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Unsustainable Peace in Mali

By Whit Miller

During the spring of 2012, Mali witnessed brief, but fierce, fighting between al-Qa’ida-affiliated Islamists, Tuareg nomads, and Malian government troops, which were eventually assisted by French forces in January 2013.¹ In Mali, as in everything regarding African politics and security, the situation is extremely complex. June 2013 saw a ceasefire signed by two of the parties involved: the Malian government and the Tuareg rebels that populate the northern regions of the country.² French, Malian, and U.N. officials now hope to prepare the path to presidential elections in areas throughout the country, including the former rebel-held northern city of Kidal.³ However, the question remains: how long will peace and quiet last? Considering the various dynamics at play in the country—and indeed within the surrounding region—peace is likely to be short-lived.

The Tuaregs have been present in the region far longer than the modern Malian state against which they fought, and their grievances have highlighted once again the arbitrary colonial borders visible on maps of North Africa and the Sahel.⁴ This ethnic group populates territory stretching from northern Mali into western Niger, southern Algeria, and western Libya.⁵ Although the Azawad state lies partially within the sovereign borders of Mali, the region has little to offer the Tuaregs aside from a state of their own, mountains, and “moonscape.”⁶ The territory could, however, present a challenge to the region similar to the one that exists between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran with regards to the Kurds and their desire for a sovereign state.

In that case, the Kurdish ethnic minority in Iraq has long enjoyed autonomy from the government in Baghdad, and has on occasion called for secession of the Kurd-dominated north to form a sovereign Kurdish state.⁷ Iraq would not welcome the

loss of the oil-rich northern territory, and both neighboring Turkey and Iran have Kurdish populations with separatist aspirations of which the respective governments are wary.\(^8\) One could see where the secession of an Azawad state in northern Mali would concern the Algerian, Libyan, and Nigerian governments about their own sovereign territory.

The presence of radical Islamists in the region could also present future problems for the government in Bamako. The Islamist group *Ansar al-Dine* (“Guardians of the Faith”) constituted the main body of the rebel movement in the spring 2012 push towards Bamako from the north. An affiliate of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), it has been working closely with the terrorist group in very small ways, but was classified, following its participation in the anti-government offensive, as a distinct terrorist organization by both the U.S. Department of State and the U.N. Security Council.\(^9\) Like the Taliban in Afghanistan, *Ansar al-Dine* militants were able, once French troops entered the conflict and began a counter-offensive, to simply fall back into increasingly rough terrain or vanish into the civilian population.\(^10\)

The Islamists have shown their ability to shift from an almost Maoist “phase two” period of guerrilla attacks back to a “phase one” period of consolidation and reconstitution. The French military ostensibly had eliminated or expelled many militants from the north of the country not more than a year ago; however, radical Islamist militants have returned to the northern region. Reports of attacks on the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission have increased, with at least two U.N. peacekeepers from Chad confirmed killed.\(^11\) This was then followed by the deaths of two French journalists working in the northern town of Kidal in early November.

Despite the removal of radical Islamists from the north of the country during the French-led military intervention, one group involved in the uprising remains active, and might be increasing its presence: the largely secular Tuareg rebels. In mid-November 2013, Tuareg rebels acting under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) returned to the northern Malian town of Kidal.\(^12\)

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\(^{10}\) Ibid.


Although the Tuaregs do not appear to have launched any recent independent attacks, they did engage in strikes in conjunction with Islamists during the last spate of violence.

While the Tuaregs and Ansar al-Dine both present active undermining forces within Mali, the country will struggle with increased natural resource exploitation and associated socioeconomic dynamics that afflict many resource-rich African states. The Malian government is expected to benefit from significant investment in its mining sector by foreign firms. The country, Africa’s third-largest gold producer, is set to double gold production during the next five years, from 50 tons per year to 100 tons per year.13 Though mining operations are in the south of the country – well away from last year’s fighting – they still present potential catalysts for unrest.14

In one scenario, following the example of autocratic leaders in other resource-rich African states, the government—either a single individual or a cabinet—could hoard the income generated by the gold exports. This lack of wealth distribution, paired with perceptions of foreign firms taking away resources and profits, could anger the population. In response, a leader or leaders could then rise to protest the injustice, and civil war could break out. While it is difficult to predict how populations will react to wealth generated by resource extraction—and the subsequent distribution of that wealth—past experiences show a concentration of wealth towards the top of government despite extreme country-wide poverty.15 In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, rebels sought to take diamond fields and other mineral resources from the government not only to ease their “people’s” poverty, but also to further finance their operations against the government.16 The caveat, of course, is that gold refining is more complex than diamond mining, and harder to sell in rough form.

Another possibility is a situation similar to what occurred at the Lonmin platinum mine in South Africa: unaddressed union grievances regarding conditions and pay could lead to miner riots and a heavy-handed police response. Underlying the tensions were political affiliations that merely added to the volatile mixture.17

Recently elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, also known as IBK, has sought to address some of these destabilizing issues. His platform includes, among

other issues, a pledge to pursue and remove from the political system those elites who
cared very well under his predecessor, Amadou Toumani Toure. On the other hand,
Keita’s firm approach to governance as the country’s prime minister led to his rejection
of a 2006 peace deal with the MNLA Tuareg separatist group. Presently it is too
early to tell just how successful IBK will be in stabilizing and reconstructing his
country. Some members of the public are already critical of the new president’s
positions and alliances, noting in particular the naming of two rebel leaders to his
party’s election lists. Although a move merely made to curry favor among the elites
living in the north, it has not sat well with urban populations that fought against the
Tuareg and Islamist occupations of the main northern cities.

While one always hopes, particularly in the case of Africa, for a brighter future
and better outcomes than those listed above, the history of African security has shown
a tendency towards the outbreak of conflict over the realization of peace. Despite
successful elections, Mali is host to enough destabilizing factors that it will not require
a major catalyst to reignite violence between its disparate groups. Sometime,
potentially in the near future—depending on how quickly rebel factions rearm and
reorganize, or how Keita’s attempts at reform proceed—Mali will likely face renewed
conflict and unrest. Though much of the previous fighting has been centered in the
northern region of the country—where Tuaregs are most dominant, and where
Islamists can most easily “melt” back into the landscape—time will tell if it can remain
isolated away from Bamako.

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19 “Profile: Ibrahim Boubacar Keita,” Al-Jazeera, 10 August 2013,
21 Ibid.
Reevaluating U.S. Defense Conversion Assistance to Russia

By Lisa Bergstrom

This article analyzes post-Cold War U.S. defense conversion assistance to Russia. The article highlights that, while defense conversion has economic, political, and social benefits, and may even promote the peaceful resolutions of conflicts, the Department of Defense approach to conversion assistance was flawed and politically unsustainable. The article concludes that, if the United States provides defense conversion assistance to other overly militarized economies, it should adopt a less centrally-managed approach.

When the agreement with Russia on the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, popularly called the Nunn-Lugar program, expired in June 2013, many in the security community eulogized the program’s efforts to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states.1 Few retrospectives, however, had much to say about CTR’s short-lived and troubled attempts “to facilitate the demilitarization of defense industries and the conversion of military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities.”2 From its authorization in 1992 until Congress prohibited it in 1996, such defense conversion assistance was always a small part of a once billion-dollar-a-year program. The Department of Defense (DoD) directly or indirectly funded only about 16 defense conversion projects in Russia and a smaller number in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.3 Yet, although it was too small to have any significant effect on the overall Russian economy, defense conversion assistance represented an important long-term investment in a former adversary. It was intended to help shrink the economic and political influence of the military-industrial complex, discourage the cash-strapped Russian defense industry from making irresponsible arms sales, and prevent WMD and missile specialists from seeking employment abroad. While Congress may have been premature to remove defense conversion from the CTR mandate, DoD’s approach to conversion assistance was flawed and politically unsustainable from the outset. If the United States provides defense conversion assistance to other overly militarized economies, it should adopt a less centrally-managed approach.

3 This includes DoD’s initial “Fast Four” projects and all the Russian projects of the Defense Enterprise Fund that could be identified, even after government ceased funding the DEF. It does not include the housing project for demobilized officers, though this entailed some defense conversion.
Twenty years after DoD signed the first contract for one of its so-called “Fast Four” Russian conversion projects in 1994, defense conversion assistance deserves another look. By the early 2000s, many commentators, citing the numerous setbacks conversion projects experienced throughout the 1990s, deemed U.S. efforts a failure, and the once extensive literature on Russian defense conversion had dried up. Yet, despite largely negative perceptions, the projects’ success rate compares favorably to estimated U.S. defense conversion success rates. Several projects that were failing in the late 1990s and early 2000s appear to have later become successful. An examination of the U.S. experience in Russia can provide lessons learned for any future defense conversion assistance.

Russia’s Defense Industry and the Soviet Legacy

Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a defense industry unprecedented among industrialized states in its size and share of the economy. At its height, the Soviet defense industry had 2,000-4,000 production enterprises and research facilities, with a workforce estimated from 6.5 to as high as 14 million people. By contrast, U.S. defense industry employment around at the end of the Cold War was 1.4-1.9 million people. Estimates of Soviet military budgets as a share of GDP range from 15-25 percent or more, while the U.S. share was 6 percent of GDP at its height. Complicating these estimates is the fact that 20-40 percent of the output of defense enterprises was civilian. Unfortunately, this phenomenon did little to prepare defense enterprises for conversion because civilian work was kept almost entirely separate.

Several features of the post-Soviet defense industry made conversion even more challenging. The Soviet defense industry had always been guaranteed the best personnel and access to resources. As for other industries, the state had provided defense enterprises’ inputs and covered their expenses; thus the enterprises had no

4 It can be difficult to determine the current status of projects or how initial DoD grants were eventually invested. This is especially true of information on the main defense conversion vehicle, the private, non-profit Defense Enterprise Fund. However, the Fast Four venture Istok Audio Trading seems to have become a major hearing aid maker despite early setbacks. The DEF investments RAMEC and Rusnet Labs were struggling in 2001 but a web search shows Russian companies with these names are still in business. See Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the Former Soviet Union, GAO/NSIAD-97-101, (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997), 28; “Istok Audio Trading,” http://www.radugazvukov.ru/en/; Matt Bivens, “Investing, Pentagon-Style,” Moscow Times, 4 April 2001, http://nunn-lugar.com/def/articles/4221.shtml.
7 O’Prey, A Farewell to Arms?, 19.
8 Similar to U.S. makers of both military and civilian goods like General Electric.
capital for investments. Many defense enterprises provided much needed services to their workers and communities, such as health clinics. As a result, two analysts characterized the Soviet defense industry as “arguably the most centralized, geographically isolated, inflexible and least prepared part of the economy for the market transition.” These problems were compounded by a weak internal market and general chaos in Russia, with unclear property rights and regulations.

**Swords to Plowshares: A Tricky Transformation**

Defense industries generally do not operate in a free market. Defense firms often have only one buyer — the government — for which they often produce relatively few, very expensive items, with cost overruns that would be unacceptable in a more competitive market. Often, governments pay for research, whether the research is successful or not. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency looked at defense conversion by U.S. firms in reports in 1966 and 1990. Both reports concluded that failures were much easier to find than successes. The 1990 study reported that defense contractors considered about 85 percent of conversion projects “doomed to failure.” Another study for General Dynamics found that 80 percent of commercial acquisitions by defense contractors were unprofitable.

The United States’ most successful defense conversion assistance, to Germany and Japan after World War II, does not make a practical model. The defense industries of the defeated powers, “rather than being converted, were destroyed and then rebuilt by benevolent occupiers.”

In general, the U.S. had little luck achieving the post-Cold War “peace dividend.” Even as it assisted Russia in converting its defense industry, the Clinton Administration promoted arms sales as a way to sustain the U.S. defense industry. Many enterprises had to merge into or be acquired by other defense companies. Some, like Raytheon, tried and failed to diversify. However, while defense employment did decline, as a whole the U.S. defense industry managed to weather the 1990s intact until the War on Terror brought higher military spending.

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Russia Attempts Defense Conversion

Moscow tried several strategies for defense conversion: assigning more civilian production to defense enterprises in the late 1980s; cutting off most state support in the “shock therapy” of 1992; and a more gradual approach for the rest of the 1990s. No strategy was particularly successful. Russian officials estimated conversion would cost $150 billion, twice Russia’s GDP in 1992. Yet, the government could afford very little conversion funding and often did not pay for its arms orders, depriving defense enterprises of capital. Defense production plummeted: in 1992 it was at 62 percent of 1991 production levels, reaching as low as 13 percent of 1991 production in 1997, before gradually rising. But Russia’s civilian production, including that at defense plants, also fell to 37 percent of 1991 production by 1998. Defense enterprises did not convert to civilian production; civilian production simply fell less fast. One institute wrote in 1996, “Instead of defense conversion, what we are witnessing is the destruction of the military-industrial complex.” Russians were justified to call it defense konvulsiya instead of konversiya.

Many defense officials and nationalist politicians touted foreign arms sales rather than conversion as their salvation, but were mostly disappointed. Russia’s arms procurement budget fell 68 percent as part of shock therapy, forcing the Kremlin to promote arms exports both as a source of funding for conversion and as its own business. Proponents mistakenly claimed increasing arms sales would be easy, since the Soviet Union sold many billions of dollars of cheap, decent-quality weapons in the 1980s. However, the Soviet defense industry never paid market value for its inputs, the Soviet Union gave a quarter of its arms exports to allies for free, and the global market had declined. Exports did climb in the 1990s, but much of the rise came from old stocks and sales, and did not reach the level needed to subsidize the defense industry or fund conversion.

