Letter from the Editors

We are proud to release the inaugural issue of *Global Security Studies Review* (*GSSR*), the official academic review of Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program (SSP), the academic pillar of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service’s Center for Security Studies. We would like to thank the staffs of *GSSR* and SSP, as well as all of our anonymous peer reviewers.

We cover a diverse range of topics in this issue. In “Somalia: A Misguided Model for Successful Intervention in Mali,” Kate Mrkvicka juxtaposes the lessons that have been learned from recent armed interventions against al-Shabaab in Somalia against those that should have been learned, and explains why the Somali intervention experience is not readily translatable to the unfolding situation in northern Mali. Andrea Clabough compares the conditions that contributed to the outbreak of Lebanon’s civil war in 1975 with Lebanon’s situation today vis-à-vis the conflict in Syria in “Lebanon and the Syrian Civil War: Preventing the Descent Back Into Conflict,” and offers policy prescriptions to mitigate the impact of violence in Syria on Lebanon’s stability. In “Pakistan, the United States, and the Confidence Deficit,” Aled Lloyd Owen discusses the nature and evolution of America’s strategic relationship with Pakistan, particularly in light of the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad last year.

Tomas Kristlik, in “The End of the Drug War: Its Implications and the Future of Drug Trafficking in Mexico,” discusses some of the salient factors that affected how the Mexican government prosecuted the Drug War there and the outcome of the conflict, as well as how Mexican criminal organizations and cartels are
likely to react prospectively. Roslyn Warren argues in “Miscalculating Nuclear Deterrence: Iran and the Bomb” that, contrary to Kenneth Waltz’s Foreign Affairs article, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” a nuclear-armed Iran will decrease regional stability and increase the likelihood of both conventional and nuclear conflict. Finally, in his op-ed, “Libya and the U.S.: More than Benghazi,” Andrew Engel argues for the strengthening of ties between the United States and Libya.

We hope that you will find these pieces thought-provoking and informative. GSSR is happy to contribute to ongoing and emerging policy analysis and debate, and we welcome you to join the discussion by submitting a letter to the editors, op-ed, or full-length article for potential publication in GSSR. Please also visit GSSR’s regularly-updated blog, Global Security Studies Forum, where we also welcome your thoughts and comments.

Ashley Frohwein, Executive Editor
Aled Lloyd Owen, Deputy Executive Editor

DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in Global Security Studies Review (GSSR) do not necessarily represent those of the editors or staff of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. The editorial board of GSSR and our affiliated peer reviewers strive to verify the accuracy of all factual information contained in GSSR. However, the staffs of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Georgetown University make no warranties or representations regarding the completeness or accuracy of information contained in GSSR, and assume no legal liability or responsibility for the content of any work contained therein.

http://gssr.georgetown.edu
Op-Ed: Libya and the US: More than Benghazi

By Andrew Engel

The September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya renewed our national focus on a country we helped to liberate a year ago – and then soon forgot. But rather than debate the components of a comprehensive, coherent Libya policy, the presidential campaign was overwhelmingly occupied with whether or when the president called the attack an act of terrorism. What was missing was a serious conversation on U.S. leadership and missed opportunities in a country struggling towards democracy and desirous of U.S. assistance. This misguided focus, whether for the sake of political theatre or not, demonstrates a clear misunderstanding by senior policymakers of what is at stake in Libya: security, money, and partnership.

Unlike Libya’s neighbors Tunisia and Egypt, which preserved their far-more established civil societies, structures of governance, and military and security apparatuses, Qadhafi’s 42-year rule effectively dismantled the state and turned Libya into an extension of his family. With his death, so went the state. Although Libya has not always been forthright in its requests for security assistance, primarily because the National Transitional Council (NTC) felt it was only a caretaker government until an elected government could take power, the United States sought an even more passive approach than “leading from behind,” even as countries such as Turkey, Jordan, France, and Italy began offering security assistance and training programs. As a result, the United States is at risk of missing an opportunity to bolster security and gain insight into, and influence with, Libya’s myriad rebel groups, underdeveloped national army, and reconstituted intelligence apparatus. The attack on the U.S. consulate, as well as other attacks against Western targets such as the British Ambassador’s vehicle, or the Red Cross offices in Misratah and Benghazi, shows that security is not exclusively a Libyan concern.

A comprehensive Libya policy, however, should not be limited to security and counterterrorism, but should also include the expansion of U.S business opportunities in Libya’s emerging economy. The country has upwards of $110 billion in assets, $60 billion of which belongs to the Libyan Investment Authority, which has $20 billion in cash. This is in addition to Libya’s underestimated oil and gas reserves: 47.1 billion barrels of oil as of January 2012 – the largest in Africa – and 52.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Furthermore, the French Business
Council estimated that there is $200 billion worth of potential investments in Libya over the next decade, investments predicated on improvements in security.

However, even Libya’s security challenges present the United States with substantial economic opportunities. Due to Libya’s vast land area and small population of just under seven million, the country cannot field an army large enough to secure its borders, but instead will have to rely on armed forces with a qualitative edge and advanced observation capabilities. Equipping and training such an army could provide billions of dollars in new contracts for U.S. defense firms. As we continue to struggle with weak domestic economic growth, the U.S. should be actively promoting American business investments in a country the IMF said is expected to have GDP growth of 122% for 2012 and 17% in 2013.

The U.S. role in liberating Libya fueled significant pro-American sentiment among the Libyan people. An August 2012 Gallup poll revealed that 54% of Libyans have a favorable view of U.S. leadership – a higher percentage than in Canada. This sentiment was evident on the Libyan streets with the end of NATO operations and, more importantly, during the outpouring of grief following the murder of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans – a stark contrast to the indifference other publics and leaders in the region have shown towards attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities. It is no surprise then that, given this positive view of U.S. leadership, Libyans in many regards look to the United States for inspiration as they build a new country. For example, Mohammed Magarief, the leader of Libya’s first elected body, the General National Congress (GNC), has expressed his desire for a democratic, civilian-led, secular, and constitutional state. This is obviously a tall order, and is only representative of one political current, but it is nonetheless the political current that U.S. leadership should engage. Libya could still become a U.S. partner and a success story amidst an increasingly uncertain “Arab Spring.”

Fearful of being perceived as overreaching, the Obama Administration’s post-Qadhafi policies have centered on a light American footprint and a wait-and-see approach. The administration has not been shy about its unwillingness to lead in Libya and has taken a cautious approach in the policies it has promulgated, particularly with regards to security. While it is true that post-Qadhafi Libya faces daunting challenges, the president and Secretary Clinton have not clearly outlined U.S interests in Libya and articulated how the United States can achieve them.

Congress has not done much better. Although Congress was swift in reacting to the Consulate attack, it has exercised little oversight over the administration’s Libya policies. With the exception of a few members, until the death of Ambassador Stevens, Capitol Hill was largely uninterested. A review of the congressional hearing schedule reveals that neither the Senate nor House committees on armed services or foreign affairs held a single hearing focusing on U.S. policy towards Libya since the fall of Qadhafi. With little congressional oversight or U.S. media attention on Libya, it is clear why policymakers were left to parsing who said what when, rather than discussing U.S.-Libya policy as a whole.

To be clear, significant challenges remain in Libya. But the country now has a new government, led by Prime Minister Ali Zidan and his recently approved cabinet, which has placed security and the economy at the top of their list of priorities. As Congress and a second-term Obama Administration grapple with the fallout from the Benghazi attack, policymakers should not lose sight of the bigger picture: U.S policies should be clearly defined and
aggressively pursued. A more secure Libya with the means to counter weapons proliferation and the flow of terrorist groups across its borders translates into a more secure United States, and with security comes ample economic opportunities upon which to foster a true U.S.-Libyan partnership.

Mr. Engel is an M.A. candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and traveled through Libya in October 2011.
Pakistan, the United States, and the Confidence Deficit

By Aled Lloyd Owen

A pessimistic analysis of recent trends in the U.S.–Pakistan relationship at the outset of 2012 might have tended to see it as being in a state of terminal decline: Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been the focus of a CIA-led drone campaign which has caused considerable collateral damage, culminating in the ‘blatant and unacceptable’ death of 24 Pakistani soldiers in November 2011. Meanwhile, the US has had its own grievances: in particular, suspected sponsorship of the Taliban and other extremist elements in both Pakistan and Afghanistan by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Most troublingly, Osama bin Laden’s assassination deep within Pakistan, under the noses of the ISI and the Pakistani Military Academy at Abbottabad, raised questions about the complicity of Pakistan’s security services, if not the Pakistani state, in harboring America’s greatest enemy. However, this pessimistic interpretation of recent events does little justice to the reality of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. For all intents and purposes, these tensions are merely representative of disagreements to be expected of any relationship, particularly one placed under the strain of a war – particularly a war as politically and militarily frustrating as that being fought in Afghanistan. These disagreements and tensions may occasionally be severe; they are often very public; but they do not threaten an alliance essential to both countries.

Pakistan: The United States’ Most Essential Ally

How essential an ally is Pakistan to the United States? At present the United States contributes 90,000 troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The next largest contributor to ISAF is the United Kingdom, a nation frequently referred to as the most staunch ally of the U.S., enjoying a ‘special relationship’ diplomatcally, and unparalleled economic and cultural ties. The UK provides the equivalent of just over 10% of the troop numbers provided by the U.S. (9,500). Financially, the UK is the second biggest contributor to the NATO mission, behind the United States. The UK even provides more funding than does the United States to ISAF-led post-withdrawal reconstruction funds, providing 316% of the total U.S. financial contribution in this area. The United States however, contributes immeasurably more to immediate military and reconstruction operations, which dwarfs the combined contributions of all other ISAF partners combined.

