	Bosses, respected professionals	Taboo ideas (communism, racism)
Characteristic emotions	Compassion	Anger, gratitude, guilt	Group pride, rage at traitors	Respect, fear	Disgust
Relevant values	Caring, Kindness	Fairness, justice, trustworthiness	Loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice	Obedience, deference	Temperance, chastity, piety, cleanliness

Haidt employs this matrix to measure differences in moral paradigms among political ideologies in the United States. It can also be used to evaluate extremist ideologies around the world, providing a more definitive measurement of what propels individuals toward ethnic partisanship and ultimately violence.

⁵⁵ Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 124.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 146-152.

Methodology

In order to test the feasibility of this framework, this paper builds on a methodology used by Haidt in 2009. Aiming to measure the ideological differences among liberals and conservatives, the researchers collected text samples of sermons given by churches affiliated with the two ideologies. They then used the Linguistics Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text analysis software and installed a custom dictionary of words associated with each foundation to count the instances when each group appealed to a certain moral foundation. Using confidence intervals, they looked for any significant differences in the groups.

To represent the ideology of ethnic partisans, American White Nationalists were sampled because of their relatively large member base, accessibility, and the absence of any language barriers. Then prominent opinion leaders within the ideology were isolated by identifying names commonly recognized by both consumers and producers of political media; a list of individuals polled is included in Appendix 1. Text samples consisted of essays, opinion editorials, and transcripts from radio and television broadcasts. The process was then repeated for liberals and conservatives. The samples taken from each ideology were drawn from at least 10 different authors, and no single author accounted for more than 10 samples. With the exception of one particularly influential author, the deceased William Pierce who was one of the most prominent members of the modern white-nationalism movements and is still referenced frequently, all samples are dated within the last 10 years. No preference was given to the subject matter of samples; the only stipulation was that they were political in nature. Next, the samples were analyzed using the LIWC software and the moral dictionary created by Haidt and his team. Slight alterations were made to the dictionary in order to capture the language of nationalists who were not sampled in Haidt's experiment and to account for the fact that similar words will have slightly different moral implications for each group. The word "conservative," for example, can represent either ingroup or outgroup depending on the ideology.

Once samples were collected and processed with LIWC, each sample was examined and edited for accuracy. Samples were edited as little as possible in order to maintain the integrity of the text. A few simple rules were followed in order to determine when a word the software picked up would be replaced with another word it would not. First, all homonyms that created false positives were replaced. The words "left" and "right," for example, were removed when talking about directions rather than political leanings. Second, all words in proper names or titles picked up by the software were removed. The word "justice," for example, was removed when referring to a judge or in an official name like the "Department of Justice." Finally, any word that registered but was unambiguously not associated with morality, such as using the word "good" to describe a meal rather than make a moral judgment, was removed. This final rule was exercised sparingly.

The ideological data collected was used to test the following hypothesis. First, *White Nationalists*

will appeal to morality in total more frequently than liberals and conservatives. In keeping with the notion that ethnic conflict is based on intuitive, ideological and moral judgments, authors should appeal more frequently to moral intuition than to System II logic.

Second, *Ethnonationalists will appeal to the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy more frequently than liberals and conservatives.* This comes from the assumption that ethnic conflict is a form of identity conflict. Nationalist ideologies and their corresponding System I judgments are predicated on how they define themselves and a referential “other.”⁵⁹ What defines “whiteness” and other ethnic groups should be a central feature in White Nationalist political discussion.

Finally, *White Nationalists will appeal more frequently to the sanctity/degradation dichotomy.* The sanctity degradation dichotomy is primarily linked with notions of purity and disgust. This hypothesis stems from the notion that nationalism is based on illusions of homogeneity.⁶⁰ Nationalists believe themselves to be ancestrally related, and have a sense of shared blood. Notions of sanctity and degradation can also be dissociative and create validation as to who is deserving of harm or care, such as the Hutus referring to Tutsis as cockroaches.

Model

To test these hypotheses, LIWC was used to analyzed the text samples and determined the percentage of all words used that were associated with each moral dichotomy. The percentages are listed in the table below.

Table 2: Percentage of words associated with each foundation

Ideology	Care/harm	Fairness/cheating	Ingroup/outgroup	Authority/subversion	Sanctity/degradation	Morality general	Total Morality
Liberal	0.627	0.242	0.899	0.517	0.161	0.428	2.733
Conservative	0.641	0.228	1.083	0.504	0.123	0.404	2.821
Nationalist	0.499	0.266	2.660	0.660	0.730	0.467	4.590

Regression was then used to identify correlations. The dependent variable was represented by the percentage of words associated with one of the foundations, or all of them when testing total morality. Dummy variables were introduced for two of the three political ideologies, while leaving one in the intercept. Because some text samples were polled from slightly different mediums, another variable was introduced. The Transcript variable represents text samples from a radio or television program, rather than an editorial or essay. The generic model looked like this:

$$Y_{\text{Morality}\%} = B_1 + B_2 D_{\text{Ideology 1}} + B_3 D_{\text{Ideology 2}} + B_4 D_{\text{Transcript}} + u_i$$

⁵⁹ Franke Wilmer, *The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 68.

⁶⁰ Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 197.

Using robust standard errors, the model was run three times; rotating which ideology was represented by the intercept, for each moral dichotomy and for total morality.

The model was then tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test. With the exception of regressions run for the authority/subversion dichotomy, there was evidence of heteroskedasticity in all instances. This was expected because sample collection methods were not truly random. The issue was somewhat ameliorated by transforming the model to a logarithmic function, but not enough to warrant sacrificing the model’s ease of interpretation. However, F-tests revealed that the heteroskedasticity was largely due to the variance in the nationalist group being significantly larger than that of the conservative and liberal groups. Since the point of the test was to see how the nationalist group differs from liberals and conservatives, this is an observation in and of itself and is discussed below.

Results

The regression table below represents the initial model in which the Liberal ideology is represented by the intercept, and the Conservative and Nationalist ideologies are represented by dummy variables. Additional tables in which the variable represented by the intercept are switched are shown in Appendix 2.

$$Y_{\text{Morality}} = B_1 + B_2 D_{\text{Conservative}} + B_3 D_{\text{Nationalist}} + B_4 D_{\text{Transcript}} + e_i$$

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable					
	Care/ harm	Fairness/ cheating	Ingroup/ outgroup	Authority/ subversion	Sanctity/ degradation	Total Morality
Intercept	0.6271	0.2416	0.8991	0.5172	0.1613	2.7335
Conservative	0.0452	0.0048	0.2056*	0.0151	-0.0960**	0.2181
Nationalist	-0.1002	0.0412	1.7811***	0.1681*	0.5162***	1.9758***
Transcript	-0.2102***	-0.1247**	-0.1506	-0.1909***	0.3917**	-0.8924***

*= p < 0.1
 **= p < 0.05
 ***= p < 0.01

These results generally support all three of hypotheses. The Nationalist coefficient associated with total morality is both positive and significant. This supports the assertion that Nationalist opinion leaders are more likely to appeal to morality than Liberals and Conservatives and that White Nationalists support their ideology more frequently with System I, or intuitive, thinking. This does not mean that rational cognition does not occur; it merely supports the idea that moral and emotional cognition tend to play a more important role in extremist ideologies than mainstream ones.

Under the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy, the relatively large coefficients associated with the nationalist variable indicate this moral foundation is highly important to the White Nationalist ideology.

This quantitatively supports the theory that ethnic partisanship is fundamentally about identity. Central to their ideology is their perception of self, and referential others outside of their group.

Finally, the coefficient on the White Nationalist variable in the sanctity/degradation regression is also highly significant and positive. This supports the notion that ethnonationalist ideologies are based on beliefs of ethnic purity.

Within the other three dichotomies—authority/subversion, harm/care, and fairness/cheating—the significance of the variables fluctuates around the .05 significance level with a high of .208 and a low of .036.⁶¹ While some of the variables are statistically significant, they do not approach the level of significance of tests for total morality or the ingroup/outgroup foundation, which are significant at a level over .001. It is unclear which of these are significant findings, chance correlation, or peculiar to the White Nationalist movement. Unlike the ingroup/outgroup and sanctity/degradation foundations, these dichotomies have no identifiable connection to theories of identity conflict and ethnonationalism. Therefore, the significance of these foundations are likely not peculiar to ethnic conflict generally, but will vary significantly depending on the narrative adopted by an ethnonationalist movement.

With regards to the heteroskedasticity observed in the regression, the large variation within the Nationalist group may, in part, be due to the underground nature of the nationalist movement. Because White Nationalist opinion leaders are not subject to the same level of public scrutiny as their mainstream counterparts, they have less incentive to temper their words. On the other hand, prominent leaders attempting to push the movement mainstream may edit their comments more judiciously. These two extremes could contribute to the large variance.

While the results are encouraging for this avenue of inquiry, it is important to recognize the model's shortcomings. First and foremost, while the ten-year time frame in which samples were collected provides a rudimentary control for the political climate, it should be improved upon in future research. Variables that control for factors such as economic circumstances, electoral conditions, and the state of security could greatly enhance the accuracy of the tests.

Additionally, this research is undoubtedly subject to sampling bias due mostly to the largely subjective process of selecting opinion leaders and editing samples, as well as the inability to collect truly random samples. While it is impossible to completely overcome this bias because of the nature of the methods used, some steps can be taken to improve accuracy. Increasing the sample size, polling scholars in the selection process of opinion leaders, and designing a less subjective method of editing samples are a few examples.

⁶¹ The care/harm foundation was significant at .036 (see Table 2 in Appendix 2).

Finally, it is unclear whether or not these findings can be broadly applied to nationalist movements around the globe, or if they are unique to the United States. Further research should explore whether the findings hold across different cultures and languages.

Conclusion

The dichotomy of rationality and irrationality pervasive in the literature on ethnic conflict has created a false dilemma in which actors pursuing self-interested motives are rational and those pursuing all other motives are irrational. It is also inaccurate from a psychological perspective. In order to rectify this, discussions of cognitive processes relevant to ethnic conflict have to be redefined. Instead, ethnic conflict should be understood in terms of intuition (System I) and rationality (System II). Ethnic conflict is motivated by moral judgments conducted by System I. System II then justifies these judgments and uses value rationality, which views moral goals as highly inelastic, and instrumental rationality to mobilize actors around these judgments.

In order to understand what motivates nationalism, it is necessary to understand the intuitive judgments made by actors. Using the moral matrix constructed by Jonathan Haidt to codify these judgments, this paper shows that White Nationalists appeal to moral ideologies more frequently than conservatives and liberals and that they rely heavily on notions of in-group loyalty and purity. These findings support the constructivist explanation for ethnic conflict, which argues that it is motivated by identity and myths of ethnic homogeneity.

This paper introduces many new avenues of inquiry. Further research should examine how the narratives adopted by nationalist movements affect moral matrices and judgment. It should also attempt to link moral paradigms directly with violence. Are certain moral ideologies more prone to certain levels and different kinds of violence? Do appeals to morality wax and wane with proximity to violence? Is it possible to measure the elasticity of individual moral foundations? Furthermore, can this paper's method of analysis be applied to other extremist ideologies such as terrorist movements or religious cults? Understanding the cognitive processes that lead to partisan action and their moral foundations reveals new dimensions of the causes of violence.

Mike Burnham is a candidate in Georgetown's Masters of Security Studies program. He graduated from Utah State University in 2013 where he majored in International Relations and Economics. His primary areas of interest include ideology, identity conflict, and substate violence. Shannon Peterson is a Clinical Assistant Professor of International Political Economy in the Jon M. Huntsman School of Business at Utah State University and is the Director of the Huntsman Scholar Program. She received her Ph.D. in International Relations from the Ohio State University in 2003.

Appendix 1: Authors Sampled by Ideology

Liberal Authors		
Author	# of Articles	# of Transcripts
Paul Krugman	10	-
Rachel Maddow	4	-
Chris Matthews	2	-
Bill Maher	2	-
Michael Kinsley	10	-
Maureen Dowd	10	-
Sarah Posen	10	-
Glenn Greenwald	10	-
Michelle Goldberg	10	-
Christopher Hayes	7	-

Conservative Authors		
Author	# of Articles	# of Transcripts
Rush Limbaugh	3	7
Sean Hannity	3	1
Ann Coulter	10	-
Glenn Beck	10	-
Bill O'Reilly	10	-
Michael Savage	2	1
Michael Medved	10	-
Andrew Breitbart	2	2
Sarah Palin	9	-
Greg Gutfeld	5	-

White Nationalist Authors		
Author	# of Articles	# of Transcripts
Greg Johnson	10	-
Richard Spencer	10	-
Frank Desilva	10	-
Kevin Strom	6	-
William Pierce	-	10
Harold Covington	10	-
Kevin Macdonald	10	-
Tom Metzger	4	-
Jared Taylor	5	-

Appendix 2: Regression Tables

Table 1: Liberal Intercept

$$Y_{\text{Morality}} = B_1 + B_2 D_{\text{Conservative}} + B_3 D_{\text{Nationalist}} + B_4 D_{\text{Transcript}} + e_i$$

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable					
	Care/ harm	Fairness/ cheating	Ingroup/ outgroup	Authority/ subversion	Sanctity/ degradation	Total Morality
Intercept	0.6271	0.2416	0.8991	0.5172	0.1613	2.7335
Conservative	0.0452	0.0048	0.2056*	0.0151	-0.0960**	0.2181
Nationalist	-0.1002	0.0412	1.7811***	0.1681*	0.5162***	1.9758***
Transcript	-0.2102***	-0.1247**	-0.1506	-0.1909***	0.3917**	-0.8924***

Table 2: Conservative Intercept

$$Y_{\text{Morality}} = B_1 + B_2 D_{\text{Liberal}} + B_3 D_{\text{Nationalist}} + B_4 D_{\text{Transcript}} + e_i$$

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable					
	Care/ harm	Fairness/ cheating	Ingroup/ outgroup	Authority/ subversion	Sanctity/ degradation	Total Morality
Intercept	0.6723	0.2464	1.1046	0.5323	0.0653	2.9515
Liberal	-0.0452	-0.0048	-0.2056*	-0.0151	0.0960**	-0.2181
Nationalist	-0.1455**	0.0363	1.5756***	0.1531*	0.6122***	1.7577***
Transcript	-0.2102***	-0.1247**	-0.1506	-0.1909***	0.3917**	-0.8924***

Table 3: Nationalist Intercept

$$Y_{\text{Morality}} = B_1 + B_2 D_{\text{Liberal}} + B_3 D_{\text{Conservative}} + B_4 D_{\text{Transcript}} + e_i$$

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable					
	Care/ harm	Fairness/ cheating	Ingroup/ outgroup	Authority/ subversion	Sanctity/ degradation	Total Morality
Intercept	0.5268	0.2828	2.6802	0.6853	0.6775	4.7092
Liberal	0.1002	-0.0412	-1.7811***	-0.1681*	-0.5162***	-1.9758***
Conservative	0.1445**	-0.0363	-1.5756***	-0.1531*	-0.6122***	-1.7577***
Transcript	-0.2102***	-0.1247**	-0.1506	-0.1909***	0.3917**	-0.8924***

*= p < 0.1

**= p < 0.05

***= p < 0.01

Energy Security and North Korea: A Failed Pursuit for Self-Reliance

MARTIN J. COOL

Though attempting to remain energy independent, North Korea has depended on outside help in order to acquire adequate energy supplies to fuel its economy. The paper argues that the Kim family has failed to adequately supplement its domestic energy production with foreign imports because of its ruling ideology of “self-reliance.” The cost has been high.

With the announcement in late 2013 of the execution of Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was once again thrust into the international spotlight.¹ Jang, believed to have been the second most powerful individual in the country before his removal and subsequent death, was seen as a key player behind the nascent economic reforms underway in the world’s most isolated nation. Those reforms, including new special economic zones jointly managed by North Korea and China, are now in question. Unfortunately for the people of North Korea, the problems in the DPRK government go far beyond the realm of economics. One of the most important contributions to North Korea’s woes has been its abysmal energy security policy. Heavily dependent on its sizable coal reserves, North Korea’s policy of “self-reliance” has stunted economic growth, destroyed its environment, and killed thousands in the devastating famine in the 1990s. Regrettably, little has changed since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011.

This paper is a study of the energy security policy of North Korea over the past twenty years through today.² Several key questions will be examined in this study: What is the current energy policy being pursued by the North Korean leadership? What are the future consequences of this policy for North Korea, the region, and the world? How can the United States and its partners engage the Kim family regime in a constructive manner?

Before addressing these questions, it must be noted that any study of North Korean energy security must address the problem of gathering accurate statistics about energy use in the country. Very

¹ Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says Leader’s Uncle Was Executed as a Traitor,” *The New York Times*, December 12, 2013, accessed on December 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-says-uncle-of-executed.html?_r=0.

² This date range was selected for several reasons: it marks the transition from state founder Kim il-Sung to his son Kim Jong-il; it is after the fall of the Soviet Union, a key supporter of the North Korean regime; and it is during this time that most of North Korea’s poor decisions began to have a negative effect on its economy.

little data is available aside from official statistics released by Pyongyang through its official news media, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). North Korean officials have traditionally been deliberately vague about the official data it releases, often using percentage increases or decreases from previous years without specifying total amounts. For example, electricity production in 1999 was listed as 45% more than the previous year. Given that 1998 was believed to be a particularly poor year for electricity production all across the country due to climatic disruptions, it is possible that 1999's production was actually much less than say 1995 or 1996.³ Either way, all researchers must accept the fact that wading through the propaganda statements of the Kim family leadership is both a challenge and a constraint when studying North Korean policy-making.