Although the Russian defense industry has shrunk greatly since the Cold War, it seems to have found more success in waiting out the downturn than in actually converting. In 2009, the sector employed 2.5–3 million people, 20 percent of industry

16 O’Prey, A Farewell to Arms?, 27–37.
17 Costigan and Martel, “Our Failure to Convert Russia’s Arms Industry,” 467.
18 Ibid., 470.
19 Cronberg, Transforming Russia, 207.
21 Costigan and Martel, “Our Failure to Convert Russia’s Arms Industry,” 463; O’Prey, A Farewell to Arms?, 34.
22 O’Prey, A Farewell to Arms?, 75.
employment, though it faces an aging workforce and solvency problems.\textsuperscript{24} Arms exports totaled a post-Soviet record of $15.2 billion in 2012. Domestic weapons procurement is also increasing. Putin is planning $700 billion in arms spending by 2020. In 2012, he fired a defense minister who had refused to buy certain poorly-made Russian weapons.\textsuperscript{25} While the Russian military needs modernization, the petro-dollar-derived spending is largely aid for defense enterprises and their blue-collar workers, the sort of voters who form Putin’s political base.

\textbf{U.S. Assistance}

Congress first authorized DoD to transfer up to $40 million for defense conversion in the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 provided new appropriations for defense conversion assistance, along with environmental restoration of former military sites, housing for demobilized officers formerly responsible for strategic nuclear forces and other programs. The law also established a private, non-profit Demilitarization Enterprise Fund (later the Defense Enterprise Fund, DEF) to invest in conversion projects with government and private capital. Unlike most CTR programs, defense conversion was not limited to WMD capabilities. DoD’s list of 150 eligible enterprises in the former Soviet Union covered those engaged in the development or production of WMDs and their delivery systems, subcomponents, command and control, and strategic defenses; thus the list included conventional capabilities.\textsuperscript{26}

The United States supported defense conversion to prevent defense workers from selling their skills abroad (particularly important in the case of WMDs) and to improve economic, and thus political, stability. The Clinton Administration also argued that expanding the CTR mandate to defense conversion, housing and environmental restoration would help convince Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear weapons they inherited.\textsuperscript{27} Many Russian defense enterprise managers were eager to work with their former adversary. One researcher who interviewed defense managers in 1992 found that many had $100 million research proposals to offer U.S. firms.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{28} Cronberg, \textit{Transforming Russia}, 142-143.
DoD provided defense conversion assistance to Russia through two main programs: a set of projects sometimes called the “Fast Four” and the DEF.29 This does not include Department of Defense, State, Energy, or Commerce programs to repurpose only nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons facilities; programs to redirect individual scientists; or economic assistance not specific to defense conversion.30

The first round of conversion assistance was the Fast Four: four streamlined, model conversion projects that could smooth the way for the U.S. private sector to operate in the unfamiliar Russian environment.31 In consultation with the Russian government, DoD selected four Russian defense enterprises and asked US companies to submit bids for joint projects. DoD wanted to begin the projects as quickly as possible, which precluded building relations between the U.S. and Russian firms before the projects. In June and July of 1994, DoD signed contracts worth $16.9 million with four U.S. businesses.32

Of the four projects, two could be considered successful. The first failed miserably because DoD paired NPO Mashinostroyenia, one of Russia’s most famous military design bureaus of missiles and space rockets, with a U.S. cola maker, an insultingly low-technology enterprise.33 Out of 17 U.S. bidders, DoD chose the Double Cola Company of Tennessee to convert Mashinostroyenia’s nitrogen building into a cola bottling facility.34 Though other bidders had proposed projects based on the institute’s space and missile technologies, DoD awarded the $5.1 million contract using its standard practice of taking the lowest bidder.35 In the end, the two sides could not reach agreement. Double Cola asked to be released from the contract, which DoD canceled after having disbursed only $195,000. Another project had some early success remanufacturing dental chairs, but ran out of funds to complete investments.36 A third had early difficulties finding customers, but later transformed into a successful hearing aid company.

29 There was also a $20 million project to have defense firms create prefabricated housing for demobilized Russian officers, which was never completed.
30 At least some such programs were more extensive and more successful than DoD defense conversion. Some continue, though in modified form. For an overview of such programs, see Amy F. Woolf, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).
33 Summaries of Fast Four projects are drawn from U.S. General Accounting Office, Cooperative Threat Reduction, 27-32.
34 Ibid., 31.
The final project was a qualified success, though it employed only between 10 and 60 Russian defense workers.  

37 DoD awarded Rockwell International Corp. a $4.1 million contract for a project, not a joint venture, with the State Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Systems (GosNIIAS). GosNIIAS was to modify hardware and software for a satellite-based air traffic control system intended for the Russian market. This was the only Fast Four project to develop a commercial spin-off of a Russian firm’s military technology. Such high-tech spin-offs were the favorite type of joint project for defense workers and Russian officials, because it leveraged Russia’s proud scientific-technical achievements and improved Russia’s access to high technology. The firms sought a Russian government contract for their system, which could have been worth $80-100 million and created 200 jobs at GosNIIAS.  

38 They did not get the contract, which led some commenters to consider the project a failure. However, Rockwell was pleased enough to create a long-term partnership with GosNIIAS, and GosNIIAS later worked on civilian projects with other western companies.  

After the Fast Four, DoD provided conversion assistance through the DEF. Established in 1994, the DEF was one of eleven enterprise funds created to promote private enterprise in former Soviet bloc states. All were independent, non-profit entities receiving government funds and government oversight; very few managed to attract private capital (the DEF was not one).  

40 Although DoD had proposed $118 million for the fund, it could only obligate $51.7 million before Congress denied additional CTR funding for the DEF in early 1996. A final $15 million in FY1997 from the State Department’s Freedom Support Act funds brought DEF funds to $66.7 million. The DEF provided loans or equity financing worth $38.3 million in about twelve projects in Russia and a few in Kazakhstan and Ukraine.  

41 Early DEF investments were often low-tech goods, while later investments focused on telecommunications and did not require Western partners. The change in strategy did not improve returns, due to both the deteriorating Russian economy and DEF mismanagement, detailed below.  

42 At least seven projects failed outright, though it can be difficult to distinguish a failure for the DEF itself from a failure for conversion. For example, RAMEC, a personal computer producer, defaulted on its loans to the DEF

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37 Ibid., 28.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Whatever further partnerships they might have had did not reach the news, but before the end of the contract GosNIIAS and Rockwell-Collins worked together on avionics for the Ilyushin airliner.  
but is still in business today. Another venture lost the DEF over $1 million but laid 600 km of cable in Russia.\textsuperscript{43}


Congressional critics believed the United States was subsidizing Russia at the expense of funding defense conversion and other U.S. projects. They also claimed the assistance was not effective, since most facilities were already dormant before conversion. (The Clinton Administration argued fruitlessly that converting dormant facilities would reduce Russia’s need to reopen these plants to rearm itself or export arms abroad.\textsuperscript{44}) DoD, however, did little to persuade Congress, because the department was not very supportive of defense conversion, outside of a few high-level officials like Secretary William Perry.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, the U.S, not fully trusting Russia, kept many of the Cold War export restrictions in place. Russians expected joint ventures with the United States would give them access to U.S. high-technology but found instead that Russia became a source of low-cost research and development for U.S. firms that, for legal and financial reasons, would not share their own technology.\textsuperscript{46} The slow progress of job creation led more Russians, in particular the security services, to suspect the U.S. was merely interested in spying or destroying Russia’s military power. This suspicion made Russia less cooperative, which in turn strengthened skeptics who argued western assistance merely freed up money for Russia to spend on its military.\textsuperscript{47}

The DEF’s troubles did not end when its government funding ceased. Allegations of bribery and mismanagement from a whistleblowing employee set off a criminal investigation in autumn 2000. A devastating DoD audit from December 2000 found the DEF spent $32.6 million of $66.7 million on management costs; had no performance goals; and had no long-term plans.\textsuperscript{48} A 2001 audit found that, had DEF funds been subject to the same cost principles as other non-profits with government

\textsuperscript{43} Bivens, “Investing, Pentagon-Style.”
\textsuperscript{44} Woolf, The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, 22.
\textsuperscript{45} This lack of support might explain why DoD gave so little oversight to the DEF. See Sharon K. Weiner, Our Own Worst Enemy?: Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2011), 143.
\textsuperscript{46} Cronberg, Transforming Russia, 145, 149.
funds, at least $2.2 million of its expenses would have been unallowable, including $106,800 in Moscow country club fees. By September 2000, the DEF’s net value including investments was only $15.2 million, though some of this decline was due to the 1998 bank crash. The DEF closed in 2003, its money gone.

A Better Way?

Although U.S. conversion assistance was deeply flawed, the program garnered more success than it was given credit for. DoD spent about $88 million on defense conversion projects in four former Soviet countries, creating nearly 4,000 jobs, which was not enough to do more than effect Russian defense conversion at the very margins. Six Russian projects appear to have become long-term successes for defense conversion, though not always successes for their investors. Sharon Weiner, who is highly critical of U.S. conversion assistance, looked at all DoD conversion projects in the former Soviet Union and concluded, “Thirty-four defense conversion projects resulted, of which twelve were at least initially successful, nineteen failed, and the fates of three are not known.” Twelve of thirty-four is a success rate of 35.3 percent; this is better than the 15 percent of conversion projects defense contractors estimated might be successful in the United States. Moreover, DoD projects had the added difficulty of operating in a post-Communist economy.

The relative and limited success of conversion assistance does not mean the United States should repeat its Russian experiences in other demilitarizing countries. A high rate of failure and the many years business ventures often take to become profitable meant that DoD defense conversion projects were ill-suited for the vagaries of Congressional politics. Defense conversion is a long-term endeavor and projects are unlikely to reach success fast enough to please Congress. Converting nuclear or biological weapon facilities may make sense even when economically unsound, however, because these workers have rare skills of interest to terrorists and rogue states. Therefore, these types of programs should still be funded.

A better program might have used loan guarantees and tax incentives to encourage U.S. businesses to start joint ventures with Russian defense enterprises. Such an approach would let partnerships develop naturally and would avoid such high-profile failures as the cola-bottling venture. Other U.S. programs did try different approaches to conversion assistance. For instance, the Commerce Department’s SABIT program provided management training to executives in the former Soviet Union, including for defense conversion, and it still operates.

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49 These controls were left out to limit red tape. Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Management Costs Associated with the Defense Enterprise Fund.
50 Weiner, Our Own Worst Enemy?, 109.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Few countries today have a militarized economy to the extent that the Soviet Union had, making it unlikely the United States will find itself needing to provide defense conversion assistance anytime in the near future. However, defense conversion has economic, political, and social benefits, and may even promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts by reducing the size of a group of people likely to support excessive arms procurement and exports. Furthering that conversion is in the long-term U.S. interest. Future planners of conversion assistance should bear in mind that such centrally-managed initiatives as the Fast Four are ill-suited to bringing defense enterprises into the free market.

[Defense conversion] may even promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts by reducing the size of a group of people likely to support excessive arms procurement and exports.

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Morality in Intelligence Practice: Lessons from the British Experience in Northern Ireland

By Natasia Kalajdziovski

This article analyzes morality in domestic counterterrorism intelligence activities through a historical analysis of the moral questions encountered by the British intelligence services throughout the Troubles in Northern Ireland. This case study highlights three important considerations: the complexity of the threatscape as it emerged, the length of the conflict and its many phases, and the level of public scrutiny for the security establishment as the conflict protracted. The article concludes that, with proper oversight and review mechanisms, domestic intelligence requires a “different morality” than what is abided by in civilian life.

The role of intelligence in successful counterterrorism efforts is undoubtedly critical. That role, however, can become complicated when counterterrorism efforts focus entirely on domestic terrorist groups. Questions of morality inevitably arise when liberal democratic states direct counterterrorism efforts against their own citizens; these questions stem from a state’s responsibility to protect both individual citizens and society as a whole. If one understands morality as the principles that help us distinguish between right and wrong, do such concepts have a place within the conduct of intelligence collection by a democratic state within its own borders?

At the heart of this intersection between moral conduct and security is the question of proportionality. If the security of its citizens is of paramount importance to any good government, that government’s ability to maintain security at a “bearable and sustainable cost” is critical.¹ Stansfield Turner, former Director of Central Intelligence, has posed the above conundrum in simple terms: the morality of intelligence conduct is a test of sound will, “that is, whether those approving [decisions] feel they could defend their decisions before the public if their actions became public.”² Former director of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Sir David Omand, however, has framed the issue as one of “sets” of morality; that is, the conduct of intelligence “requires extraordinary methods, involving a different morality than that of everyday life.”³ While neither presents intelligence within a moral vacuum, what Omand suggests – this “different morality” – is key. He identifies the question of morality in intelligence practice not simply as an issue of public operational viability, but rather says that the “rules we hope govern our private conduct as individuals in society cannot

¹ David Omand, Securing the State. (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), xviii.
³ Omand and Phythian, 51.
fully apply.” However, the crux of this conundrum for intelligence services and those who guide their policy and practice resides in distinguishing and defining where moral parameters must exist.

For the British security establishment in Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles, the issues in defining moral parameters in intelligence practice became acute. As their experience demonstrates, sometimes those parameters can be lost, muddled, or forgotten in the height of crisis, and definitions can be altered or changed as a conflict protracts. In an effort to uncover some of the moral questions faced by the British intelligence services throughout the Troubles, this article will chronologically investigate how these questions manifested and modified as the conflict unfolded. It will examine three areas: initial intervention, service engagement with the “long war,” and the sophistication of the intelligence apparatus in the latter days of the conflict. This article will not attempt to judge the morality of the decisions made by the services, but rather demonstrate how the ambiguity between moral codes and effective security is inherently difficult to navigate.