While Pakistan’s diplomatic relationship with the United States enjoys none of the smooth-running of the U.S.’s ‘special relationship’ with the United Kingdom, Pakistan’s military contribution to the War on Terror far outstrips that of the UK’s. By the end of 2011, approximately 150,000 Pakistanis had been involved in offensive operations against militant groups in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province, formerly referred to as the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where 3,946 Pakistani military personnel have lost their lives with a further 9,000-plus wounded. It is interesting that although Pakistan is constantly the subject of editorials in the U.S. media lambasting it for preoccupying itself militarily in Kashmir against India and not devoting itself wholly to the fight against militants in the KPK and

http://gssr.georgetown.edu
FATA, those same animosities are not leveled against Great Britain’s withholding of armed forces to guarantee her territorial security in the Falkland Islands, or to conduct peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Africa. No NATO ally can be said to be as valuable, or to have sacrificed as much to the United States’ campaign in Afghanistan as Pakistan, although these other allies enjoy far more stable and cordial diplomatic relations with the U.S.

A Frustrating Relationship

Unlike America’s NATO partners in ISAF, what Pakistan has offered in terms of its sizable military contribution, it has adversely compensated for with its dependence on U.S. funding. This has proved to be a double-edged sword for the United States. On the one hand, the United States cannot hope to achieve its strategic military aims in Afghanistan without Pakistani military assistance in FATA and KPK, but on the other hand, the vast U.S. financing of Pakistan’s military resources has been subject to flagrant corruption. A 2009 publication by Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government entitled ‘US Aid to Pakistan – U.S. Taxpayers have funded Pakistani Corruption’ provides one such list of accusations against the Pakistani government. False claims submitted to the United States for reimbursement have included $1.5 million for damage to Navy equipment which had never been used in combat. $15 million was paid by the United States for the construction of bunkers in FATA, yet there is no evidence of the bunkers’ existence. Similar projects for which no evidence of their actual existence is available include a $30 million road-building scheme and a $55 million refurbishment of the Pakistani national helicopter fleet.

U.S. funding for Pakistani military operations in FATA, an essential investment, has contributed to some tactical victories, but even this rewarding dimension of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship has been tainted by false claims. There is a considerable evidence supporting allegations that the Pakistani army has claimed $80 million per month for military operations when troops were actually just in their barracks, often during ceasefires. Funding specifically allocated to counter-insurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) in FATA and KPK has also been subject to abuse or produced undesirable results. $200 million worth of procurement funding allocated for improving Pakistan’s COIN/CT capabilities was found to have been spent on conventional high-level war fighting equipment, including F-16s and air-to-air, air-to-ship, and missile-to-missile armaments, as well as large-scale anti-air/anti-missile defense systems and a new air defense radar network oriented east of the Indus.
River toward the India-Pakistan border. Meanwhile, U.S. officials visiting FATA in 2009 to observe the effects of U.S. CT/COIN effectiveness funding described members of the Frontier Corps thusly:

*The soldiers were ‘Standing…in the snow in sandals or bare foot…wearing World War 1-era pith helmets and carrying barely functional Kalashnikov rifles with just 10 rounds of ammunition each.’* [4]

The conclusion of the mission was that ‘the great majority’ of Coalition Support Funds given by the U.S. for CT and COIN were diverted to Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance, with only $300 million reaching the army by the end of fiscal year 2008. That funding which did filter through was almost certainly largely spent by Pakistan with their main security threat in mind: India.

However galling it is that United States’ funds have been misappropriated in this way, its relationship with Pakistan remains essential. The United States must take its own share of the blame for allowing such massive corruption to occur: Until 2007, U.S. military funding to Pakistan operated with little preconditions, and even later, the U.S. failed to take adequate steps to monitor claims and spending. In the aftermath of the 2011 Abbottabad raid, the Pakistani military cancelled a $500 million counter-terrorism program which was funded and conducted by American armed forces. This cancelation not only had the effect of rejecting an opportunity to improve Pakistan’s CT capability within its armed forces; it stirred the United States into action, leading to the withholding of $800 million (just over one-third) of financial aid to Pakistan for 2011-12.[5] The effects of this more assertive approach to combatting corruption are yet to be clearly seen. It is clear that this situation has been a wake-up call for Pakistan, and a stern lesson for the United States that the stick also accompanies the carrot.

That the United States continues to tolerate the still high levels of corruption within the Pakistani government and military is testament to the strength of America’s dependence upon Pakistan’s military assistance and the weight it places on maintaining Pakistan as an ally. The withholding of aid in 2011 was a positive step for the United States in establishing conditionality, but also demonstrated a willingness to be patient and maintain the existing relationship.

**Alleged Duplicity: The ISI and Osama Bin Laden**

More difficult for the United States to deal with is alleged ISI support for the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other militant groups within Pakistan and Afghanistan. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) has frequently linked Pakistan’s intelligence services with supporting attacks on ISAF troops within Afghanistan. A statement by Haji Saifullah, the district leader of Maywand, Kandahar, given to the Canadian military (and later re-printed in a Canadian newspaper) gives an idea of the type of HUMINT received on the subject:

*“The Pakistan ISI is openly giving money for people that are laying mines. If the mine goes off on coalition forces, they are going to get more money; if they go off on ANA (Afghanistan National Army soldiers), they are going to get middle-class money and if it is going off on police, they are going to get less money.”* [6]
While HUMINT must always be treated with caution – little HUMINT comes without an agenda – the similarity of content and the volume of accounts available give credibility to allegations of at least some ISI complicity in anti-NATO actions.

The tracing of Osama bin Laden to Abbottabad, Pakistan has done little to redeem the ISI in the eyes of the United States. After vanishing from Tora Bora in 2002, it was long suspected that bin Laden was sheltering in Pakistan in either FATA or KPK. Here, it was supposed, bin Laden could live among Pashtun communities (his preferred environment) and direct al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan while remaining relatively well protected from Western special forces hunting him; compliance on the part of any elements of the Pakistani state need not and did not enter the equation.

The eventual rediscovery of bin Laden at a fortified compound in Abbottabad raised doubts about the innocence of the Pakistani establishment. Closer to Kashmir than Afghanistan, Abbottabad provided an urban, non-Pashtun setting for bin Laden deep within Pakistan – a far cry from the original speculation. The large compound in which bin Laden was found and assassinated was a conspicuous anomaly in a small town composed of mostly one- and two-story buildings, just a few miles south of a major Pakistani military academy. In short, the failure to identify his presence in Abbottabad hints at either complicity or gross incompetence on the part of the ISI. The U.S. raid on the compound came under heavy criticism from Pakistan, as it had been unauthorized and conducted without giving Pakistan prior warning. Notwithstanding statements on behalf of the U.S. military that operational security demanded that they not warn Pakistan of the raid until their helicopters had crossed the Durand line, justifiable distrust of the ISI and the Pakistan Army almost certainly played a role. Pakistan’s insistence on sentencing Shakil Afridi (the doctor who assisted the CIA in locating bin Laden) to thirty-three years in prison on the charge of treason has done little to dispel deep-rooted impressions of state duplicity.

In spite of plausible allegations against the ISI, the United States and ISAF continue to rely heavily on Pakistan’s intelligence services for the conduct of their operations in Pakistan. The effectiveness of drone strikes in FATA, for example, relies heavily upon on HUMINT gathered by the ISI. The ISI provides valuable information on armament and narcotics trafficking over the Durand line and provides an enormous contribution to ISAF’s overall intelligence picture of the ‘AfPak’ theater. The United States and her allies are as dependent on the ISI as they are on the Pakistani military to achieve their aims in Afghanistan. The Afridi case however, has again demonstrated a growing willingness on the part of the United States to use the stick as well as the carrot in its relations with Pakistan, with Congress docking $33 million from Pakistan’s 2013 aid allocation – $1 million for each year Afridi has been sentenced to serve.[7] The indispensability of the ISI to NATO limits the United States’ options regarding how significant and effective these punishments can be.

The Confidence Deficit

It is essentially the United States’ lack of confidence in the Pakistani army’s and intelligence services’ ability to effectively fulfill their obligations within this alliance that leads to the dichotomy of America’s most essential ally in the war in Afghanistan being the greatest
thorn in her side. The U.S. cannot do without Pakistan’s army containing the threat in FATA, but it must be funded, and it cannot be relied upon to use that funding effectively to the ends which the United States desires. There is therefore a knock-on effect on U.S. confidence in the capability of Pakistani troops to meet U.S. requirements, for without effective funding and procurement, they cannot hope to perform CT/COIN operations to a desired level and effectiveness. Similarly, the U.S. and ISAF cannot hope to retain their current intelligence effectiveness without the assistance of the ISI, yet they know that while the majority of the institution supports NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, a select element is supporting the insurgency that is the very reason for ISAF’s existence.

While this element shelters and supports the enemies of the United States and her allies, they do not make Pakistan an enemy; rather, they make her a frustrating ally. The United States does not need another war, especially in a time of financial cost-cutting and foreign policy retrenchment, and particularly not one with such an important ally. Perseverance rather than punishment is the order of the day in dealing with Pakistan, where limited U.S. forces are utilized to compensate for those areas in which Pakistan has failed or cannot be relied upon to make an impact. The most public manifestation of this strategy has been the use of drones to conduct surgical strikes to add sharpness to Pakistani COIN/CT efforts in FATA and KPK. Undertaken with the permission of the Pakistani government, the use of drone strikes enables the U.S. to shape gains made by Pakistani ground forces and intelligence gathering into results more keenly suited to its own aims.

The early years of the drone offensive placed strain on the U.S.-Pakistan diplomatic relationship and demonstrated that the United States too could be a frustrating ally: In 2008, 49% of all deaths from drone strikes were civilians or Pakistani military personnel. U.S. authorities have made conscious efforts to reduce the number of civilian deaths, both to improve tactical effectiveness of drones and to restore Pakistan’s confidence in her ally, with civilian deaths at 30% in 2009 and just 6% in 2010.[8] The United States has seen more clearly than Pakistan the need to address the confidence deficit in their relationship.

**States Wish to Compensate for Pakistan’s Inability to Deal with Terrorism and Insurgency**

One must conclude that the United States does not see Pakistan as an enemy but as a friend who cannot be relied upon to guarantee the security of its allies and neighbors. Though Pakistan is a breeding ground for terrorists and insurgents, it demonstrates a genuine commitment to rid itself of those elements, and as such should not be viewed as a potential target by the United States. The desire to see Pakistan as a problem and a partner is not exclusive to the U.S. and her NATO allies. This point is reinforced when we look to the relationship of Pakistan and China, a nation which has no links to the ‘War on Terror’ but shares a similarly frustrating security relationship with Pakistan as does the United States.