***Juche* and Self-Reliance**

North Korea's energy policy, like its political and economic policies, is built around the *juche* ideology, translated as either self-determination or self-reliance. In pursuit of this ideology, North Korea seeks above all else to provide for itself in every facet of statehood in order to avoid subordination to a foreign power or foreign entity. In his book *The Impossible State*, renowned Korean scholar Victor Cha explains *juche* as consisting of four main tenets: man is the master of his fate; the master of the Korean Revolution is the people; the Revolution must continue in a self-reliant manner; and the key to the Revolution is its founder, Kim Il-sung. In many ways *juche* can be thought of as a form of Korean nationalism that can be traced to the birth of the current North Korean regime. This nationalism was evident despite the fact that North Korea was within the Soviet Communist sphere. As Cha writes, North Korean ideology differed from Marxism-Leninism in that it privileged "state and sovereignty" over internationalist sentiments.⁴ When the worldwide Communist movement came to an end in the early 1990s, the nationalist aspects of *juche* naturally lived on in the North Korean government.

Another prominent Korean scholar, Bruce Cumings, finds the word *juche* more difficult to translate than merely "self-reliance" or "self-determination." It is less an idea than a "state of mind," he writes, that puts Korea first in everything. Kim Il-sung's prominent use of the word alongside other common terms, however, such as *chajusong* (self-reliance), *minjok tongnip* (national independence), and *charip kyongje* (independent economy), helped to color *juche* with its now familiar impression of self-sufficiency. Significantly, all of these terms are antonyms of a Korean phrase, *sadaejuu*, which means serving and relying on a foreign power, a concern of all Koreans that has been borne out of centuries of

³ Virginie Grzelczyk, "Uncovering North Korea's energy Security Dilemma: Past Policies, Present Choices, Future Opportunities", *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* Vol 6, Issue 1 (2012): 138, accessed on December 12, 2013 from <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=141530> . -

⁴ Victor D. Cha, *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future* (New York: Ecco., 2012), 37-38.

subordination to regional powers.⁵ In its pronouncements through the state-run KCNA, one can still observe North Korea's fiercely independent and anti-foreign stance today.

How successful has North Korea been at applying its *juche* philosophy of self-sufficiency throughout its history as it concerns its energy policy? Although an exhaustive review of the Soviet-Korean and Sino-Korean relationships during the Cold War is beyond the reach of this paper, it will suffice to say that the DPRK received significant amounts of aid from the Soviet Union and China during that time, usually after attempts at energy self-reliance failed. Though estimates vary, as much as \$4.75 billion in aid was delivered by Communist-bloc countries to North Korea between the end of World War II and 1984.⁶ Probably the most revealing time period about the degree to which North Korea depended on its Soviet and Chinese backers for its energy supply was in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed. North Korea was accustomed to importing oil at a heavily discounted rate of around 25 percent of the market price.⁷ As the Cold War came to an end, North Korea went from importing about 3.5 million tons of oil per year to less than 1.5 million tons. By 1991, petroleum imports had fallen to 45,000 tons. While crude oil just four years prior had accounted for nearly 22 percent of North Korea's imports from the Soviet Union, by 1990 it was under 7 percent. The ripple effect on the economy, however, shows just how hollow the DPRK's self-reliance ideology really was. The lack of oil imports reduced the amount of coal that could be produced because ammonium nitrate was not available without petroleum products. Additionally, crop production lagged due to the decline in chemical fertilizers that required those Soviet imports as well.⁸ All sectors of the North Korean economy and countryside felt the chain reaction.

Unfortunately for the people of North Korea, many of the problems afflicting the North Korean economy result from poor decisions made by the leadership in Pyongyang during the Cold War that still have effects today. In the 1970s, for example, the DPRK considered building oil-burning power plants in order to make up for its energy shortfalls. The idea was dismissed by Kim Il-sung, however, because it did not align with his philosophy of *juche*. As Kim Il-sung explained it, if North Korea built "oil-burning stations, we will have to import oil from other countries. This is contrary to our party's policy of building an independent economy. Therefore, I did not accept the scientists' suggestion and decided to build power stations that rely on the resources of our own country."⁹ Another example occurred in the 1960s

⁵ Bruce Cumings, "Corporate state in North Korea," in *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, ed. Hagen Koo, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 214.

⁶ Cha, *The Impossible State*, 28.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, 114.

when North Korea decided it should build new electric plants powered by thermal power and coal, sources that it had in abundance. The problem, however, was the size of the power plants that were actually built. Lacking the technology to excavate enough coal to feed the plants, North Korean workers were forced to undergo *Chollima* movements. *Chollima* referred to the use of “ideological zeal” in order to make up for shortfalls in technology or manpower. Unfortunately, the movements often led to massive inefficiencies in the economy and broke the backs of the North Korean workers while failing to meet the standards set by the government.¹⁰ Though North Korea was able to survive the Cold War years because of its backing from fellow Communist states, the results were to be felt later in the 1990s when the subsidies slowed significantly.

1990-2013: Domestic Production and Foreign Suppliers

How has North Korea performed in meeting its energy goals since the end of the Cold War? Pyongyang depends heavily on its own massive amounts of coal reserves. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2011 North Korea produced over 35 million tons of coal and consumed 30 million tons.¹¹ In her paper “Uncovering North Korea’s Energy Security Dilemma: Past Policies, Present Choices, Future Opportunities,” Virginie Grzelczyk writes that by the middle of the last decade, North Korea started to recover from the depths of the famine and economic disaster that had occurred in the 1990s shortly after it lost aid from the Soviet Union. According to pronouncements from the North Korean media during that time, Pyongyang’s commitment to “step up the construction of large hydro-power plants” and “large power plants” showed marginal success. Although it is unclear how many hydropower plants North Korea are operational today, production from both hydro and solar probably helps to offset some of North Korea’s energy needs that cannot be met with coal. Official state news broadcasts by KCNA has also highlighted other countries’ use of alternative sources of energy, such as natural gas in Iran, geothermal in Iceland, and nuclear power, suggesting possible future developmental goals.¹² However, North Korea’s lack of access to technologies and its extreme international isolation make these alternative energy sources difficult to exploit.

Whatever its future prospects for alternative energy use, the bottom line is that without assistance from its surrounding neighbors, North Korea cannot meet its current energy goals. Despite its coal reserves, North Korea is severely lacking in oil and must import most of what it uses from other countries.

¹⁰ Ibid., 113-114.

¹¹ “Overview data for Korea, North,” *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, last updated May 30, 2013, accessed on December 12, 2013, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=KN>.

¹² Grzelczyk, “Uncovering North Korea’s energy Security Dilemma.”

According to the EIA, North Korea produced a total of 9 barrels of oil in 2013 but consumed 14,000.¹³ North Korea has made up for this shortfall in a variety of ways. The United States has in fact provided large amounts of energy aid over the past twenty years. The Congressional Research Service reports that between 1995 and 2003, the United States provided over \$400 million in heavy fuel oil through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as part of the Agreed Framework signed in 1994. It was halted by the Bush administration in 2002 after North Korea's hidden uranium program was discovered and then resumed in 2007. By December of the next year, 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil had been shipped to North Korea from the United States. The United States has ceased all deliveries of food and energy aid to North Korea since 2009.¹⁴

North Korea's main energy provider since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been the People's Republic of China. World Bank consultant Nicholas Eberstadt reports that since the early 1990s, Beijing has provided nearly 90 percent of North Korea's energy imports.¹⁵ According to a report recently published by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), Pyongyang has continued to increase its economic dependence on China since Kim Jong-Un came to power in late 2011. Leaders in Beijing desire above all else a friendly country on its northeastern border, and this is largely what motivates China to support the North Korean regime. However, Pyongyang is aware of China's predicament and frequently exploits this to achieve its interests. China wants to keep a buffer zone between itself and U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. North Korea provides the strategic depth necessary for the task. Additionally, China fears the onslaught of North Korean refugees that a North Korean collapse might entail. The idea of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees deluging China's northeastern region is a key inducement to Beijing's policies towards Pyongyang. If war broke out on the peninsula, Chinese leaders know that in addition to Seoul, China would bear a significant portion of the costs.¹⁶

South Korea has alternated between providing North Korea with large amounts of food and energy aid at times to providing little to none at others. Between July 2007 and March 2009, South Korea provided 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil and over 95,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil equivalent as part of the Six-Party Talks.¹⁷ However, when the talks broke down, then President Lee Myung-bak cut back on aid to North Korea significantly. Lee's approach was in stark contrast to his two predecessors, Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-Jung, both of whom were advocates of the Sunshine Policy, which sought

¹³ "Overview data for Korea, North", *U.S. Energy Information Administration*.

¹⁴ Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, "Foreign Assistance to North Korea," *Congressional Research Service*, June 11, 2013, accessed December 10, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf>.

¹⁵ Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu, "The China-North Korea Relationship," *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 21, 2013, accessed December 12, 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Manyin and Nikitin, "Foreign Assistance to North Korea."

reconciliation with North Korea through cooperation and aid. In 2010, Seoul's Ministry of Unification declared the policy an abject failure that had been unable to reverse North Korea's "perverse" policies. The Sunshine Policy cost South Korea around \$4.5 billion, some of which went to joint establishments like the Kaesong Industrial Zone, but much of which was given to North Korea through food, energy, and economic aid.¹⁸

North Korea also has significant energy ties with Mongolia. Information is scarce on the exact nature and amount of energy goods traded between these countries. However, recently announced deals not related to energy between North Korea and Russia and North Korea and Mongolia are indicative of a desire to strengthen energy ties. Last month, North Korea and Mongolia agreed to cooperate in the areas of industry, agriculture, and tourism. Significantly, Mongolia's President, Tsakhia Elbegdorj, was the first head of state to visit Pyongyang since Kim Jong-Un came to power in December 2011. Additionally, a deal signed in June of this year will allow a Mongolian company, HBOil JSC, to acquire a 20 percent stake in the North Korean oil refinery called Sungri, located in the free trade zone of Rason in northeast North Korea. According to HBOil, Sungri has a refining capacity of 2 million tons per year and connects to Russia through the Russian railway system.¹⁹

North Korea continues to receive periodic yet unpredictable energy supplies from Russia as well. In 2005, Russia supplied 340,000 tons of oil products to North Korea, almost one-third of its total use that year. However, these deliveries have most likely dropped in recent years given Putin's criticism of North Korea over its nuclear weapons development.²⁰ International sanctions were imposed early in 2014 after Pyongyang's successful missile launch, but Moscow continues to pursue an economic and energy relationship with North Korea in order to open up the isolated nation. Significantly, Moscow recently signed deals involving the South Korean government with financial backing of South Korean companies. In October 2013, South Korea and Russia revived talks on a gas pipeline from Russia through North Korea into South Korea.²¹ The origins of this project date back to 2011 but it has been repeatedly delayed due to inter-Korean political tensions and South Korean concerns that North Korea could hold Seoul

¹⁸ Andrew Salmon, "South Korea: Policy of engagement with North is a failure", *CNN.com*, November 19, 2010, accessed December 11, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/19/south.korea.sunshine.policy/>.

¹⁹ Sam Kim, "North Korea-Mongolia Sign Deals Before Leaders Meet in Pyongyang," *Bloomberg News Online*, October 29, 2013, accessed on December 10, 2013, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-29/north-korea-mongolia-sign-deals-before-leaders-meet-in-pyongyang.html>.

²⁰ Peter Hayes, David von Hippel, and Scott Bruce, "The DPRK Energy Sector: Current Status and Future Engagement Options," *NAPSNet Special Reports*, August 16, 2011, accessed on December 5, 2013, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-dprk-energy-sector-current-status-and-future-engagement-options/>.

²¹ Simon Mundy, "Russia-South Korea pipeline talks revived," *The Financial Times*, October 16, 2013, accessed December 10, 2013, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0220a776-3668-11e3-aaf1-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk>.

hostage by interrupting the smooth flow of natural gas. Separately, a deal reached in mid-November 2013 between Russia and South Korea allows South Korean companies to invest in rail and port projects in Rason, North Korea. Currently, Russia owns a 70 percent stake in the joint venture RasonKonTrans and North Korea owns the other 30 percent. The deal would permit South Korean companies to circumvent current bans on direct investments in North Korea by allowing them to purchase the Russian shares instead. South Korean companies Posco and Hyundai would probably purchase about half of Russia's shares.²² The project would be a major step forward in inter-Korean cooperation as well as a boost to North Korea's ability to transport goods out of its northeastern ports.

Energy and the DPRK Economy

As discussed above in regards to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the lack of energy production has had a negative impact on the North Korean economy as well. Once known for its industrial prowess shortly after World War II, North Korea has seen a degradation of its factories and industrial equipment due to poor quality electricity. According to a Nautilus Institute report that uses open source materials and visits to North Korea by the report's authors, many factories in North Korea have been shuttered for extended periods of time or permanently shut down over the past decade due to fuel shortages. The decline in cement and steel production has led to a shift away from energy-intensive industries towards smaller and more energy-efficient activities such as trade in raw materials and small textile factories.²³ Instead of devoting their entire day to a factory that lacks production materials to run, many North Korean workers instead spend their time selling scraps from the vacant factories on the black market in order to make enough money to buy food to feed their families. Indeed, the growth of market activity in North Korea over the past fifteen years, a closely watched phenomenon by those looking for change in North Korea, owes its success in part to energy deficiencies at the national level.²⁴

For average North Koreans, the lack of energy supply has not only had an impact on their jobs at the factory, but also their day-to-day needs. With the decrease in energy production, a concomitant rise in the use of biomass, like wood and other organic materials, has occurred since 1990. According to Nautilus, biomass has more than doubled as a fraction of the DPRK's energy supply over the past two decades. As the public distribution system stalled throughout the 1990s and 2000s, wood burning became the alternative.²⁵ Gathering sticks and scraps to burn became a common picture all across North Korea.

²² Daniel Schearf, "S. Korea, Russia Agree on Backdoor Investment in North," *VOA News*, November 15, 2013, accessed on December 12, 2013, <http://www.voanews.com/content/s-korea-russia-agree-on-backdoor-investment-in-n-korea/1790707.html>.

²³ Hayes, von Hippel, and Bruce, "The DPRK Energy Sector."

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

This, in turn, led to deforestation in many parts of the country. The countryside's vulnerability to landslides and other natural disasters increased, contributing to much of the flooding seen over the past twenty years. The vicious cycle of economic stagnation, energy deficiencies, and a lack of protection against natural disasters is evident.²⁶

The famine of the mid-1990s killed an estimated 600,000 to 3 million North Koreans and was caused in large part by the mismanagement of both the supply of energy and the economy by DPRK officials.²⁷ According to some North Korean observers, the poor decisions made by North Korean leadership that caused the North Korean economy to fail will ultimately spell the eventual end of the Kim regime. Those decisions and the resulting famine led to a significant increase in market activity in the country. In an op-ed for the *New York Times* titled "The Market Shall Set North Korea Free," North Korean defector Jang Jin-Sung describes the shocking discovery of the amount of propaganda produced by the leaders in Pyongyang in order to hide the truth from the average North Korean.²⁸ When the state rationing system collapsed, individuals began to barter for their goods and stopped showing up to their jobs at the factories. The inability of the state to provide daily goods forced the population to depend on someone besides the Kim family, whom they had been taught to believe had provided for all of their essential needs. As the Jang writes, "the umbilical cord between the individual and the state has been severed."²⁹ Instead, the people turned to hard cash, often the U.S. dollar, which was most often used for trading in the underground market. As its economic and energy policies spiraled out of control, the North Korean leadership increased its rhetoric about American imperialist intentions and heightened fears among North Koreans that the United States might intervene. The threat of intervention was used to justify North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Nuclear Weapons Negotiations

North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is closely related to its failed energy security policy, which is closely related to its failed economic strategy. It is no surprise then that North Korea's leadership announced its dual pursuit of "simultaneous economic and nuclear development," sometimes referred to as *byungjin*, in March 2013.³⁰ This policy prioritizes the nuclear and munitions industrial sector along

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Manyin and Nikitin, "Foreign Assistance to North Korea."

²⁸ Jang Jin-Sung, "The Market Shall Set North Korea Free," *The New York Times*, April 26, 2013, accessed on December 12, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/opinion/global/The-Market-Shall-Set-North-Korea-Free.html>.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Scott Snyder, "The Motivations Behind North Korea's Pursuit of Simultaneous Economic and Nuclear Development," *The Council on Foreign Relations*, November 20, 2013, accessed on December 5, 2013, <http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/11/20/the-motivations-behind-north-koreas-pursuit-of-simultaneous-economic-and-nuclear-development/>.

with the electric power, coal, metal, and railway transport sectors. It emphasizes new ways to use science and technology and rejects denuclearization as an option, as much of the world has called on North Korea to do. Instead, North Korean leaders made it clear that they are seeking to “break out” of the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries by seeking more foreign investment through the creation of special economic zones and increased foreign tourism. This new approach could potentially put the United States and its partners in a bind. Countries will be forced to make a choice between holding fast on economic sanctions in order to bring about denuclearization and pursuing economic and energy partnerships with North Korea in the hopes of building stronger ties.

Future negotiations, whether bilateral or through the Six-Party Talks, must address the trade-offs between energy and economic assistance and denuclearization. Absent energy aid, North Korea cannot meet its goal of energy independence. In order to revitalize its failing economy, Pyongyang must solve its energy deficit problems. Only then will North Korea to develop legitimate exports and move away from weapons smuggling and other illicit activities.³¹ Leaders in Pyongyang know that North Korea must develop other sources of revenue and hard currency in order to continue to operate its patronage style of rule and stay in power. Understanding this aspect of North Korea’s goals can help Western diplomats understand the West’s leverage.