**Intervention and the Fallout of Moral Responsibility**

What initially started as a civil rights movement in Northern Ireland during the late 1960s quickly became a very different beast. In this initial phase of the conflict, the security establishment formulated a situational appraisal using intelligence that was “hopelessly out of date,” hindering a detailed assessment for the logic of intervention. As then–Home Secretary James Callaghan noted at the outset of the Troubles, the British “government knew less about Northern Ireland than [it] knew about our distant colonies, on the far side of the earth.” The colonial undertone mentioned here is telling. During a phase in which the British state was withdrawing from a number of its colonial holdings, it came to the conclusion (through preconceived notions about the Irish character and the intelligence assessment dervied from Northern Ireland) that intervention was the most logical response. The question of leaving was “seriously considered,” but the British government reached the conclusion that withdrawal would lead to sectarian violence as it had in British India. The British state initially articulated its interventionist role as one of mediation. It saw itself as being morally

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5 For the purposes of this article, “intelligence services” will be referred to as any and all groups assigned with intelligence roles in the province. This includes both civilian and military services.


8 Ibid., 21.

9 Ibid.
superior to the two warring sectarian groups within the province. Furthermore, it did not understand the conflict for what it was — "one of divided loyalties and overlapping territorial claims." Intervention thus became, in the minds of the British, a moral responsibility to the citizens of the province — a decision that was predicated on a strategic misreading of the conflict and the state's place within it.

One key issue immediately emerged: as violence increased from 1969 onward, the need for accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence became critical. With this need, however, came moral quandaries, specifically surrounding the assessment of threats and the collection of information linked to the 1971 policy of internment. In their work on state–terrorist engagement, John Bew et al argue that interment was, “at best, a necessary but extremely high-risk evil,” as the security establishment found itself in a position where it could envision no other option available. However, the initial problem posed for the services by internment was one of threat assessment. Due to the lack of up-to-date information, the services found it difficult to distinguish between those individuals who were actively in the process of planning terrorist activity and those who shared “the religious or political beliefs or ethnic backgrounds of the terrorists.” Therefore, the services found themselves unduly targeting entire communities rather than individual perpetrators. Despite this, of the 357 people initially detained during internment’s implementation, only 12 were selected as part of Operation CALABA for submission to what were known as the Five Techniques. British intelligence expert Bradley Bamford has assessed that the use of the Techniques at this point in the conflict was the only way the services could collect actionable intelligence, although this proved to be at the cost of radicalizing previously unengaged members of the Catholic community due to a “one–sided application” of internment policy to Catholics.

British intelligence services have a long history of developed interrogation methods, honed through the various colonial campaigns of the early twentieth century. However, these were never codified until the creation of what vernacularly came to be known as The Bible, a "fully–fledged interrogation doctrine.” What was found

10 Neumann, 25; Andrew, 603.
11 Neumann, 20.
13 Kate Martin, “Domestic Intelligence and Civil Liberties” in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, ed. Christopher Andrew, Richard Aldrich, and Wesley Wark (London: Routledge, 2009), 361.
16 Bew et al., 35.
17 Aldrich, 166.
therein were the previously mentioned Five Techniques, a form of “in-depth” interrogation that included "wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and restrictions on food and drink." 18 The Bible "advocated the highest standards of behaviour on grounds of both morality and effectiveness," although its use during the initial phase of the Troubles demonstrated a correlation between peaks of violence and the sporadic abandonment of the guidelines. 19 In the lead-up to the codification of The Bible, however, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had some difficulty in deciding morally acceptable parameters of in-depth interrogation. As Eunan O’Halpin illustrates in his work on the JIC during this period, they settled on "a range of techniques designed to break a detainee’s will to resist interrogation," which, in the view of the British state, “fell short of physical abuse." 20

While CALABA was initially deemed successful, its methods were critiqued as highly dubious and immoral. Despite a lack of criticism when performed in the colonial context, 21 when the Techniques were applied to British citizens “just 300 miles from Whitehall rather than nameless locals in the remote fastnesses of a dissolving empire,” the reaction was somewhat more severe. 22 Moreover, many of the serious accusations of complicity in torture came from outside of the United Kingdom. For example, the European Court of Human Rights initially ruled in 1975 that the Techniques were a form of torture, although this was downgraded two years later to “degrading treatment.” 23 The outcry resulting from this episode led to a reformation of The Bible. The resulting methods, which would be used throughout the remaining phases of the Troubles, now centred on "achieving empathy with the subject by building up a relationship over time," rather than the previous focus of quickly obtaining intelligence by any means necessary. 24

Internment and the Techniques are demonstrative of some of the uncharted moral territory through which the intelligence services navigated in the initial phase of the Troubles. With violence on the rise and actionable intelligence still scant, British intelligence was faced with the question of how to balance its critical and acute need

18 Ibid., 163.
19 Ibid., 168.
21 Through his analysis of JIC documents from the period, O’Halpin demonstrates that the JIC itself was taken by surprise at the negative reaction to interrogation methods used in the province considering the lack of such backlash when used in previous campaigns in the British Empire. O’Halpin, 672.
22 The outrage domestically was best demonstrated through the reporting of the Sunday Times’ Insight Team, who published numerous reports of individuals who had claimed “ill-treatment” during interrogation. The prevalence of these reports – which were then subsequently picked up by other media outlets – triggered a response from the government in the form of the Compton Inquiry. See Aldrich, 169.
23 Bew et al., 36.
24 Aldrich, 176.
for information with the means through which that information would be acquired. Although leaders in the security establishment were responsible for how these moral questions would be handled, on-the-ground operational realities were hindered by “higher-level” hesitancy on behalf of policymakers who initially had a “lack of clearly defined direction” to intervene. In this sense, moral responsibility was little more than a grandiose notion which lacked any real strategic objective or operational plan. It was derived from a weak initial assessment of the conflict, which resulted in poorly-constructed and haphazard decisions on the ground. Moreover, despite the government assessing that its intervention “would make it possible to inject the supposed virtues of British political culture [...] into the province,” by 1972, the security situation became untenable for the Stormont government. Direct Rule was implemented on March 24, 1972. As terrorism expert Peter Neumann has argued, in strategic terms Direct Rule "represented no fundamental shift in British government policy,” and is thus derived from the initial assessment of intervention as a moral responsibility. In this sense, we are able to see one facet of the complex relationship between intelligence and moral action — assessment is rendered poor when intelligence is outdated. This in turn had a subsequent impact on the morality of the decisions derived from intelligence assessments.

**Enemy Engagement – Touts and the Long War**

The year that Direct Rule was implemented was also the bloodiest of the Troubles. More than 400 people were killed as a direct result of conflict-related violence. As it became clear that the conflict had no immediate chance of abating, the services settled in for what became known as the “long war.” One of the key strategies for the intelligence services during this phase was the use of informants, also known as touts. From a strategic standpoint, the value and importance of touts in collecting operational intelligence and in reducing violence are indisputable. As Mark Urban highlights:

> The effects of the informer war are profound: the level of violence is reduced; the republican community is rendered increasingly paranoid and must eliminate a proportion of its own membership in an attempt to retain its integrity...[it is] key to the containment of terrorist violence.

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25 Bew et al., 36.

26 Its implementation saw the suspension and dissolution of Stormont and the transfer of legislative and administrative power away from the province to the seat of government in Westminster. See Andrew, 620.

27 Neumann, 69.

28 Aldrich, 169.

The role of touts became increasingly critical as the provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) moved underground and adopted a more sophisticated cell structure consisting of Active Service Units (ASU). The tout system, in this respect, allowed the intelligence services two advantages: information and an increase in adversary paranoia. Touts could infiltrate into the deepest parts of the enemy organization, which provided the services vital operational intelligence and the ability to use that information to eliminate key players through arrest. On the latter point, Bew et al highlight that, “such was the rate of attrition that by some estimates the average ‘life span’ of the...Officer Commanding of the IRA’s Belfast Brigade was reduced to just six weeks.” Moreover, the psychological impact — the very fear of infiltration — proved to be key for causing internal disunity. For example, from 1978–1997, the IRA’s internal security unit, the Nutting Squad, killed 24 of its own members out of fear that they were informants.

The tout system presented clear moral quandaries. From an outside perspective, Northern Irish journalist and Troubles specialist Martin Dillon suggests that engagement led "to an erosion of confidence in the law and a dark suspicion that anything can be contemplated in pursuit of the defeat of terrorism.” Intelligence specialist Peter Gill framed the concern by indicating that the "deception and betrayal" inherent in running touts "may have deleterious effects on the moral characters of both handlers and sources.” It is important to understand that the conflict reached a critical stage at the adoption of the tout system - operational intelligence needed to abate the threat was scant, and the conflict began to manifest as a near-run thing. In such circumstances, the intelligence services were forced to examine any and all options which might offer a strategic advantage, however morally ambiguous those options were.

In this respect, the biggest moral question encountered by the services during this phase was one of negotiating cost: what moral boundaries could be crossed in an effort to protect valuable assets? If we examine the role of Freddie Scappaticci, codenamed Stakeknife, we see the implications of this question come to a head. A career informer, Scappaticci was undoubtedly one of the most valuable touts — the “jewel in the crown” for the intelligence services. Reportedly recruited as far back as 1978, Scappaticci held a primary role within the Nutting Squad. He led “investigations into suspected informers, inquiries into operations [...] debriefings of IRA volunteers

30 Urban, 31.
31 Bew et al., 52.
32 Urban, 102.
35 Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, Stakeknife: Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland (Dublin: The O’Brien Press, 2005), 64.
and the vetting of potential recruits.” Scappaticci’s role in the Nutting Squad meant that he was inevitably involved in criminal activity, including murder. Moreover, the cost of protecting assets as integral as Stakeknife was high. The assassination of Francisco Notorantonio speaks to this issue. Brian Nelson, a member of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) tasked with identifying targets for the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) assassination squad, was asked by the UFF to begin a file on Scappaticci. Nelson, however, was also a tout for the intelligence services. He was allegedly ordered by his handler to make a case to the UFF for targeting Notorantonio — a pre-Troubles republican paramilitary but who was no longer active — in an effort to save the strategically-critical Scappaticci. The UFF then subsequently targeted and killed Notorantonio. This assassination begs the question of what lengths are appropriate in maintaining the position of a key tout.

Martin Ingram, a former British Army soldier who served in the Intelligence Corps and later in the Force Research Unit, was familiar with the Stakeknife file. Ingram’s activities give an interesting perspective on the cost of running high-level touts. Ingram attests that although he now believes the moral price was too high for the intelligence Scappaticci was providing, his opinion was reversed when he was still operational within the intelligence establishment in the heat of the conflict. Ingram's admission highlights an important issue in determining morality in intelligence: once removed from the conflict, hindsight forces practitioners to look at operational decisions through a lens of public morality rather than Omand's proposal of an alternative morality not applicable within the functions of everyday life. This is not an attempt to justify or condemn the cost of running Scappaticci, but rather it is an effort to demonstrate the murky moral line which must sometimes be straddled in the pursuit of security.

**Intelligence Surplus and the Timeline of Action**

Evidence suggests that by the late 1980s, the amount of actionable intelligence coming into the services "meant that sometimes they had foreknowledge of terrorist attacks." While this was a strategic coup for the services, it also presented new moral problems. The issues encountered were threefold: the question of when to use that intelligence, how to use it, and who to use it on. As this section will demonstrate, the services grappled with all three issues on a consistent basis throughout the latter part of the conflict.

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36 Ibid., 62.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Urban, 165.
The foreknowledge of attacks left the services with two options: to arrest individuals pre-emptively if irrefutable evidence existed, or allow the attack to proceed as planned in order to catch perpetrators in the act. The latter option — what some have called a policy of ambushing — became the favoured option in practice by 1983. This option almost inevitably resulted in a situation where terrorists (predominantly in these cases IRA volunteers) were killed rather than apprehended. This was seen by some as a deliberate “shoot-to-kill” policy on behalf of the security establishment. As Bamford argues, there is no legislative evidence that such a policy formally existed or that any such decision was taken at the highest level of the British government. However, the “large number of terrorists killed during this period, in circumstances where many believe that an arrest could have been made, is seen as evidence that such a policy existed” in practice.

Both the Loughgall and Gibraltar incidents, in 1987 and 1988 respectively, are examples of these supposed ambush and shoot-to-kill policies and are also reflective of how and when foreknowledge is used in practice. Loughgall involved the deaths of all 8 men in an IRA ASU headed by Jim Lynagh, after intelligence alerted the services to an impending attack on a Royal Ulster Constabulary base in the area. The SAS knew the time and location of the attack and waited for the ASU to plant its IED, but the ASU operatives were killed rather than apprehended. The Gibraltar incident, named Operation FLAVIUS, cuts a similar shape. After intelligence determined that an ASU consisting of Seán Savage, Danny McCann, and Mairéad Farrell was headed to Gibraltar for an attack, the SAS was again called in. All three were killed rather than apprehended. In both incidents, it is unclear who opened fire first. Moreover, both raise questions as to why the IRA volunteers were not arrested rather than terminated. Some argue that these ambush/shoot-to-kill incidences are examples of a deliberate policy between “the security service and the Thatcher government,” whereas MI-5 biographer and intelligence specialist Christopher Andrew has argued that “there is no persuasive evidence that the decision was premeditated” in either the Loughgall or Gibraltar incidences to assassinate. Regardless, the moral question here is centred on timeframe — knowing that last-minute efforts predominantly result in a perpetrator’s death, how long is it morally appropriate to wait before apprehending someone planning terrorism?