China’s confidence deficit stems from the perceived inability of Pakistan to effectively deal with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which seeks to make Xinjiang Province an independent Islamic state. Chinese intelligence, working alongside ISI, has deduced that these rebels are trained in FATA. Beijing’s desire to quell al-Qaeda and ETIM operations in Xinjiang has led to requests for Chinese military bases in FATA. Ostensibly, China seeks the bases to establish an offensive capability for its military to complement Pakistan’s operations against
these elements. However, the move is indicative of a deficit in China’s confidence in Pakistan to effectively deal with the threat.

Pakistan is a crucial player in the war on terror, both in the context of the U.S.-led retaliation for the 9/11 attacks and in a more global context. Pakistan is not an adversary, but an essential if inept partner. It must do more to tackle corruption in order to improve its effectiveness in dealing with internal elements that threaten other nations. If it persists in failing to instill confidence amongst its allies in its ability to do this, then it must accept that they will wish to conduct their own operations within Pakistan in order to guarantee their security. If Pakistan fails to do this, then its safety at the hands of its current allies will be less strongly guaranteed.

Mr. Owen is an M.A. Candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. His focus includes security issues in the Indian subcontinent and maritime peacekeeping operations.

The End of the Drug War: Its Implications and the Future of Drug Trafficking in Mexico

By Tomas Kristlik

The long-term effort to suppress the Mexican profit-seeking illicit networks (PSINs)[1], labeled “Mexican Drug War” when Operation Michoacán was launched in 2006 by Mexican President Felipe Calderón, seems to have ended with the death of Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano in a shootout with Mexican marines in October of this year. By late 2012, Calderón’s last year in office, the vast majority of famous top cartel leaders were either killed, presumed dead or extradited to the U.S. to serve jail sentences. There is only one last capo left standing, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, leader of the Sinaloa cartel. Despite the visible results of the so-called “kingpin strategy” of cartel decapitation, applied extensively by the Mexican government, it is the Sinaloa cartel that can be plausibly considered the winner of the Drug War.

In this article, I will first explain why the Sinaloa cartel under Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera succeeded in the long and intensive fight against both the Mexican government and its rivals in the illicit drug trade. Second, using Nathan Patrick Jones’s typology regarding resiliency of criminal organizations, I will describe the effects the struggle with the Mexican state had on the Mexican PSINs, suggesting that despite damage suffered during the war, the Mexican PSINs are far from being defeated and Calderón’s administration thus achieved only partial success mainly due to its rigid strategy of “beheading.” Finally, I will provide an outline of possible future scenarios based on lessons learned from recent internal developments within the drug industry.

How El Chapo Won the Drug War: Success of the Sinaloa Cartel’s “Transactional Business Model”

In this section, I will focus on explaining various business models applied by the Mexican PSINs. I will explore how these strategies influence the state response against PSINs, and how these strategies provide strong resilience for the PSINs.

Now at the end of 2012, with President Calderón having left the stage and most of his major rivals in the drug business shattered, El Chapo Guzmán can plausibly be considered the winner of the drug war. There is one essential factor responsible for El Chapo Guzmán’s success: the “business model” of the Sinaloa cartel. This model, has invited a less intense response from the Mexican government against cartel activities. It also provided effective mechanisms to deal with results of the “kingpin strategy” applied by the Calderón Administration, thus significantly increasing resiliency of the PSIN, providing it with a comparative advantage against the business model adopted by its rivals in the illicit drug trade.

Nathan Patrick Jones offers a typology of illicit networks based on a distinction between “insurgent,” “transactional,” and “territorial” networks, whereby the latter two are labeled
“profit-seekers.”[2] Since the conception of insurgent networks – defined here as political movements attempting to overthrow a state through unconventional uses of force – is irrelevant for the Mexican case in discussion, I will exclude the “insurgent” type of network from further consideration in this article.

“Profit-seeking illicit networks” can be divided into two categories according to their respective business strategies: “transactional” and “territorial.” Transactional PSINs focus primarily on the business of trafficking in illicit goods and laundering revenues, hiding their wealth behind legitimate front businesses. This seemingly licit appearance of the network makes it extremely hard to detect and identify, especially when the whole network purposefully seeks to maintain a low-profile. Transactional networks’ business strategies within democratically-governed societies focus on securing their operational environment by corrupting higher-level state and federal government officials, including military and federal law-enforcement forces. Such networks confine their use of violence mainly to fending off business rivals, not targeting civilians. Transactional networks share some characteristics with territorial networks due to the need for specific trafficking routes throughout the region, but do not make money through extortion of the local population.[3]

In contrast, territorial PSINs focus on the control of specific territory, generating revenue not only through drug trafficking within the area, but also through taxation and extortion of the local population, often relying upon kidnapping to enforce their authority. Bribery is usually focused on local, municipal, or law-enforcement officials. Unlike transactional PSINs, territorial PSINs are usually more hierarchically-organized because they must control and protect their territory from rival smugglers, who attempt to traffic without paying fees, or “taxes,” to the relevant controlling territorial PSIN. The use of violence serves mainly as an operational tool to demonstrate the territorial PSIN’s own power or the weakness of state control over territory, or to send a message to rival traffickers. This violence usually tends to be especially brutal and symbolic. Torture, mutilation of victims’ bodies, beheadings and other forms of brutal violence are very common.[4]

Despite these idealized conceptions of networks, most PSINs tend to be hybrids of transactional and territorial types, containing varying proportion of each. Within the Mexican context, the Sinaloa cartel might serve as an example of primarily transactional PSIN, whereas Los Zetas, the Gulf cartel, the Juárez cartel, or the Arellano Félix Organization (AFO) are mostly territorial networks.

Under Charles Tilly’s conception of the state, wherein institutions of the modern state (such as taxes) are created to allow war-making, the state is more likely to target territorial rather than transactional PSINs, because modern states and territorial illicit networks are alike. Both are territorial, hierarchical, prone to violence, and funded via taxation.[5] The predatory alternative governance structure these territorial PSINs establish through extortion and kidnapping directly challenges the state by illicitly taxing the local population and exercising violence within the state’s territory.[6] Therefore, for a “territorially sovereign state,” the primary target is the “territorial” PSIN.[7]

In other words, the Sinaloa cartel survived largely intact because of its inclination to keep a low-profile through a less publicly visible modus operandi: relying on extensive corruption
rather than brutal symbolic violence, and because the federal state intuitively targeted primarily Los Zetas, AFO, and other territorial networks, regarding them as their main threat and rivals. Moreover, brutal and frequent violence used by territorial PSINs also increased public demand for the Mexican federal government to suppress them. The Sinaloa cartel therefore profited from its status as a “secondary” target and the consequently less intense fight with the Mexican government.

**The impact of “transactional” and “territorial” business models on PSIN resiliency**

Organizational resilience can be broadly defined as the ability to survive a disruptive event.[8] Probably the most significant weakness in the existing literature on organizational resilience is that outcomes resulting from disruptive event are often seen in absolute terms, the organization either survives or does not. On an individual level, there are various levels of survival and there is no reason to believe this does not apply to some extent to organizations, hierarchies, and networks as well. In case of Mexican PSINs the absolute categorization of the survival issue offers extremely weak explanatory power in terms of clarifying what impact the Mexican government’s effort had on PSINs; hence more sensitive and more sophisticated approach is required.[9]

Jones attempts to overcome this gap in the treatment of resilience by presenting a continuum based on a typology of “levels of resilience.”[10] For Jones, the highest of the four levels of resilience is to “survive intact,” which means that after a disruptive event an organization can survive intact without requiring major reorganization to survive.[11] This is best characterized by contingency theory designs, which argue that organizations purposefully aiming to build highly adaptive structures – creation of adaptive structures becomes an integral part of organization’s standard operating procedure – will be more successful in adaptation to changing environment, and therefore resilient. This seems to be confirmed by the survival of the Sinaloa cartel, since extremely adaptive structure is the main factor responsible for its resiliency and overall success. Despite a serious blow to the cartel caused by the arrest of Alfredo “El Mochomo” Beltrán-Leyva in 2008, and the subsequent separation of the Beltrán-Leyva faction, the Sinaloa cartel retained its operational capacity, winning the battle for Ciudad Juárez drug routes in 2010 and being labeled by some U.S. officials as the most powerful drug trafficking organization in the world.[12] There is reason to believe this status remains valid despite the death of one of El Chapo’s top lieutenants, Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel Villareal, in July 2010. I include the Sinaloa cartel within the top level of organizational resiliency because of its fast and successful adaptation to its changing environment.

The second-highest level of resilience in Jones’s typology is the survival of a disruptive event resulting in the need to “restructure.”[13] In the context of Mexican PSINs, a prime example of a disruptive event is the arrest or killing of top leadership. Since the “kingpin strategy” has been largely deployed by the Mexican government every cartel suffered significant losses among its top leaders. Such events can spur a rapid restructuring or even a violent fragmentation of PSINs.[14] Los Zetas provide an example here. With the death of Arturo “Z-1” Guzmán Decena in 2002 and the capture of Rogelio “Z-2” González Pizaña in 2004, the group restructured under Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano, who rose in command as “Z-3” to take charge of the organization. An example of a split within a PSIN might be one again involving Los Zetas. After Osiel “El Mata Amigos” Cárdenas Guillén, former leader of the Gulf
cartel, was arrested in 2003 and extradited to the U.S. in 2007. Los Zetas gradually achieved more influence within the cartel and finally separated from it, forming their own independent organization in 2010. AFO suffered severe internal struggle and fragmentation after the arrest of Eduardo “El Doctor” Arellano Félix in 2008, but seemingly recovered and reunited in 2010 around Fernando “El Ingeniero” Sánchez Arellano after his main rival in the successor fight, Eduardo Teodoro “El Teo” García Simental, was arrested.