Like past efforts to compel North Korean denuclearization, future talks will most likely include energy assistance as a potential carrot. In past negotiations, a short-term assistance measure such as heavy fuel oil was used in exchange for North Korea halting its nuclear weapons program. According to a Congressional Research Service report, prior to the breakdown of the Six Party Talks in 2009, the DPRK had received a total of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil and equipment from all involved parties. Additionally, 245,110 metric tons of fuel equivalent assistance had been delivered.³² Other assistance measures from the United States included the costs of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear reactor, payments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspections, and food aid. Heavy fuel oil has both positives and negatives as an inducement during negotiations for North Korea’s denuclearization. On the positive side, heavy fuel oil is difficult to use for military purposes, which is a key goal for both the United States and South Korea. However, heavy fuel oil is relatively expensive and does not fit well with North Korea’s current energy infrastructure. Additionally, from the U.S. and South Korean perspective, its supply does not allow for interaction between outsiders and DPRK technicians; rather, deliveries go directly from Western donors to DPRK officials, who can then control its distribution and prevent donations from being used for North Korean propaganda.

³¹ Hayes, von Hippel, and Bruce, “The DPRK Energy Sector.”

³² Manyin and Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea.”

Another short-term energy option would be diesel generators and diesel to burn, which can then be used in schools and hospitals, for agricultural purposes, and to help facilitate mineral resource development. Long-term energy assistance could include the repair and expansion of some of North Korea's hydroelectric plants, wind power plants, and improvements in energy efficiency throughout its economy. As North Korea develops its northeast region, infrastructure and economic development could be a key point of cooperation. If a gas pipeline could be developed that crosses North Korea from Russia to South Korea, the DPRK could act as a transit point in the exchange of energy for capital between Moscow and Seoul.³³ This set up would provide Russia and South Korea with diversification for its buying and selling of natural gas while giving North Korea an important source of revenue.

Conclusion

This paper evaluates the energy security policy of North Korea based on its *juche* ideology of self-reliance. Despite its attempts to remain energy independent, North Korea has for most of its modern history depended on outside help in order to acquire enough energy to run its economy. Though North Korea was heavily industrialized before and shortly after World War II, the Kim family regime has overseen a steadily faltering economy based off of flawed choices on how to use the energy sources available domestically as well as how to import its remaining energy needs. The cost has been high. When its lifeline to the Soviet Union was severed after the collapse of communism, the North Korean government was unable to provide its citizenry with the requisite food and materials to survive the devastating droughts and floods in the 1990s. Forced to survive on their own, many began frequenting the black markets. Activity in these underground markets may be shaking the foundation from which the Kim family derives its legitimacy. Only time will tell if new economic and energy policies will bring stability and progress to the country, or whether instability will take hold in an unpredictable nuclear state in a strategically sensitive part of the world.

Martin J. Cool is an MA candidate at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. He is an active-duty officer in the United State Air Force and has a BS degree in Global Security and Intelligence Studies from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.

³³ Hayes, von Hippel, and Bruce, "The DPRK Energy Sector."

The Foreign Policy of U.S. Arms Transfers

PAUL KHURI

This paper examines the transnational security implications of U.S. arms transfers. It evaluates U.S. arms transfer policy to the Afghan mujahedeen during the Cold War, compares that policy to U.S. support for non-state groups in Libya and Syria beginning in 2011, and offers recommendations for U.S. policymakers.

State actors frequently use arms transfers as a tool of foreign policy, distributing weapons for a variety of reasons. In many cases, a supplier state providing arms to another state or sub-state group has played a significant role in determining status and perceived influence over the recipient state or group. In other cases, arms transfers are conducted for economic gain, prestige or by means of a negotiated *quid pro quo* political arrangement. Still, weapons transfers are sometimes conducted in order to shift the balance of power in a military conflict or to achieve some combination of many interwoven goals.

This paper seeks to examine some of the transnational security implications of arms transfers, specifically focusing on U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis other countries and sub-state groups. Because information relating to the transfer of arms to non-state actors is not well publicized in most cases, the majority of statistical information in this paper will focus on government-to-government arms sales. The case studies presented in this paper, however, will focus on the foreign policy implications associated with arms bound for a number of sub-state groups including the Afghan mujahedeen and Libyan and Syrian rebels.

To accomplish these goals, this paper: 1) provides an overview of the foreign policy objectives of international arms transfers, detailing the interrelationship of arms transfers and foreign policy with a case study of U.S. arms transfers to the Afghan mujahedeen during the Cold War; 2) analyzes current U.S. policy regarding international arms transfers, drawing upon both the available statistical information on U.S. arms transfers to other governments as well as two recent examples of arms transfers to sub-state groups in Libya and Syria; 3) addresses the shortfalls of the U.S.'s arms transfer policies to the Afghan mujahedeen as well as the Libyan and Syrian rebels; and lastly 4) provides recommendations for policymakers on future U.S. arms transfers to non-state actors.

Background on International Arms Transfers

Countries distribute arms to other states or sub-state groups for a variety of strategic purposes. These purposes can be consolidated into four overarching themes according to Professor Frederic Pearson, an

expert in arms trade issues. First, many of the goals states have through the transfer of arms include homeland defense and the impression it offers of autonomy and self-sufficiency.¹ In other words, states often adhere to the belief that by strategically providing other less stable governments with weapons, the receiving states will be more secure, which in turn helps ensure the security of the supplying country.

Second, states also provide arms to other countries in order to reap the benefits associated with arms-supplying states, the idea being that the weapons this state can provide are better than those of its rivals.² During the Cold War for example, arms in part represented superpower status and influence. This strategic use of U.S. arms transfers to maintain superpower prestige was exhibited during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In this case, the Nixon administration succumbed to resupplying the Israelis with weapons, though Nixon had hoped to delay doing so to pressure Israel into a negotiated settlement with its Arab rivals. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger later explained the decision to arm the Israelis, saying “the United States could not—either today or tomorrow—allow Soviet arms to win a big victory, even if it was not decisive, against U.S. arms. This has nothing to do with Israel, or with you.”³ Kissinger’s statement emphasizes the importance of the perception of Soviet weapons—those used by Syria and Egypt to attack Israel—vis-à-vis American weapons used by the Israelis. Kissinger’s point was that while resupplying arms did not fulfill an immediate U.S. interest, the United States did so anyway because of the perceived harm that would be done to its status if it avoided resupplying the Israelis.

Third, states also transfer weapons to other countries or sub-state groups to support those they desire to maintain or to attain regional power, or to counter those already in power. An illustrious example of this foreign policy goal is evidenced in the U.S. decision to provide arms to the Afghan mujahedeen during the Cold War in an effort to fend off the spread of communism to the region.

Fourth, states provide arms to other countries or sub-state groups in an effort to seek influence over them. Such arms deals are perceived to provide the supplying state with influence over the political decision-making calculus of the receiving state or group, “that is, bargaining through arms supply to obtain concessions such as military base rights or votes in the United Nations,”⁴ for example. Thus, for the preceding four reasons, the United States and other countries have historically supplied conventional arms to governments and non-state actors throughout the world.

Throughout the Cold War, both U.S. and Soviet foreign policies included arms transfers to states and sub-state groups that benefited each respective superpower. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan,

¹ Frederic S. Pearson, *The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy of International Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 53.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., 53-54.

for example, the United States was determined to undermine the spread of communism by supporting what it perceived to be friendly forces that shared a common goal. That support was partly manifested in weapon transfers to the Afghan mujahedeen to fight their mutual enemies.

Arms Transfers to the Afghan Mujahedeen

After World War II, U.S. foreign policy sought to promote capitalism while simultaneously containing the global spread of communism. Communist influence in Afghanistan began to spread throughout the 1970s and the Afghan Communist party staged a coup d'état in 1978, effectively taking over the Afghan government. Less than a year later, terrorists kidnapped the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, whom later died under unclear circumstances. Unsurprisingly, this series of events fostered concern among U.S. officials over the new Afghan government, led by Nur Muhammad Taraki.⁵ Taraki's government implemented a broad program of communization dedicated to narrowing Western influence in Afghanistan and forming an Islamic government in Kabul.

From the American perspective, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place at a time when the United States was losing influence in the Middle East and South Asia. The Shah fell in Iran earlier that year, placing an increased burden on a secure oil supply for the United States and its allies. Due to the risk of compromised U.S. interests, President Carter decided to intervene in Afghanistan to counter the Soviet campaign. American officials believed that if the Soviet Union could successfully spread its influence over Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries might be next, directly affecting U.S. strategic positioning in the region.

President Carter immediately reacted to the Soviet invasion by signing a presidential finding on covert action to funnel arms and to provide training to the Afghan resistance movement.⁶ Meanwhile, Pakistan perceived Moscow's aggressive intervention in neighboring Afghanistan as a threat to its national security. With the loss of Iran as an ally and dwindling options for access to Afghanistan, U.S. and Pakistani interests quickly aligned. Pakistan became the frontline in the resistance against the Soviet occupation.⁷ Shortly after the Soviet invasion, the U.S. Congress secretly provided large sums of money that incrementally increased funding of the U.S. effort. These funds amounted to \$30 million in 1981, \$200 million in 1984, \$470 million in 1986, and \$630 million in 1987 and were matched dollar for dollar under an agreement the United States negotiated with Saudi Arabia.⁸ The funding provided hundreds of

⁵ Charles G. Cogan "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979." *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10. No. 2 (1993): 75.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Steve Coll. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. 65, 151.

thousands of weapons, including Lee Enfield .303 rifles, Chinese AK-47s, vast quantities of Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (RPG-7s), 60-millimeter Chinese mortars, 12.7-millimeter heavy machine guns Soviet-origin SA-7 Surface-to-Air Missiles, (SAMs), and 2,300 Stinger SAMs to Afghan mujahedeen groups.⁹ The weapons to arm the mujahedeen were purchased by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through global arms markets and from the Egyptians and Turks, so as to avoid any U.S. connection to the weapons on the world stage. The Chinese intelligence services also provided weapons to support the U.S. effort. Likewise, Polish army officers secretly sold their surplus Soviet weapons to support the U.S.-led effort.¹⁰ To avoid direct links to the Afghan mujahedeen, the CIA mainly funneled arms and money through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to supply and oversee military training camps in Pakistan. According to one CIA officer, "We took the means to wage war, put them in the hands of people who could do so, for purposes for which we agreed."¹¹ As the above examples exhibit, arms transfers to the Afghan mujahedeen played a critical role in U.S. efforts to counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

However, the Afghan rebels were not the only group receiving U.S. arms transfers during the Soviet-Afghan war. With Pakistan's strategic importance as the broker of U.S. arms transfers to the mujahedeen, the Pakistanis leveraged their valuable position to negotiate significant aid and arms packages for themselves. In effect, the United States provided handsome arms transfers to Pakistan as a *quid pro quo* for the United States to use Pakistani territory for its operations. The deal also allowed the United States to use the Pakistani intelligence apparatus to funnel arms and supplies across the border and train the Afghan mujahedeen.¹² By 1985, Pakistan became the fourth largest recipient of U.S. bilateral military assistance, underscoring the significance of Pakistan's role as the arms broker for the Afghan mujahedeen. With the approval of a \$4.02 billion military and economic aid package in 1987, Pakistan became the second largest recipient of American aid (largely arms), only after Israel.¹³ U.S. policymakers reasoned the arms deal with Pakistan was necessary because: (1) Soviet influence over Pakistan would have gravely affected U.S. commercial and military interests in the Persian Gulf; (2) The arms deals would entice the Pakistani government to funnel arms to the mujahedeen; (3) Pakistani territory could be of use as a base for future contingencies, particularly against the Soviet threat; and, (4) a credible defense of Pakistan would increase American prestige among the Arab countries and China.¹⁴

⁹ Ibid., 66, 337.

¹⁰ Ibid., 66

¹¹ Cogan, "Partners in Time," 74.

¹² T. V. Paul, "Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship." *Asian Survey* Vol. 32. No. 12 (December 1992), 1086.

¹³ Ibid., 1083-84.

¹⁴ Ibid., 1084 and Fukuyama, Francis. "The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report." *RAND Corporation* (1980), 30-35.

The Pakistanis refused to settle for anything less than the best weapons from the United States, successfully negotiating an arms package that included 42 well-equipped F-16 fighter aircraft. Originally far less advanced F-5G aircraft were to be provided as part of the arrangement, but the United States later agreed to provide the more advanced arms they requested in exchange for Pakistani assistance arming the mujahedeen.¹⁵

Arming the Pakistanis was also perceived as a measure that would deter the Soviets from attacking Pakistan.¹⁶ Conscious of the potential repercussions due to their support of the Americans, Pakistani officials also sought to deter a large-scale Soviet attack on their territory. Meanwhile, the United States wanted to ensure the continuity of the ISI's successful arming and training of the mujahedeen and prevent the Soviet Union from gaining any additional control and influence over South and Central Asia. By 1985, significant advancements could be seen from the joint U.S.-Pakistan effort. On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier departed Afghanistan, leaving the country in a state of disarray after a series of government coups and proxy wars spanning 20 years.

U.S. arms transfers to Afghanistan from 1979 through 1993 had its share of both successes and failures, the reach of which continue to be felt throughout the world today. When President Carter initiated the arms program in 1979, U.S. policy was intended to undermine the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in an effort to cripple the spread of communism. All else aside, this effort was successful and the policy worked. Despite the perceived success of the U.S. arms transfers described above, the United States continues to pay the price of this shortsighted policy almost three and a half decades later. By using the ISI to supply Afghan mujahedeen groups with an abundance of weapons, U.S. policy was exclusively and shortsightedly focused on the immediate goals of weakening and later expelling Soviet forces from the region. To the discredit of the United States, little effort went into contingency planning once these near-term goals were accomplished.

In 1994, Islamist mujahedeen forces united under the Taliban and replaced the Afghan government with a fiercely anti-American Islamist regime using weapons previously provided by the United States. The Taliban went on to ruthlessly rule much of the country under strict Islamic law. They expanded the already widespread network of Islamic schools built over the previous decade, which added to the radicalization of the population. The Taliban also created a safe haven for international terrorists to converge and plot external attacks. They harbored Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda followers, providing them the freedom to train scores of terrorists including those that would ultimately collude to

¹⁵ W. Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan." *Pacific Affairs* 57.2 (1984): 296.

¹⁶ Paul, "Influence through Arms Transfers," 1083-4.

attack the United States in September 2001.¹⁷ Since the 9/11 attack, thousands of U.S. forces have fought the Taliban in Afghanistan to destroy a population that the United States inadvertently helped fund, arm and train three decades ago. Thus, while the U.S. policy was ultimately successful at accomplishing the goals of undermining and later forcing the Soviet withdrawal, the arms transfers manifested into many longer-term global security issues.

Current U.S. Policy Regarding International Arms Transfers

The United States, Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom export the most weapons worldwide. Together, these countries accounted for three-quarters of all weapons exports between 2007 and 2011.¹⁸ Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. arms transfer policy appears to have focused on assisting allied nations' abilities to protect themselves from regional security threats. Reported data suggests that developing countries are routinely the primary recipients of arms sales from the United States and other suppliers, with the percentage of global arms sale agreements to such countries steadily increasing from 68.6% between 2004 and 2010 to 83.9% in 2011.¹⁹

The United States dominates the global arms trade. In 2011, the total of worldwide arms transfers were valued at \$85.3 billion, with the United States accounting for \$66.3 billion, 77.7% of the worldwide total. Russia, the second largest arms supplier after the United States, accounted for only \$4.8 billion, or 5.6%, of the worldwide total.²⁰ Asia and Oceania received 45% of U.S. arms transfers of conventional weapons from 2007-2011. The major recipient countries in the region were South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and Pakistan. The region with the second largest imports of U.S. arms from 2007-2011 was Europe, accounting for 19%, followed by the Middle East, which received 17%.²¹

In 2011 the United States spent more on arms transfers than ever before, surpassing 2010 expenditures by almost 68%.²² The huge increase between 2010 and 2011 marks an abrupt adjustment to U.S. policy for that year, with \$33.4 billion—more than half of all U.S. arms transfers—going from the United States to Saudi Arabia for that year.²³ By comparison, the second largest recipient of U.S.

¹⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: militant Islam, oil, and fundamentalism in Central Asia* (Yale University Press, 2001), 6-7.

¹⁸ "SIPRI Yearbook 2012, Summary- Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (2012), 12.

¹⁹ Richard F. Grimmett, and Paul K. Kerr. "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011." *Congressional Research Service*, Library of Congress, 2012, Summary Page.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Summary Page, 70.

²¹ "SIPRI Yearbook 2012- Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. 2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter 6, 259-271.

²² Grimmett and Kerr, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011," 70.

²³ *Ibid.*, Summary Page.

weapons in 2011 was India, receiving only \$6.9 billion.²⁴ The significant increase in U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia was likely an effort by the United States to beef up Saudi security in light of instability in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. The United States continues to be concerned about the stability of the region after the Arab uprisings brought down the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2011. The increase in arms sales is also likely intended to reassert Saudi Arabia's regional power vis-à-vis Iran, which is of rising concern to the United States and its regional allies.²⁵ While statistics for government-to-government arms transfers are often readily reported, the same cannot be said about arms transfers to non-state actors, which often are initiated covertly, or below the radar as in the case with arms used to support Libyan rebels in 2011.²⁶

Arms Transfers to Libyan Rebels

Similar to the case of U.S. arms transfers to Afghan mujahedeen during the Cold War, the United States has allegedly transferred or supported the transfer of weapons to other sub-state groups in an effort to promote its foreign policy objectives in recent years. The 2011 Libyan war highlights this foreign policy decision. The United States government worked with its international partners to provide weapons to rebel groups seeking to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi's regime. Though there are few details or evidence to suggest that the United States directly transferred weapons to Libyan opposition groups, some reports allege that the United States gave its approval for Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to do so.²⁷ According to the *New York Times*, the United States government did not give the Emiratis permission to ship U.S. made weapons to Libyan rebels, "but instead urged the Emirates to ship weapons to Libya that could not be traced to the United States."²⁸ Similar to the case of the Cold War-era Afghan mujahedeen, Libyan rebels were provided arms by different countries, including Qatar and the UAE, ultimately helping support the opposition's defeat of Qaddafi's regime.²⁹

While the weapons sent to Libya successfully brought down the Qaddafi regime, there were second-order effects similar to the results of weapons supplied to the Afghan mujahedeen. Supposedly, after some of the shipments of arms bound for Libya—consisting of French and Russian designed small

²⁴ "SIPRI Yearbook 2012," 261-63.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 263.