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41 Urban demonstrates that between December 1983 and February 1985, ten individuals were killed in related incidents (8 were IRA volunteers) following a five year period in which no one was killed. See Ibid.
42 Bamford, 593.
43 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Andrew, 739.
47 Andrew, 741.
The attempted assassination of Gerry Adams by loyalist paramilitaries in March 1984 poses another interesting moral question about for whom preventative intelligence is used. Information was received from a tout within the UDA regarding a UFF plan to shoot Adams. Evidence suggests that there was no warning issued; only once the shots had been fired, missing their target, did the SAS – alleged to be present for the entire incident – apprehend the UFF members. As Urban argues, it “raised uncomfortable questions about the difference between the security forces' response to foreknowledge of republican and loyalist attacks.” Urban's assessment is also in line with the Stevens Inquiry's finding that threat intelligence was not always treated equally between Protestant and Catholic groups.

Finally, the question of to whom intelligence should be shared also demonstrates some moral quandaries for the services. There were repeated allegations of collusion between the services and loyalist paramilitaries groups throughout this period. For example, many inside and outside the conflict were convinced that the services were “behind the increasing effectiveness of loyalist paramilitary organization in targeting republicans from the late 1980s.” Practitioners such as former Belfast Special Branch head Bill Lowry dismiss these claims, saying, “If we colluded as much with Loyalists as is often alleged by Republicans why did they kill so many innocent Catholics and very few Republicans?” From an independent standpoint, the Stevens Inquiry concluded that “collusion involving direct support of loyalist paramilitaries by security agencies was low level”; however, their forensic examination of contemporary classified documents found the fingerprints of eighty-one people on documents which “they had no lawful reason to possess.”

The question of morality by this latter stage in the conflict is rendered additionally complex when societal reaction is examined. Much of the public by this point seemed to “applaud the elimination of republican terrorists and [were] less than curious about the moral tightrope that must be walked to make such actions possible.” In this respect, the concept of conflict fatigue must be taken into account when moral questions are at hand. As Bamford notes, the Gibraltar incident in particular is a prime example of the public's growing indifference to violence: it “showed the moral ambivalence of a liberal democratic society toward the use of lethal

48 Urban, 179.
49 Urban, 182.
50 Urban, 217.
51 Sir John Stevens, Stevens Inquiry III: Overview and Recommendations (Belfast: Stevens Enquiry, 2003), 11.
52 Moran, 14.
54 Stevens, 10.
55 Urban, xviii.
force in counterterrorism operations.” While public opinion should not be the only barometer by which intelligence agencies should measure the morality of their decisions, how the parameters of morality alter and expand as a conflict protracts is worthwhile to note.

Conclusions

The standard argument today assesses that the conduct of the British intelligence services in Northern Ireland “was ultimately very effective but at the price of employing some highly dubious methods.” The conflict, as it presented itself from its inception, was one which demonstrated the difficult position of comprehending the complexities inherent in quashing domestic terrorism. As we have seen, negotiating methods vis-à-vis critical time restraints and information scarcity in the first phase of the conflict led to some hastily-implemented and occasionally counter-productive collection realities, some of which had questionable moral groundings. As the conflict protracted and long-term engagement was established, the murkiness of moral conduct by the services became further complicated, somewhat paradoxically, by the increasing success and improvement of their intelligence capacity in the province.

From the broadest perspective, the most significant question raised by the British experience in Northern Ireland is one of scale: how far is a state willing to expand the borders of moral conduct for the sake of security? Perhaps the best way to approach these ambiguities is to consider Omand’s recommendation. While there is not a suggestion that intelligence services should act within a moral vacuum or that they should conduct their business without the appropriate oversight and review mechanisms in place, there ought to be an acknowledgement that given the very nature of intelligence, its conduct and practice requires a “different morality” than to what is abided in civilian life.

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56 Bamford, 595.
57 Bamford, 581.
Evolving Civil-Military Relations:  
A Comparative Analysis of Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan  

By Faiqa Mahmood

This paper analyzes the role of the Egyptian military in politics and considers how civil-military relations may be improved. It traces the historical development of civil-military relations in Egypt and then compares the situation in Egypt with those of Turkey and Pakistan. The analysis demonstrates that, while the militaries of neither Turkey nor Pakistan can boast the levels of civilian control present in some Western governments, there are still salient lessons that can be drawn from the evolutionary paths of both militaries – lessons that might aid Egypt’s transition towards heightened civilian control of the military.

The Egyptian revolution of January 2011 brought a rare wave of unity, hope, and optimism to the Middle East. Egypt became a source of inspiration for the Arab region and beyond. The unprecedented eighteen-day revolution led to the fall of a thirty-year dictatorship, bringing together widely divergent groups and political actors for the common cause of freedom and dignity. However, the same Egyptian society that inspired others in its ability to peacefully unite, the most populous Arab nation in the world is today marked by deep societal schisms.

On June 30, 2013, a year after the post-revolutionary elections brought the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party to power, mass protests brought Cairo to a halt. Protestors divided into two distinct camps, one side demanding that President Mohamed Morsi resign from office, while the other side insisted that he stays. As was the case during the January 2011 revolution, all eyes were on the military. On July 3, 2013, General Fattah al-Sisi announced the removal of his country’s first democratically elected president. He subsequently suspended the constitution and installed an interim government presided over by senior jurist Adly Mansour. Given the immense geostrategic importance of Egypt as a key U.S. ally in the Middle East, Egypt's civil-military relations are now inevitably in the limelight.

This paper analyzes the role of the Egyptian military in politics, and considers how civil-military relations may be improved. It traces the historical development of civil-military relations in Egypt from the Gamal Nasser era to the present day. After a review of the relevant literature in the field, it then compares the situation in Egypt with Turkey and Pakistan. Turkey and Pakistan have been chosen for this analysis because they share two major similarities: both are Muslim-majority countries where the military plays a significant role in the politics and economics of the state. Like Egypt, both Turkey and Pakistan have a military history marked by military interventions, with diverging consequences for democracy in each case. Thus, this analysis looks to Turkey and Pakistan for comparison, with a view to deriving lessons for Egypt from their respective histories. Finally, recommendations are made for the
development of strong and balanced civil-military relations in Egypt. While the militaries of neither Turkey nor Pakistan can boast the levels of civilian control present in some Western governments, there are still salient lessons one can draw from the evolutionary paths of both militaries, lessons that may aid Egypt's transition towards heightened civilian control of the military.

Theoretical Underpinnings and Literature Review

The American, British, and Soviet militaries are all classic examples of civilian-controlled militaries. Their commanders obey civilian leaders and refrain from actively participating in domestic politics. On the opposite end of the spectrum fall praetorian militaries. Huntington defines praetorianism as militaries not bound by civilian control, that tend to restrict the operations of standard civilian government institutions.¹ Neither are they reluctant to take control of the state. However, according to Paul Staniland, most militaries fall somewhere in the middle.² To explain this variation within the spectrum of civil-military relations, theories focus on the configuration of internal versus external threats to the state. According to Samuel Huntington, the nature of international politics and increasing technological demands of warfare indicate that militaries have no choice but to become highly specialized and externally focused institutions.³ Thus, “the functions of the officer become distinct from those of the politician and policeman.”⁴

Michael Desch uses both external and internal threats to explain variations in military intervention and in politics. As Desch puts it, “it is easiest for civilians to control the military when they face primarily international (external) threats and it is hardest for them to control the military when they face primarily domestic (internal) threats.”⁵ Conversely, where there are wide-ranging internal threats, the military is required to make political decisions. In a society beset by both internal and external threats, civil-military relations are likely to be troubled. Praetorianism occurs most often in societies where internal threats are high, but external threats are low.⁶ Table 1 summarizes the threat framework's predictions.

Another segment of theories on civil-military relations focuses on domestic politics, defined as the military's relationship with society-at-large as well as the

⁴ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
military's own belief system. In his critique of Huntington, S.E. Finer contends that the very elements of military professionalism and specialization believed by Huntington to engender an apolitical military (such as its corporate character and a sense of social responsibility) may in fact encourage political intervention. A specialized and well-armed military that functions as a fine-tuned corporate bureaucracy may believe that it has a social responsibility to intervene when civilian government fails to meet the demands of society. Since such corporate bureaucracy and institutional efficiency may well be a result of external threats to the state, the very elements of professionalism as described by Huntington often lead to military intervention in domestic politics.

TABLE 1: THE THREAT THEORY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High External Threat</th>
<th>Low External Threat</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Internal Threat</td>
<td>Poor Civil-Military Relations</td>
<td>Praetorian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Internal Threat</td>
<td>Strong Civilian Control</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
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Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner agree with Finer's analysis. “Military establishments … intervene in politics (whether by coup or by a more gradual expansion of power and prerogatives) when civilian politicians and parties are weak and divided, and when their divisions and manifest failures of governance have generated a vacuum of authority.” In his later work, Huntington himself leans more towards the domestic politics framework, stating that militaries become politicized when civilian governments fail to address major policy issues facing the state.

Despite the differences in the two sets of theories — that is, the threat framework and the domestic politics framework — a key prediction is common in both camps: military involvement in internal security tasks leads to praetorianism, resulting in the military's politicization. In other words, in order to establish civilian control of

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7 Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 14.
9 Ibid., 20-21
10 Ibid., 22
11 This table is a modified version of one in Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 14.
the military, it is imperative that the military be absent from the internal security and political sphere of the state.\textsuperscript{15}

Using the aforementioned frameworks, this paper will examine the role of the Egyptian military in domestic politics. It will demonstrate that the specific, external threats faced by Egypt have forced the state to create a highly specialized, highly professional military. In a bid to secure their rule, successive authoritarian regimes in Egypt have provided the military with regulated and unregulated patronage, resulting in a military with large economic interests and a culture of corporate bureaucracy. These factors, combined with weak civilian institutions and political parties, created a power vacuum that the Egyptian military continues to fill. When compared with the Turkish model, it is apparent that the Egyptian military lacks certain essential elements that will allow an evolution similar to the Turkish military in the near future. A comparison with the Pakistani military yields a more concrete comparison. Civil-military relations goals for Egypt similar to Pakistan are attainable in the near future. While the Turkish model is superior in that the military commanders have exhibited deference for civilian control, it is difficult to emulate due to reasons explained below. Nonetheless, it is a goal to which the Egyptians should aspire. More realistically, it is probable that the Egyptian military will follow a path of gradual and incremental civilian control, similar to the situation currently taking place in Pakistan.

\textbf{Civil-Military Relations in Egypt: A Brief Historic Overview}

Egypt's military gained its political power in 1952 when Nasser led the Free Officers Movement to overthrow the corrupt Western-controlled monarchy. Nasser's rule of Egypt from 1956 to 1970 was marked by the entrenchment of the military's economic and political position of privilege in Egyptian society. This chaotic era was punctuated by Egypt's twenty-year arms agreement with the Soviet Union, and its disastrous wars in 1956 and 1967.\textsuperscript{16} Egypt's defeat in the Six Day War offered Nasser the opportunity to purge the military's officer corps, including Armed Forces Chief of Staff Abdel Hakim Amer. This marked a turning point in civil-military relations in reducing the military's political influence. After Nasser's death in 1971, Vice President Anwar Sadat assumed power, reversing many of Nasser's core policies. His major policy changes included opening up Egypt's economy, introducing a multiparty parliament and, perhaps most importantly, his peace treaty with Israel in 1978. Islamists assassinated Sadat in 1981 and Vice President Hosni Mubarak assumed power.\textsuperscript{17} Mubarak focused

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 329
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 24, and Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Egyptian Military, Part One: From the Ottomans through Sadat,” \textit{Middle East Policy} 18 No. 3 (2011), 63-78.
on fighting Islamists’ infiltration of the military and their influence on society, resulting in a brutal crackdown during the 1990's. Mubarak, too, attempted to depoliticize the military by firing his popular Defense Minister, Abu Ghazala, and providing the military numerous economic privileges in exchange for political control.\footnote{Ibid.}

According to Silverman, when the 2011 revolution brought the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to power, there was an underhanded attempt by the military to preserve the economic privileges provided to it by the overthrown ruler.\footnote{Ibid., 25.} Such attempts at preservation included opposing political and economic reforms, preventing the revision of select constitutional clauses, repressing continued protests against military rule, arresting thousands of protesters using extrajudicial courts, and barring numerous candidates from the presidential election on technicalities (through the Constitutional Courts).\footnote{Ibid., 25.} A set of SCAF-backed supra-constitutional principles declared in November 2011 aimed to solidify the military's power and autonomy, suggesting the military act as a guarantor for the civil state, and retain veto power over the civilian government in all military affairs. Under public pressure, the proposal was dropped.\footnote{Moataz El Fegiery, “Crunch Time for Egypt’s Civil Military Relations,” FRIDE Policy Brief 134 (2012): 2.}

Backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi was elected president in 2012, intensifying the power struggle further. The ascension of Egypt’s first ever democratically-elected civilian government placed civil-military relations in uncharted territory. In a sudden and unexpected response to SCAF’s attempts to increase its power and influence, President Morsi removed Field Marshal Tantawi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense, and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sami Anan, in addition to other senior military leaders.\footnote{Ibid., 3.} Dubbed a "civilian counter-coup" by some observers, the move began a series of events that culminated in the ouster of President Morsi on July 3, 2013.\footnote{Victor Kotsev, “A Brotherhood Coup in Egypt,” Asia Times Online, 15 August 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NH15Ak04.html.}

As of December 2013, the issue of President Morsi’s ouster still plagues all aspects of Egyptian society. Pro-Morsi supporters refuse to accept the legitimacy of a military-backed interim government. They continue to stage protests and sit-ins. In an unprecedented move (and in a bid to deal with the lingering protests), Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Fattah al-Sisi, called on Egyptians to take to the streets in July 2013 "to prove their will and give me, the army and police, a mandate to confront possible violence and terrorism."\footnote{“Egyptian Army Chief Calls for Street Protests,” BBC News, 24 July 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23434809.} After ostensibly receiving such
a mandate from obliging mass protestors, the military began operations to clear pro-Morsi sit-ins. The result has been violent, with both sides allegedly using deadly force on their opponents.\textsuperscript{25} The current volatile political climate in Egypt makes an analysis of civil-military relations extremely challenging, yet urgent.