The third level of resilience is “fragmentation,” – defined as when a disruptive event leads to a splitting of the illicit network into smaller parts.[15] Such a situation often occurs along lines of functional specialization, when, for example, smugglers and enforcers split from each other. Such is the case of the Gulf cartel, which suffered internal split in 2010 when Antonio “Tony Tormenta” Cárdenas Guillén, brother of Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, was killed and Los Zetas separated from the organization. Remaining enforcer groups within the cartel, Los Rojos and Los Metros, entered into a fight with each other after Samuel “El Metro 3” Flores Borrego was killed by the former group in 2011.[16] Also, fragmentation within Los Zetas seems to be occurring now due to internal problems within the leadership circle. With Iván “El Talibán” Velázquez Caballero’s arrest in September and Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano’s death in October of this year, Miguel Ángel “Z-40” Treviño Morales is the senior member most likely to assume leadership within the organization.[17] Nevertheless, Treviño’s suspected participation in the arrest of Velázquez Caballero and other important members of the organization undermines his authority. Los Legionarios, a recent splinter group from Los Zetas, has already declared war on Treviño.[18] Moreover, some of the local cells of Los Zetas seem to have become less responsive to the central authority in the organization, further weakening the cohesion of the cartel structure.

The final level, reflecting the lowest level of resilience, is “dissolution,” – whereby central PSIN nodes or entire PSINs can be dissolved by state action or systematically dismantled beyond recognition.[19] Within the world of illicit drug smuggling, the Colombian Medellín and Cali cartels provide such examples. Intensive military and law-enforcement efforts dismantled these organizations beyond recognition in the first half of 1990’s. More recent examples from the Mexican PSINs include the Beltrán-Leyva cartel that dissolved after the death of Arturo “El Barbas” Belrán-Leyva in early December 2009 and arrest of Carlos Beltrán Leyva later that month.

These examples of recent changes within Mexican PSINs invite the assumption that territorial networks, besides being the state’s “natural” primary target, have demonstrated lower levels of resilience. The business model of territorial PSINs invites stronger state responses and decreases organizational resiliency because this model cannot cope effectively with significant loss among leading representatives within the PSIN. That is why Los Zetas, the Gulf cartel, the Juárez cartel, and AFO suffered so much, particularly during the last six years. The transactional business model invites less intense state responses and also provides capacity to more effectively deal with the loss of leaders, because the network structure is less dependent on individuals, thus increasing the PSIN’s resiliency. El Chapo and the Sinaloa cartel won the Drug War: by application of a more effective and flexible business model.
The future of drug trafficking in Mexico

It is still too early to predict the long-term impact of the strategy deployed by Calderón’s administration against PSINs. Nevertheless, it seems correct to assume that the outcomes do not justify increased optimism. The “kingpin strategy” remained the primary instrument of the Mexican government to fight the PSINs. As demonstrated above, this approach proved effective only against territorial PSINs, weakening but not completely destroying them. The most powerful Mexican criminal network is still fully operational, acquiring even more relative power due to the weakening of its rivals, and possibly even increasing its absolute power because of its long-term systematic effort to infiltrate the highest levels of the Mexican federal government. The only somewhat positive fact might be that El Chapo is already in his late fifties, and generational change might occur within the Sinaloa cartel. Managing the large empire of the Sinaloa cartel requires extraordinary personal qualities and it is possible that El Chapo’s successors will not be up to the task.

Large territorial PSINs, once-formidable criminal organizations such as the Arellano Félix family, the Juárez cartel, the Gulf cartel, and Los Zetas, are currently undergoing a significant qualitative and quantitative transformation caused by the long fight with the Mexican government and with each other. Questions remain regarding whether this process will result in further fragmentation and dissolution of these PSINs or whether this transitory period will be concluded by successful adaptation to a new environment and their full reestablishment into the drug trafficking industry. Considering experiences from the last two decades, the latter scenario is very likely. With the “territorial business model” obviously failing, and the “transactional business model” undoubtedly flourishing, there is reason to expect the Mexican PSINs to become more transactional, with more flattened structures and “lower-profiles”.

It is also very likely that the “portfolio of services” offered by the Mexican PSINs will expand beyond the realm of drug and arms trafficking and money laundering. Human trafficking has proven extremely lucrative, lately becoming almost as profitable as drug trafficking itself.[20] Considering the high level of economically motivated migration in the region, it seems plausible that illegal transport of persons will remain attractive for the Mexican PSINs. Recently, Mexican PSINs have expanded their services to include illegal activities such as production of DVDs, with Los Zetas taking over the piracy business in the Mexican states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Puebla.[21] Before its dissolution in 2011, La Familia Michoacana engaged in illegal extraction and export of iron ore to China.[22] Available evidence also suggests significant involvement of Mexican PSINs in producing and trafficking counterfeit prescription drugs such as Viagra.[23] The attraction here is obvious since the demand for pharmaceutical drugs runs into hundreds of billions of dollars globally, and the returns on low-cost production can be immense.[24] Increasing popularity of high-potency synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine can decrease the logistical burden of transporting large quantities of more traditional narcotics based on natural components, like cocaine and marijuana, across Latin America.

Conclusion

The so-called Mexican Drug War is over, but the fight against narcotics is not. The future development of this struggle seems to be largely dependent on the creative capacity of PSINs,
their capability to adapt to a changing environment and always diversifying international demand for illicit goods and services. PSINs that remain loyal to territorial business models and traditional strategies, such as extortion, kidnappings, and violence against civilians, will retain their “high-profile,” inviting strong responses from the state, which will likely result in dissolution of these PSINs. Those PSINs that are instead adopting transactional characteristics with low-profile statuses and diversified portfolios of illegal services, often provided on an ad hoc basis, will most likely succeed; penetrating deeper into legitimate business activities, and strengthening symbiotic rather than predatory relationships between legitimate and criminal activities. Thus further enhancing the threat transnational organized crime poses to the Mexican government and to the security of the Americas.[25]

Lessons learned from the history of drug trafficking units in Mexico, especially those from the last six years, suggest that shall the currently observed trends of evolution within the transnational organized crime continue there is not much time left before the transactional PSINs as a phenomenon, or the Sinaloa cartel in particular, virtually usurp the state, depriving it of its institutional capacity to launch major coordinated, successful efforts against PSINs operating within its territory.

Mr. Kristlik is an M.A. candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.

[1] The term “profit-seeking illicit network (PSIN)” was introduced by Nathan Patrick Jones in his doctoral dissertation as an alternative to the less accurate term of “drug cartel” in analysis of illicit drug traders. In this article, I use the term “PSIN” to refer to the characteristics of the illicit drug trade entity, and the term “cartel” only in reference to the established name of these entities. For details about introduction of the term “PSIN,” see: Nathan Patrick Jones, The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resiliency, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 2012. http://search.proquest.com/pqdtft/docview/916751920/previewPDF/139FF3498741D49856E1?aaccountid=11091.
[9] For more in-depth analysis of organizational resilience, see Paul Chabot, An Historical Case Study of Organizational Resiliency, Chapter 2.
[22] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

By David Vanca

The United States is at war and America’s critical infrastructure faces the danger of destruction of Pearl Harbor proportions. This is the sentiment that U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, shared with business leaders in his speech to the Business Executives for National Security on October 12, 2012. Secretary Panetta warned that a cyber-attack against utility, transport systems, and financial services could be as damaging as the September 11 attacks. At the same time, he assured that the U.S. government is serious about strengthening the nation’s defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, and urged the private sector to support future national legislation for operations in cyberspace. Panetta’s warning strongly echoes themes discussed in Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake’s 2010 book “Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to do About It.”

Clarke, a former cybersecurity tsar who served three presidents as an advisor on national security issues, and Robert Knake, an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, provided a picture of Pearl Harbor-level cyber-attack two years before Secretary Panetta’s October 2012 speech. Given the discovery of sophisticated new cyber weapons such as Stuxnet and the Flame, the current state of debate over cybersecurity legislation, and the new rules of engagement in cyberspace, the book is even more relevant today than it was in 2010.

Main Points

The book focuses on cyber threats from nation states rather than from cyber criminals, cyber terrorists, or “hacktivists.” Clarke and Knake define cyber war as “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” In the authors’ point of view, cyber war is real, global, and capable of occurring at the speed of light. Most importantly, the authors believe that cyber war has already begun, and that nations are preparing the cyber battlefield. Although existence of cyber weapons like Stuxnet was not known to the authors when the book was published, Clarke and Knake predicted
that the U.S. and several other countries possess cyber-attack capabilities that could devastate a modern state. The authors explain that many of the systems that private citizens and governments rely upon (banking system, electric grids, air and rail transportation, the Internet networks etc.) could be successfully targeted and quickly destroyed or rendered inoperable. The authors argue that cyber war represents a greater threat to the security of the United States than to any other nation, because of the U.S.’s disproportionate and overwhelming dependency upon cyberspace. They warn that the U.S. is not adequately prepared for a potential cyber-attack from a nation state that possesses advanced capabilities for a cyber-attack, such as China, Russia, and even North Korea. They conclude that most future wars will include concerted wielding of both kinetic and cyber weapons.

Beyond these warnings, Clarke and Knake provide practical and theoretical prescriptions for improved national and international cybersecurity. They reason that the U.S. does not need to dominate the cyberspace domain since the U.S. already possesses the best offensive cyberspace capabilities. In contrast, they stress that the U.S. needs to create a cyberspace strategy that creates better defensive capabilities for America’s critical infrastructure. In short, the authors believe that the U.S.’s offensive prowess cannot make up for the weakness of its defensive position and conclude that the U.S. could suffer from self-deterrence unless it reduces its vulnerabilities to cyber-attack. Furthermore, according to the authors, defending the U.S. from the cyber-attacks should be the first goal of cyber war strategy. They argue that the lack of a credible cyber defense strategy could cause escalation of a cyber-conflict into a kinetic conventional war.