²⁶ Mark Hosenball. "Exclusive: Obama authorizes secret help for Libya rebels." *Reuters*, Mar. 30, 2011, accessed May 11, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/us-libya-usa-order-idUSTRE72T6H220110330>.

²⁷ James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael S. Schmidt, "U.S.-Approved Arms for Libya Rebels Fell Into Jihadis' Hands," *New York Times*, December 5, 2012, accessed May 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/africa/weapons-sent-to-libyan-rebels-with-us-approval-fell-into-islamist-hands.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

arms, such as machine guns, automatic rifles, and ammunition—were transferred to the Libyan rebels by air and sea, the Obama administration became concerned Qatar was turning some of the weapons over to Islamic militants.³⁰ There appears to be a lack of consensus as to where the arms that were sent to the Libyan rebels ended up; however, evidence suggests that at least some of the arms have been moved from Libya to militants with ties to al-Qaeda in Mali, while others were transported to support rebels in Syria.³¹ It is also likely that the same weapons that were used to bring down Qaddafi's regime have since added to the new government's difficulty in restoring order to the country by disbanding the many armed militias remaining as remnants of the 2011 war.

Reports also indicate that significant amounts of arms have been flowing out of Libya in the possession of fleeing Tuaregs. Other reports indicate arms that are reaching Islamic extremists in neighboring countries, in some cases even shifting the balance of power, as in Mali and Syria.³² According to a UN report, the arms leaving Libya have been in the form of "heavy and light weapons, including man-portable air defense systems, small arms and related ammunition and explosives and mines."³³ The instability resulting from the Libyan war has also worsened the security situation in the remote areas where Libya, the Niger, and Algeria converge.³⁴ There is increasing international concern regarding the arms that are easily trafficked through this lawless area.³⁵ Such fears highlight the potential for the weapons from the war in Libya, both those attained by Qaddafi's regime as well as those transferred to the rebels in 2011, to have further destabilizing effects on neighboring countries.

Cross-border violence has also caused alarm for Algerian authorities due to the Libyan government's inability to maintain security on its side of the border. Algeria's continued security concerns are partially the result of the January 2013 siege of the country's Ain Amenas gas plant, perpetrated by Libya-based Islamists linked to al-Qaeda. Algerian government forces were called upon to intervene in the Ain Amenas attack and after a four-day standoff with militants, Algerian special forces raided the natural gas complex where hundreds of workers were held captive. 37 hostages and 29 militants were

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² UN Security Council. "Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya," 25, accessed May 11, 2014, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_99.pdf.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Scott Stewart, "Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya." Stratfor, February 02, 2012, accessed May 11, 2014, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya>.

killed by the end of the incident.³⁶ The attack on the gas plant, fueled by well-armed Libyan Islamist militants, also affected importers of Algerian gas. Ain Amenas, which normally produces 10% of Algeria's total natural gas output, experienced a temporary loss of gas production. The assault completely cut off gas production at the facility for over a month and even then production was significantly limited to only one of the plant's three production trains.³⁷ The implications of the alleged arms transferred to Libya are widespread and extend beyond Libya's borders, as specifically evidenced by the case with Algeria. As proved to be the case with arms transferred to the Afghan mujahedeen, the potential destabilizing second-order effects of arms provided to Libyan rebels is important to consider when assessing the foreign policy implications of U.S.-backed arms transfers in the future.

Arms Transfers to Syrian Rebels

As concerns mount over Salafi jihadists' role in Syria, the United States has allegedly avoided directly arming the Syrian rebellion that has sought to oust President Bashar al-Assad since March 2011. While little information is publicly available regarding the transport of weapons to the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), media reports suggest the United States has been funneling millions of dollars for humanitarian purposes while simultaneously feeding intelligence to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.³⁸ In turn, the Saudis and Qataris have been acting as intermediaries to smuggle automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition to opposition fighters.³⁹ The intention of this policy has supposedly been to prevent American weapons from reaching anti-American Salafi fighters while allowing the United States to

³⁶ Lamine Chikhi, "Algerian Troops Find Huge Arms Cache on Libyan Border." Reuters, October 24, 2013, accessed May 11, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/24/us-algeria-security-idUSBRE99N17V20131024>. "Moktar Belmoktar, al Qaeda linked terror commander behind Ain Amenas gas plant attack in Algeria, resurfaces," CBSNews, September 11, 2013, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/moktar-belmoktar-al-qaeda-linked-terror-commander-behind-ain-amenas-gas-plant-attack-in-algeria-resurfaces/>.

³⁷ "Algeria," United States Energy Information Administration, accessed May 11, 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ag>.

³⁸ The SNC, which is formally called the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and is also commonly called the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) was formed in November 2012 in Doha, Qatar. The coalition was formed to create a unified coalition of opposition groups in the fight against Bashar al-Assad's government. The United States government along with most of the international community has come to recognize the SNC as the 'the legitimate representative' of the Syrian people ("National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces," Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, accessed May 27, 2014, <http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=50628>).

³⁹ David E. Sanger, "Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria," *New York Times*, October 14, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html>.

determine which groups of the opposition warrant its support. Nevertheless, the U.S. policy has been reported to be providing arms to unintended recipients.⁴⁰

According to the *New York Times*, American officials and Middle Eastern diplomats have stated “most of the arms shipped at the behest of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to supply Syrian rebel groups fighting the government of Bashar al-Assad are going to hardline Islamic jihadists, and not the more secular opposition groups that the West wants to bolster.”⁴¹ According to available reporting, as was the case with weapons transfers to the Afghan mujahedeen and Libyan rebels, U.S. backed arms transfers to the Syrian rebels appear to be consistently turning up in the hands of U.S. adversaries. Additional evidence suggests that rebels are growing long beards to impersonate Salafi jihadists after hearing that Qatar was more inclined to give weapons to Islamist fighters.⁴² Thus, U.S. policy has inadvertently helped arm the jihadists that it initially sought to sideline by using Saudi Arabia and Qatar to control the flow of weapons to the Syrian rebels. Having analyzed the unintentional and potential consequences of the arms transfer policies implemented in the Afghan and Libyan cases, speculation points towards an unfavorable future for Syria and its neighbors in the event Salafi jihadists continue to acquire significant amounts of arms.

Conclusion, Policy Deficiencies, and Recommendations

Multiple similarities arise in the policies that led to the transfer of arms to the Afghan mujahedeen, and Libyan and Syrian rebels. While the circumstances and details of arms transfers to the SNC remain ambiguous, there appear to have been both successes and failures resulting from the arms transfers to the Afghan mujahedeen and Libyan rebels. In both cases, the successes appear relatively immediate in nature, while the failures emerge over the long-term. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was an immediate success in line with U.S. strategic objectives, while the arming of anti-American Islamists and the creation of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a long-term strategic failure. In the case of Libya, U.S. and NATO supported arms transfers to Libyan rebel groups in 2011 succeeded with the immediate goal of overthrowing Qaddafi. However, this policy appears to have inadvertently led to the arming of Tuaregs and Islamist militants who have intensified and destabilized the security situation in Libya and in nearby Mali. The arming of Libyan rebels has since required international armed intervention in Mali to prevent the creation of a safe-haven for Islamist militants—including al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—similar to the circumstances that led Afghanistan to become a safe haven for

⁴⁰ Mark Mazzetti, C.J. Chivers, and Eric Schmitt, “Taking Outsized Role in Syria, Qatar Funnel Arms to Rebels,” *New York Times*, June 29, 2013, accessed May 11, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/sending-missiles-to-syrian-rebels-qatar-muscles-in.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

terrorists in the 1990s. Though the long-term effects of arming Libyan rebels remain to be seen, the other case studies throughout this paper illustrate the potential risks to regional security posed by the weapons transferred during the Libyan war.

In the case of Syria, alleged U.S. sanctioning of Qatari and Saudi arms transfers to the Syrian opposition has already shown similarities with Afghanistan and Libya. With the United States ostensibly leaving its allies to deliver arms to the Syrian rebels, jihadists loyal to al-Qaeda have been reported to be receiving many of the weapons transfers. Just as Pakistan chose to arm the most radical anti-American mujahedeen fighters in the 1980s, apparently so too is Qatar in Syria.⁴³

It is thus incumbent upon the United States to learn from previous mistakes. In order to effectively and responsibly execute arms transfers as a tool of foreign policy, U.S. policymakers must vigorously assess the short and long-term potential outcomes of arming non-state groups. Distributing large quantities of arms to non-state actors is both risky and unpredictable. In all of the cases addressed in this paper, the United States allegedly used third party states—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and/or Qatar—as conduits to deliver arms to groups it supported. It appears that in all of these cases, many of the arms ended up in the wrong hands, leading to long-term blowback. None of the countries used by the United States share its exact interests, as evidenced by their calculus in supporting Islamist extremists. Thus, the United States should not rely on such intermediaries to implement its policy. The United States has attempted to use intermediaries is to mask its involvement, but, in all of the above cases, the media has traced the alleged arms transfers back to the United States and widely publicized the policy.

The United States is far more likely to be successful in its arms transfers to non-state actors if it cuts out the middlemen and supplies the arms through its own distribution networks. As Vali Nasr, a former State Department advisor stated, “when you have an intermediary, you are going to lose control.”⁴⁴ U.S. policymakers should be very critical of arming non-state groups in the future. However, if circumstances determine that the potential benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, the United States should directly arm the non-state actors itself, without relying on intermediaries.

Paul Khuri is a Middle East analyst at a private consulting firm in Washington, D.C. where he focuses on the intersection of politics, economics, and security. He is also an MA candidate in International Security Policy at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

⁴³ Sanger, “Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria.”

⁴⁴ Risen, Mazzetti, and Schmidt, “U.S.-Approved Arms for Libya Rebels Fell Into Jihadis’ Hands.”

Blast from the Past: Using History to Shape Targeted Strikes Policy

DAMIAN MENCINI

In many ways, drone strikes are unprecedented: the technology, the frequency of use, and the geographic scope are all by-products of the twenty-first century. The United States government, however, has a deep history of debating whether to kill individual enemies and has a history of authorizing operations to do so. This paper analyzes America's history of targeted lethal strikes and offers recommendations for modern policy.

Drone strikes are sensational events. As such, scholars, pundits, and government officials have exhausted reams of paper and hours of airtime arguing whether they are legal, ethical, or effective. Few commentators, however, have expanded the spectrum of study to include an analysis of the years before 9/11. This paper argues that the history of targeted lethal operations prior to September 11, 2001 can inform modern policy.

In order to study the history of targeted strikes, the first task must be to widen the definition to one that moves beyond Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and precision missile systems, first employed by the U.S. military and Central Intelligence Agency in 2001.¹ The use of remotely piloted aircraft in fact dates back to the Vietnam War.² There are two types of operations employed in drone strikes: targeted killings and signature strikes. Both types of operations have histories that predate September 11, 2001. Signature strikes are targeted operations based on an individual's patterns of behavior, or "signature," rather than his or her individual identity. Targeted killings, by contrast, occur when decision-makers intentionally identify, track, and kill an individual. Importantly, targeted killings are not "assassinations." Commenting on the distinction, Attorney General Eric Holder said, "Some have called operations 'assassinations.' They are not, and the use of the loaded term is misplaced. Assassinations are unlawful

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), 210-214.

² The Air Force and CIA used small jet-propelled unmanned aerial vehicles during the Vietnam War called Lightning Bugs to carry out high-altitude reconnaissance missions. The precursor to the MQ-1 Predator drone—the most prolifically used remotely piloted aircraft in the twenty-first century—dates back to late 1980s when an American contractor created the Gnat and the Amber, which were larger stand-off platforms. The MQ-1 Predator drone was first deployed in the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, and then later armed in the twenty-first century. For more on the history of remotely piloted aircraft see: Brian Glyn Williams, *Predators: The CIA's Drone War on Al Qaeda* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013), 20-25.

killings.”³ The primary distinction between targeted killing and assassination operations is that the latter is not considered grounded in law.

In order to argue that the history of targeted killings and signature strikes can inform modern policy, this paper includes three sections. The first section summarizes the precedents for both types of operations in an effort to establish a historical foundation. This foundation is used to analyze specific historical trends. The paper concludes with three policy recommendations extracted from the past yet crafted for the future.

Historical Precedents

The United States government has long debated whether to kill its enemies. Targeted killings are legal operations by a state or its agents that intentionally and deliberately kill individuals. Governments target an individual, fix his or her location, and then kill him or her.⁴ The operation against Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor and admiral of the Japanese Fleet, in 1943 is a clear example that American policymakers consistently cite to justify modern operations.⁵ American aviators gunned down Yamamoto on April 18, 1943 after American intelligence cryptologists deciphered a Japanese message identifying the admiral’s flight itinerary.

In the early decades of the Cold War, the CIA plotted to assassinate various foreign leaders. The Church Committee, a Senate Select Committee convened to study government intelligence operations chaired by Senator Frank Church, revealed these assassination plots in 1975. The public reaction was overwhelmingly negative. While the CIA never succeeded in assassinating enemy leaders, public outcry in the wake of the Church Committee revelations left a significant scar on the CIA and its officers. Moreover, the Church Committee findings led to three executive orders banning assassination as a foreign policy tool.

³ Eric Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,” (Speech, Chicago, IL, March 5, 2012), The Department of Justice, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>.

⁴ Micah Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report no. 65 (January 2013): 6; Charles Faint and Marshall Harris, “F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion “Feeds” The SOF Targeting Process,” *Small Wars Journal*, January 31, 2012, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-%E2%80%9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-sof-targeting-process>.

⁵ Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law”; Harold Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” (Speech, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2010,) The State Department, <http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm>; Jeh Johnson, “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration,” (Speech, New Haven, CT, February 22, 2012), Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-johnsons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448>.

In the aftermath of the Church Committee findings, subsequent administrations were reluctant to engage in targeted killing operations out of a fear the public would misconstrue them as assassinations. In 1986, the Reagan administration authorized an airstrike against terrorist facilities in Libya. One of the facilities was the command-and-control center and home of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Although targeted killings literature cites the air strike against Libya as a case, it is not an operational precedent for targeted killing.⁶ The United States intelligence community knew that Qaddafi moved locations multiple times each night to avoid internal coup attempts; therefore, the U.S. military did not equip the aircraft with ordnance powerful enough to destroy the bunker at Qaddafi's command center.⁷ While the Libyan strikes were not an operational precedent for targeted killings, President Reagan invoked a legal justification that the Obama administration uses to justify its drone strikes today: the right to self-defense as stipulated by the United Nations Charter Article 51.⁸

Later, the Clinton administration authorized a cruise missile salvo on a compound where Osama bin Laden was thought to be located in August 1998. The operation was unsuccessful, but is another example of an attempted targeted killing because bin Laden was specifically identified as a target, then located before the strike was carried out. The failure to kill Bin Laden in 1998 and 1999 also led to the development of the armed Predator drone, which became the weapon of choice for the Bush and Obama administrations' targeted killing operations.

Signature strikes are preemptive operations in which operators target individuals based on certain characteristics associated with enemy leaders or militant organizations. Characteristics associated with militants' movements include the handling of explosives, travel toward armed conflict, and training in al Qaeda compounds.⁹ Unlike targeted killings, signature strikes do not target high-value commanders with known identities; rather, operators eliminate low-level fighters. Target devolution—the shift from

⁶ For mentions of the 1986 airstrike in targeted killings literature see Jeffrey Richelson, "When Kindness Fails: Assassination as a National Security Option," *International Journal on Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 15, no. 2, (2010): 243-274; Howard Rachtel, "Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Duke Law Journal* 55, no. 3, (2005): 677-710; Kenneth Anderson, "Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law," Working Paper between the Brookings Institution, Georgetown University Law Center, and Hoover Institution (2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2009/5/11%20counterterrorism%20anderson/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.pdf.

⁷ Stephen Hosmer, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 27; Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 122.

⁸ Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike against Libya," (Speech, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1986), <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/41486g.htm>.

⁹ Kevin Jon Heller, "One Hell of a Killing Machine: Signature Strikes and International Law," *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 11, (2013): 94-103.

targeting high-value leaders to low-level combatants—and preemptive operations are hallmarks of signature strikes.

The Phoenix Program conducted during the Vietnam War was an intelligence exploitation program aimed at dismantling Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in which target selection devolved from high-ranking commanders to low-level fighters. The Phoenix Program relied on Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) to neutralize Viet Cong soldiers and facilitators. The PRUs had three methods of neutralization: capturing, inducing desertion, and killing.¹⁰ The PRUs and the Phoenix Program neutralized tens of thousands of Viet Cong and the PRUs killed a significant number of them. The PRUs used certain criteria to target VCI such as evidence of their activities and positions within the VCI organizational structure.¹¹ These criteria are similar to how signature strike operators evaluate prospective targets today. As the Phoenix Program aged, the PRUs targeted fewer high-value commanders in favor of a greater number of low-level combatants.¹²

The Reagan administration's counterterrorism policy, articulated in 1984, advocated a preemptive posture akin to today's signature strikes. National Security Decision Directive 138 authorized the CIA to: "Develop, in coordination with other friendly security services, capabilities for the pre-emptive neutralization of anti-American terrorist groups which, plan, support, or conduct hostile terrorist acts against U.S. Citizens, interests, and property overseas."¹³ The Reagan administration never implemented NSDD 138, however, and neither the CIA, the military, nor America's allies conducted operations to neutralize foreign terrorists. Despite the fact that it was never used, the policy explicitly articulated preemptive offensive counterterrorism measures. In addition, Secretary of State George Schultz publicly called for the United States to use preemptive force to check international terrorist organizations.¹⁴

Targeted killings, signature strikes, and armed drones are not interdependent. Armed drones can be used to carry out operations that are not targeted killings or signature strikes, and likewise Special Forces teams can carry out the same operations. The tools are less important than the nature of the operations. Historically, the White House has authorized operations to kill its enemies and will undoubtedly continue to do so.