The next section of this paper aims to compare the role of the Egyptian military with its Turkish counterpart in an effort to distill lessons learned and guidance on how to restore balance to a society whose fate remains closely tied to the decisions of its military leaders.

**Turkey: A Changing Civil-Military Balance**

The events unfolding in Egypt after Morsi’s ouster put relations between Egypt and Turkey on a rocky path, as evidenced by a reciprocal decision to recall ambassadors of the two governments.\textsuperscript{26} Despite recent events, a 2012 opinion poll found that 69 percent of respondents held a positive opinion of Turkey, making it the most popular among 18 Middle Eastern countries included in the poll.\textsuperscript{27} Turkey was followed closely by Egypt with 65 percent.\textsuperscript{28} It is interesting to note that although Turkey was seen as the region’s most powerful player, this perception arose from a political perspective, not from a military or economic one.\textsuperscript{29} Despite Turkey’s ongoing opposition to the Assad regime in Syria, 70 percent of respondents considered the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK) Party to be a friend to their country, with respondents from Egypt, Libya and Palestine being the most supportive of Turkey’s regional role.\textsuperscript{30} However, positive responses to the question of whether Turkey is a model for the Middle East fell from 61 percent in 2011 to 53 percent in 2012.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, while Turkey remains a well-regarded political power in the region, it is not as popular as it once was. Its recent economic success, democratic regime, and secular political system continue to be viewed as a model in the Arab World.\textsuperscript{32}

However, it is unclear whether Egypt can model Turkey’s successes in this respect. Notwithstanding the recent unrest in Turkey, many observers propose it as a model for democratization in the Middle East due to its unique political evolution. However, a thorough review of democratization in Turkey reveals that it not only has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, *The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012*, trans. Jonathan Levack (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2013), 6.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 5.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 25.
\end{itemize}
significant hurdles to overcome before it can claim to be a true democracy, but also many of the major milestones it has achieved are difficult to replicate elsewhere in the region. According to Atasoy, rather than a completed model for other countries to emulate, Turkey is an illustrative case of ongoing democratization from which other Muslim majority countries can draw lessons.\(^\text{33}\) Two essential features make Turkey unique in the Islamic world: it is the only majority Muslim country that is partly European and currently negotiating EU membership, and it remains the only majority Muslim country never to have lost its independence.\(^\text{34}\) These factors make a complete replication of the Turkish model difficult.

Since 2002, when the country’s first Islamic party was elected to government, the balance of power within Turkey has gradually shifted in favor of civilian authorities.\(^\text{35}\) Although experts agree that civilian control of the military is increasing, opinions diverge with respect to whether or not the military is a willing partner in this change.\(^\text{36}\) Scholars such as Herper believe that the Turkish military has matured to the extent that it actively seeks civilian oversight, whereas Cizre believes that the military remains an unwilling and reluctant partner in the dynamic.\(^\text{37}\)

Historically, the military has been the institution that protects and upholds the principles laid down by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of the nation. From 1960 onwards, the military intervened in politics on four occasions when it felt a need to confront internal and external threats to the country in order to preserve the secular character of the state.\(^\text{38}\) A perceived absence of professionalism on the part of politicians concerned the Turkish military. Between 1960 and 2002, it was the military that attempted to re-structure political life. Following military interventions, new constitutions were adopted or the existing ones amended, whereas the provisions that “the military is responsible for defending and guarding both the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution” and that the “Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as the external

\(^{33}\) Seymen Atasoy, “The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East?” Middle East Policy 18 No. 3 (2011): 86-100.
\(^{34}\) Ibid., 86.
threats if necessary by force” remained unchanged. However, this dynamic is now changing due to a number of domestic events and international factors.

First, as mentioned above, in 2002, the Islamic–rooted AK Party won the election with a clear majority, signaling the end of an era of political fragmentation. Upon its assumption of office, the party took the position that the military was subservient to the government, not the other way around. With its new vision for Turkey and comprehensive foreign policy initiatives, the AK Party redefined Turkey’s new positions on issues that the military had previously dictated or shaped, thus shifting the power balance towards civilian control.

Second, in September 2010 Turkey held a historic referendum on government-sponsored constitutional amendments that were designed to reshape the structure of higher administrative courts and reduce the role of the military in Turkish politics. The referendums passed, signaling the popularity of Turkey’s ongoing modernization and reform in line with accession to the European Union. As the possibility of the military bureaucracy’s intervention in the political system lessens because of the EU reform process and greater openness in society, Turkey’s judiciary has begun to assume the role of “system guardianship” and has started to make overtly political decisions, thus moving the military towards civilian control.

These domestic developments are intertwined with international factors that forced Turkey to enact legal reforms that removed the bureaucratic mechanisms which previously allowed the military to exert influence over both domestic and foreign policy-making in Turkey. In December 1999, after the Helsinki Summit confirmed Turkey’s candidacy in the EU, Ankara was forced to harmonize its laws according to EU regulations, as Brussels demanded that Turkey implement “civilian control over the military.”

The post–Cold War world order is another major international factor changing the role of the military in Turkish politics. Following the Cold War, the Turkish military fell out of step with society and continued to see the world in bi-polar terms. Desch criticizes the military for failing to recognize Turkey’s transition from a “security-oriented democracy” to a “freedom-oriented democracy.” In addition, despite the AK Party’s victories in elections in 2002 and 2007, the Turkish military continued to view the AK Party’s growing electoral strength as a threat to the country,

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39 See Article 35 of Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces; see Article 85 of Internal Service Regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces; and see Cizre, “Disentangling the Threads of Civil-Military Relations,” 57-75.
41 Ibid., 4.
42 Cizre, “Disentangling the Threads of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey,” 57-75.
43 Ibid., 58.
partly alienating the AK Party’s huge constituency and damaging the military’s influence in the domestic political sphere.

**Is Turkey a Viable Model for Egypt?**

After the 2011 Egyptian revolution, there were calls for the Egyptian military to emulate the “Turkish model.” Indeed, the two countries share certain similarities. Both have large and influential armies whose leaders consider themselves the guardians of the established political system. Both Turkey and Egypt have large populations, powerful Islamist groups, and increasingly pious middle classes. But is the Turkish model a plausible option for Egypt? As discussed below, the Turkish model is the result of a number of unique historical trends that make it difficult to replicate elsewhere.

According to some observers such as Hashim⁴⁶ and Karon⁴⁷ there are actually two Turkish models, neither of which would be easy for Egypt to emulate. The model most scholars refer to involves military intervention in the political process to overthrow governments that have deviated from the principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, thus creating democracy by keeping the excesses of civilian politicians, whether Rightists, Leftists, or Islamists, in check.⁴⁸ The second Turkish model – one that is discussed in more detail in Arab circles than in the West — refers to a democratic Islamic government that establishes control over the powerful military establishment, making it a democratic nation that is less and less threatened by the corporate or nationalist interests of the military.⁴⁹

Steven Cook and Hashim contend that the first model, based on a "guardians of secularism" role for the military, is "hyped up"; in fact, Turkey has achieved democracy not because of its military, but in spite of it.⁵⁰ Turkey only began a transition to democracy between 2002 and 2005, when it undertook thorough reforms in order to meet Europe’s requirements (known as the Copenhagen criteria) to begin EU membership negotiations. The military opposed these changes, but because the AK Party led a broad based coalition which aspired to the political and economic benefits of EU membership, the military was constrained from acting to undermine the reforms.⁵¹ Yet, the differences between Turkey and Egypt are vast. There is no

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⁴⁸ Hashim, “The Egyptian Military, Part Two,” 120.
⁴⁹ Ibid., 121
⁵¹ Ibid.
critical external actor to play the role of the EU and constrain the Egyptian military from threatening democratization. Egyptian civil society is beset by religious forces that are not particularly tolerant, democratic, or globalized. Finally, although they have similar-sized populations, Turkey's economy is three times larger than Egypt's.\(^{52}\)

The second model, based on democratic Islamic government effectively controlling the military establishment, is a more hopeful goal for Egypt. However, the security sector reforms that enabled such an outcome, particularly regarding national security and budgetary issues, are tied closely to Turkey's bid for EU membership. In the absence of such an external factor, it will be some time before Egypt can approximate similar policy reforms.

**Pakistan: An Alternative Model**

Since Egypt's 2011 revolution, observers such as Spencer Ackerman, Michelle Dunne, and Michael Kugelman have made comparisons between the Egyptian and Pakistani militaries. Like Egypt and Turkey, Pakistan's army views itself as the guardian of national identity and it views its globalized, nuclear-armed neighbor as an existential threat. Yet this severe, sustained external threat from India has not generated civilian control of the army, in keeping with the analysis of Huntington and other external threat theorists. The Pakistani military has a history of praetorianism similar to Egypt, leading observers to cite the “Pakistani model” in making predictions for Egypt's civil-military relations.\(^{53}\)

Pakistan's political history is characterized by frequent breakdowns of constitutional and political arrangements, atrophy of political institutions and processes, ascendancy of the bureaucracy and the military, and constitutional and political engineering by military rulers to protect their powerful interests.\(^{54}\) The reasons for these developments can be traced back to Pakistan's inception when it faced serious internal administrative and management problems caused by the partition of British India. On the external front, Pakistan's troubled relations with India arose out of the partition process and the 1947-48 First Kashmir War. Furthermore, Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory also perturbed Pakistani rulers. Consequently, Pakistani rulers were haunted by the fear of the collapse of the Pakistani state due to external and internal security pressures.\(^{55}\) Because of these external threats, Pakistan priorities favored the needs of territorial security and focused on building a strong and well-equipped military. All this worked to the disadvantage of civilian institutions and processes.

\(^{52}\) Hashim, “The Egyptian Military, Part Two,” 121.


\(^{55}\) Ibid., 96-113.
Pakistan’s attempts to restore a democratic government are showing promise, however. In May 2013, a civilian government completed a full term before transitioning to another civilian government—a first in Pakistan's history. Although the elections were marred by violence, they nonetheless mark a triumph for democracy. Still, the military establishment in Pakistan continues to play a major economic as well as political role. Even with a praetorian military economically invested in the status quo, civilian control may be established by following gradual, incremental steps. This presents a viable and attainable model for Egypt to follow.

Parallels between Egyptian and Pakistani Militaries

The Egyptian and Pakistani militaries share similarities such as being their respective countries’ most powerful institutions, wielding control over foreign and defense policy, and enjoying a generous share of the national budget. The Pakistani and Egyptian militaries also preside over vast economic empires that operate with little transparency, and are unchecked by civilian leadership. According to Ayesha Siddiqa in her 2007 book *Military Inc.*, the assets and business interests of Pakistan’s military range from breakfast cereal to construction firms. Based on estimates from 2007, the military’s business capital equates to more than 6 percent of GDP. In both Egypt and Pakistan, the affluence of the armed forces stands in sharp contrast to the impoverished general population.

There are also major differences between the roles of the Egyptian and Pakistani military that relate to real or perceived threats to sovereignty. Pakistan has an insecure border. At one time or another, border disputes have marked its relationships with both Afghanistan and India. Thus, the military’s first and foremost priority continues to be defending the country from external threats, with internal stability given less priority. Egypt has not faced substantial threats to its sovereignty after the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1979 following Camp David Accords. Egypt also benefits from a more ethnically and culturally homogenous population and a more secure border than does Pakistan.

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56 The impressive breadth of the Egyptian military’s industrial complex is easily matched by that of the Pakistani military. Assets of both militaries include manufacturing capabilities for flat-screen TVs, automobiles, and sports services, among other things. See Sherine Tadros, “Egypt military’s economic empire,” *Al Jazeera*, 15 February 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/02/2012215195912519142.html.


58 Ibid.

Despite concerns about Islamist influences,\(^{60}\) Egypt’s military remains a staunchly secular institution. By contrast, Pakistan’s armed forces are conservative and religious in orientation.\(^{61}\) For several decades, elements of the Pakistani security establishment, particularly Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have nurtured ties with hardline Islamist organizations,\(^{62}\) including the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist group that claimed responsibility for the brutal attacks in Mumbai, India in 2003.\(^{63}\) Because of demographic factors, this orientation is likely to remain entrenched for the foreseeable future.

**Deriving Lessons from Pakistan**

Even with the differences between the two militaries, Pakistan offers the Egyptian army a template for its bid to maintain influence in a newly democratic environment.\(^{64}\) In a Pew poll released in May 2013, nearly 90 percent of Pakistanis said their country was on the wrong track—yet nearly 80 percent said the military exerts a positive influence on the nation.\(^{65}\) The Pakistani military is the only one in the Muslim world that has retained its privileged position in an increasingly democratic political system.\(^{66}\)

Despite the Pakistani military’s popularity, there is little public appetite for another coup,\(^{67}\) and the army appears to be keenly aware of this sentiment. The institution’s reputation has been damaged in recent years, primarily by revelations of Osama bin Laden’s residence near a military academy in Abbottabad. The army is hesitant to do anything that could further harm its positive, but increasingly fragile, image.\(^{68}\) It is not just the military’s image that has changed, however. Pakistan’s political climate has transformed as well.\(^{69}\)

Democracy in Pakistan has strengthened to the point where coups are no longer easy to justify, much less pull off. In addition to the historic transition from one


\(^{68}\) “Egypt’s Military and the Pakistani Model,” *Stratfor*.