**Critical Assessment**

*Cyber War* is a highly readable book that is increasingly relevant to today’s national security environment. The authors emphasize that the book is neither a technical, nor a military document, and accordingly, they simplify many technical details for the sake of streamlining and increasing the accessibility of their narrative. They make credible assessments about the inherent insecurity of the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems that are part of the U.S. strategic infrastructure and of the Internet as a whole. The authors paint a picture of deficiency in the cyber-security of America’s critical infrastructure, which includes but is not limited to power grids and train, air-control, and financial system networks.

Clarke and Knake provide a number of hypothetical scenarios of major cyber-attacks on the U.S., including descriptions of how orchestrated triggering of dormant logic bombs and malware attacks could cause massive damage. They warn of collapsed air-traffic control, railroad disruptions and derailments, hacked and disrupted financial systems, exploded pipelines, and major blackouts across the large portion of the country. What the authors call “cyber Pearl Harbor” is an almost apocalyptic scenario: cities are cold, dark, and running out of food, ATMs and banks are not functional. Plane and train accidents and pipeline explosions in suburban areas cause scores of human casualties. They conclude that such a major cyber-attack is not only possible, but may not be punishable since the U.S. might not be able to correctly attribute the attack to any country or government.

The book’s greatest shortcoming is that it lacks footnotes, endnotes, and an index. Consequently, the credibility of some of the facts and statements is difficult to confirm. Though
the authors may be correct in their assertions, the lack of sources does not establish the credibility of the authors’ claims and statements. Indeed, while the authors are engaging and skilled story tellers, at times, their warnings about the dangers of cyber-war border on fear mongering, such as their argument that the vulnerabilities of the internet may even turn copy machines, printers, and shredders into cyber-weapons that could be used by hackers and other cyber-attackers.

True, software is highly susceptible to hacking because software and network errors are not always quickly or easily discovered. And yes, there has been a steady increase of cyber-attacks on U.S. industrial and security networks in recent years, but the lack of proven use of cyber-weapons or logic bombs in the United States does not support the authors’ assertions that logic bombs were found “all over our electric grid.” The authors do not provide reliable substantiation to support this statement. To provide backing for their cautions, the authors quote an outdated Time magazine article from 1994 that warned about the dormant logic bomb that could attack the computer system that runs the U.S.’s national air defense system or central bank. Unfortunately, they fail to deliver any evidence that logic bombs have ever been used to attack U.S. critical infrastructure. Of course, the discovery of Stuxnet in June 2010 provides a prime example of the existence of a sophisticated logic bomb that managed to destroy hundreds of centrifuges in the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran. The existence of Stuxnet puts Clark and Knake’s assertions about dangers of logic bombs into a new perspective.

Ultimately, Clarke and Knake are at their strongest when they explain the challenges of creating a comprehensive strategy for national cybersecurity. Clarke’s government experience provides valuable insight and a unique perspective that helps the reader to understand the challenges that the federal government faces in creating such a strategy. The authors strongly criticize the government’s long-term inability and unwillingness to prescribe national strategy and standards for cybersecurity to the private sector. It is illuminating to discover that there is virtually no difference between different presidential administrations in terms of their willingness to regulate standards for network security in the private sector. The authors argue that a lack of government leadership on this front undermines any serious improvement of U.S. cyber defenses. Furthermore, they point out that Chinese and Russian cyber defenses have become stronger in recent years due to their governments’ oversight and regulations of their national Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The Obama’s Administration’s efforts to formulate national cybersecurity strategy have accelerated in last two years but still fall short of some of Clark and Knake’s recommendations.

The authors’ prescriptions for how to improve the security of the U.S. cyberspace against foreign cyber-attack may be the most valuable portion of the book. Even though neither of the prescriptions provides a “silver bullet” for significant improvement of national cybersecurity, the prescriptions are a welcome balance to the cyber-doomsday scenario that the authors provide throughout the book. At the least, their technical and political proposals may serve as a good starting point for debates regarding cyber war and cybersecurity.

First, Clarke and Knake propose a Defensive Triad strategy that would use federal regulation as a tool to create cybersecurity requirements, which would include a regulated backbone of the Internet (a computer network infrastructure) and secure power grid, and an overhaul of cyber defense itself. The authors’ ideas of how to deal with the policy problem of
policing Internet traffic without giving the government the power to spy on citizens could be implemented in reality. They propose that monitoring should be out of the jurisdiction of the government, and recommend that the ISPs should place deep-packet inspection systems, a computer network filtering system that examines data before it passes into the network, to monitor the backbone. ISPs should also be required to inform customers when evidence arises that their computers have been part of a botnet, a collection of internet-connected computers whose security defenses have been breached by malware and control ceded to a malicious party. ISPs should also have the authority to deny access to customers who do not respond after being notified of their computer’s vulnerability. The authors’ present a convincing argument that ISPs should be required to do more to keep the cyber “ecosystem” clean, and that the government should remain sufficiently removed from the process to protect privacy and encourage competition. There may, however, be many ethical and legal issues that could arise from such an arrangement, and it is unclear how such a policy would work in practice.

The authors’ arguments about the necessity of securing the national power grid are compelling and less controversial. It is generally accepted that power grids could be vulnerable to cyber-attack – especially if the nation implements digitalization and creation of a smart grid (a class of technology used to modernize utility electricity delivery systems) – and that federal regulations might be necessary to secure the national power grid. Private energy companies are notoriously unconcerned about the security of their networks, unless the security of the networks seriously threatens service availability and convenience for their customers and diminishes the value of their product. The authors do not provide any proposal that tackles the relatively steep price of improved security, nor do they specify what level of security would be sufficient. The price-to-security ratio will be an inevitable point of contention during private sector/government negotiations of new security standards for the U.S. critical network. Finally, I agree that federal regulations should require the electric companies to create improved security measures that would deny unauthorized access in cyberspace.

Additionally, Clarke and Knake argue that there needs to be an improvement in the security of sites that hold classified information from the government and government contractors. Security breaches from the Pentagon, Department of Defense (DOD), Lockheed Martin, Booz Allen Hamilton, and other sites could prove costly in the time of cyber war. The authors propose that the government should invest in secure defense IT systems instead of relying on open systems based on Microsoft software. They do not mention, however, what the cost of these new IT systems would be and how much more security they would provide relative to Microsoft systems. Moreover, I am hesitant to agree with the authors that more secure network systems would by themselves enough to effectively deter nations like China or Russia from attempting cyber-attacks against the U.S.

Above all, the authors’ idea of arms control in cyberspace is certainly intriguing. They explain that arms control in cyberspace cannot be fully implemented because its effectiveness cannot be truly verified and controlled. Instead, the authors present an interesting point regarding attribution. They argue that since attribution is nearly always uncertain, the President should create a doctrine of cyber equivalency, in which cyber-attacks would be judged by their effects, not by their means. While this doctrine would not mitigate the attribution problem, it would implore all nations to have national cyberspace accountability and foster an obligation to assist in efforts to stop suspected cyber-attacks, which would make every nation responsible for
preventing hostile actions originating from servers in their country. Unfortunately, Clarke and Knake are not clear about how a responsibility of each nation to police their cyberspace could or would be enforced. Moreover, this proposition would have very complex legal implications that the authors fail to address. For example, would the U.S. have a responsibility to shut down websites of political dissidents that China or Russia consider objectionable?

Cyberspace is both a virtual and physical domain, with no clear boundaries. There is no international law or doctrine governing the global cyberspace. While there are laws and doctrines that govern the land, sea, and air, it is questionable whether traditional rules of engagement could be effectively used in cyberspace. The Obama Administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy provides general guidelines for DoD to engage in cyberspace. The essentials of current discussion on rules of engagement in cyberspace are being echoed in the book. In one of the chapters, the authors provide an example of an U.S. war-game exercise in which China would not be deterred by the U.S. to project its power in the South China Sea. This interesting hypothetical scenario emphasizes the importance of cyber defensive and offensive capabilities, and the relative asymmetry of cyber warfare. The authors conclude that the U.S. should not opt for attacking first in the event of cyber war, even if their offensive capabilities are superior to their defensive capabilities. America’s poor cyber defenses are exactly why the U.S. should not engage in a cyber war. Since there has never been a real life instance of cyber war, these calculations remain only theoretical. For example, it is unrealistic to assume that a capable adversary would refrain from attacking weakly defended U.S. targets in cyberspace merely because the U.S. did not attack first. Cyber-deterrence does not work in the way nuclear deterrence does, due to the difficulty of accurate attribution of an attack’s source. Again, there needs to be a doctrine that will establishes red-lines for when and how would the U.S. would respond to cyber-attack with offensive power – either cyber or kinetic.

**Conclusion**

Despite the shortcomings discussed here, Cyber War touches on an interesting and important topic that deserves to be included in any discussion about national security. Even if not all the threats discussed in the book are feasible, Clarke and Knake underscore a key point: that some of the U.S. critical infrastructure lacks proper security against cyber-attack, and the government, private companies, and other stakeholders should show initiative in efforts to improve it. The authors undoubtedly have unique insight into the level of government involvement in cyber-defense preparedness for cyber-attack. They are right about certain vulnerabilities of America’s critical infrastructure and about the improving capabilities of certain nations, such as Russia, China, and North Korea, to launch successful cyber-attacks against the U.S. and other nations, but they frequently overstate the danger of ‘cyber Pearl Harbor.’ Yes, the development of sophisticated cyber-weapons such as Stuxnet and Flame raise concerns about the potential destructive capabilities of cyber weapons, if they were used against the United States. But so far, there has been no precedent for a truly destructive cyber-attack of Pearl Harbor proportions. It is important to remember that Stuxnet was designed to target specific networks or SCADA systems and avoid collateral damage. This, of course, does not mean that a concerted attack of Stuxnet-like cyber weapons could not be employed in the future, but this type of attack would require a clear commitment of cyber-capable state actor to engage in war.
Finally, I argue that nation states may not engage in cyber war just because they have the capability to do so. There are many reasons why cyber-capable nations might not want to engage in cyber war. Cyber war is an uncharted territory with many unknown variables. A nation that is willing to engage in cyber war needs more than just the capability to launch a successful cyber-attack; it would also need a comprehensive national strategy which considers cyber war as an appropriate and viable option for advancement of national interests. Countries may, for example, use cyber-attack capabilities as part of specific military operation advancing broader national strategy. For example, nations may use cyber weapons if they decide to engage in conventional armed conflict or covert operations, or to deter other states from launching kinetic military actions against them. Therefore, Clarke and Knake are correct in asserting that the U.S. is vulnerable to cyber-attacks and that there is a vital need for national discussion concerning the security of the nation’s strategic networks. While it has become clear that the United States needs to improve its cyber defenses and overhaul its national security strategy for engagement in cyberspace, it is not certain that even these necessary efforts will effectively diminish the danger of being drawn into cyber war in the future.