¹⁰ Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and Birds of Prey* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 236.

¹¹ United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, *Phung Hoang Adviser Handbook*, (Saigon: U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, November 20, 1970): 9.

¹² William Rosenau and Austin Long, "The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency," *RAND*, (2009): 14.

¹³ National Security Decision Directive 138, "Combatting Terrorism," The White House (April 3, 1984), 4.

¹⁴ George Schultz, "Terrorism and the Modern World," *Terrorism* 7, no. 4 (1985), 431-447.

Key Trends

These past operations and precedents inevitably raise the question: how can history inform today's targeted killing and signature strikes policy? This section identifies six distinct historical trends that should inform policymakers today.

Fusion between Military and Intelligence

Over the years, the military has taken on responsibilities traditionally assigned to the intelligence community, while the CIA has amassed increased war-fighting capabilities.¹⁵ The air raid on Yamamoto exemplified traditional military and intelligence roles. Intelligence cryptologists decrypted a Japanese cable and provided actionable intelligence to the military, which then carried out the lethal operation. The Phoenix Program and the use of Provincial Reconnaissance Units, on the other hand, was a convoluted convergence of military and CIA responsibility. American advisers to the PRUs were either military or intelligence officials, and the responsibilities for each team included intelligence collection and analysis as well as enemy neutralization through capture, desertion, or elimination. Intelligence collection and analysis has been the traditional role of intelligence officers, while enemy neutralization has historically been the responsibility of a soldier. The targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki is an example of a nearly seamlessly fused operation by which the CIA and JSOC both had intelligence collection capabilities and armed drone programs in Yemen. Moreover, the National Security Council originally assigned the task to fix and finish Awlaki to JSOC, but then switched the mission jurisdiction to the CIA in the final months of the hunt.¹⁶

These three examples show the increasing fusion between the two communities over time. In the downing of Yamamoto's plane, the communities adhered to traditional roles. During the Phoenix Program, the PRUs were a mix of military and intelligence personnel performing a wide range of activities ranging from intelligence collection to enemy neutralization. The Awlaki drone strike is a capstone to the increasing fusion between the two communities.

Today's terrorist organizations are decentralized, geographically dispersed, and horizontally-structured, factors which demand a different response to the localized and vertically-structured threats of

¹⁵ Mark Mazzetti and Robert Chesney also argue for a convergence between military and intelligence. For more see Mark Mazzetti, *The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth* (New York: Penguin Press, 2013); Robert Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," *Journal of National Security Law and Policy* 5, (2012): 539-629.

¹⁶ Hakim Almasari, Margaret Coker, and Siobhan Gorman, "Drone Kills Top Al Qaeda Figure," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576602301252340820>; Mazzetti, *The Way of the Knife*, 308.

the past. In addition, today's terrorist organizations and insurgent movements are asymmetric.¹⁷ Thus, it is unsurprising that the military and intelligence communities have sought to improve their own counterterrorism capabilities by expanding their traditional roles of war fighting and intelligence collection and analysis.

Armed, unmanned systems are the perfect technological platform for the fused operations of the twenty-first century. Remotely piloted vehicles were initially designed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.¹⁸ When the CIA and DOD decided to equip the MQ-1 Predator drone with a Hellfire II missile in 2000, however, they added a war fighting function. Thus, there are two layers of fusion between today's military and intelligence operations. The first is the jurisdictional fusion between the CIA and the military, where the military now has greater intelligence capabilities and the CIA has more war fighting responsibilities. The second, more tactical layer of fusion is the technological platform. Both the intelligence community and the Department of Defense are employing armed, unmanned systems which have the capability of collecting intelligence and killing enemy combatants.

The increased fusion between military and intelligence communities raises the legal issue of covert authority. The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the defense and intelligence communities and added provisions to the U.S. Code. Title 10 and Title 50 clarify the roles of the intelligence and defense communities. Yet there is no strict interpretation of these statutes.¹⁹ Title 10 is often associated with the Department of Defense and its concomitant military operations, while Title 50 is thought to refer to intelligence agencies and covert action.²⁰ The debate over Title 10 and Title 50 burgeoned after the Special Forces raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. The CIA temporarily contracted U.S. Navy Seals under Title 50 authority to conduct a covert action mission because the United States military did not have authorization to conduct military missions in Pakistan.²¹ Mark Mazzetti, a national security reporter for the *New York Times*, notes that the security community's slang term for this phenomenon of temporarily contracting military personnel is "sheep dipping."²² Title 10 and Title 50 authority further

¹⁷ Carter Ham, "Fit for the Future: Cross-Atlantic Perspectives on Ground Forces," (Lecture: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.), June 20, 2013.

¹⁸ J.R. Reid, interview with author (Washington D.C., August 2013). J.R. Reid is a former Air Force Lieutenant and currently an engineer with General Atomics, which is the manufacturer of the MQ-1 and MQ-9 remotely piloted vehicles. The MQ-1 and MQ-9 are the primary aircraft used by the military, the CIA, and JSOC to conduct targeted killings and signature strikes and are better known for their product names "Predator" and "Reaper."

¹⁹ Andru Wall, "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action," *Harvard Law School National Security Journal* 3, (2011): 100.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 87.

²¹ Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," 539.

²² Mazzetti, *The Way of the Knife*, 133.

explains that the CIA originally secured the contract to use armed drones in Pakistan because the Agency needed to conduct strikes under covert authority.

The increased fusion between the military and intelligence communities highlights important considerations for this paper's policy recommendations. This trend has a history that dates back to the Phoenix Program where mission creep was evident between soldiers and spies. Three decades later, the intelligence community and Pentagon catalyzed this convergence when faced with the asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat and the unique war fighting and intelligence capabilities of armed drones. In modern fused operations, the Bush and Obama administrations have relied on the framework embedded in the U.S. Code for aggregating military and covert action activities. Therefore, any policy recommendation has to recognize the history of fusion, its recent developments, and the established framework in the U.S. Code.

Executive Command

Throughout the history of targeted killings and signature strikes the executive branch has become increasingly involved and open about its role in the use of lethal force. The Roosevelt administration did not admit that Admiral Yamamoto died in a plane crash until a month after the operation when Japanese radio stations eulogized the fallen commander. Even then, President Roosevelt simply responded with "Gosh!"²³ Later, the Truman administration did not reveal that American aviators gunned down Yamamoto until after Japanese leaders surrendered. The White House stayed removed from any role in the targeted killing, mainly because they did not want to reveal that American intelligence officer cracked the Japanese Code.

In the early years of the Cold War, the National Security Council authorized the CIA's assassination plots under the auspices of "plausible deniability." The White House intentionally installed mechanisms to distance itself from lethal action. The 1986 airstrike on Qaddafi was a departure from this norm because President Reagan addressed the nation announcing the raid on Libya's terrorist facilities. President Clinton followed Reagan's lead and announced the cruise missile strike on the al Qaeda compound near Khost in 1998.

President Obama has taken the most active role of any U.S. President to date in authorizing lethal force. The National Security Council curates the disposition matrix—the software that manages the location and priority of terrorist targets—while President Obama makes the final decisions—which operations to conduct.²⁴ In addition, President Obama and his top officials have taken to public forums to

²³ "Gosh!" Says Roosevelt On Death of Yamamoto," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1943.

²⁴ Greg Miller, "Plan for hunting terrorists signals U.S. intends to keep adding names to kill lists," *Washington Post*, October 12, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408f6e6a4b_print.html.

argue the administration's position and criteria on targeted strikes. The role of the executive branch in targeted lethal strikes is more visible today than it was in the era of plausible deniability.

One plausible explanation for why the Obama administration has taken such an authoritative role in authorizing and publicizing targeted strikes is the technology itself.

Remotely piloted aircraft have a clear chain of command. The President no longer has to wait for the dust to settle to hear the results of cumbersome covert proxy operations. With remotely piloted targeted killings, the results are quickly communicated up the chain of command. Moreover, the public's conception that America is waging war by remote control undoubtedly pushes the authorizing administration to be more forthcoming about the technology and how the respective agency employs it.

Technology

Military and intelligence communities have employed advanced technology throughout the history of targeted killings. From the inventions of the longbow to the airplane, distancing humans from conflict is a trend that has long existed in warfare. Today's technologies place an even stronger emphasis on removing human operators from the equation. In the strike on Admiral Yamamoto, army aviators used the maneuverable P-38 aircraft, a plane with less than a year of combat deployment.²⁵ The debates within the Clinton administration over how to kill Osama bin Laden also reveal the fact that the administration feared putting U.S. personnel in danger. The administration used cruise missiles, which removed American operators from battle. The missiles, however, had long flight times necessitating knowledge that a specific target—in this case Bin Laden—would be in one location for an extended period of time. Military officials proposed using AC-130 gunships but were worried about their short flight time, the need for nearby landing zones, or the risk of losing American personnel in foreign territory.²⁶ These considerations resulted in arming the MQ-1 Predator drone, which has proved to be an effective tool for hunting terrorists.

Remotely piloted vehicles such as the MQ-1 and the more advanced MQ-9 are ideal platforms for targeted killings and signature strikes. The MQ-9 — variously titled the Predator or Reaper, depending on the agency or military division terming it — can fly for twenty-seven hours at a maximum altitude of 50,000 feet, loiter for hours above a target, and can carry a laser-guided, Hellfire II Missile as well as more sophisticated and substantial bombs.²⁷ A human operator, often thousands of miles away, remotely

²⁵ "Lockheed P-38J-10-LO Lightning," Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, http://airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?object=nasm_A19600295000.

²⁶ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), 135-136.

²⁷ "MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B," General Atomics, (Product Information Card: Received at the AUVSI Unmanned Systems Conference, August 2013).

pilots this aircraft. The precision munitions systems and the remotely-piloted nature of unmanned aerial vehicles are valuable benefits to counterterrorism operations, but those features are not what make them the ideal tool for lethal strikes. The reason remotely piloted vehicles have become synonymous with counterterrorism under the Obama administration is due to their unique ability to loiter. The UAV's capacity to circle for hours at a time overhead make it the ideal tool for intelligence collection, target identification, and lethal strikes.

While these major technological advancements and the use of remotely piloted vehicles in lethal counterterrorism missions have raised profound ethical questions, drone technology is rapidly advancing and its use will undoubtedly continue in targeted strikes by the military and CIA. Using new technology has been a trend in targeted killings for decades and has been one of the most debated issues in modern targeted lethal policy.

Preemption and Imminence

Signature strikes and targeted killings are preemptive in nature. The White House authorizes the use of preemptive force with the expectation that an adversary will attack first.²⁸ A concept that goes hand-in-hand with preemption is determining whether an attack is imminent. John Yoo, an attorney in the Bush administration, wrote, "Imminence classically depends on timing. Only when an attack is soon to occur, and thus certain, can a nation use force in preemptive self-defense."²⁹ The Obama administration explicitly outlines imminence as a criterion for a targeted killing. Eric Holder, the Attorney General, wrote in a leaked White Paper, "an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States."³⁰

The Obama administration has justified its preemptive lethal actions in domestic and international law. John Brennan, the current Director of the CIA, noted in a speech that "The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of attack."³¹ Following the precedent of the Reagan and Clinton administrations, the Obama administration also grounds its international legal authority in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. With regard to international law, officials have vehemently defended the use of unmanned technology, arguing that there is no stipulation that "bans the

²⁸ Karl Mueller, Jasen Castillo, Forrest Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen, *Striking First: Preemptive and Preventative Attack in U.S. National Security Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 6-8.

²⁹ John Yoo "Assassinations or Targeted Killings After 9/11," *New York Law School Law Review* 56, (2011/12) 73.

³⁰ "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qaeda or an Associated Force," Department of Justice (White Paper: 2013).

³¹ Brennan, "The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy."

use of remotely piloted aircraft for [national self-defense] or that prohibits [the United States] from using lethal force against [its] enemies outside of an active battlefield."³²

In the historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes, imminence and preemption were not always explicitly used as justification by the presiding administrations. It is possible, however, to infer preemption in many of the operations. NSDD 138 was the most explicit reference to using preemptive tactics to counter terrorism, although it is impossible to know whether those tactics would have been lethal because the Reagan administration never implemented the neutralization policy. The targeted killings on Yamamoto and Awlaki and the attempted strike against Bin Laden in 1998 all highlight the preemptive justification. Yamamoto was the architect of Pearl Harbor and the commander during Midway; as such, military and national security advisors reasoned that he would orchestrate a surprise attack on U.S. forces again. According to historian Paul Woodruff, the raid on Yamamoto was not motivated by vengeance, but instead aimed to preempt another attack.³³ Thus, the Roosevelt administration justified the air raid as preemptive. Likewise, Bin Laden had attacked several U.S. assets around the world by the year 1998. Intelligence revealed he was planning to attack more targets, which he did in the *USS Cole* bombing in the year 2000, and on September 11, 2001. Anwar al-Alwaki was an ideologue turned operator who plotted several attacks against the United States and inspired many more. Therefore, there was a clear expectation Awlaki would continue to target Americans.

The use of UAV technology raises the issue of imminence and by extension, preemption. Using armed drones allows pilots to see militants in the early stages of any attack. A militant might be handling explosives or training in an al Qaeda compound for an attack that could happen in a day, in a month, or in a year, which raises the question: How soon is imminent? Juan Zarate, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Counterterrorism in the Bush administration, stated in an interview that the Obama administration has greatly expanded the concept of imminence. Zarate stated:

*The notion of preemption changed because it was no longer clear imminence, it morphed into a sort of persistent imminence ... the traditional examples of imminence are when tanks are ordered on the border, ships are headed towards the harbor, and aircraft are headed into sovereign airspace, that is imminence. Now, that concept has changed to they have tanks, ships, and airplanes.*³⁴

Preemption has always been implicitly involved in targeted strikes because policymakers are looking to eliminate an individual before that individual can attack. Yet the shift toward persistent imminence can be, in part, attributed to UAV technology. The ability to spy on militants who are performing nefarious

³² Ibid.

³³ Paul Woodruff, "Was it Right to Gun for Yamamoto?" in *Lightning over Bougainville*, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1990), 46-53.

³⁴ Juan Zarate, interview with author (Cambridge, MA: March 2014).

actions but who may not be explicitly planning an attack on the United States, for example, forms the basis of signature strike policy.

Expanding internationally recognized concepts such as imminence increases the risk that legal authority is stretched to its breaking point. Administrations have a working platter of legal justifications to choose from, and each administration uses different authority to justify imminence. Presidents Reagan and Clinton used Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to justify strikes. The Bush administration used constitutional authority. Instead of authorizing strikes from presidential authority, the Obama administration grounded its justifications in the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force. Rewriting international and domestic law and internationally recognized concepts such as imminence sends a message to other nations that they too can alter accepted norms as they see fit.

Public Support

Two factors contribute public support for lethal force: a target's value and executive transparency. Public support is imperative in maintaining political support for a sustained targeted killing strategy. The checkered history of American targeted lethal operations, seen through the Phoenix Program and Cold War assassinations, highlights the real risk that public anger could force the U.S. government to halt an otherwise successful program. This section argues that targeted killings that have high target value and high executive transparency have the most public support.

Unquestionably, the two most well-received targeted killings in American history were those of Admiral Yamamoto and Osama bin Laden. Both operations were euphorically welcomed because each man had precipitated a devastating loss of life. The primary differentiating factor between the strike on Yamamoto and the raid on Bin Laden, however, is the issue of executive transparency. In the case of Yamamoto, reporters did not announce his death until a month after Japanese radio had already eulogized it. When the White House did finally reveal that American aviators had killed the Japanese Admiral, the announcement coincided with the official Japanese surrender of World War II. Euphoria for the operation overlapped with a United States victory, and it became difficult for the public to bifurcate the two events.

The American public despised Bin Laden, and it is perhaps for this reason that the strike at Abbottabad offers an example of successful executive transparency. Americans turned en masse to their televisions and computers when news about Bin Laden's death began to leak. The Awlaki drone strike, by contrast, did not receive the same level of public support, despite the fact that Alwaki was a high-value target. From an operational perspective, Awlaki's target value was high, but the Yemeni cleric did not earn the same public enmity as Bin Laden or Yamamoto. Awlaki's American citizenship also complicated public support for the strike. Although President Obama announced Awlaki's death the morning after it occurred, the news was that the White House targeted an American citizen and the debate quickly shifted

to the issue of citizenship rather than the value of the target.³⁵ Thus, two factors theoretically contribute to positive American reaction to targeted killings as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Hypothetical Public Support for Targeted Operations

		Target Value	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Executive Transparency	<i>High</i>	POSITIVE	NEUTRAL TO NEGATIVE
	<i>Low</i>	NEUTRAL TO POSITIVE	NEGATIVE

The most positive public support to targeted strikes will occur when target value and executive transparency are both high. Using the same logic, negative reaction will occur when target value and executive transparency are both low. The other example worth noting is the CIA’s assassination attempts during the Cold War, which resulted in negative public reaction. As noted earlier, assassinations are different from targeted killings because the former are illegal. Nevertheless, the executive transparency was very low and the CIA plotted the operations in secrecy against a range of targets during the Cold War. The most notorious target of these proposed assassinations was Fidel Castro. While Castro’s target value was high, executive transparency was low.³⁶ The Phoenix Program led to heightened cynicism directed towards the CIA, and signature strikes continue to face considerable opposition.³⁷

Public reaction where a low target value is coupled with high executive transparency, and high target value is coupled with low executive transparency are both noted as neutral; however the public will likely respond more favorably to the death of a high-value target (thus neutral to positive), as it did in the Yamamoto raid, even when transparency is low. There is also no real precedent for announcing low-value

³⁵ Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the ‘Change of Office’ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ceremony,” (speech, Fort Meyers, VA, September 30, 2011), The White House.