\(^{69}\) Ibid.
democratically elected government to another, Pakistan has passed recent constitutional amendments that limit the power of the presidency and transfer ample resources and responsibilities from the central government (the military’s traditional power source) to provincial and local authorities. This decentralizing action bodes well for democracy in Pakistan, as do the growing strength of the judiciary and independent media.

In comparison, Egypt is still in the early stages of democracy. Unlike Pakistan — where powerful private media and activist courts hold sway — there are few checks on an interventionist military in Egypt. The military views the civilian leadership with suspicion and is not yet convinced by the competence of civilian institutions. In many ways, Egypt today is similar to Pakistan in the 1990s, when the military used what it termed constitutional and legal means to control the system and the Pakistan People’s Party. In 1990, 1993, and 1996, Pakistan’s generals used the judiciary, the presidency and opposition parties to dismiss sitting governments and dissolve the parliament to prevent civilian governments from gaining ground.

If this trend holds true for Egypt, the coming years could see the Egyptian parliament prematurely dismissed more than once. Already, the Egyptian army, faced by a situation in which the civilian institutions were unable to govern, and unrest reached a level where the Muslim Brotherhood-led government could not control the situation, intervened in domestic politics in a manner similar to General Pervez Musharraf in 2007. In such a climate, it becomes necessary to consider what steps may be taken to ensure civilian oversight of the military in Egypt.

As Atasoy suggests, the following recommendations aimed at the society at large can be immensely beneficial in creating more balanced civil–military relations.

The [Egyptian] military views the civilian leadership with suspicion and is not yet convinced by the competence of civilian institutions.

In the present case, these recommendations have been tailored to the particular circumstances prevalent in Egypt today:

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72 “Egypt’s Military and the Pakistani Model,” Stratfor.
73 Ibid.
74 Bremmer, “Is Becoming Pakistan the Best Egypt can Hope for?”
75 Ibid.
76 Atasoy, “The Turkish Example,” 86-100.
1. The constitution must emphasize universal principles of human rights and freedoms, rather than rigid ideological doctrines and the glorification of state or religion. Under the 2013 draft of the constitution, international human rights instruments ratified by Egypt are deemed domestic law (article 93). Article 92 further stipulates that laws defining rights and freedoms cannot limit them, and removes previous limitations on rights to be practiced in line with fundamental values of society. These are constitutional steps in the right direction, but much will depend on how they are implemented.

2. The training and legal framework of the armed forces must emphasize modern standards of civilian oversight. Personality cults lead to authoritarianism. The military as well as political bodies must emphasize institutions and ideals over personalities. Under the 2013 draft of the Egyptian constitution, however, the military has gained even greater autonomy than under the 2012 draft. It is no longer viewed as a branch of the executive, but rather an independent state pillar. Additionally, whereas previously the Minister of Defense, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, was appointed by the President under Article 147, under Article 234 of the new draft, the appointment must be approved by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, thus curtailing civilian oversight.

3. Full freedom of the press is necessary, but it must be accompanied by the institutionalization of professional and ethical standards in the media to prevent the manipulation of society. This institutionalization of standards is particularly urgent, since during the 2013 military coup and ensuing unrest, the media became a front line in the conflict. Persons associated with targeted media outlets were frequently attacked and even barred from government press conferences.

4. The judiciary must never be used as an ideological or political instrument; this inevitably results in a loss of partiality and credibility of the courts. Effective

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78 Ibid.
79 Brown and Dunne, “Egypt’s Draft Constitution.”
measures must be taken to prevent such an outcome, such as a thorough constitutional design.

5. Military and civilian bureaucratic institutions must be purged of anti-democratic elements. Accountability and transparency must be paramount.


Additionally, the following recommendations focus specifically on the establishment of civilian oversight of the military, as well elucidated by El Fegeiry.\textsuperscript{82}

1. Appropriate civilian oversight over the military’s budget must be established. This change must be brought about gradually and incrementally to avoid political confrontations. This process seems to be currently underway in Egypt. Whereas the 1971 constitution made no mention of the military budget, article 197 of the now defunct 2012 constitution created the National Defense Council responsible for the military budget.\textsuperscript{83} The 2013 draft, in article 203 expands upon the civilian members of government to be included in the Council. The Council is to be presided over by the President, and must include the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Minister of Defense. However, the Council is only responsible "for discussing the armed forces’ budget, which is incorporated as a single figure in the state budget."\textsuperscript{84} Thus, whether this new provision leads to actual civilian oversight remains to be seen.

2. The power to declare war must lie in the hands of elected civilian representatives. Under the Egyptian constitution of 1971, the president could declare war with the approval of the parliament. However, current military leaders have opposed handing such powers entirely to civilians. Any future constitutions must establish a workable compromise. Under article 152 of the 2013 draft of the constitution, the President can only declare war after consultation with the National Defense Council, and the approval of the House of Representatives with a two-thirds majority.\textsuperscript{85} Given that the National Defense Council includes the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the Commanders of Navy, Air Forces, and Air Defense, as well as the head of Military Intelligence, it appears that the constitutional provisions in relation to

\textsuperscript{82} El Fegiery, “Crunch Time for Egypt’s Civil Military Relations,” 3-5.


\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 5.
the declaration of war are indeed evolving towards a compromise between civilian and military leaders.

3. Elected senior representatives holding executive positions must be responsible for the appointment and dismissal of senior military leaders. This must take place in a manner that is transparent. As noted above, the 2013 draft constitution takes a step back on the appointment of the Minister of Defense, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Under the 1971 constitution, the Minister of Defense was appointed by the President, under the 2013 draft, such an appointment must be approved by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has the potential to make the civilian oversight involved merely symbolic.86

4. Only in specifically defined cases of emergency should the executive be permitted to order the armed forces to assist in preserving domestic security. The emergency situations in which the president can order the army to deploy domestically must be defined clearly and narrowly in the constitution, and the role of the military in domestic security must be similarly defined to prevent abuse.

Democratizing civil–military relations and institutionalizing civilian oversight of military affairs must be a top priority during Egypt’s ongoing transition to democracy. This will be a hard task: having been entrenched in the political regime for decades, the far-reaching powers and privileges of the military establishment are difficult to dislodge. Any sustainable transition would have to be based on a broad national consensus, inclusive of all political actors, even those that are out of favor with the military establishment. Ensuring a transparent and inclusive constitutional drafting process must stand at the heart of the transition. Ultimately, the success or failure of any transition process will depend on the ability of all political factions in Egypt, both Islamists and liberals, to reunite on the revolutionary front.

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86 Ibid., 3.
Winning Minds:
The Role of Education in Securing Afghanistan

By Elizabeth Royall

Both the Coalition and the Taliban claimed a correlation between Afghan education and their strategic goals. This paper addresses whether Afghan education content and provision affect security. It reviews the history of education in Afghanistan, examines the Taliban’s evolving view of education, and analyzes existing metrics of security and education. Little evidence suggests that education dampens support for insurgency. By making education part of the counterinsurgency strategy, the Coalition inserted itself into a contentious Afghan debate on the role and content of education, and exacerbated conflict.

In the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military incorporated humanitarian aid and development work into its military strategy to defeat the Taliban. “Counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at,” proclaimed Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) and prominent counterinsurgency thinker David Kilcullen. Accordingly, education became one front of Afghanistan’s multidimensional insurgency and counterinsurgency campaign. Both the Coalition and Taliban saw education’s provision and content as a strategic prize to be won in the war for the hearts and minds of Afghans. This paper addresses whether Afghan education content and provision affect security. It reviews the history of education in Afghanistan and American involvement in Afghan education, examines the Taliban’s evolving view of and role in education, and analyzes existing metrics of security and education.

While both the Coalition and the Taliban in Afghanistan claimed a correlation between controlling education and their strategic goals, there is little evidence to support either correlation or causation between education and security. Instead, by linking education to political and military goals, schools became yet another front in the war between the Coalition and the Taliban, leading to violence against schools, teachers, school administrators, and students. Meanwhile, a significant majority of Afghans see development aid as negative, despite the expansion of services. The outcome for Afghanistan and its education system is still unclear and will remain so for years, but analysis of the education and security nexus is required to test assumptions.

1 David Kilcullen quoted in Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent (Boston: MIT Press, 2009), 183.
2 This paper uses Coalition as an umbrella term for the major military and government actors in the conflict, to include NATO’s International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF), U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, the U.S. Embassy, and USAID. If referencing a specific organization, it will so indicate.
driving current and future policy. Assumptions made by governments, academics, humanitarians, and insurgents about the role of education in conflict provide discursive justification for education’s co-option by security actors, particularly in the last decade. Such assumptions include: 1) uneducated or Islamic-educated children are more vulnerable to insurgent propaganda; and, 2) providing education will allow the government, Coalition, and/or Taliban to demonstrate legitimacy and win popular support. This paper will address how those assumptions shaped the Taliban insurgency as well as the Coalition’s counterinsurgency. Finally, it will examine the merits of those assumptions.

Both Coalition and Taliban forces believed the provision and content of education would influence the outcome of the conflict. As both sides became more involved in education, however, the education sector became more contested and violent without demonstrable impact on the conflict. A regression analysis of security and education data in Afghanistan did not show evidence to support a correlation between education and security outcomes that would indicate that Islamic education or a lack of education would pose a security threat. Neither did regression analysis show that increased educational attainment would lead either to a decrease in violence or increased support for counterinsurgents. By disregarding the political implications of education in favor of viewing education as a benign good, this paper finds that the U.S. military securitized education and made education more politically contentious. Rather than becoming a balm to violence, the battle for control and influence over the Afghan school system exacerbated scars from Afghanistan’s fractious history. This paper argues that due to a lack of correlation or positive outcomes, education and security should be decoupled, and that military and civilian policymakers should limit expectations of short-term aid’s efficacy.

The Tumultuous History of Education in Afghanistan

Education is not a neutral activity; it is inherently political and serves an important role in nation building. It is, in fact, a top-down effort to forge a single nation of different communities with a clear idea of and commitment to the state. Starting in the 1920s, education reform in Afghanistan—particularly reforms involving women’s rights,
secular education, and state control over Islamic schools—sparked intense backlash from those who felt their power and way of life was being threatened. After the Communist coup d’état of 1978, public general education schools became one of the mujahedeen’s first military targets. Thousands of teachers and students were killed. The Communist Party hoped to control Afghanistan through various reforms, including compulsory co-ed education. In order to counter the Communist influence, Islamist parties began to use madrassas (private, non-state supported religious schools) for the same purpose of political indoctrination, particularly in Pakistani refugee camps. Both Islamist and Communist militias recruited fighters among students and teachers.

After the fall of the Communist regime in 1992, civil war among mujahedeen factors continued to tear Afghanistan apart. Once again, the education system was not immune from the broader conflict. President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s (1992-1996) government advocated an American-designed, heavily politicized curriculum used during the 1980s in refugee camps. He attempted to bridge the difference between general education and madrassas by increasing religious studies in general education and increasing secular subjects in Islamic education (public religious schools with a set curriculum). But the government used its limited money to pay for war, not schools. Students began bringing weapons to class, an unusual occurrence under the Communists. Soon, teachers had little protection or ability to discipline students. Mujahedeen were selected as head teachers, regardless of their educational background.

By the time the Taliban came to power in 1996, the education system was so decimated that the Taliban did not destroy the education system. Enrollment increased due to improved security. The Taliban altered the general education curriculum so students spent at least half their time studying religious subjects. The Taliban also sponsored private madrassas that introduced some secular subjects to madrassa education. Most notoriously, the Taliban closed girls’ schools in the cities, resulting in an almost two-thirds collapse in girls’ enrollment. However, NGO-provided private, semi-underground education continued in some areas. Following international

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10 Ibid., 11.
11 Ibid., 12.
12 Ibid., 13.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
pressure in 1999, the Taliban reopened some schools for girls in the cities, using the 1980s refugee camp curricula to educate only young girls in segregated classes. The Taliban continued Rabbani’s lack of investment in education (as well as other aspects of government).

Following the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001, the Ministry of Education (MoE) enjoyed a funding flood due to international sympathy and U.S. military involvement. Finally, it could endeavor to bring education to all Afghan children. The prospect of universal education prompted optimism both in Afghanistan and the West, but pockets of resistance to education soon emerged, particularly in regard to curriculum and schooling for girls.15 The government of Afghanistan saw education as a solution to ethnic and regional divisions.16 MoE endeavored to please conservative elements by expanding Islamic education after significant community concern that donors were pushing secular, or even Christian, education on Afghan students.17 MoE commissioned new Islamic education textbooks and placed mullahs on MoE’s payroll to teach religious subjects and early childhood education.18

But the dilemmas of the past soon resurfaced: public education was too poor to build faith in the government’s merit or competence, but sufficiently controversial to rattle conservative elements, particularly the clergy.19 The counterinsurgency strategy to associate schools with the government in order to use education to build support backfired by feeding into the historical narrative of education as an unwelcome government interference and a tool of indoctrination. Increasingly, Afghans rejected or violently attacked the education sector. The Taliban used public opposition to education to discredit public education and build support.

Why Link Education to Security Efforts in Afghanistan?