Mr. Vanca is M.A. candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. His interests include international security, international politics, and trans-state actors in world politics.
Intervention in Somalia: A Misguided Model for Success in Mali

By Kate Mrkvicka

In March 2012, the government of Mali was overthrown in a military coup. Seizing on the instability and power vacuum, insurgent groups, including al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), took over control of vast swaths of territory in the north of the country. The recent unrest in Mali has attracted the attention of Western governments, who worry that regional instability will continue to empower and embolden jihadist groups based in the region. In mid-October, the United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution promising to assist the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with security and military planning in the event of an intervention in Mali.[1] U.S. government officials have stated that they too are considering involvement in a military, political, or humanitarian intervention in Mali, and have touted efforts to defeat al-Shabaab and restore stability in Somalia as a potential model for success in Mali.[2]

Given the desire of the United States and other Western nations to find a strategy that allows them to work to prevent the spread of Mali’s instability while maintaining a light footprint, it is unsurprising that Somalia has been raised as a model for future involvement. It is true that Mali is similar to Somalia in several key respects, but this fact should deter rather than encourage policymakers to turn to Somalia as a model for intervention in Mali. Although the security situation in Somalia has improved drastically in the past year, long-term stability in Somalia is far from assured. Modeling a potential intervention in Mali after Somalia is premature and ultimately perilous if policymakers fail to understand how foreign intervention in Somalia served to worsen, rather than ameliorate, certain aspects of the security environment there.

On the surface, many elements of the turmoil in Mali mirror the situation in Somalia following the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991. Mali, like Somalia, is crippled by a weak military and plagued by food insecurity. As in Somalia, Mali’s government was overthrown in a military coup, allowing armed groups to seize control of large swaths of territory. In both cases, jihadist groups emerged in the absence of a functioning central government.[3] The recent behavior of AQIM and other jihadist groups in Mali is similar to al-Shabaab’s activities in Somalia before it was considerably weakened by increased pressure from African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces. Both groups have espoused a strict interpretation of Shari’a, and targeted individuals who refuse to comply with their dictates.[4]

The entry of Kenyan Defense Forces in October 2011 augmented the efforts of AMISOM and TFG forces to rout al-Shabaab from its traditional strongholds in the southern regions of Somalia. The departure of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other key cities has in turn led to greater political stability and allowed for significant progress in state-building on the part of the Somali government. In September 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mohamed was elected president in Somalia’s first presidential elections since 1991.

http://gssr.georgetown.edu
Although TFG and AMISOM forces have largely been successful in driving al-Shabaab from its longstanding havens in southern Somalia, the group remains capable of harassing the Somali government and its other opponents through asymmetric means, namely ambushes, bombings, and assassinations. In April, two Somali government officials and four others were killed in an al-Shabaab-orchestrated suicide bombing of the national theater in Mogadishu.[5] In another telling example of al-Shabaab’s persistence in targeting Somali officials, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud survived an assassination attempt only two days after assuming his post in September.[6]

There are many factors contributing to the continued inability of the Somali government to defeat al-Shabaab and break out of its continued state failure. Somalia’s longstanding status as a failed state impacted the government’s attempts to counter al-Shabaab at every level. The TFG, the fourteenth attempt at establishing a legitimate government in Somalia, was based in Kenya for the first three years of its existence due to the level of control the insurgency commanded over the country. Upon its return to Mogadishu in 2007, the TFG failed to decisively establish its control over the capital. Al-Shabaab’s recent departure from most of its permanent bases in Mogadishu, hailed by some observers as a victory for the TFG and AMISOM, did not cripple al-Shabaab’s ability to perpetrate attacks in Mogadishu. Furthermore, AMISOM and the TFG failed to fill the security vacuum created by al-Shabaab’s withdrawal, which left Mogadishu a contested and volatile city for months after al-Shabaab’s departure.

The preoccupation of the TFG with maintaining even nominal control of the areas in which it operated, coupled with its struggle to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, left it little time to address the root causes of the societal discontent that has fueled the insurgency. Since its inception, the TFG struggled to earn legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali populace, which criticized the government for showing favoritism towards certain clans.[7] Somali officials tended to label opponents and rivals as extremists without identifiable proof, which furthered the perception held by the Somali population that the TFG was mainly an instrument to serve the interests of its officials.[8]

The TFG struggled to perform the most basic state functions, including taxation, policing, and the provision of social services. These failures were compounded by the severe levels of poverty and hunger in Somalia, which only worsened during the famine in 2011. The lack of a functioning central government in Somalia since 1991 created grievances that made the rhetoric advanced by al-Shabaab more appealing to the Somali populace. The TFG’s chronic dysfunction made the alternative political arrangement presented by al-Shabaab appealing, even if the majority of the Somali population did not share al-Shabaab’s religious fervor.

Because of its weakened condition, the TFG was forced to depend on the U.S., neighboring states, and international organizations for many security functions. The involvement of each of these entities in Somalia’s security situation resulted in overlapping areas of responsibility in some cases, as well as areas of critical need that were not addressed by any party. Furthermore, the presence of foreign actors in Somalia caused resentment to grow among the Somali population, the majority of whom felt the TFG was a construct of outside nations rather than a government representative of and responsible to the Somali people.
Meanwhile, the inability of the TFG to maintain a presence, much less to project power, outside of the capital provided al-Shabaab with wide swaths of territory, particularly in southern Somalia, in which to operate freely. Particularly troubling are Somalia’s chronically porous borders, which allowed violence to spill over into neighboring states and made it easier for skilled and motivated foreign fighters to enter Somalia to join al-Shabaab. Similar issues have emerged in Mali; already, several of Mali’s neighbors have begun reinforcing their borders to stem the flow of weapons and fighters into and out of Mali.

Along with these domestic political factors, another factor warrants closer examination before attempting to duplicate the ‘Somali model’ in Mali: the unintended effects of foreign involvement. Although outside intervention in Somalia was necessary for the TFG to maintain its fragile grip on power, it also galvanized al-Shabaab and other violent Islamist movements in Somalia. The presence of outside forces in Somalia, particularly because Ethiopian and AMISOM troops are Christian-dominated forces, transformed al-Shabaab’s campaign in Somalia from a localized conflict with religious overtones into a principle battlefield of the global jihad.

Foreign intervention in the Somali conflict, first in the form of the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, and then in the form of the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, attracted the attention of al-Qa’ida (AQ). Well before the merger of al-Shabaab and AQ in February 2012, AQ sought opportunities to incorporate the Somali conflict into its greater narrative of global jihad. Although links between the two groups had long existed, al-Qa’ida had relatively little interaction with al-Shabaab in the first two years of the latter’s existence, likely because of al-Shabaab’s initially limited focus on expelling Ethiopian forces from Somalia.[9] In 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then second-in-command of al-Qa’ida, released a statement in which he equated the conflict in Somalia to the jihad being waged in both Afghanistan and Iraq:

_Similarly to what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq where the strongest world power has been defeated in the face of mujahid groups that long for paradise, its slaves will face similar defeat on the land of Muslim, mujahid Somalia, God willing. Therefore, employ ambushes, mines, raids, and martyrdom-seeking campaigns so as to devour them exactly as lions devour their preys._[10]

In late 2008, al-Qa’ida operative Saleh Nabhan, who was later killed in an airstrike in 2009, appeared in a propaganda video produced by al-Shabaab. In the video, Nabhan pledged his loyalty to Osama bin Laden and called for Muslim youth to come to Somalia to join the jihad.[11] As al-Shabaab’s alignment with al-Qa’ida increased, its rhetoric adopted themes that mirror al-Qa’ida’s: global jihad and the establishment of a caliphate in Somalia.

The perceived occupation of the traditionally Muslim territories of Somalia by entities the movement labeled infidels was a boon for al-Shabaab’s propaganda efforts. The invasion by Ethiopian forces in 2006 further galvanized both al-Shabaab and the Somali population as a whole. Following the invasion, al-Shabaab immediately called for new recruits from inside and outside Somalia to join their ranks and expel the Ethiopians. The group’s recruiting appeals appear to have been successful: in early 2006, al-Shabaab had only approximately 400 fighters at its disposal; after the Ethiopian invasion in late 2006, its fighting cadre had grown to approximately 2,000 fighters.[12]
Lauding the new Somali government as the long-sought solution to Somalia’s political free-fall, and casting the efforts of AMISOM and the international community to bring stability to Somalia as a fait accompli is short-sighted, particularly given the previous fourteen failed attempts to establish a viable government in Somalia. Somalia will only thrive if, and when, a permanent and legitimate political solution can be reached, which requires either a government capable of integrating all clan- and religious-based entities, or a government powerful enough to tamp down future extremism. Any solution that stops short of these objectives will leave the door open for insurgency and violence to return.

AMISOM and the TFG’s efforts against al-Shabaab, although admirable, have yet to prove successful in eradicating the group completely, as evidenced by al-Shabaab’s continued execution of attacks against government targets. Similarly, though the newly-constituted Somali government formed in August shows signs of greater inclusiveness and accountability to the Somali population, it is too early to determine whether it represents a viable permanent political solution or merely the latest iteration of attempts to save Somalia from continued state failure. Some measure of international involvement may be necessary to restore order and prevent the spread of violence in Mali. Rather than turning impulsively to Somalia for a blueprint for future intervention in Mali, U.S. policymakers should be mindful of the fragility of Somalia’s stability, and should incorporate into their calculus the potential for intervention to exacerbate the conflict.

Ms. Mrkvicka is an analyst for the U.S. government and an M.A. candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. The views expressed in this article represent the author’s views alone and not those of the U.S. government.