³⁶ The example of Castro shows how low public support can be for lethal operations and the severe scrutiny for the CIA. The CIA assassination plots, however, are omitted from further analysis because this paper focuses on legal operations.

³⁷ Congressional Representatives looked to add a provision to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to ban signature strikes. See United States House of Representatives, “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,” 113th Congress 1st Session, Report 113-277 (November 25, 2013), 28.

strikes with high executive transparency because there are not many scenarios where the public would be grateful that the president informed them the military targeted low-level militants. The only possible scenario is if the president was clarifying an operational mistake, which certainly would not result in positive public support.

Figure 2 shows observed public support to lethal targeted strikes. As noted, it would be bizarre for an executive administration to have high transparency for a low-value target unless an egregious error occurred. Therefore, the quadrant for high transparency and low target value highlights the rarity of such an event. The major implication of this argument is that high-value targets and executive transparency are the two most important factors in determining positive American reaction to the use of targeted lethal force.

Figure 2: Observed Public Support for Select Targeted Operations 1943-2011



Policy Recommendations

There is a rich history of the American government contemplating and using targeted lethal force prior to 9/11. Based on trends highlighted above, this paper suggests three policy recommendations.

1. *The executive branch should only conduct targeted killings and stop signature strikes.*

The White House should eliminate the signature strikes policy. Targeting individuals by characteristics alone expands the concept of imminence too far, setting a dangerous precedent. Technological innovation, as well as a public appetite for counterterrorism, have led to targeting killing policies that widen the concept of imminence beyond recognition. By analyzing an individual's past actions, it is possible to explain how he might pose an imminent threat to the United States. Post strike, it is also possible to convey that individual's misdeeds to the public. It is impossible, however, to assess an

individual's plots or operations when the state does not know an individual's identity. This fact eliminates the opportunity to announce the proposed beneficial ramifications of a strike to the public.

Signature strikes also set a dangerous precedent for the international community. If other nations decide to conduct lethal operations to counter terrorism or other national security threats, the White House's targeted killings policy sets a better example than its signature strike policy. The White House is significantly more transparent when it targets individuals than when it targets militants based on their behavior. When a government specifically identifies the individual it is targeting, it also makes it possible for scholars, reporters, international institutions, and the public to assess whether that person poses an imminent threat and the merits of the government's justifications for the targeted killing. It is impossible to do the same for signature strikes. The executive branch, based on its past strikes, has a set of criteria for signature strikes which include handling explosives, traveling in an armed convoy towards a conflict, or training in a known al Qaeda facility. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations have explicitly defined these scenarios; the criteria are only inferred through reports. Thus, another nation's signature strike policy is open to their own government's interpretation, which is especially disconcerting when considering some of the world's more repressive regimes.

Signature strikes may be effective at eliminating threats by chance, yet the pros of signature strikes do not outweigh the cons. Signature strikes may be more effective in active duty war zones where there are troops on the ground supported by armed drones. Signature strikes in limited lethal counterterrorism operations, however, are out of place. The chances of a signature strike going awry and killing scores of civilians is much higher than a targeted operation against a well-known individual. The scenarios for signature strikes are open to the pilot or targeting analyst's interpretation. In addition, if the President decides he or she needs to continue to kill terrorists outside of active war zones in the future, signature strikes run the risk of severely damaging relations with host nations.

If the CIA and military conduct too many unsuccessful or collateral damage-ridden signature strikes, the United States runs the risk of nullifying the host nation's agreement to allow American UAVs in their airspace. Thus far, leaders from Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia have remained amenable to American UAVs in their airspace. The recently reported negotiations between Pakistani leaders and American policymakers about curbing low-value strikes, however, signal that foreign nations will use airspace as a diplomatic bargaining chip.³⁸ Nullifying the agreement would eliminate the opportunity to target high-value individuals. If the reports are true that the Obama administration agreed to scale back its strikes in Pakistan and only target high-value individuals, a policy which would serve to eliminate all

³⁸ Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, "U.S. to Curb Pakistan Drone Program," *Wall Street Journal*, February 5, 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579365112070806176>.

signature strikes, then American officials are already moving toward this recommendation.³⁹ While the agreement between Pakistani and American officials is a step in the right direction, the Obama administration has continued to authorize signature strikes in Yemen in 2014.⁴⁰

2. The Central Intelligence Agency should remain in charge of conducting targeted killings.

The question of who should run America's armed drones to counter terrorism has been a question since "The Predator Initiative."⁴¹ When the Bush administration was debating who should run the armed predator program in 2001, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, raised a series of key questions. According to the 9/11 Commission, Tenet asked, "What is the chain of command? Who takes the shot? Are America's leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control?"⁴² Such questions concerning command have only become more complex in the past decade due to the fact that the CIA and JSOC both run parallel drone programs. In January 2014, the United States Congress blocked the transfer of the CIA's armed drones to the military (presumably to the Joint Special Operations Command) by adding provisions in the classified portion of the federal budget.⁴³ The CIA should be the sole organization in charge of targeted killings for one very good reason: it is better at targeted killings. The CIA has a track record of securing accurate intelligence sources, which makes for accurate targeting data resulting in fewer civilian casualties.⁴⁴

On the surface, it makes more sense for JSOC to run the counterterrorism drone program. Owen Cote, a security studies expert who specializes in military operations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, stated in an author interview, "The CIA will stop conducting operations at some point and JSOC will take over. JSOC is gearing up for the shift. JSOC was a killing machine in Iraq. They would conduct kill-capture raids every night, collect the intelligence, and run the next operation."⁴⁵ There are

³⁹ Ibid. and Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, "U.S. said to curtail drone strikes in Pakistan as officials there seek peace with Taliban," *Washington Post*, February 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-curtails-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-as-officials-there-seek-peace-talks-with-taliban/2014/02/04/1d63f52a-8dd8-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html.

⁴⁰ In April 2014, CIA-operated UAVs killed as many as 55 unidentified militants in southern Yemen. Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Drones and Yemeni Forces Kill Qaeda-Linked Fighters, Officials Say," *New York Times*, April 21, 2014, <http://nytimes.com/2014/04/22/world/middleeast/us-drones-and-yemeni-forces-kill-qaeda-linked-fighters-officials-say.html>.

⁴¹ DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida and the Intelligence Community Response," Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report, March 19, 2004, 60.

⁴² National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 211.

⁴³ Greg Miller, "Lawmakers seek to stymie plan to shift control of drone campaign from CIA to Pentagon," *Washington Post*, January 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-seek-to-stymie-plan-to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-to-pentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Owen Cote, interview with author (telephone, March 2014).

two lethal drone programs in Yemen: the CIA operates one and JSOC operates the other. JSOC was the first organization to have authority over Yemen, but the CIA was given the authorization to expand to Yemen because JSOC made several mistakes including targeting the wrong individuals.⁴⁶ Congress's decision to block the transition is presumed to be influenced by the poorly executed strike on December 12, 2013, when JSOC controlled drones killed several civilians, tribal leaders, and possibly members of a Yemeni wedding party.⁴⁷ If the United States government is going to kill individuals around the world with a UAV, correct and accurate execution of the operation is crucial.

While the CIA is an intelligence organization, not a killing organization, it has achieved superior results with targeted killings. Targeted killings are intelligence driven operations. The first two legs of a find-fix-finish mission are contingent on intelligence. In addition, the "finish" portion of the operation will only be as successful as the intelligence is accurate. This mission is better suited for the CIA. After 9/11, the CIA swelled with a new class of counterterrorism analysts and targeters who spent more than a decade hunting terrorist targets in Iraq and Afghanistan. The CIA has more intelligence resources than JSOC to ensure their targeting data is correct. The CIA also has the ability to use human intelligence in targeted killings, which proved useful in the Anwar al-Awlaki strike.⁴⁸

The CIA was also the first organization to conduct armed drone strikes. The Agency therefore, has had time to build an infrastructure and targeting processes. The drone theatre in Pakistan is by far the most pervasive in terms of frequency of strikes and longevity of the program. The CIA's experience and seasoned personnel translate to more precise results. Austin Long, a scholar at Columbia University who specializes in counterinsurgency and has spent time as an embedded researcher with U.S. Special Forces teams, argues that while JSOC has expanded rapidly over the last decade with massive increases in personnel, "The Agency has cadres of personnel who are more refined and have better [tactics, techniques and procedures]."⁴⁹ For example, he notes that, "In some cases the Agency may launch four drones for one strike. One may designate the target. One may fire the weapons system. But one's job is solely to

⁴⁶ Greg Miller, "Obama's new drone policy leaves room for CIA role," *Washington Post*, May 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obamas-new-drone-policy-has-cause-for-concern/2013/05/25/0daad8be-c480-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html.

⁴⁷ Schmitt, "Congress Restricts Drone Program Shift" and Zaid Ali and Laura King, "U.S. Drone Strike on Yemen wedding party kills 17," *Los Angeles Times*, December 13, 2013, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/13/world/la-fg-wn-yemen-drone-strike-wedding-20131213>.

⁴⁸ Prior to the Awlaki strike, the CIA ran multiple operations to find Awlaki through human intelligence. Journalists have reported that the CIA finally tracked Awlaki through an agent in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. For more see Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage, and Scott Shane, "How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America's Cross Hairs," *The New York Times*, March 9, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html>.

⁴⁹ Austin Long, interview with author, (telephone: March 2014).

evaluate possible collateral damage.”⁵⁰ By giving each pilot a different responsibility, these procedures ensure a broader operational picture, ensuring that operators can properly assess the presence of civilians and not just focus on the target.⁵¹ Thus, the CIA not only has more seasoned targeters with better intelligence resources, they also have better techniques honed through more years of experience conducting drone strikes.

The obvious counterpoint to this recommendation is that the CIA’s primary focus should be intelligence collection. Allowing the Agency to conduct targeted killings is outside its mission, detractors of the proposed strategy say. Yet, the shift in CIA culture has already happened. The 9/11 attacks galvanized American leaders to do whatever it took to track down terrorists and hold them accountable. This eliminated any hesitations that top CIA leadership had about returning to killing operations. At this point in U.S. national security policy, it is more important that the government conduct operations diligently and effectively, taking every opportunity to account for false intelligence and active civilian presence. The CIA already has the resources and, after 9/11, the authorization to kill terrorists.

A second counterargument centers on whether CIA personnel would support the continuation of targeted killings. According to the media, the most adamant advocate within the CIA to end its lethal strikes is John Brennan, the agency’s own director.⁵² During Brennan’s confirmation hearing as director of the CIA, he stated, “The C.I.A. should not be doing traditional military activities and operations.”⁵³ Brennan’s opposition is surprising given his influence in amplifying the Obama administration’s drone strikes and his decision to transfer the responsibility to hunt Awlaki from JSOC to the CIA.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the media reports that Brennan aims to refocus the agency on analysis because of the CIA’s less-than-stellar analytical performance in forecasting the Arab Spring.⁵⁵ Mazzetti reports that the predominant faction within the CIA advocating a continuation of the policy of targeted strikes is the agency’s counterterrorism center. The CTC also has the support of Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein.⁵⁶ Refocusing the agency to emphasize analysis over counterterrorism does not nullify this paper’s recommendation. The CIA already has a functioning counterterrorism apparatus.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Mark Mazzetti, “Delay in Effort to Refocus CIA from Drone War,” *New York Times*, April 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/delays-in-effort-to-refocus-cia-from-drone-war.html?smid=nytnow-share&smprod=nytnow&_r=0.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Hakim Almasmari, Margaret Coker, and Siobhan Gorman, “Drone Kills Top Al Qaeda Figure,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576602301252340820>

⁵⁵ Mazzetti, “Delay in Effort to Refocus CIA from Drone War.”

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Strengthening traditional analysis can be done in parallel with continuing lethal counterterrorism operations. *If* the White House is going to continue to authorize targeted lethal action, which agency will be the most diligent, cautious, and precise? The answer is the CIA.

3. *The Executive Branch should announce the CIA's mandate to conduct targeted killings and release the targeting "playbook."*

The third and final recommendation rests on the implementation of the second. If the CIA retains control over lethal counterterrorism strikes, the public needs to know. Transparency is not only a fundamental feature of democracy, but greater transparency facilitates stronger public support and thus ensures that targeted killing operations maintain political support. There are two steps to implementing this change. First, the White House should declassify parts of the "playbook" for targeted strikes. Second, the executive branch should write a new mandate authorizing the CIA to carry out targeted killings solely for counterterrorism purposes. There have been numerous press reports that the National Security Council created a "playbook," which outlines the Obama administration's procedures for targeting terrorists.⁵⁷ The National Security Council playbook is classified. The report in full does not need to be declassified because it would most likely compromise agreements with host nations, reveal special technologies, and expose informants. The only substantive material that the executive branch should declassify is the institutional process for approving lethal strikes. Americans are still sensitive to terrorists' threats. For the most part, they support counterterrorism agendas. The public, however, prefers to know the procedures that the government uses for killing terrorists and militants. How many people review the list of priority individuals? Who makes decisions for the priority of certain individuals? What is the nominating process for adding new extremists to the list? These are all questions the executive branch could answer by releasing a version of the secretive "playbook."

The CIA's new mandate should address covert authority, include an executive order, and outline Congress's role in the new targeted killings program. The NSC needs to sift through the logistical details to determine whether to conduct operations under covert authority or not. The host nation's citizens should see that the United States government is conducting lethal operations; therefore, the White House and CIA should end the era of keeping the intelligence agency's hand in armed drone strikes hidden. The

⁵⁷ Karen DeYoung, "A CIA veteran transforms U.S. counterterrorism policy," *Washington Post*, October 24, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-veteran-john-brennan-has-transformed-us-counterterrorism-policy/2012/10/24/318b8eec-1c7c-11e2-ad90-ba5920e56eb3_story.html; Greg Miller, Ellen Nakashima, and Karen DeYoung, "CIA drone strikes will get pass in counterterrorism 'playbook,' officials say," January 19, 2013, [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-19/world/36474007_1_drone-strikes-cia-director-playbook](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-19/world/36474007_1_drone-strikes-cia-director-playbook;); Michael Crowley, "Holder: Obama's New Drone Strike 'Playbook' Has Arrived," *Time*, May 22, 2013, <http://swampland.time.com/2013/05/22/holder-obamas-new-drone-strike-playbook-has-arrived/>.

executive branch should formally authorize the CIA to conduct targeted killings by declassifying the original executive order in the Bush administration that expanded the Agency's responsibilities. Alternatively and preferably, the NSC should draft a new executive order with congressional input. In such an order, the White House should outline why the CIA will continue targeted killings by highlighting its successes and failures over the past decade. In addition, the mandate should provide full legal justifications for the Agency's new role in counterterrorism. Finally, the new mandate for the CIA should include its responsibilities for congressional intelligence oversight committees to oversee the program and allow the committees complete access to the disposition matrix and all operations.

Conclusion

Since September 11, 2001 the Bush and Obama administrations have conventionalized the use of targeted lethal force, but they did not inaugurate the policy. For decades, American presidents have waged war by precisely targeting enemies and killing them. Today's operations only differ from those in prior decades because of their technology and frequency. These operations will undoubtedly continue, as will the debates surrounding them. Open debate is a fundamental feature of democracy and will only serve to clarify the nation's position on using lethal force. The impetus is to look forward when considering how, why, and when the American government should act with lethal resolve, yet it is equally important to look backwards. Understanding the past debates about killing individual enemies serves to enlighten the contemporary debates.

Damian Mencini graduated from Boston College in 2014 as a Scholar of the College. His research interests include counterterrorism, proxy warfare, and U.S. National Security policy. This paper is based on a section of his senior thesis, which won the John McCarthy, S.J. Award for most distinguished thesis in Social Sciences.

A Theory of Cyberwarfare: Political and Military Objectives, Lines of Communication, and Targets

JASON RIVERA

National militaries that wield cyber forces and other entities that possess a critical stake in the future of cyberspace have yet to develop a comprehensive strategy for the conduct of cyberwarfare. Broken down by three lines of effort – political and military objectives, lines of communication, and offensive and defensive targets – this paper puts forth a strategic theory on cyberwarfare designed to give insight as to how a contemporary military may field forces in order to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic superiority in the cyber domain.

The interwar period between 1918 and 1939 is well characterized by the term, “Revolution in Military Affairs.” This era of military history is remembered as critically important in terms of aviation advances and is often characterized by the remarkable progress in technology, weaponry, and general military strategy. During this era, modern militaries fielded squadrons of fighter and bomber aircraft as nations endeavored to achieve air superiority and overall military superiority through new and unexplored domains.¹ Throughout the Second World War, these modern militaries would deploy their air capabilities into a global conflict that proved to be more costly in terms of lives and destruction of property than any war in human history. By the end of World War II, airpower proved to be a critical component of the Allied Powers’ victory within both the European and the Pacific theaters of war.