The story of the U.S. military’s investment in education is a result of the unique mythology of Afghan history, one that blames the creation of the Taliban on radical madrassas. Ultimately, the U.S. military spent $228.6 million in seven years on Afghan education projects with Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding alone, paid Western education advisors to MoE, and developed its own priorities for Afghan education.20 The American military became invested in education for practical and ideological reasons. Likewise, development groups were eager to

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17 Ibid., 86.
19 Ibid., 2.
securitize education in order to gain funding and support for development activities. They pointed to studies of other developing countries that suggested increased levels of high-quality education reduces wars by decreasing the likelihood of males becoming combatants.21 In the security realm, education was part of winning a counterinsurgency by demonstrating the government's ability to provide for its population. Lieutenant General (ret.) Karl Eikenberry argued that “the construction of roads and schools can be just as decisive, if not more, than military operations.”22 The assumption that development and reconstruction assistance is critical to promoting stability in conflict states led to near nine-fold increases in U.S. foreign assistance budgets in Afghanistan, stronger linkages between development and security strategies, and a shift of development activities from aid agencies to the military.23

Military Education Priorities and CERP

While the early years of the Afghan war focused on a limited counterterrorism and reconstruction mission—to include school-building—by 2007 a robust insurgency had entrenched itself in Afghanistan. In 2009, newly-appointed General (ret.) Stanley McChrystal adopted his own version of population-centric counterinsurgency. Education made up one of five subsections in the counterinsurgency’s “enabling socioeconomic development” line of operation (assumption #1).24 Furthermore, the Coalition reasoned, if the government could demonstrate its ability to deliver services to the population, the people would benefit, a social contract would be formed, and the population would oppose the insurgency in favor of the government (assumption #2).25 In concrete terms, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF’s) strategy document noted that military investment in education “has had, and will continue to have, direct and tangible impact through 2014.”26 “Development can help consolidate military gains and support our diplomatic efforts,” concluded a Senate Foreign Relations Majority Report, “to create the conditions for a more stable, democratic

26 “Socioeconomic Development Priorities for Transition,” 2. Development was no longer an activity that occurred as an addendum to military operations, it had become part of the strategy to achieve security. In Algeria, Malaysia, and Vietnam, development projects were rewards to be doled out after the population had submitted to counterinsurgent—development.
government.” Education strategies and priorities would be enacted through a novel military development fund: Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP).

In the shattered countries of Iraq and Afghanistan, the lack of effective development and infrastructure was addressed as a military problem that the military sought to redress. Thus, CERP was designed to fund small projects chosen by a local military commander in order to build goodwill among the local populace while contributing to the overall development of the country. Scholars argued that the lack of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan was a contributing factor to the rapid spread of Taliban influence following 2001. The 2005 Afghan government National Military Strategy noted that if key essential services were “not provided quickly, the people will be more vulnerable to extremist elements claiming to offer a better alternative.” Afghan CERP spending started at just under $40 million in 2004 and it peaked at nearly $550 million in 2009. At the same time, U.S. humanitarian funding in 2010 was just over a third of what it was in when CERP began 2004. CERP funding, meanwhile, increased by 2500 percent during that period, demonstrating how development funding in support of military objectives supplanted traditional humanitarian and development work.

As described by CERP’s guidelines, “Money as a Weapon System,” development spending became a new mechanism to win the war:

CERP is a vehicle to address causes of instability through fostering positive, interdependent relationships between [the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)] and key populations. The program also helps the coalition…create a positive impression of coalition forces and the GIRoA, and help them understand that GIRoA is a better alternative to deliver the government services.

In contrast to practice in earlier counterinsurgencies use of development as a reward to those who had laid down arms, CERP was conceived to convince insurgents to lay down arms. CERP projects were concentrated in unstable, “key terrain” areas that military planners determined were the most important to subdue, and therefore

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29 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 192.
30 See “Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, Implementing Agency, and Sector” at “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants—Afghanistan,” USAID.
had concentrations of military forces with CERP money to spend. The political implications of CERP money and the aftereffects of CERP spending practices were acute but little considered.  

A counterinsurgency strategy to use aid to build up the government is a difficult pitch when many Afghans believe the Taliban more effectively addresses their most important needs—governance and security.

The assumption of education’s importance was not unique to the Coalition. The Taliban’s evolution on education represented their strategic view that provision of Taliban-friendly education was vital to countering the influence of the Afghan state; likewise, the Taliban would demonstrate an ability not only to fight, but to govern. As a result, schools became another contested area between the Coalition and the Taliban.

The Taliban’s Insurgency Doctrine: The *Layeha*

The Taliban’s doctrine and practice evolved as they re-assessed the proper role of education in their insurgency. After U.S. forces drove the Taliban from power, the remaining members regrouped and strategized about how they could defeat the U.S. (and later, ISAF) forces and retake power. At the end of 2006, the Taliban released the *layeha*, or code of conduct, for their fighters and the Afghan population to communicate the Taliban’s values and standards. The 2006 *layeha* began fairly simply, with only 30 rules, echoing much of the philosophy and policies that characterized the Taliban’s time in power, three of which specifically address the education system:

> It is forbidden to work as a teacher under the current puppet regime, because this strengthens the system of the infidels. True Muslims should apply to study with a religiously trained teacher and study in a Mosque or similar institution. Textbooks must come from the period of the Jihad [1980s] or from the Taliban regime. Anyone who works as a teacher for the current puppet regime must receive a warning. If he nevertheless refuses to give up his job, he must be beaten. If the teacher still continues to instruct contrary to the principles of Islam, the district commander or a group leader must kill him…Thus we tolerate none of [NGO’s] activities, whether it be building of streets, bridges, clinics, schools, madrases (schools for Koran study) or other works. If a school fails to heed a warning to close, it must be burned.

The Taliban see the war as not simply between two groups of armed forces, but made up as wedge issues such as education that could separate the people from the state. A March 2006 statement by Taliban Leadership Council spokesman

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34 Thompson, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan,” 2.

35 “Sign and Sight,” *The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan*.

Mohammed Hanif announced, “If schools are turned into centers of violence, the government is to blame for it.” Words quickly turned into action; school attacks increased by 65% in 2006, according to ISAF estimates.

In May 2009, the Taliban released a new layeha, which superseded the 2006 version. The document had many notable changes, particularly regarding education. While the size of the layeha more than doubled to 67 rules, specific mention of teachers and attacking schools was eliminated in favor of pointing to Taliban-run education as the only legitimate education. “The provincial authority is responsible for Mujahidin education and their personal behavior with local people,” commands the layeha. “All education and training should be committed to the education and training that Islamic Emirate has established for the Mujahidin.” Meanwhile, the layeha granted significant freedom to Taliban members to attack, capture, or destroy construction equipment, projects, and personnel. Allowing attacks on unspecified construction and projects was an effective method for the Taliban to square the circle of preventing development work while not explicitly banning it and risk angering the local population.

The most recent version of the layeha was published in May 2010 and moves even more towards the ‘hearts and minds’ aspect of insurgency, explicitly echoing much of the philosophy of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine: “The Taliban must treat civilians according to Islamic norms and morality to win over the hearts and minds of the people.” The longer 2010 document, with 87 rules, moves further away from violence against the school system but alludes to a Taliban commission for education, suggesting a push towards competitive governance and development with the government of Afghanistan:

The educational and training activities within the structure of the Islamic Emirate should be carried out according to the programme and regulations of the Education commission. The persons responsible in the provinces and districts shall conduct their educational efforts in accordance with the strategy of the above-mentioned commission.

37 “Lessons in Terror,” 34.
While the *layeha* echoes the 1990s Taliban’s primary focus on the state’s military and judicial functions, Taliban policy towards education had clearly shifted, at least publicly.\(^{43}\) The Taliban’s use of targeted killings, intimidation, and abductions of government officials, mullahs, tribal leaders, teachers, and politicians effectively separated the population from the Afghan state.\(^ {44}\) The Taliban’s strategy shifted from violence to intimidation. By co-opting service providers, instead of viewing them as “tools of the infidels,” Taliban influence of schools and other services could demonstrate legitimacy and control of the population.\(^ {45}\)

**Taliban Involvement in the Education Sector**

The Taliban believed in the strategic importance of education: that by controlling the education of children and providing a service appreciated by parents, the Taliban could curry favor with the population while making the long term environment more favorable to their cause. Wahid Muzhda, an Afghan analyst who worked with the Taliban during their reign, said that the Taliban targeted schools not out of ideological opposition but because they wanted to deny a venue for the government to propagate anti-Taliban views.\(^ {46}\) An analysis of school attacks by CARE determined that “the single most important reason cited for attacks is the fact that schools are (or are perceived to be) government entities.”\(^ {47}\) Likewise, visits by military personnel to schools, regardless of whether they funded the construction of the school, temporarily increased the risk to the school after their visit.\(^ {48}\) This suggests that associating schools with counterinsurgency objectives such as government presence and legitimacy had the unintended consequence of increasing violence against teachers, students, and schools. However, resistance to education was not exclusive to the Taliban or their supporters as the geographical spread of violence and threats extended beyond areas plagued by insurgency.\(^ {49}\) Violence was perpetrated by people in the communities that were opposed to some aspect of education but were not necessarily aligned with the Taliban. In line with Afghanistan’s history, nation-building through education continued to be largely unsuccessful and controversial, leading to a contestation of the authority of the government outside Kabul and its international supporters.\(^ {50}\)

The Taliban’s varied reasons for opposing specific sources of education in Afghanistan culminated in a two-pronged strategy of hard and soft power techniques. Schools were opened in areas the Taliban controlled, providing a public service to the

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., 28.
\(^{45}\) Ibid., 29–30.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., 35.
\(^{49}\) Giustozzi, “Nation - Building Is Not for All,” 17.
\(^{50}\) “Lessons in Terror,” 4.
local community. However, the method used most was the appointment of friendly officials to ensure schools were teaching Taliban-sympathetic curriculum. This soft power technique attempted to limit the influence of the Afghan government in local villages by manipulating the education system. In January 2007, the Taliban announced that they were opening schools in areas they controlled, initially for boys but later would expand to open girls’ schools. They also claimed to be printing new textbooks worth $1 million that would teach an Islamic curriculum without math or science.\textsuperscript{51}

Meanwhile, the Taliban focused on the softer targets of private schools. A Taliban spokesman said that the aim was to reopen schools to benefit poor children and to counter the propaganda of the West (assumptions #1 and 2).\textsuperscript{52} As the Taliban exerted control of areas, the usual process was to appoint a ‘shadow’ governor, district chiefs, education chief, and media representative, though the extent of control varied depending on the obedience of local commanders and the amount of money collected from ‘taxes’ and criminal enterprises.\textsuperscript{53} Encouraging parents to send their children to private schools while pressuring public schools to use a Taliban-era curriculum enabled the Taliban to limit Afghan government influence on families. Sometimes even public schools were closed down and reopened as private schools, enabling the Taliban to be perceived as pro-education while rejecting the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{54}

As violence against students and schools decreased, MoE found itself in a difficult spot—wanting to take credit for the softening of the Taliban and reopenings of schools, yet unwilling to acknowledge any concessions to the Taliban. Instead MoE credited local “involvement of the elders” for the reopening of schools. This reflected the difficulty of Afghan government officials balancing between three contradictory audiences: Afghan communities, the Taliban, and international military and civilian presence. Beginning in 2010, a dramatic decline in school attacks was mirrored by an increased willingness by both MoE and the Taliban to acknowledge top-level negotiations. “If they want to call schools ‘madrasa’ we will accept that, if they want to say Mullah to a teacher we have no problem with that. Whatever objections they [the Taliban] may have we are ready to talk to them,” a MoE spokesman said.\textsuperscript{55}

Interviews with Attaullah Wahidyar, then in charge of information and curriculum but since promoted to MoE chief of staff, acknowledged meeting weekly with Taliban members and repeatedly emphasized the importance of “back-door

\textsuperscript{52} Giustozzi and Franco, “The Battle for the Schools,” 8.
\textsuperscript{55} National Interim Plan 2011-13, 46.
diplomacy” with the Taliban while saying that reopened schools in Taliban-controlled areas were not the result of deals, but due to community demand.56 While claiming that no curriculum changes were made in support of the Taliban, Wahidyar emphasized that the lack of funding for Islamic education and textbooks would be a major problem for MoE, one that could potentially lead to “an uprising.”57 Over the last two years, MoE prioritized Islamic education over general education, leading MoE to exceed all of its Islamic education targets while failing its general education targets.58 Taliban commanders in the field often openly talked about an agreement between the Taliban leadership and MoE to reopen all schools in exchange for the MoE’s adoption of a new curriculum.59

In January 2011, Education Minister Farooq Wardak asserted in an interview that the Taliban no longer opposed girls’ education, blaming local mullahs for the opposition to education.60 In other discussions with Minister Wardak he blamed “enemies of education” for violence against schools, specifically the Pakistani intelligence service and foreign insurgents.61 Two months later, the Taliban publicly denied attacking schools. A few days after that, MoE announced that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had issued a decree “instructing insurgents not to attack schools and intimidate schoolchildren,” citing an unpublished message from the Taliban military council in Khost. In April, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mojahed said in an interview that the Taliban did not oppose education. According to the Taliban, negotiations with MoE largely favored them by getting the government to pay for something that could produce a recruiting base for them.62 However, such assumptions had little evidence to support them.

Examining the Evidence Regarding Assumptions About Education and Security

In order to produce some clarity in the conflicting facts, opinions, histories, and claims made about the role of education in securing Afghanistan, this study ran a regression analysis of education and security metrics in Afghanistan to determine correlation and assess the merits of assumptions made about education in a security context. Further

56 Attaulah Wahidyar (Director of Publications and Information, Afghan Ministry of Education), in discussion with the author (Elizabeth Royall), 28 January 2012.
57 Wahidyar, interview by Elizabeth Royall.
60 Ibid., 11-12.
61 Farooq Wardak (Afghan Minister of Education), in discussion with the author (Elizabeth Royall), 29 May 2012.
research and additional metrics will be necessary for conclusive findings. The data is grouped by the assumptions laid out in the introduction.