[4] Ibid., 2.


Lebanon and the Syrian Civil War: Preventing the Descent Back Into Conflict

By Andrea Clabough

Civil wars are often perceived solely as internal tragedies even though they often have devastating impacts beyond their borders. While the Syrian conflict has raged for over a year with no resolution in sight, Syria’s immediate neighbors are arguably in equally precarious positions. Within this regional nexus, Lebanon faces the gravest risks as the Syrian conflict intensifies due to its history of civil conflict spurred by internal insecurity. Despite this dangerous situation, there are several immediate- and medium-term policies that the international community and Lebanon’s central government can implement to prevent the Syrian conflict from engulfing its neighbor.

To fully understand the threats facing Lebanon vis-a-vis the Syrian crisis, it is crucial to understand the parallel regional context of the 1970s that initially pushed Lebanon into civil war. Figuring prominently, then and now, is the concept of a “security dilemma,” referring to a basic lack of trust and assurance in an uncertain world that a person, community, or state can adequately defend itself from perceived threats; in order to become secure, these actors prepare for future conflict, inadvertently threatening other actors within the system and inducing
widespread insecurity.[1] This general insecurity fosters conditions that can result in a spiral into violence.

However, security dilemmas within states usually result from the breakdown of the central authority of the state. This situation brings grievances and fears of domestic groups to the fore; for example, the potential to gain – or lose – political power is a common issue. This creates the perceived need by a state’s constituent communities to prepare against an uncertain future by, for example, stockpiling weapons. These initially defensive measures are often viewed as offensive measures by rival or neutral communities, who resort to similar tactics to enhance their own security, thereby reducing that of others. This dynamic of misperception produces instate arms races, hardens group identities, and isolates moderate voices while empowering extremists.[2] At the sub-state level, therefore, security dilemmas can both enable and incentivize violence.

The Security Crisis of the 1970s

The regional context of the early 1970s produced an internal security dilemma within Lebanon, ultimately instigating one of the most destructive civil wars in modern history. Debate continues within Lebanon today as to which group’s or groups’ actions sparked the security crisis that unfolded in 1975; what is certain, however, is that the influx of a massive Palestinian refugee diaspora into southern Lebanon following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War constituted a destabilizing factor in an already fragile confessional state.[3] The evolving regional security situation precipitated the emergence of an internal security crisis among Lebanon’s confessional communities; the arrival of PLO commandos in southern Lebanon, for example, exacerbated tensions between the native Lebanese Shia community and the largely Sunni Palestinian refugee community. Likewise, the presence of the military wing of the Palestinian movement, the Fatah organization, forced Sunni Muslims throughout the country to increasingly come to grips with the Palestinian cause, to which Lebanon’s ruling Maronite Christian community felt no allegiance.[4] As a result, the increased Palestinian presence (beyond those Palestinians who came to Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War) increasingly placed Lebanon’s constituent communities at odds with one another while pushing older grievances over the state’s weak power-sharing system to the fore.

These issues, however, quickly moved beyond the political and ideological realms. As group identities solidified over the Palestinian crisis, Palestinian commandos ignited an arms race as they utilized their substantial arms caches for operations along the southern border with Israel.[5] Lebanon’s empowered Christian minority, which increasingly saw itself as at odds with the armed Palestinians, began gathering its own armaments to counter them. These actions precipitated a domino effect of mobilization; anticipating violence between the Palestinian and Christian factions, a range of sectarian militias emerged from amongst the Sunni, Shia, and Druze communities.[6] Within a few years, the situation was such that all of Lebanon’s sectarian communities were “armed to the teeth” by the spring of 1975.[7]

With the central government in Beirut increasingly fractured and clearly incapable of addressing the issues related to the Palestinians’ presence, all of Lebanon’s communities understandably sought self-defense as a top priority in a rapidly deteriorating situation. Consequently, the first violent clashes between Christians and Palestinians in April 1975 sparked
a chain reaction that led to the eruption of a full-scale civil war within a matter of weeks.[8] After fifteen years of bloodshed and hundreds of thousands of casualties, the Lebanese state was reconstructed in the early 1990s as a revised version of the confessional system that reallocated governing power, primarily to Lebanon’s larger Sunni and Shia communities, in exchange for the disarmament of almost all of the sectarian militias involved in the conflict.

Disturbingly, the situation in Lebanon today has key similarities to the crisis of the 1970s because these key explosive elements are being reproduced by the Syrian conflict. The catalyst for conflict in Lebanon in the 1970s was the influx of large numbers of Palestinian refugees, as a result of the outcomes of both the June 1967 Six Day War and the Palestinians’ defeat in Jordan during Black September in 1970. These major influxes of Palestinians fundamentally altered confessional demographics in Lebanon, making the confessional power-sharing arrangements embodied in Lebanon’s National Pact seem increasingly outmoded and inequitable.

Ties between these refugees and older Palestinian communities in Lebanon grew stronger as the refugee crisis brought existing sectarian grievances to the fore and rival groups acquired the materiel to wage extended conflict. Given that Lebanon has maintained a relatively decentralized confessional governing system substantially similar to that which preceded the civil war, there is a strong possibility that a similar security dilemma could reemerge in the context of the expanding Syrian conflict.

Today, the Syrian crisis is bringing new armed sectarian organizations into Lebanon, specifically, Sunni-dominated anti-Assad militias. The violence in Syria has descended into a roughly Sunni-Alawite civil war with smaller communities, such as Druze and Syrian Christians, caught in the crossfire. Reports throughout the conflict have indicated that the diverse anti-regime forces arrayed against Assad are using neighboring states, and especially their border regions, to coordinate the movement of fighters, weapons, and supplies.[9] The deluge of armaments, given Lebanon’s history with violent conflict, is extremely. The history of civil conflicts in this region and beyond shows that weapons move rapidly across borders, and that it is extremely difficult to control their use or ownership by relying on the artificial boundaries of these states.

In addition to providing materiel for potential conflict in Lebanon, the Syrian conflict is also deepening sectarian divisions by increasing perceptions of threats and grievances. Like the Palestinians decades earlier, fleeing Sunni refugees from Syria look to their co-religionists in Lebanon for political and logistical support against the Alawi Assad regime.[10] The pleas of the expanding refugee community for support against Assad have aggravated the largely pro-Assad Shia communities around Beirut and in Lebanon’s south; not surprisingly, recent Sunni-led anti-Assad rallies have ended in mob violence.[11] Likewise, the role of Hezbollah as a pro-Iranian (and consequently pro-Assad) Shia militant group actively aiding Assad against the Syrian Sunni opposition movement has only fueled inter-sectarian tensions back in Lebanon.[12] For example, the recent assassination of Lebanon’s Sunni Intelligence Chief, Wissam al-Hassan, has been attributed to Syrian agents acting through Hezbollah and was widely denounced by anti-Syrian government officials throughout the country.[13] The Sunni cleric Ahmad al-Assir has gained prominence in recent months as the ideological leader of an emerging anti-Shia militia.[14] The Syrian refugee crisis, therefore, has revived and solidified inter-sectarian rivalries such that low-level violence is on the rise throughout Lebanon.
This toxic combination of heightened sectarian divisions resulting from the refugee influx, a divisive foreign crisis, and a growing regional arms trade could rapidly foster a new intrastate security dilemma in Lebanon. While the situation has not yet reached a crisis level, the almost certain continuation of the Syrian civil war for many months – if not years – makes threats to its neighbors impossible for the international community to ignore. Even if there appear to be few options to end the crisis in Syria, the international community can still do much to help Lebanon before tragedy ensues. While it should be emphasized that none of these potential policies is a panacea, none are so difficult or costly that they should consequently not be adopted.

1) **Manage the immediate impacts of the refugee crisis.** Reports indicate that there are upwards of 130,000 registered Syrian refugees now living in Lebanon; there are likely thousands of additional refugees that remain unregistered, with even worse prospects for securing basic supplies and shelter.[15] Refugee flows, particularly when they are primarily constituted by a single sectarian group, can be highly destabilizing. In the case of Lebanon, the current refugee flows are straining local economies and especially social services, while the government in Beirut has provided little tangible support to overwhelmed local organizations.[16] Lebanon’s history of dealing with massive refugee flows is hardly reassuring. International donors should immediately meet the donor goals proposed by the United Nations for Syria Fund, and take steps to ensure that this growing community possesses the basic requirements for physical and human security for at least the next several months.[17]

2) **Develop medium- and long-term programs to support the refugee community.** Refugees are regularly described as a “temporary” problem; often, however, they become a permanent fixture in their adopted countries. There is little reason to expect that the Syrian conflict will end in the near future. The Lebanese government must come to grips with reality and prepare for the assimilation of Syrian groups, with the support and oversight of international refugee organizations including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This preparation should include, for example, guest worker programs and the integration of refugee children into the Lebanese public education system.

3) **Secure the border areas, with particular emphasis on the arms trade.** Lebanon is increasingly becoming awash with fighters and armaments; even if this robust arms trade is targeted toward opponents of the Syrian regime, the movement of weapons through Lebanon is extremely dangerous for that country’s security. As noted earlier, the perception of threat from armed rivals is a key element of an internal security dilemma. The relief agencies already at work in the border regions should coordinate with Lebanese security forces to secure the porous border regions and prevent these areas from becoming lawless havens for armed groups, while protecting and documenting those fleeing the Assad regime.

4) **Bolster the central government and local representative bodies, especially legitimate institutions of law and security.** The breakdown of central authority is a critical element in civil conflict; the crisis of the 1970s in Lebanon was largely due to the inability of leaders in Beirut to exercise authority as the country disintegrated.[18] In the current situation, central and local government bodies cannot afford to be overwhelmed, or worse – appear incompetent or irrelevant. The failure to govern effectively creates opportunities for sub-state groups to fill gaps...
in governance, which can precipitate the collapse of the state.[19] These legitimate political and security institutions, including police, court systems, and local councils, must be empowered to provide essential security and social functions in order to demonstrate a capable leadership. International aid in support of Syrian refugees, for example, should be coordinated and dispersed in conjunction with local authorities. This focus on partnership will create a positive trend of local ownership of these programs while giving local and state leaders the opportunity to project strength and control over a tense situation.