Nearly 70 years later and after over a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and much of the Western world is headed toward another interwar period. Like the interwar period of the early 20th century, the world is likely to undergo yet another technological change that may have far-reaching implications on military strategy. Military forces throughout the world are exploring methods and means by which they may exert force within cyberspace and are allocating intellectual, financial, and human resources towards fielding a cyber force capable of conducting war in the 21st century. It is noteworthy that the FY 2014 U.S. defense budget’s top priority is the military’s transformation to a “smaller and leaner” force, yet all branches of the U.S. military receive drastic budget and force size

¹ Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 630–635.

increases for cyber operations.² Despite the heavy investment in cyber capabilities, it appears that the proverbial cart may have been placed before the horse; despite receiving massive amounts of financial and human resources, there appears to be no general consensus for a national strategy for military cyber operations, let alone an agreed upon understanding of the term ‘cyberwar.’

The rarity of public historical information on cyber conflict makes the development of military strategy in cyberspace a difficult objective to pursue. The details of cyber operations are often restricted and information regarding the development of network accesses, methods, and means are closely guarded industrial and state secrets. Furthermore, the nature of network administration gives ultimate authority to those who possess physical access to the network, giving administrators the exclusive capability to disconnect from the network and conduct remediation. It follows then that successful offensive cyber operations (OCO)³ and computer network exploitation (CNE)⁴ are more often than not carried out in a clandestine or covert manner as to not alert the network administrator. The resulting secrecy of operations within the cyber domain has hampered the development of military strategy within cyberspace as only limited numbers of personnel possess full access to the knowledge base necessary to formulate strategy.

This paper develops a framework that military planners can use to understand cyberspace as a battlefield terrain upon which cyber forces secure, exercise, and dispute control of computer systems and networks in order to achieve political and military objectives. The paper’s theory of cyberwarfare is undergirded by three critical assumptions. First, all state-sponsored military operations are conducted for the purpose of accomplishing nation-state political or military objectives. Second, cyberspace, inherent to the initial design of the Internet, is formulated upon lines of communication designed to transport information from point A to point B. Third, like the military concepts of key terrain or centers of gravity, there are key targets within cyberspace for which position and possession yield a decisive military advantage. Using the theory presented, this paper concludes by illustrating three lines of effort necessary for a state to effectively engage in cyberwarfare.

The Building Blocks of a Theory on Cyberwarfare

Over 100 years ago, naval strategist Sir Julian Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* to explicate national strategies for the use of naval forces. In part one of this text, Corbett begins by putting forth a theory of war largely inspired by 19th century wartime strategist Carl von Clausewitz, defining war

² DoD Comptroller, “United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request,” *The Department of Defense*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), 2-2 & 3-5.

³ Maren Leed, “Offensive Cyber Capabilities at the Operational Level: The Way Ahead,” *Center for Strategic International Studies*, (2013): v.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations,” (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), GL-6.

as “an exertion of violence to secure a political end which we desire to attain.”⁵ Given this well understood and accepted definition of war in the physical domain, it stands to reason that in an attempt to define cyberwarfare, one might assume that the purpose of cyberwarfare is to achieve political and strategic military objectives via cyberspace. Two other priorities described by Corbett are relevant to a strategy for cyberwarfare: lines of communication and the nature of the object.

Corbett focuses on the naval commander’s ability to secure seaborne lines of communication as a mode of securing command of the sea.⁶ It is upon those critical lines of communication for which the necessary elements of warfighting power transit to and from the battlespace. In Corbett’s time, securing lines of communication were critical to the transit of logistical supplies, troops, information, weaponry, and all other necessary components required to wage intercontinental war. Similar to this manner of naval warfare, warfare in cyberspace also requires command and control of key lines of communication. Albeit distinct in their composition, the centrality of communication in the conduct of naval and cyberwarfare gives Corbett’s 19th century naval theories incredible explanatory power for understanding the methods and means by which warfare is conducted in the cyber domain.

Whereas naval lines of communication may be defined as important water passages, major canals, and large ports, cyber lines of communication can be thought of as the world’s critical Internet exchange points, oceanic fiber optic cable lines, major satellite communications (SATCOM) uplink /downlink facilities, and the world’s most subscribed-to internet service providers (ISP). At a more micro level, naval lines of communication may include small bodies of water such as lakes and rivers or minor boating facilities with small docks, whereas the micro level in the cyber domain may be characterized by complex and disparate distributions of logical lines of communication such as routers, switches, servers, and IP address linked networks. In either case, control of key lines of communication are critical to military strategy both in the naval domain and the cyber domain. Therefore any comprehensive theory that seeks to develop a national strategy to conduct cyberwarfare should include as a primary objective the need to secure critical cyber lines of communication, both physical (fiber optic cable, SATCOM, ISPs, etc.) and logical (network domains, routers, servers, etc.).

Corbett’s second contribution to a theory of cyberwarfare is the ability to comprehend the nature of the object. Corbett defined the nature of the object largely as those tactical or operational objectives that comprised the necessary benchmarks of overall wartime strategy.⁷ More specifically, he defined these objects as having positive or negative aims, which in turn implied the need, respectively, for offensive or

⁵ Julian S. Corbett, *Some principles of maritime strategy*, (Sussex, UK: Naval & Military Press, 2009), 30.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 315.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 309.

defensive strategies.⁸ In the Russo-Japanese War, for example, in 1904 when Admiral Togo attacks Port Arthur in an attempt to contain the Russian fleet to the harbor, the key object of focus was the Russian fleet⁹; the political aim in this case was the resolution of rival imperialist ambitions over Manchuria and Korea. In the Spanish-American War, on the other hand, the object of war was limited to the liberation of Cuba whereas the political objective was to defeat Spanish aggression and take away their foothold in the Caribbean.¹⁰ Unlike the Russo-Japanese War or the Spanish-American War, wartime operations in cyberspace are often characterized by the ever-ambiguous adversary, the anonymous environment that is the Internet, and the targeting of second and third order effects as opposed to the primary object in question. That is to say that, in cyberspace, the nature of the object is not as easily understood and therefore requires elaboration.

It would be easy to assume that the nature of the object in cyberspace operations is the adversary's forces and strongholds or garrisons. This is where it is important to understand the key differences between the physical domains (land, sea, air, and space) and the cyber domain. One simple and concise definition of cyberspace is a domain characterized by the physical, logical, and social interconnectedness of computers and data networks.¹¹ Therefore, the nature of the object in cyberwarfare should be a physical, logical, or social component that can be affected — positively or negatively — via the use of interconnected computers and data networks. Similar to the limitations of land, sea, and air instruments of combat, the instruments of cyberwarfare must also be limited in their application; this application must be conceptually understood in order to formulate a theory on cyberwarfare.

In cyberwarfare, the key object should never be literally interpreted as people (soldiers, government officials, etc.), instruments of war (tanks, aircraft, etc.), fortifications (garrisons, ports, etc.), or geographic territory (land, cities, etc.). Rather, it should be understood that targeting strategy in the conduct of cyberwarfare should be focused on the computer-centric and networked components of those aforementioned wartime objects. It is not enough to postulate that the key targets within cyberwarfare are the computers and data networks of the friendly forces or the adversary; this supposition, while all-encompassing and simply defined, creates far too broad an area of focus. Strategy, while necessarily flexible and adaptive, must also be focused and directed towards quantifiable objectives.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Lieutenant Commander Michael Berry, "The Russo-Japanese War: How Russia Created the Instrument of their Defeat," *US Marine Corps Command and Staff College*, (2008): 26.

¹⁰ Edward F. Dolan, *The Spanish-American War*, (Brookfield, CT: The Millbrook Press, 2001), 80.

¹¹ The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command divides cyberspace primarily into three realms: physical, logical, and social – Training and Doctrine Command, "TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-8: Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028," *Department of the Army*, (Fort Euis, VA: GPO, 2011), 8.

The key targets within cyberspace are those computer operated and data networked critical infrastructure components required by both friendly forces and the adversary to conduct diplomacy, governance, military operations, commercial/economic business transactions, and day-to-day municipal functions within modern society. This position on the definition of key objects within cyberspace begs the question: what is intended by the term “critical infrastructure components”? Critical infrastructure is defined by United States Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21:

*Critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin [modern] society [and are comprised of the] distributed networks, varied organizational structures and operating models (including multinational ownership), interdependent functions and systems in both the physical space and cyberspace, and governance constructs that involve multi-level authorities, responsibilities, and regulations.*¹²

PPD 21 identifies the 16 sectors of critical infrastructure as follows:

Sixteen Sectors of Critical Infrastructure		Table 1
Chemical	Basic, specialty, and agricultural chemicals; pharmaceuticals; consumer products	
Commercial Facilities	Public assembly (arenas, zoos, museums, convention centers, etc.); sports leagues; gaming; lodging; outdoor events; entertainment and media; real estate; retail	
Communications	Voice and data services; satellite, wired, and wireless transmission systems; communications services providers and exchanges	
Critical Manufacturing	Metal, machinery, electrical equipment, appliance, component, and transportation equipment manufacturing	
Dams	Dam projects; hydropower generation facilities; navigation locks; levees, dikes, hurricane barriers, mine tailings; industrial waste impoundments; other water retention and water control facilities	
Defense Industrial Base	Worldwide industrial complexes that enable the research and development, design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and required components or parts	
Emergency Services	Law enforcement; fire and emergency services; emergency management; emergency medical services; public works; hazardous materials, search and rescue; explosive ordinance disposal; special weapons and tactics and tactical operations; aviation units; public safety answering points	

¹² Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Policy Directive – Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” *The White House*, accessed January 26, 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil>.

Energy	Petroleum, coal, and natural gas; electricity generated from nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, wind, and geothermal sources; electric utility and nonutility power producers; electric power substations and transmission systems
Financial Services	Banks, credit unions, brokers, and other financial institutions that deposit funds and make payments to other parties, provide credit and liquidity to customers, invest funds for both long and short periods, and transfer financial risks between customers
Food & Agriculture	Farms; restaurants; food manufacturing, processing, and storage facilities
Government Facilities	Buildings that are owned or leased by federal, state, and local governments that are used for public business activities, commercial transactions, or recreational activities or that are not open to the public used for highly sensitive information, materials, processes, and equipment; special use military installations, embassies, courthouses, and national laboratories; education facilities; national monuments and icons
Healthcare and Public Health	Critical infrastructure that protects all sectors of the economy from hazards such as terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, and natural disasters; hospitals and other medical facilities
Information Technology	Virtual and distributed functions that produce and provide hardware, software, and information technology systems and services; helps provide and maintain the Internet in collaboration with the Communications Sector
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste	Nuclear power plants; non-power nuclear reactors used for research, testing, and training; manufacturers of nuclear reactors or components; radioactive materials used primarily in medical, industrial, and academic settings; nuclear fuel cycle facilities; the transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear and radioactive waste
Transportation Systems	Aviation; highway infrastructure and motor carrier; maritime transportation systems; mass transit and passenger rail; pipeline systems; freight rail; postal and shipping
Water & Wastewater Systems	Public drinking water systems; publicly owned wastewater treatment systems; potable water; sewage systems

In defining and illustrating the 16 areas of critical infrastructure, it is important to note that none of these sectors stand alone; rather, they are interdependent. A military garrison, for example, is encompassed by more than just the government facilities sector; modern military garrisons require chemical sector support for pharmaceuticals required by the garrison medical facility, communications support to conduct command and control of disparate elements, and the defense industrial base to supply, equip, and maintain the garrison's warfighting resources. These same garrisons require internal or external energy production and distribution capabilities, financial mechanisms to transfer funds for the purchase of supplies, and will often have several on-base restaurants or a base commissary for the purchase of groceries (food and agriculture sector). These bases will be further empowered by a variety of other sectors, to

include information technologies and the Internet, traffic lights, perhaps a railway system to transit heavy military equipment, and possess access to municipal water and wastewater distribution services. All sectors being considered, a single military garrison will often span across a considerable number of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors defined by PPD-21. Thus it stands to reason that in understanding the nature of targets in cyberwarfare, the key target is not the garrison in of itself, but rather the computers and data networked components required to manage the critical infrastructure systems necessary to maintain day-to-day operations at the garrison. In cyberwarfare, a force seeks to defend their own computer operated and networked critical infrastructure from invaders — the defensive, negative aim — while simultaneously seeking to advantageously posture their own capabilities against the computer operated and networked critical infrastructure of the adversary — the offensive, positive aim.

In summation, these explorations of targeting, objectives, and the nature of cyberspace as a domain of war elucidate lines of effort necessary to formulate a strategy for the conduct of cyberwarfare. The first effort is to define the political and strategic military objectives and conduct planning as to how cyberspace can be leveraged to achieve these objectives. The second effort is to secure both physical (fiber optic cable, SATCOM, ISPs, etc.) and logical (networks, routers, servers, etc.) cyber lines of communication in order to achieve superior offensive and defensive fighting positions within cyberspace. The third effort is to conduct tactical and operational targeting and defensive operations within cyberspace via computer operated and data networked critical infrastructure components. These critical infrastructure components are required by both friendly forces and the adversary to conduct diplomacy, governance, military operations, commercial/economic business transactions, and day-to-day municipal functions within modern society. The computer networked aspects of the 16 sectors of critical infrastructure as defined by PPD 21 should be considered the key terrain or centers of gravity in the conduct of cyberwarfare and should thus dictate the main objects of cyberwarfare.

Cyberwarfare and its Three Lines of Effort

An effective military fighting force operating within the cyber domain will be task-organized in such a manner as to complement the pursuit of the three lines of effort (LOEs) in cyberwarfare: the identification of political/military objectives, the control of lines of communication, and the attack and defense of the key tactical and operational targets within cyberspace.

Line of Effort 1: Develop Political and Military Objectives

Political and military objectives as they pertain to the role of cyberwarfare in the overall conduct of wartime operations are to be understood as taking place within realms of policy, statecraft, and grand-strategy. These objectives will be determined at echelons far above those who conduct strategic military planning and operations pertaining to cyberwarfare. It is therefore paramount that proper planning for

cyberspace warfare be conducted in such a manner that cyberspace operations complement, and not detract from, the political and military objectives they are designed to support. This seems like a conceptually simple concept to grasp, however, several recent incidents of state-sponsored cyberspace operations have detracted from the likely political objectives of the sponsoring state. Consider the Russian attacks against Estonia in 2007 when, due to the removal of a Soviet Era war monument from the Estonian capital of Tallinn, a group of alleged “patriotic hackers” in Russia conducted denial of service attacks against Estonian government and financial websites.¹³ These attacks, while temporarily debilitating to the Estonian people, failed to ultimately serve Russia’s political objectives — presumably to inspire fear and compliance within the Estonian government — and ultimately empowered Estonia by making Tallinn the headquarters location for the NATO Cyber Centre of Excellence.¹⁴ The lesson to be learned from Russia’s debacle is that cyberspace operations, while capable of delivering potentially devastating effects, must be prudently planned in order to ensure cohesion with political and military objectives.

In the conduct of cyberwarfare, nation-states will generally possess two types of strategic aims – security-related aims and control-related aims. Security-related aims are those national strategies designed to promote Internet freedom, cooperation, and international security norms for cyberspace. Control-related aims are those national strategies designed to restrict Internet freedom, prevent cooperation, and promote or sponsor criminal activities in cyberspace. While the promotion of security-related and control-related aims are not mutually exclusive of each other – states will often support aims of both types – there are some generalities that can be inferred as to the types of aims a state will support. Democratic states that are leaders in the international community, possess flourishing economies, and have established rule of law tend to promote security-related aims. The following are some examples of strategic security-related aims:

- The promotion of Internet freedom.
- The promotion of cooperative Internet governance with a focus on an international multi-stakeholder model.
- Ensuring nations conduct cybersecurity due diligence.
- Promoting the Internet as an engine of economic growth.
- Combating cybercriminals.
- Combating industrial espionage.

¹³ The Economist, “A cyber-riot: Estonia has faced down Russian rioters. But its websites are still under attack,” *The Economist*, accessed February 22, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/node/9163598>.

¹⁴ Jason Healey, *A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012*, (Vienna, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013), 190-193.

- Combating the disruption of services.¹⁵

Conversely, autocratic states that diverge from the consensus of the international community, have economies that fall behind their primary competitors, and are noticeably lacking in terms of law enforcement capacities tend to promote control-related aims. The following are some examples of strategic control-related aims:

- The prevention of Internet freedom in order to combat popular unrest and political activism.
- The prevention of the multi-stakeholder model in order to deter a disadvantageous consensus.
- Dissuading nations from conducting cybersecurity due diligence to allow freedom of maneuver.
- State-sponsored industrial espionage.
- State-sponsored intelligence espionage.
- State-motivated or state-driven denial of services.
- State-sponsored destruction or alteration of physical and/or intellectual property.¹⁶

Line of Effort 2: Secure, Exercise, and/or Dispute Control of Lines of Communication

The capacity to secure and control cyber lines of communication is a function of military training and tactics. Given the proper training curriculum and given a steadily available pool of cyber expertise and knowledge, a military force within the cyber domain should be able to develop the capability to functionally navigate within computer networks, execute command line script for both offensive and defensive purposes, and have a sufficient understanding necessary to secure and control cyber lines of communication given the constraints of available technology and the adversary's own strategy. As previously stated, these lines of communication are both physical (fiber optic cable, SATCOM, ISPs, etc.) and logical (network domains, routers, server domains, etc.).

The key devices that comprise network domains are networked end-point devices, switches, routers, and firewalls. An end-point device is any networked device used by a person to interface with the Internet. Desktops, laptops, smart phones, and networked printers are examples of networked devices. A switch is a multiport connection device on the data-link layer that provides a common point of connection between networked devices, hubs, and other switches.¹⁷ A router is a network layer device


¹⁵ Christopher Painter, Coordinator for Cyber Issues, United States Department of State, Conference: Georgetown International Engagement on Cyber III, March 4, 2014

¹⁶ Melissa Hathaway, former acting senior director for cyberspace at the National Security Council and president of Hathaway Global Strategies, Conference: Georgetown International Engagement on Cyber III, March 4, 2014.