To analyze the relationship between education and security in Afghanistan, this paper examines several indicators. The study uses the following as independent variables: general education attendance, Islamic education attendance, Islamic education attendance as a percentage of general education attendance, and the number of schools. Dependent variables are the number of anti-government/Coalition security incidents (anti-government elements (AGE) incidents) and ISAF casualties. The author ran a single variable regression test to find what correlations exist between education and security indicators and identify areas for further research. The indicators included observations from each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces for the years 2008–2011 (the Ministry of Education does not have comprehensive statistics prior to 2008). Those variables were selected because they were available at a province level during the specified timeframe and are representative of various assumptions made about education in Afghanistan. While a greater number of indicators over a longer period of time, ideally at a district level, would have been ideal, this study was limited to publicly available data during an ongoing war. Statistical significance is set at p < 0.1.

Assumption #1: Uneducated or Islamist-Educated Children Are Vulnerable to Insurgent Recruitment

For this assumption to hold true, the study would expect to find that as the number of primary and secondary schools and attendance in general education schools increased, violence would decrease. This assumption is based on the counterinsurgency theory that as the Afghan government and the Coalition provides for a population’s needs, the population would be less likely to join the insurgency. There are two population segments targeted by education: the children who would be attending school who otherwise may be attracted to militant causes and the adults and teenagers who are out of school but are upset with the state of government services provided to their community. Education practitioners point out that education provides opportunity to poor students; a lack of access to education excludes individuals from most lawful occupations, forcing people to find identification and satisfaction elsewhere. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren argue that most individuals join armed groups due to a lack of alternatives. Countering the argument that a lack of education causes

63 While most statistics about education in Afghanistan cite enrollment numbers, attendance numbers are much more accurate. Enrollment numbers are significantly higher than attendance and are not responsive to external changes. School attendance and totals are taken from the Ministry of Education’s Education Management Information System and covers years 2008 to 2011, http://emis.af/Education%20Preview/index.aspx

militancy, Dr. C. Christine Fair and Dr. Bryan Shepherd find that militants are more educated than their peers.\textsuperscript{65} AGE incidents had a statistically significant but slight correlation with total general education attendance, showing a $p$ value of .076, $r^2$ value of .47, with a .0019 coefficient. In line with current literature, there was no statistically significant correlation ($p$ value of .158) between total general education attendance and ISAF casualties. This suggests that improving education attendance in a province did not affect the violence of the insurgency in that area. The number of schools in a province, however, has a statistically significant positive correlation with the number of AGE incidents, showcasing a $p$ value of .003 and $r^2$ value of .67 with a .089 coefficient. This could be explained in that schools become an additional target or may spark conflict themselves. Alternately, it could reflect that more funding was available to build schools in contested areas.

Likewise, this assumption would suggest that, as the number of children in Islamic education and the relative proportion of Islamic to general education attendance increased, violence would increase in tandem. In Afghanistan, MoE administers a public Islamic education system parallel to the general education system. These follow a MoE curriculum (different from the general education curriculum) and do not include private madrassas. There is no available data on private schools. Since parents have the option to enroll their child in Islamic verses general education schools, the number of students attending Islamic education and the percentage of Islamic education attendance to general education attendance is the closest approximation available of education’s religiosity that can be analyzed to determine correlation to security metrics. Examining the narrower field of whether Islamic education produces a security threat had similar results to other studies of madrassas’ effect on militancy.\textsuperscript{66} Islamic education school and attendance increases outpaced general education growth, reflecting MoE’s prioritization of Islamic education during this timeframe, as MoE can choose how much to invest in general verses Islamic schools. The percentage of students in Islamic education varied widely across provinces, from 0.12\% in Daikundi to 11.89\% in Pansjhir. In order to determine correlation between religious education and security outcomes, this research used religious education (the number of students attending Islamic education and the percentage of Islamic education attendance to general education attendance) in a province as the independent variable and two security indicators as dependent variables: the number of ISAF casualties and the number of AGE incidents recorded.\textsuperscript{67} With $p$ values of .669 and .419, there is no


statistically significant correlation between the number of students attending Islamic education and ISAF casualties or AGE attacks. Likewise, with \( p \) values of .733 and .757, there is no statistically significant correlation between ISAF casualties or AGE attacks and the percentage of students in Islamic education. This suggests that growing religiosity of education will not affect the strength of the insurgency.

**Assumption #2: Providing Education Will Allow the Government, Coalition, and/or Taliban to Demonstrate Legitimacy and Win Popular Support**

For this assumption to hold true, per CERP guidelines, the study would expect that as CERP education spending and/or total CERP spending increased, Afghans would reap the benefits of development provided by the Coalition and government, and would increase their support to the Afghan government and Coalition. Likewise, levels of violence would be expected to decline as CERP spending increased. Education CERP spending averaged 11% annually as a percentage of total spending (compared to 9% in Iraq\(^68\)).

In order to determine correlation between CERP education spending and security outcomes, this study used national CERP metrics (total CERP spending, total education CERP spending, the percent of education spending of CERP funding) as independent variables. Three security indicators were used as dependent variables: the number of U.S. military personnel wounded in action and AGE attacks with civilian casualties or attacks against Afghan military and police forces. While a greater variety of security indicators would have been ideal, there is little publicly available data on security in Afghanistan that goes the full length of the CERP program (2004-2012). This analysis shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between CERP spending (education, education percentage of total CERP spending, or total spending) and U.S. casualties or AGE incidents. See full regression results in the appendix.

The lack of evidence to support the above assumptions within counterinsurgency suggests that education has a limited effect, if any, on political violence. In his study, Ethan Bueno de Mesquito writes, “Any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak.”\(^69\) Counterinsurgency scholar John Nagl, a proponent of education’s role in the global ‘war of ideas,’ concedes that education is an enabler to governance and economic development, not an end in itself.\(^70\) Even in areas of Afghanistan with little insurgent presence, there was no statistically significant correlation between security and


\(^{70}\) John Nagl (Minerva Chair at the U.S. Naval Academy), in discussion with the author (Elizabeth Royall), 4 March 2013.
education. This suggests that a functioning education system is not one of the many factors necessary for a successful counterinsurgency.

**Was Development Strategy in Afghanistan Flawed in Theory or Practice?**

“Something I worry about increasingly as time goes on is the sense that the development strategies in Iraq and now Afghanistan have failed,” said retired General John Allen, a former ISAF commander. “The development dimension of what we have attempted to undertake was either the wrong approach or was just flawed from the beginning...and I think that really deserves some rigorous testing.”

Afghanistan witnessed well-intentioned efforts and strategies without a clear understanding of their effect and utility; as the military withdraws and identifies lessons learned from Afghanistan, researchers should also assess assumptions and policies with rigorous qualitative and quantitative testing.

One misunderstanding of the war and counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan was the assumption that providing education was important to popular satisfaction with the government. Studies and surveys have shown that the most important factors to the Afghan people are security and fair governance. In contrast, ISAF resources prioritized development over governance; building roads and schools and health clinics rather than an effective civil service and justice system. A counterinsurgency strategy that uses aid to build up the government is a difficult pitch when many believe the Taliban provides sufficient or even better services to their most important needs. A significant majority of Afghans see development aid as negative despite the expansion of services due to corruption and poor execution of development. Assumptions that aid projects create positive perceptions of aid providers or the host nation government may not be valid in Afghanistan. “We must strive to uncover the true drivers of instability in a region,” testified USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah in 2011. “What we’ve found is that it is generally not the case that a lack of schools or roads drives conflict. Often the situation is far subtler, having to do with local power dynamics.”

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74 Buonocore, “Aid as a Weapon.”


In Afghanistan, the Coalition focused on the wrong drivers of conflict—on the lack of development and government presence rather than poor governance.  

Finally, another miscalculation was the confusion between tactical and strategic gains. This strategic confusion was particularly apparent in military-funded education aid. Edwina Thompson concluded in a conference report on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan:

Reconstruction and development projects are having development benefits, but we do not know whether they are addressing the major drivers of conflict/insurgency. Small-scale aid projects can certainly help to facilitate and legitimise interactions between external actors and local communities...The important caveat, however, is that the benefits are very local and tactical; therefore the relationships are transactional in nature, and the work is not winning populations over to GIRoA.  

While military-funded education aid helped to produce dramatic improvement in educational attainment, it did not translate into strategic gains against the Taliban insurgency. The lessons learned from military provision of education warn against assumptions regarding the impact of education in conflict countries. Education and literacy are tools that can be used to ease or cause conflict, and as such, education does not inherently contribute to military or government gains. The efforts of MoE and ISAF to use education for nation-building and counterinsurgency activities produced backlash while not achieving strategic goals. Afghanistan analyst Antonio Giustozzi concludes:

State promotion of secular education did have an impact in the villages, creating in some areas new demand for educational services and therefore forever changing the status quo in many villages. However, the present mix of half pursued agendas seems to offer the worst possible world: it creates opposition, but lacks the strength necessary to achieve positive results and mobilise that section of the population that still sees state education as an asset.  

Despite popular consensus, little evidence—presented in this paper or elsewhere—suggests that education or other development activities dampens support for political violence. While education and aid may serve important humanitarian and long-term development interests, it does not create peace in the near term. By

79 Ibid., 13.
80 Giustozzi, “Nation-Building Is Not for All,” 2.
making education part of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the United States inserted itself into a highly-contentious internal Afghan debate on the role and content of education and further exacerbated conflict over education. Education’s impact on security is ambiguous and mixed at best.

**Policy Recommendations**

*Decouple Education from Security Objectives.* The U.S. military should extract itself from education in Afghanistan and future counterinsurgencies until it can demonstrate education can contribute positively to a counterinsurgency campaign. Without evidence that education aid translates into security objectives and counterinsurgency gains, military aid to education will raise expectations of results from both military commanders and local citizens while outcomes are often far from what is expected. Military and foreign intervention in education politicizes education and places it at risk for greater violence. This is not to say that the U.S. and foreign donors should not provide humanitarian aid to the education sector, but the military and policymakers should not make military strategy based on predictions of the effect of that aid.

*Limit Expectations of Short-Term Aid’s Long-Term Consequences.* The conscription of education into counterinsurgency limited the efficacy of education efforts GIRoA capacity by pursuing development strategies that are not aligned with GIRoA’s development strategy and priorities. Afghanistan does not discredit education aid; it discredits using education to accomplish military goals. The outcome for Afghanistan and its education system is still unclear and will remain so for years. To repeat General (ret.) David Petraeus’ unanswerable question, “tell me how this ends.”

“Every age has its follies; perhaps the folly of our age could be identified as an unmatched ambition to change the world, without even bothering to study it in detail and understand it first,” opined Giustozzi. “What is surprising in the attitude of contemporary policy makers is the readiness to enter countries and set out to transform every remote corner of the world.” While Afghanistan’s history of controversy over education and the poor execution of inconsistent strategies in Afghanistan exacerbated the issue, this study demonstrated that provision of education does not necessarily contribute to the defeat of an insurgency. This flawed thinking led the United States to insert itself in an internal Afghan debate about the value, content, and provision of education with little beyond unrealized expectations to show for it.

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Appendix to “Winning Minds”: Data Tables

Variables with Statistically Significant Correlations
Statistical Significance is set at p < 0.1.

| Independent Variable | Dependent Variable | No. of Obs. | R²   | Adj. R² | Coef. | P>|t| |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------------|------|---------|-------|------|
| No. of Schools       | AGE incidents      | 136         | .67  | .65     | .089  | .003 |
| AGE incidents        | Gen. Ed. attendance| 136         | .47  | .44     | .0019 | .076 |
| AGE incidents        | No. of Schools     | 136         | .47  | .44     | .7717 | .003 |

Variables Without Statistically Significant Correlations

| Independent Variable | Dependent Variable | No. of Obs. | R²   | Adj. R² | Coef. | P>|t| |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------------|------|---------|-------|------|
| Islamic Ed. Attendance| ISAF casualties   | 136         | .48  | .46     | -4.585| .669 |
| Islamic Ed. Attendance| AGE incidents    | 136         | .48  | .46     | -.7886| .419 |
| Islamic Ed. Per.     | ISAF casualties    | 136         | .12  | .08     | -.0025| .733 |
| Islamic Ed. Per.     | AGE incidents      | 136         | .12  | .08     | -.0021| .757 |
| No. of Schools       | ISAF casualties    | 136         | .67  | .65     | -.239 | .468 |
| ISAF casualties      | Gen. Ed. attendance| 136         | .41  | .37     | -.0001| .158 |
| ISAF casualties      | Islamic Ed. Per.   | 136         | .41  | .37     | -.0637| .967 |
| ISAF casualties      | Islamic Ed. No.    | 136         | .41  | .37     | -.0003| .795 |
| ISAF casualties      | No. of Schools     | 136         | .41  | .37     | -.0172| .468 |
| AGE incidents        | Islamic Ed. Per.   | 136         | .47  | .44     | 7.047 | .680 |
| AGE incidents        | Islamic Ed. No.    | 136         | .47  | .44     | -.0099| .395 |
| U.S. WIA             | Edu per. CERP      | 8           | .57  | .49     | -52.1 | .941 |
| U.S. WIA             | CERP               | 8           | .57  | .49     | .00001| .386 |
| U.S. WIA             | Edu CERP           | 8           | .57  | .49     | -.0004| .500 |