These and similar policies could and should be seriously considered by all of Syria’s regional neighbors that have felt the ramifications of this conflict. For Lebanon, however, such policies could be especially important in preserving the country’s security and stability and that of the larger region. At this point, the international community has largely lost the leverage and initiative to meaningfully direct the course of events in Syria. While the regional consequences of this civil conflict beyond Syria will be felt for generations, the worst impacts may still be preventable. The international community too often simply accepts the things it cannot change. Now, it is time to change the things it can.

Ms. Clabough is a second-year M.A. candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. A native of Knoxville, Tennessee, Ms. Clabough graduated from Vanderbilt University in May 2011 with B.A. degrees in Political Science and History.

[4] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 143.
[7] Cleveland and Bunton, Modern Middle East, 384.
[8] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.

[16] Reports have indicated, for example, that even basic shelter from the encroaching Lebanese winter is not assured to Syrian refugees.


[18] Byman, Keeping the Peace.

Miscalculating Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East: Why Kenneth Waltz Gets It Wrong

By Roslyn Warren

In his Foreign Affairs article, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Kenneth Waltz suggests that a nuclear-armed Iran is nothing to fear. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that Iran’s membership in the nuclear club will actually increase stability in the Middle East. However, Waltz misses an essential point: nuclear deterrence does not rule out the potential for conventional escalation, which can destabilize regions in unpredictable and potentially catastrophic ways. When it comes to nuclear-armed adversaries, the outbreak of “full-scale war”[1] cannot be the only definition of instability. Tense relations between nuclear-armed foes, be they offensive posturing or limited conventional conflict, create opportunities for miscalculation and escalation to the nuclear level.

A closer examination of relations between India and Pakistan reveals that nuclear weapons embolden revisionist nuclear states – i.e., states dissatisfied with the existing regional balance of power – and raise the propensity for and incidence of conventional conflict. Taking Pakistan as a model, a weaponized Iran, believing it has a significant deterrent capability, will, at a minimum, increasingly antagonize Israel without fear of nuclear reprisal. Another, more frightening, side effect of Iranian weaponization runs contrary to Waltz’s deterrence model: Both Israel and Iran could each believe a preemptive strike lay in its favor. For these reasons, Waltz’s assertion that a nuclear Iran will increase stability in the Middle East is wrong.

Waltzian neorealists claim that states are rational actors seeking, above all, security within an anarchical international system. States maximize their own security by attempting to balance their power against the status quo power; i.e., a state content with the existing, regional balance of power. Security imbalances spur instability. For Waltz, such is currently the case in the Middle East. Because of Israel’s nuclear dominance, it can project undeterred hostility towards its neighbors.[2] The defensive realist remedy for this type of instability is nuclear balance. Waltz suggests that, “By reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less.”[3] Given that all states are rational actors seeking to maximize their relative security, Waltz argues that fear of nuclear reprisal vis-à-vis a second-strike capability acts as a sufficient deterrent between two nuclear-armed adversaries.[4] Hence, if Iran developed nuclear weapons, relations between the two most powerful actors in the Middle East would become more stable.

In contrast, many nuclear proliferation experts use the stability-instability paradox to explain how regions with rival nuclear powers become increasingly unstable. The stability-instability paradox posits that two nuclear-armed, adversarial states, believing that neither will initiate a nuclear strike, can and will increasingly engage in offensive posturing and limited conflict with one another.[5] The newly-weaponized, revisionist state – for example, Pakistan or potentially Iran – feels emboldened, and more freely resorts to adventurism in the form of
enhanced offensive posturing, increasing low-level conflict, and perhaps stronger support for terrorists. On the other hand, the status quo state – India or Israel in these cases – perceives its freedom of action constrained by its adversary’s new status. [6] Instability at the conventional level in the form of more pronounced aggressive posturing and/or limited conflict heightens tensions between major regional powers, and leaves the door open for escalation and miscalculation at the nuclear level.

For Waltz, India and Pakistan prove his point: These two nuclear-armed adversaries have not launched a nuclear war against one another because they fear a reciprocal strike, thereby balancing each other and stabilizing their relations. However, Waltz’s analysis only explains why India and Pakistan have not yet launched a calculated nuclear attack against one another. He fails to consider how tensions across the conflict spectrum have increased since India and Pakistan both weaponized, which could inadvertently escalate to the nuclear level.

Flashpoints between India and Pakistan highlight the stability-instability paradox clearly. S. Paul Kapur reveals how Pakistan’s weaponization has “encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior,” whereby it can challenge India “without fearing catastrophic Indian retaliation.” [7] In the Kashmir crisis, Pakistan supported a violent insurgency in Kashmir and the Indian state of Jammu. While the extent to which Pakistan involved itself in the initial fighting remains unclear, Pakistani forces did engage in their “largest-ever peacetime military exercise” and announced a strategic shift to a “policy of offensive defense” in relations with India. [8] Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto acknowledged, “Nuclear weapons ‘came out’ as an important tool in that struggle,” allowing Pakistan to “provide extensive support for a low-scale insurgency”…while insulating it from a full-scale Indian response. [9]

Similarly, in the Kargil crisis, the Pakistani military “marshaled a substantial body of forces” and crossed the Line of Control (the military border between the Indian and Pakistani-controlled parts of the disputed region), resulting in Indian air and ground mobilization and significant casualties on both sides. [10] Sumit Ganguly explains, “Absent nuclear weapons, Pakistan would not have undertaken the…misadventure.” [11] Relations between India and Pakistan reveal that weaponization emboldens revisionist nuclear states and raises the propensity for conventional conflict.

While exhibiting nuclear restraint in both of these situations, India has made “aggressive changes” to its “conventional military posture.” [12] India’s new Cold Start doctrine, for example, “enable[s] India to rapidly launch a large-scale attack against Pakistan.” [13] Responding to this, the director-general of Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), illustrates how conventional instability can escalate to the nuclear level: Cold Start “is destabilizing; it is meant to circumvent nuclear deterrence […]. If it becomes too threatening we [Pakistan] will have to rely on our nuclear capability.” [14] While the line at which Pakistan would employ nuclear weapons remains unclear, this statement suggests that Pakistan’s strategic calculations in responding to conventional conflicts with India now include a nuclear contingency plan. Equally disconcerting, Indian officials believe they can “calibrate” their actions relative to Pakistan’s tolerance, “stopping short of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear thresholds.” [15] Erroneously appraising another country’s red lines could have catastrophic effects, leading to unintended drastic escalation. [16] The India-Pakistan relationship displays
how the stability-instability paradox subjects the region to escalation and miscalculation on a nuclear scale.

The stability-instability paradox also holds true for the Israel-Iran case. Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton, and Matthew Irvine point out that a nuclear-armed Iran could stir regional conflict, producing high-stakes miscalculations with “some inherent risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear war.”[17] A Middle East where “conflict below the nuclear threshold seem[s] ‘safe’” will likely “encourage Iranian adventurism, reduce Israeli freedom of action, and increase aggressive actions by Iranian proxies.”[18] Geographic proximity and mutual distrust could lead “Israel and Iran [to] adopt ‘launch-on-warning’” doctrines for their nuclear arsenals, increasing the chances that “false warnings of an impending attack by one side” could unravel into an “accidental nuclear war.”[19]

When it comes to a weaponized Iran, Waltz’s contention fails to follow its own rational deterrence logic. In this scenario, it is not fear of a second strike that deters Israel and Iran, but vulnerability to a first strike that could lead one side or the other to initiate a nuclear attack. Kahl notes, “Reciprocal fears of surprise attack could produce incentives for either side to launch a deliberate pre-emptive attack.”[20] Israel, with its nuclear superiority, fearing a nuclear-armed Iran, could seek to annihilate Iran’s small arsenal by initiating a first strike. Even if Iran only feared an Israeli conventional attack, Iran’s nascent nuclear arsenal, extremely vulnerable to an Israeli strike, could generate an Iranian “use them or lose them” sentiment, where Iran could also calculate that a first strike lay in its favor.[21] This would leave two nuclear-armed adversaries without diplomatic relations living in close proximity to one another, both feeling vulnerable and potentially believing a first strike could work to its advantage.[22] In the Middle East, even the prospect of a weaponized Iran heightens the potential for conflict to escalate to nuclear levels.

While no one can know with certainty what the regional security environment will look like if Iran joins the nuclear club, one thing is certain: nuclear weapons sustain the possibility of nuclear war. The Waltzian deterrence model may hold true in a Cold War retrospective, but unintended accidents and escalation are still possible. When adversarial states both possess a nuclear second-strike capability, relative security gains cannot be achieved at the nuclear level. Waltz concedes that because states seek to maximize their relative security, nuclear states may choose to develop a massive conventional weapons arsenal as well. In this way, even Waltz acknowledges the paradoxical nature of nuclear weapons, admitting heightened aggression and limited war is possible even when both states are nuclear-armed.[23]

As demonstrated by the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons generate increasingly aggressive behavior, creating greater opportunities for conflict, not fewer. A likely scenario between Israel and a nuclear Iran involves increased low-intensity conflict where low-level skirmishes could lead to unintended escalation or accidental nuclear detonation. At worst, nuclear-armed foes could decide that a first strike is worth the risk.

Ms. Warren is an M.A. candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.

[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.


[5] Ibid.


[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.


[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.


[22] Ibid.

GSSR STAFF

Executive Editor: Ashley Frohwein

Deputy Executive Editor: Aled Lloyd Owen

Assistant Editors:

Brandon Aitchison
Andrea Clabough
Kate Mrkvicka
Charles Snyder
David Vanca
Tomas Kristlik

CONTACT US

Find us on the web at http://GSSR.Georgetown.edu

Submissions intended for publication in GSSR should be directed to GSSR.submissions@gmail.com. For additional information regarding submissions to GSSR, please visit https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/globalsecuritystudiesreview/submissions/

General inquiries should be addressed to GSSR.info@gmail.com.