¹⁷ Shon Harris, *CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, Sixth Edition*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2013), 617.

designed to connect local area networks to each other.¹⁸ A firewall is a device that is used to restrict access or the passage of data between networks.¹⁹

The following model presents a simplified diagram of how networks communicate with each other via the Internet. End-point devices, through the use of switches and routers, are able to transmit information through the Internet to other end-point devices. Switches facilitate communication among end-point devices within a network while routers facilitate communication between networks. Firewalls serve to prevent unauthorized passage of information from the Internet to the internal portions of the network. In the following model, network A is prevented from accessing the internal portions of network B and network B, likewise, is prevented from accessing the internal portions of network A. An end-point device can send information to an endpoint device in another network, but only so long as that transaction is authorized by the other network's firewall. In order to secure, exercise, or dispute control of lines of communication, a network owner must maintain the integrity of their network domain — the defensive, negative aim — and the capacity to exert control over information within a foreign, non-owned network domain — the offensive, positive aim.



The process by which adversarial networks compete for leverage and control of both their own as well as foreign networks is known as Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).²⁰In general, the CNE process should be understood to be the functional navigation and control of lines of communication.

¹⁸ Ibid., 615.

¹⁹ Ibid., 628.

²⁰ Ibid., 4.

CNE is best understood as an eight-step process that includes: reconnaissance (exploring and conducting initial enumeration of a network), initial intrusion into a network (levying an exploit designed to gain user access), establishing a backdoor into a network (the means by which an intruder can ensure the ability to come back into the network at a later point without having to re-apply ‘loud’ exploits), obtaining user credentials, installing various utilities (levying software/malware exploits designed to achieve the intruder’s intended purpose), privilege escalation/lateral movement, data exfiltration/alteration, and maintaining persistence (ensuring the clandestine nature of the intruder’s presence, maintaining a low profile, and maintaining the ability to enter the network and exfiltrate/alter information at will).²¹

Once a cyber force achieves persistent presence and access within a network, that force possesses the capacity to either secure, exercise, or dispute command of that network. According to Sir Julian Corbett, the ability to *secure* command in naval warfare is the capacity to achieve local or temporary control of key maritime lines of communication.²² In cyberspace, this concept is analogous to the defensive acts of tightly locking down a network via the use of firewalls, intrusion detection/protection systems, and antivirus programs or the offensive act of CNE. In the cases of both naval and cyber warfare, the ability to secure key lines of communication and prevent the adversary from doing the same are key to maintaining battlespace superiority. The ability to *exercise* control can be understood as the process by which a force uses lines of communication in order to conduct trade, movement operations, production, and otherwise all other functions that pertain to the receipt of economic/strategic benefits.²³ Within the cyber domain, this should be understood as a function of authorized and unauthorized usage of networks for the purposes of controlling the movement of information. A friendly force exercises control by conducting authorized use of networks via the facilitation of legitimate communications and information exchange; an adversarial force exercises control by conducting unauthorized use of foreign, non-owned networks via the facilitation of unauthorized data exfiltration and espionage operations.

Disputing command occurs when opposing forces maintain presence and conduct operations designed to weaken the adversary’s capacity to exercise control of the lines of communication.²⁴ In defensive network operations, disputing control would take the form of active defense measures designed to actively eject an adversary from the network, close off vulnerable vectors of infiltration, and drop Internet traffic from identified malicious IP ranges. In offensive network operations, disputing control should be understood as those efforts designed to reestablish presence within a foreign network after being detected — such as placing backdoors or finding alternative gateways for infiltration — or those

²¹ Mandiant, “M Trends: the advanced persistent threat,” *Mandiant*, (2010): 3.

²² *Ibid.*, 5 and 321.

²³ *Ibid.*, 233.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 320.

efforts designed to deny the foreign network's authorized users to access their network resources, such as denial of service attacks.

Line of Effort 3: Acquire and Engage the Target

Upon execution of CNE and decision-maker acceptance of CDE, a decision may then be made to conduct cyberattack or computer network defense response actions. A *cyberattack* can take many forms, to include denial of service, authentication spoofing, man-in-the-middle, ticket and hash falsification, remote unauthenticated exploits, end-user application exploits, command-line remote control tools, and port redirection attacks.²⁵ *Computer network defense response actions* (CND RA) are deliberate measures and activities designed to protect and defend computer systems and networks already under attack.²⁶ Unlike passive defense, CND RA can be thought of as counter-offensive measures designed to stop an attack in motion.

While the development of political objectives and CNE to control cyber lines of communication are documented, categorized, and understood, one of the paramount challenges in the conduct of cyberwarfare is target acquisition and engagement. Russia's failure to exert influence over Estonia, for example, was partially due to a failure in planning but also due to a failure to acquire specific and well-planned targets.

In cyberspace operations, the object of offense or defense will almost always be some form of information. Even cyberattacks that yield physical effects are informational in nature. For example, Stuxnet affected Iran's Natanz fuel enrichment plant by causing the rotor within the centrifuges to fly apart, but this physical effect was generated by a covert malware operation that affected information systems that controlled centrifuge function.²⁷ Information is the functional aspect of cyberspace and is the core purpose of its existence. In general, information can be created, stored, transferred, modified, deleted, secured, and processed.²⁸ Humanity derives usefulness from information via the means by which it is processed; therefore, a national targeting strategy should specifically target information processes that are most critical to a nation's adversaries. Information, in general, is processed in one of two ways:

- Information processed by humans exists in the form of ideas; the most valuable ideas within an organization comprise that organization's intellectual property. Intellectual property is comprised of plans, schematics, formulas, strategic communications, etc.

²⁵ Stuart McClure, et al., *Hacking Exposed 7: Network Security Secrets & Solutions*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2012), 162-204.

²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network Defense (CND)," *Joint Chiefs of Staff*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), GL-8.

²⁷ David Albright, et al., "Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant?" *Institute for Science and International Security*, (2010): 4.

²⁸ David Fahrenkrug, Colonel, United States Air Force, Class Seminar, February 6, 2014.

- Information processed by machines exists in the form of protocol; the most critical protocol within an organization comprises that organization's critical control systems. Control systems include those protocols that operate network-centric weapons, life support systems, sensors, communications systems, transportation systems, etc.

Given the above, target acquisition and engagement strategies should focus on information — human ideas and machine protocol — that are the most critical to the achievement of political and military objectives. This proposition implies a need to categorize information in terms of offensive aims, defensive aims, and functional areas of technological expertise. This requires functional categories to best organize cyberspace fighting forces. The 16 areas of critical infrastructure provided in PPD-21 provide a useful baseline for cyber planners and strategists, laying down the general framework upon which society both leverages and relies upon computer systems and networks. The following are some examples of information targets that could be acquired and engaged in cyberspace operations:

Information processed by humans: ideas and intellectual property


- Military (Defense Industrial Base) Sector
 - Weapons and systems development schematics
 - Contingency plans, communications, and tactics, techniques, & procedures
- Financial Services Sector
 - Illicit actor or rogue government finances
 - Financial strategies
- Information Technology Sector
 - Websites, web forums, and social media
 - Plans and procedures for software/hardware development
- Government Sector
 - Intelligence and economic communications data
 - Political leadership and diplomatic communications data

Information processed by machines: protocol and control systems

- Military (Defense Industrial Base) Sector
 - Air defense, radar acquisition, and sensory technologies
 - Airborne, seaborne, or ground vehicle manufacturing components
- Communications Sector
 - Mobile, SMS, and bluetooth technologies
 - Satellite communications and publically switched telephone networks
- Transportation

- o Rail systems, aviation systems, and highway systems
- o Pipelines, traffic lights / traffic management systems, and GPS navigation
- Information Technology Sector
 - o Wi-Fi, firewall systems, and databases
 - o Routers, switches, and fiber optic cables

Once a target is acquired and the decision is made to engage the target, there are four general categories of offensive capabilities that can be delivered through cyberspace. The first of these capabilities is the most passive: cyber espionage. Cyber espionage is the process of engaging a networked target for the purposes of conducting state-sponsored intelligence operations. The second offensive capability is the execution of network-enabled psychological operations. Psychological operations include the alteration of information processed humans (ideas and intellectual property) in order to sow confusion, distrust, rebellion, or other such emotional uncertainties amongst the adversary’s combatant or non-combatant population. The third offensive capability in cyberspace is the denial of service. This category includes those actions taken through cyberspace to either deny Internet service entirely or deny access to authorized users. The last and potentially most dangerous offensive capability in cyberspace is cyber sabotage. Cyber sabotage includes those actions conducted through the use of cyberspace designed to sabotage computers, computer networks, or networked machines in such a manner as to cause mechanical failure, procedural error, or physical destruction.



Cyberwarfare involves three distinct and methodical lines of effort (LOEs) — from the political objective and the control of lines of communication to the ultimate execution of a cyberattack or CND

RA. The above model demonstrates these LOEs in a linear manner and serves to depict the processes necessary to conduct cyberwarfare operations. The linear nature of this model is critical as the various LOEs of cyber operations are predicated upon the successful execution of the previous LOE. For example, it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to rationally and successfully secure control of the correct lines of communication if the proper planning had not been conducted prior to the execution of reconnaissance and infiltration operations. In the same way, the process of acquiring and engaging the target would not be possible without the securing of the appropriate lines of communication necessary to deliver a cyber effect against the target. It is, therefore, critical that cyberwarfare operations be conducted using this linear model in order to ensure synchronization of endstate cyber effects with the original intent of the political/military objectives.

Case Studies

Understanding the principles outlined above benefits from an exploration of successful case studies, demonstrating how the three LOEs of cyberwarfare are executed in order to achieve political and military objectives.

Operation Orchard

In September 2007, international media sources reported that Israeli fighter jets had destroyed Syria's al-Kibar Nuclear Reactor building complex in the middle of the Syrian desert.²⁹ It is widely believed that the Israelis were able to successfully infiltrate Syrian airspace by triggering a kill-switch installed in Syria's air defense radar systems at Tall al-Abuad.³⁰ The event was followed by a series of accusations by the Syrian government, very little commentary from the Israeli government, and ultimately did not result in a protracted international conflict. The below table analyzes Operation Orchard using the theoretical model of cyberwarfare proposed above in order to better understand the conduct of this operation and its ultimate success.

²⁹ Erich Follath & Holger Stark, (2009) "The Story of 'Operation Orchard': How Israel Destroyed Syria's Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor," *Spiegel Online International*, accessed February 22, 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-story-of-operation-orchard-how-israel-destroyed-syria-s-al-kibar-nuclear-reactor-a-658663.html>.

³⁰ Real Clear Politics, (2013) "Significant Cyberattack Incidents: Operation Orchard, 2007," *Real Clear Politics*, accessed February 22, 2014, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/lists/cyber_attacks/op_orchard.html.

LOEs of Cyberwarfare		Description of Events
1	Develop Political & Military Objectives	According to Israel's own security doctrine, the Israeli State must maintain technological, efficacy-focused, and qualitative advantages over its adversaries. This implies that Israel must possess weapons and defensive systems that counter its adversaries in all aspects. i.e., Israel must possess a nuclear advantage over a regime such as Syria. Given this doctrine, it behooved Israel's national security objectives to preemptively strike Syria's al-Kibar nuclear reactor building complex.
2	Control Lines of Communication	Israel has invested substantially in cyber warfare capabilities by improving their ability to conduct offensive and defensive computer network operations and leveraging its high-tech software cluster local to Tel Aviv and the IDF's elite cyber element, Unit 8200. Some sources suggest that the coding for the Operation Orchard cyberattack was conducted by Unit 8200 and was designed to allow aircraft to leverage a kill-switch embedded within the microchips of Syria's air defense systems. One possible CNE vector for conducting this cyberattack could have originated from a U.S. developed technology known as Suter - an airborne electronic warfare suite thought to transmit data streams consisting of sophisticated algorithms into enemy integrated air defense systems.
3	Acquire & Engage the Target	The cyber target acquired within Operation Orchard was specifically integrated as part of a larger military operation. The target was precisely directed towards Syria's air defense systems and was controlled in such a manner as to not bleed over to other sectors of Syria's critical infrastructure. The algorithms and means used within this cyberattack could have easily bled over to the realms of electric power, however, the Israelis managed to cater their deployed cyberweapon without having any detrimental effect on the Syria's electrical grid. This is an important aspect of the targeting process as bleed over could have had a negative impact on Israel's strategic objectives by causing excess collateral damage and, thereby, turning international opinion against the Israeli cause.

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008

The conflict between Russia and Georgia originated from a territorial dispute over the independent regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, where Russia had provided ‘peacekeepers’ and extended economic benefits to the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to possibly undermine Georgia’s political influence in the area.³¹ In 2008, Georgia attempted to reassert its control over South Ossetia in which Russia reacted by responding with military force supported by a significant cyber offensive.³² By the war’s end, Russia had effectively achieved the majority of its goals by demonstrating military superiority, successfully employing cyberpower in consort with physical power, and advancing the

³¹ Jim Nichol, “Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests,” *Congressional Research Service*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), Summary Page.

³² Ibid. 14 and 194.

posture of its long-term political objectives. Unlike the 2007 Estonia incident, Russia was able to adequately mesh its cyberspace operations with its political objectives. The below table is an analysis of the LOEs of cyberwarfare and how these LOEs advanced Russia’s political and military objectives.

LOEs of Cyberwarfare	Description of Events
1 Develop Political & Military Objectives	The Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev administrations had carefully formulated their political and military objectives up to 2.5 years prior to the combined operations invasion of Georgia. These goals included the effective termination of Georgian sovereignty in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by empowering pro-Moscow separatists, expelling Georgian troops from secessionist enclaves, sending a strong signal to other former Soviet states (primarily Ukraine), and the provision of strong disincentives for pursuing NATO membership.
2 Control Lines of Communication	Russia's cyber warfare strategy was premised upon the objective of controlling military and government lines of communication within the Georgian state. Evidence suggests that reconnaissance efforts against Georgian government sites had taken place as early as 19 July 2008 - weeks prior to the outbreak of physical conflict. Russia was able to leverage the fact that Georgia does not have its own Internet exchange point and was thereby reliant upon neighboring countries such as Armenia, Turkey, and Russia for almost 70% of its Internet exchange capacity. This allowed Russia to essentially canalize Georgian web activity via a few centralized points which in turn allowed Russian cyber forces to mass their efforts in order to target Georgian government web activity.
3 Acquire & Engage the Target	The Russian cyber campaign disrupted and/or degraded a total of 38 Georgian and Western websites upon the initiation of the war, to include those of the Georgian President, the National Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme Court, the Parliament, and U.S. and United Kingdom embassies in Georgia. Russian cyberforces primarily employed sophisticated Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) methods against targets, incorporating SQL injections and cross-site scripting (XSS). Additionally, Russia managed to distribute its efforts to control LOCs by posting potential targets on a website known as "StopGeorgia.ru", which provided a venue for Russia's patriotic hacker population to engage lower-tier, easy to hit targets within Georgian web space. Unlike the Estonia incident in 2007, Russia's 2008 cyber targeting efforts greatly enhanced their political objectives. The Georgian population has a relatively low number of Internet users and is not heavily reliant on IT-based infrastructure, which implies that the cyberattacks did not harm the population so much as they did the Georgian government. This allowed the Russians to effectively isolated the Georgian government away from its people and ensure that (unlike the Estonia incident) cyber targeting efforts did not have unnecessary collateral damage effects against the populous.

Conclusion

This paper proposes three lines of effort for cyberspace: 1) the formation of the political and/or military objective and prudent planning in order to ensure the appropriate usage of CNE capabilities; 2) achieving physical and logical control of lines of communication via the eight-step CNE process; and 3) the acquisition and tactical/operational engagement of key offensive or defensive targets in support of strategic political and/or military objectives. These LOEs represent the critical aspects of warfare within the cyber domain and must be carefully planned in parallel with political, diplomatic, and the other domains of military operations in order to achieve the desired strategic political end-state.

The examples and case studies demonstrate the need for governments and militaries to ensure appropriate alignment between political objectives and cyber targeting operations. Lack of unity of effort and alignment of purpose (such as in the case of Russia and Estonia) can result in the conduct of cyber warfare operations that achieve political end-states that are not only less than desirable, but entirely contrary to the original purpose of the cyber operation itself. The presence of unity of effort along with appropriate planning (such as in the case of Operation Orchard or the 2008 Russo-Georgian War) can result in the delivery of cyberattacks that serve as significant combat multipliers to strategic military operations. In some rare cases, cyber effects can be so carefully constructed and so well-aligned with political objectives that the cyberattack in of itself can serve as the primary line of effort and deliver a devastating blow to a force's adversaries.

While much of cyberwarfare's recorded history has been classified, one thing has become remarkably clear: the more strategically important cyberspace operations are to a nation's political and military objectives, the more it appears to resemble wartime operations on the land, in the air, and in the sea.³³ That is, core military principles such as unity of effort, centers of gravity, concentration of force, and strategic surprise remain fundamental to the planning and execution of military operations within both the physical and cyber domains. Technologically proficient nation-states that consider these core military principles while wielding cyber capabilities will undoubtedly be globally influential forces in the 21st century. More dangerous, however, are those technologically capable actors that wield cyber capabilities, but do not consider core military principles. It is these states that will recklessly and dangerously act in the cyber domain and possibly bring their respective regions, if not the world, into chaos.

Jason Rivera is an MA candidate in Georgetown's Security Studies Program and an active duty U.S. Army Officer. All views and information expressed originated solely with the author and do not represent the official positions or opinions of U.S. Cyber Command or the U.S. Department of Defense.

³³ Ibid., 21.